

# The Rise of Moscow's Power

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## Introductory Statement

The manuscript of this book was left unfinished, owing to the author's death on Dec. 8th, 1979.

He entrusted me with the editioning. According to his will, the study has been translated and published as he left it, without any addition by another pen.

The unfinished Xth chapter, in the intention of the author was to be the last. He died about 30 minutes after having written the last sentence. The summing-up and the general revision are—of course—missing.

Essentially the book is the third part of a trilogy—though each of the three volumes are entirely independent studies: *The Origin of Russia* (1954), *The Making of the Russian Nation* (1963), *the Rise of Moscow's Power*. All three taken together present the History of Russia from the very beginnings to the end of the XIVth century.

My warm thanks go to Mr. P. S. Falla, for his excellent translation and also to Dr. A. Folkierski, for his painstaking, friendly assistance, to Miss D. Jurkiewicz for her constant help and to Mr. L. Olech for his assiduous collaboration in proofreading and compiling the indices.

Karolina Lanckorońska

# I

## Introduction to the Early History of Eastern Europe

## The land and the people

The East European plain is divided into a number of geographical zones.<sup>1</sup> The area between the Upper Volga and the Oka lies in a mixed forest belt of conifers and deciduous trees.

The Soviet Union is today one of the most densely forested countries in the world.<sup>2</sup> In 1914 forests covered about 33% of the territory of European Russia;<sup>3</sup> in the 1860s the figure was about 40%.<sup>4</sup> Then as now, the most extensive forests were in the north and north-east<sup>5</sup> (over 60% of the area),<sup>6</sup> and the least extensive in the steppe or semi-steppe regions of the south (about 8%).<sup>7</sup>

In the past, Russia's wealth of forests was far greater even than it is today.<sup>8</sup> 'As late as the seventeenth century,' wrote the Russian historian Klyuchevsky, 'to a West European travelling to Moscow via Smolensk, Muscovite Russia presented the appearance of a single uninterrupted forest, in which towns and villages were no more than small clearings.'<sup>9</sup>

The vastness and inaccessibility of the forest areas made living conditions extremely difficult. Penetrating the virgin forests required enormous effort, as the dark, gloomy vegetation obstinately resisted every inch of the human invader's progress. Moreover, the area was full of bogs and marshes and infested by reptiles, insects and wild beasts, increasing the dangers that awaited human beings at every step.

As contemporary sources indicate, forests and swamps were the most characteristic features of the country,<sup>10</sup> and to a large extent this is still the case today. Russia is the marshiest country in the world,<sup>11</sup> the total area of swamps and marshes being over 2 million square kilometres or 9.5% of the whole territory (12% of European Russia).<sup>12</sup> The distribution of marshland on the East European plain is uneven,<sup>13</sup> but large marshy areas are found not only in the northern tundra but in both the forest belts—

the coniferous (taiga) and the mixed coniferous-deciduous. The taiga is among the marshiest parts of Russia, but marshes are also frequent further south, e.g. on the Upper Volga and the Oka.<sup>14</sup>

These vast, inaccessible territories were traversed by rivers.<sup>15</sup> Unlike many Western rivers, those of Eastern Europe flow slowly and smoothly, owing in the main to the flatness of the country. Especially in the forest areas they follow a meandering course, which increases their length and the extent of their basins.<sup>16</sup> The Volga, for instance, is more than twice as long as a straight line drawn from its source to its mouth.

Except for the southern steppes, Eastern Europe is covered by a densely interconnected network of rivers, frequently flowing in different directions and almost merging together on account of the closeness of their sources<sup>17</sup> and their innumerable tributaries and sub-tributaries. Boats could be carried or dragged across the short distances between them, and these portages (*voloki*), like primitive canals, made navigation possible over an enormous area.<sup>18</sup>

As in former times rivers were the chief arteries of communication, the settlement of the Volga-Oka and other regions largely followed the course of the waterways.<sup>19</sup> This is confirmed by archaeological data. New investigations and local finds may no doubt affect our present views in detail, but there is already a plentiful store of evidence on which to base conclusions regarding the settlement of the Volga-Oka area from the ninth to the thirteenth century.

The first feature that leaps to the eye is the number of blank spaces on the archaeological maps of the period.<sup>20</sup> These are not so much due to neglect by archaeologists as to the fact that the areas in question, being entirely marshy or covered by dense forests, were almost uninhabited and played scarcely any part in the human economy—a state of affairs that continued for many centuries.<sup>21</sup>

Archaeological maps show that the population of the Upper Volga area was not only sparse but very uneven. Settlements of no more than two or three huts<sup>22</sup> were scattered along the banks of rivers and lakes,<sup>23</sup> as a rule in some sectors only, while the great forest tracts in between were almost empty of human habitation. This was so not only in the ninth and tenth centuries but for a long while later; time, of course, brought changes, but

did not modify the essential picture. As Klyuchevsky wrote: 'If we could have looked down from above on central Russia [i.e. the then Muscovite state] in the fifteenth century for instance, it would have looked like a canvas embroidered in curious patterns, with thin strips of habitation along the watercourses and large dark spaces in between.'<sup>24</sup> In the same way Maksimov observes that the tendency for settlement to concentrate on river-banks in the region in question continued for a very long time, and only began to diminish in the sixteenth century.<sup>25</sup>

The character of the terrain and the pattern of settlement throw light on the nature of human occupations. It is generally accepted that the basic activity of the inhabitants of the Volga-Oka region at that time was agriculture.<sup>26</sup> This is indirectly confirmed by archaeological finds of implements and by the evidence of chronicles. Some areas were less forested and more fertile, forming oases in the wilderness of forest and swamp, and attracting settlers especially in the neighbourhood of rivers and lakes.<sup>27</sup>

Many authors maintain that river valleys were favourable to the development of agriculture. This is true, but only to a certain extent. The banks of rivers and lakes, whether more or less wooded, were generally marshy because of flood-waters, and were more suitable for pasture than cultivation. There was of course drier ground here and there which attracted tillers of the soil, but there is no reason to think that it covered a large area.<sup>28</sup> For many reasons cultivation was a difficult matter: apart from the severity of the climate,<sup>29</sup> the soil was clayey and sandy, with a low humus content,<sup>30</sup> and the primitive methods of the time<sup>31</sup> required enormous effort for very poor results.<sup>32</sup>

The fact that settlement concentrated on the wooded banks of rivers and lakes was also due to a desire to exploit the natural wealth of forests and waters. Settlers did not avoid forest areas provided they were not too far from rivers. Bearing in mind the nature of the country and the difficulty of scraping a living from agriculture, it is very likely that fishing played an important part; this in turn is confirmed by archaeological finds of fishing gear and fishes' bones and scales. These show that some of the fish were of enormous size. The Volga abounded in fish, and especially fine ones were caught in the Oka around Murom and in the Sheksna, a left-bank tributary of the Volga. Other sources of many kinds of fish were the Klyaz'ma, the Nerl', Lake Pereyaslavl',

Lake Beloe and others.<sup>33</sup> There was always a strong demand for fish, a food rich in albumen, both in pre-Christian times and later, when it was a staple diet during the many strict and lengthy religious fasts.

The number of variety of wild animals naturally led to the development of hunting.<sup>34</sup> From larger animals such as the autochs, bear, elk, stag and wild boar to smaller creatures such as the beaver, sable, ermine, otter, fox, marten and squirrel, or wild fowl such as the wood-grouse, black-cock and hazel-hen<sup>35</sup>—all these yielded a rich booty to the huntsman, not only of food but of skins and furs, for which the forest areas of Eastern Europe were famous then and later. Hides and pelts supplied the population's urgent need for clothing, footwear and objects of daily use. Furs and honey were a means of paying tribute to conquering peoples, and furs were also a staple of the region's international trade.

Archaeological finds from the ninth to the thirteenth century include a huge number of bones of domestic and farm animals, especially horses and pigs but also cows, sheep, poultry, ducks and geese. These served as draught animals and provided meat, milk, eggs, dairy products, hides, wool and so on. From the point of view of breeding domestic animals the forest was of great importance, especially deciduous trees with thick undergrowth which provided fodder for a great part of the year. Even in winter, when hay was lacking, dried leaves and the bark of some trees was useful for this purpose.<sup>36</sup>

Among the resources of the forest were honey and wax, produced in the first instance by innumerable swarms of wild bees which made honey not in hives but in the hollows of old trees. In later times we often hear of the abundance of honey to be found in forest thickets, but our oldest information about bee-keeping goes back only to the thirteenth and fourteenth century.<sup>37</sup>

In addition the forest provided nuts, berries, mushrooms and various herbs, as well as timber for building huts, fences, stockades, bridges, boats and carts; wood also served as fuel and for making various implements of daily use. While more recent authors place the main emphasis on agriculture, older historians such as Klyuchevsky, Milyukov, Rozhkov and others believed that the population of those days lived chiefly from hunting and fishing.

In my opinion the problem should not be considered in too abstract a fashion. Life was extremely hard, and people had to resort to many means of survival. Everything depended on the local conditions with which they had to contend, but no single occupation was sufficient to maintain life. Thus, I suggest, one can scarcely think in terms of agriculture prevailing over hunting and fishing or vice versa, but should rather consider them all on an equal footing. No doubt their relative importance varied at different places and times, but our source material is too scanty to admit of a more precise judgment, and attempts to do so are bound to remain hypothetical.

### Notes to Chapter 1

1. See Appendix 1, Geographical Zones of the East European Plain.
2. M. Tsvetkov states in *Lesnye karty i metodika ikh sostavleniya*, 1950, p. 107, that Russian forests extend over a huge area measuring nearly 10,000 km from west to east and nearly 5,000 km from north to south.
3. M. Tsvetkov, *Lesnistost' gubernii Evropeiskoi chasti Rossii so vremeni general'nogo mezhevaniya po 1914 g.*, TILV 1950, p. 190. See also N. Kuznetsov, *Raspredelenie lesov v Evropeiskoi Rossii*, n.d. (after 1917), p. 3; id., *Obrashchenie lesnykh ploshchadei v zemel'nyi fond*, 1920, p. 5.
4. V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, part I, in his *Sochineniya v vos'mi tomakh* I, 1956, p. 55.
5. G. Tanfil'ev, *Predely lesov na severe Rossii*, 1911 (unavailable to me); id., *Glavneishie cherty rastitel'nosti Rossii. Lesa severnoi Rossii i Sibiri*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, 1953, pp. 526–52.
6. G. Tanfil'ev, *Fiziko-geograficheskie oblasti Evropeiskoi Rossii*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty* 1953, p. 507, shows the degree of afforestation in the northern parts of European Russia towards the end of the nineteenth century (1893): 86% of the area of Vologda province, 71% of Perm, 63% of Olonets, 60% of Kostroma etc. Cf. F. Arnold, *Russlands Wald*, 1893, pp. 17–62; A. Voeikov, *Voprosy zaseleniya Severa i razvitiya ego khozyaistva*, in his *Vozdeistvie cheloveka na prirodu*, 1949, pp. 187–9.
7. M. Tsvetkov, *Lesnistost'*, p. 191; N. Kuznetsov, *Raspredelenie*, pp. 4–5.
8. L. Maikov, *Zametki po geografii drevnei Rusi*, ZMNP, CDXXIV, 1874, p. 263.
9. V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs* I, p. 66. A. Maksimov expresses a similar view in: *Istoriya razvitiya sel'skokhozyaistvennogo landshafta v lesnoi zone Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR*, OPZD, 1962, p. 103: 'Historical sources

indicate that in quite recent times the whole central and northern forest belt of the European part of the U.S.S.R. was covered with continuous, almost endless virgin forest in which there were no roads or paths.'

10. For a retrospective map of forest and marsh areas in north-eastern Europe at the period in question see A. Potulov in *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956.

11. K. Ivanov, *Osnovy gidrologii bolot lesnoi zony i raschety vodnogo rezhima bolotnykh massivov*, 1957, p. 3.

12. L. Davydov, *Gidrografiya SSSR (Vody Sushy). I. Obshchaya kharakteristika vod*, 1953, p. 179.

13. Cf. V. Kupriyanov, *Obzornaya karta bolot SSSR, TGGI*, IV (58), 1948. There is an extensive literature on the origin and history of these bogs and marshes, their classification, draining etc. Cf. G. Tanfil'ev, *Bolota i torfyaniki*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, 1953, pp. 55-76; V. Sukachev, *Bolota, ikh obrazovanie, razvitie i svoistva*, 3rd edn, 1926; V. Dokturovsky, *Torfyanye bolota. Proiskhozhdenie, priroda i osobennosti bolot SSSR*, 1935; N. Kats, *Bolota i torfyaniki*, 1941; id., *Tipy bolot SSSR i Zapadnoi Evropy i ikh geograficheskoe rasprostranenie*, 1948; V. Romanov, *Bolota i ikh svoistva*, 1953, and others.

14. G. Tanfil'ev, *Glavneishie cherty rastitel'nosti Rossii*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, p. 544; L. Davydov, *Gidrografiya*, p. 180.

15. N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii. Geografiya Nacheal'noi (Nesterovoi) letopisi*, 2nd edn. 1885, pp. 19-20; L. Maikov, *Zametki*, pp. 255-6. V. Ioganson, in: *Obshchaya gidrologicheskaya kharakteristika SSSR*, in: *Ocherki po gidrografii rek SSSR*, 1953, p. 32, and others, believe that in early times the water level was higher and the river-beds wider and deeper than today, on account of the diminution of the forest area. There are, however, differing views on this. Cf. L. Berg, *Klimat i zhizn'*, pp. 24, 28-31, 36-9 etc.

16. V. Aref'eva, V. Ioganson and A. Kemmerich, *Russkaya ravnina*, in *Ocherki po gidrologii rek SSSR*, 1953; L. Davydov, *Gidrografiya*.

17. From this point of view special importance attaches to the region in which three great rivers have their source: the Volga, Dnepr and Western Dvina, linking the Caspian and Black Sea with the Baltic. This region was also connected with the Baltic by way of the Lovat', Lake Ilmen', the Volkhov, Lake Ladoga and the Neva.

18. N. Barsov, *Ocherki*, pp. 218-21; N. Voronin, *Sredstva i puti soobshcheniya*, in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi I*, 1951, pp. 302-3.

19. The location of settlements was also, of course, dictated by the fact that man cannot live without water. Cf. A. Voeikov, *Chelovek i voda*, in his *Vozdeistvie cheloveka na prirodu*, 1949, p. 127.

20. The two most important archaeological studies, with maps, are: A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhrner, *Poseleniya drevnei Rusi*, *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956, and E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurechiya*, *MIA*, XCIV, 1961.



21. A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya*, p. 15.
22. V. Klyuchevsky, *Sochineniya* I, p. 309; P. Tretyakov, *Sel'skoe khozyaistvo i promysly*, in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi* I, 1951, p. 51; A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, op. cit., p. 18.
23. Observations based on archaeological material agree with the earliest written sources, which usually describe in terms of rivers and lakes the areas inhabited by Slav and non-Slav peoples of Eastern Europe.
24. V. Klyuchevsky, op. cit., p. 69.
25. A. Maksimov, *Istoriya razvitiya sel'skokhozyaistvennogo landshafta v evropeiskoi chasti SSSR*, OPZD, VII, 1962, p. 109.
26. M. Fekhner, *Derevnya severo-zapadnoi i severo-vostochnoi Rusi X-XIII vv.*, TGIM, XXXXIII, 1967, pp. 275-80.
27. Thus in the region of Uglich (*Ugleche pole*) settlement extended along the Volga; in the Pereyasavl'-Suzdal'-Vladimir region, chiefly along the Nerl', a left-bank tributary of the Klyaz'ma, etc.
28. Cf. V. Klyuchevsky, op. cit., I, p. 309; A. Maksimov, op. cit., pp. 105-7.
29. At all times, and especially at this period, climate had a major effect on agriculture. The chronicles constantly refer to cold summers, unexpected frosts etc., resulting in bad harvests and famine, and to epidemics and outbreaks of cattle-plague. Abundant source material on Eastern Europe, including the region of the Oka and Upper Volga, is collected in: I. Buchinsky, *O klimate proshlogo russkoi ravniny*, 1957. See also M. Bogolepov, *Kolebaniya klimata i istoricheskaya zhizn'*, COID, CCXXXIX, 1911, pp. 1-22.
30. V. Klyuchevsky, op. cit., pp. 308-10; id., *Skazaniya inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve*, 1918, pp. 178-181; P. Tretyakov, op. cit., p. 51, and others. D. Vilensky, *Istoriya pochvovedeniya v Rossii*, 1958, contains a wealth of material on the soils of Eastern Europe.
31. In order to cultivate the soil in wooded country it was necessary first to choose an area with a large proportion of undergrowth, where the trees were mainly deciduous and their trunks not too big; the trees were then cut down and the area cleared of stumps and undergrowth, which was allowed to dry out and then burnt. The virgin soil (*novina*) was then suitable for tillage, but only for a short time. In the first year the harvest was fairly good, as the fire had destroyed the weeds and the ash was a good fertilizer. But even by the second year the crop was much less plentiful, as the soil was exhausted, and after three or four years the process had to be repeated elsewhere. The old clearings could not be re-used until after a fresh growth of trees, which took between 30 and 60 years. This scorched-ground system of agriculture (*podsechnaya, ognevaya sistema zemledeliya*) was in general use in the north-east up to the ninth or tenth century A.D. and involved the cultivation of a large

number of scattered forest areas. Cf. P. Tret'yakov, *Podsechnoye zemledelie v Vostochnoi Evrope*, IGAIMK, XIV (1), 1932. As time went on and techniques improved, the forest clearings were ploughed with a wooden plough (*sokha*), which to some extent increased their yield. Arable land (*pashnya*) was generally cultivated for three or four years and then left fallow (*perelog*) for over ten years: cf. P. Tret'yakov, *Sel'skoe khozyaistvo*, pp. 56-63; V. Levasheva, *Sel'skoe khozyaistvo*, TGIM, XXXII, 1956, pp. 20-3, and others. In practice both systems were used in the north-east at the period we are concerned with, the preference generally being dictated by local conditions or tribal custom.

32. S. Strumilin, *K istorii zemledel'cheskogo truda v Rossii*, VE, 1949(2), pp. 44-62; P. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, I, 1956, p. 129.

33. The historical sources make frequent mention of fisheries but, until the fifteenth century or thereabouts, seldom indicate the species of fish. However, from archaeological evidence (analysis of fish-bones) it appears that the waters in question were inhabited by pike, perch, sheatfish, carp, perch-pike, crucian, tench etc. Some species known to us from later sources are today extinct or known by other names. In general, however, the many varieties of species were much the same as at the present day: see L. Sabaneev, *Ryby Rossii*, 3rd edn, 1911, and L. Berg, *Izbrannye trudy*, especially vols. IV, 1961, and V, 1962. Berg's works on the subject are listed in: *Sistematicheskii spisok rabot akad. L. Berga, Pamyati akad. L. Berga. Sbornik rabot po geografii i biologii*, 1955.

34. Animal bones occur with great frequency in archaeological finds. The great majority are bones of domestic animals, which has led archaeologists (Artsikhovsky, Tret'yakov and others) to suppose that hunting played a less important part than livestock-raising. This view, however, which is contrary to general probability (vast forest areas with plenty of game) and to the accounts in historical sources, was rightly questioned by E. Goryunova in: 'K voprosu ob "osteologicheskoi statistike"', *KSDPI*, XXXV, 1950, pp. 60-5. Huntsmen generally skinned animals on the spot and brought home only edible carcasses, so that the number of bones of wild creatures found in settlements is not a true indication of the prevalence or otherwise of hunting: cf. V. Mal'm, *Promysly drevnerusskoi derevni*, TGIM, XXXII, 1956, p. 107. The importance of hunting is also emphasized by V. Tsalkin, *Materialy dlya istorii skotovodstva i okhoty v drevnei Rusi po dannym izucheniya kostnykh ostatkov iz raskopok arkheologicheskikh pamyatnikov lesnoi polosy Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR*, MIA, LI, 1956, p. 137; id., *Zhivotnovodstvo i okhota v lesnoi polose Vostochnoi Evropy v rannem zheleznom veke*, MIA, CVII, 1962, p. 73. An earlier work which is still important for the amount of source material it contains is N. Aristov, *Promyshlennost' drevnei Rusi*, 1866, pp. 2-20.

35. S. Kirikov, in: *Izmeneniya zhivotnogo mira v prirodnykh zonakh SSSR (XIII-XIX vv.)*. *Lesnaya zona i lesotundra*, 1960, discusses the animal population at the period we are concerned with and the changes in later centuries. See also E. Grimm, *Okhotnich'i, pushnye i rybnye promysly, Proizvoditel'nye sily Rossii*, Otd. V, 1896; N. Kutepov, *Velikoknyazheskaya i tsarskaya okhota na Rusi s X po XVI v.* I, 1896; S. Ognev, *Zveri SSSR i privileyushchikh stran* I-VII, 1928-50; M. Kuznetsov and S. Ognev, *Pushnye bogatstva SSSR*, 1949; *Fauna SSSR*, 1962, and others.

36. N. Aristov, op. cit., pp. 40-8; N. Voronin, *Pishcha i utvar'*, in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi* I, 1951, pp. 265-8; P. Tret'yakov, *ibid.*, pp. 54-5; V. Levasheva, op. cit., pp. 76-93.

37. N. Aristov, op. cit., pp. 31-40; V. Perevalov, *Nekotorye dannye ob ispol'zovanii lesa v istoricheskom proshlom*, *TIL*, V, 1950, pp. 145-9; N. Voronin, op. cit., pp. 269-70; V. Mal'm, op. cit., pp. 129-38.

## The Ancient Rus'

The earliest history of Eastern Europe of a more than tribal character is connected with the people known collectively as Rus'.<sup>1</sup> The basic source for the investigation of that history is the famous *Povest' vremennykh let* (Tale of Bygone Years), a chronicle written in about 1113 in the Crypt Monastery at Kiev.<sup>2</sup> The abundant material contained in the *Povest'*—geographical, ethnic, political etc.—calls for consideration under the dual aspect of time and space. The chronicler described not only events of his own day (the second half of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth century) but also those of the past. He drew his information from other written sources, most of which have disappeared, as well as from oral tradition, which was very important in those days.

The scope of the *Povest'* covered an enormous area, nearly the whole of Eastern Europe, with varying degrees of thoroughness according to the amount of material at the writer's disposal. He showed most interest in the Slav tribes, especially the Polyanians, who inhabited the region of the Middle Dnepr with their capital at Kiev; but he also devoted a surprising amount of space and attention to another people, the Rus'.

The Rus' first appear in the sources in the ninth century, when they are represented as a powerful though previously unknown<sup>3</sup> people who had conquered many tribes of Eastern Europe. As was usual in those times, the conquered peoples, such as the Slavs on the Danube,<sup>4</sup> came to be known by the names of their conquerors, e.g. Bulgars or Hungarians.<sup>5</sup> The term 'Rus'ian land' (*ruskaya zemlya*) originally designated the lands conquered and governed by the Rus'. As they consolidated their position in Eastern Europe and conditions became more stable (albeit as the result of force), the 'Rus'ian land' increasingly became a political concept.<sup>6</sup>

The original Rus' did not speak a Slav language.<sup>7</sup> Those who lived in Slav lands, learnt the language of the natives in order to communicate with them on matters of primary necessity; this does not exclude the possibility that they could also speak Rus'ian among themselves.

The language of the Rus' shows them to have been an alien element among the eastern Slavs. The chronicler speaks of the Slav tribes taking the name of Rus': 'they began thus to name themselves', 'they were named Rus'', 'those who are now called Rus'' etc. (*nacha sya prozyvati, prozvashasya rus'yu, nyne zovomaya Rus*).<sup>8</sup> These expressions make it clear that the name of Rus' was something new to the eastern Slavs (and the non-Slavs of the area), unconnected with their past or traditions. In the same way, Arab writers of the period clearly distinguish between Rus' and Slavs.<sup>9</sup>

The *Povest'*, moreover, defines clearly the ethnic content of the term Rus': it denoted the Norse Varangians, who in this way imposed their name on the East European peoples.<sup>10</sup> The Kiev chronicle is supported on this point by numerous contemporary sources.<sup>11</sup> For instance, the emperor Louis the Pious in 839 enquired closely into the origin of some Rus'ians who were passing through Germany, and discovered that they were Swedes.<sup>12</sup> Liutprand, bishop of Cremona, who carried out diplomatic missions in Byzantium in 949 and 968, indicates that the term 'Rus'' was synonymous with 'Normans' or 'Norsemen': '. . . Rusios, quos alio nos nomine Nordmannos appellamus . . . ; Graeci vocant . . . Rusios, nos vero a positione loci nominamus Nordmannos.'<sup>13</sup>

The equivalence, noted by Liutprand, of the terms 'Rus'' and 'Norsemen' in the ninth and tenth centuries is indirectly confirmed by other sources. The patriarch Photius mentions an incursion by the Rus' (Rhos) against the capital of the Empire in 860,<sup>14</sup> while Joannes Diaconus of Venice refers to it as an attack by Norsemen (*Normannorum gentes*).<sup>15</sup> Again, in a letter of 871 to the emperor Basil I, Louis the German mentioned that the Norman rulers, like those of the Avars, Khazars and Bulgars, bore the title *chakanus* (khaqan);<sup>16</sup> while the Bertinian Annals and oriental<sup>17</sup> sources state that *khaqan* was the title of the ruler of the Rus'.<sup>18</sup> The Slavonic translator of the chronicle of Georgius Monachus (*Hamartolos*) says that the Rus' were of Varangian origin (*ot roda Varyazheska sushchim*),<sup>19</sup> i.e. Normans; and an eleventh-century

Armenian source also identifies them with the Varangians.<sup>20</sup>

Studies of the Rus' names of the Dnepr cataracts, as given by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, have shown that they are derived from the Old Swedish language.<sup>21</sup> The *Povest'* states many times that the Varangians came to Eastern Europe from their home in Scandinavia<sup>22</sup>, and refers to the Baltic as the Varangian sea (*more Varyazh'skoe*).<sup>23</sup> In 943–4 the Rus' plundered the lands around the Caspian Sea,<sup>24</sup> which they reached by way of the Volga. Ibn Miskawaih, who lived in the late 10th and early 11th century, left a description of this raid containing several noteworthy details.<sup>25</sup> Speaking of the abundance of fruit in the Caspian region, he relates how the invaders ate the fruit in great quantities, and how their uncontrolled greed for the produce of the newly conquered country brought about a dangerous epidemic among them. Then follows an important comment by the Arabic author: 'The reason was that the land of the Rus' is very cold, and trees do not grow there. Fruit is brought to them only in small quantities from distant parts.' This account, which clearly refers to the far north, fully confirms what the *Povest'* says about the original home of the Varangian Rus'.<sup>26</sup>

The first Rus'ian rulers of whom the *Povest'* tells us have Norse names. Under the year 862 we read of the invitation to the Varangian prince Rurik (Norse Hrörekr) and his brothers Sineus and Truvor (Norse Signiutr and Thorwathr), who came from Scandinavia and ruled the northern region of Novgorod, Beloozero and Izborsk. The first Norsemen to establish their rule in Kiev were Askold (Höskuld) and Dir (Dyri).<sup>27</sup> The treaties concluded with Byzantium in 911/912 and 944/945 by the Rus'ian rulers at Kiev mention numerous Rus'ians by name. In the former treaty Oleg (Norse Helgi) stands in first place, and in the latter Igor' (Ingvarr), while along with them are mentioned dependent princelings, envoys, merchants and warriors.<sup>28</sup> A large majority of these have purely Norse names: it was Varangians who provided the Rus' rulers with their closest associates and counsellors in peace and war.<sup>29</sup>

We thus find that sources which are extremely numerous for such remote times oppose the Rus' to the Slavs, emphasize the difference of their languages, identify the Rus' with the Norman Varangians, and indicate that their original home was in Scandinavia; moreover the first Rus'ian rulers and their dignitaries

bore Norman names. This represents quite an unusual degree of consensus among independent sources as to the ethnic character of the Rus'ians at the earliest period of their history.<sup>30</sup>

The Varangian Rus'<sup>31</sup> who came from Scandinavia, 'from overseas' (*iz zamor'ya*) to Eastern Europe exacted tribute from the local tribes, both Slavs and others, and, despite initial resistance, became rulers of the new territory in a relatively short time. The first to rule were three brothers, each attended by numerous fighting men: Rurik at Novgorod, Sineus at Beloozero and Truvor at Izborsk. After the early death of Sineus and Truvor, Rurik inherited their dominions,<sup>32</sup> and future generations regarded him as the founder of the Rus'ian state.<sup>33</sup>

Under Rurik's successor Oleg the Varangians extended their rule southward with the capture of Smolensk, Lyubech and Kiev. This southward movement had been foreshadowed by Rurik, as two of his followers, Askold and Dir, had previously penetrated as far as Kiev with his approval.

After Oleg's death in 912 the Dnepr region was first governed by Igor', a minor at the outset of his rule, who died in 945. Next came his wife Ol'ga (d. 969), their son Svyatoslav (d. 972) and the latter's son Vladimir I (the Great), a key figure in East European history, who died in 1015. Such is a very brief account of the events described by the *Povest' vremennykh let* for the 9th and 10th centuries.

As the chronicle shows, the Rus' did not confine themselves to ruling the northern lands but in quite a short time advanced southward to Kiev with its dominating position on the Dnepr. Possession of the city was of capital importance from the economic<sup>34</sup> and military<sup>35</sup> points of view. Constantinople, famous for its wealth, attracted the Norman conquerors, although their trade with Byzantium was as yet little developed.<sup>36</sup>

The Rus'ian rulers of Kiev did not admit their new subjects to a share in government, but used only their own people.<sup>37</sup> It might have been expected that some members of the tribe of Polyanians, who had had their capital at Kiev, would have been signatories to the treaties concluded in the first half of the 10th century between Rus' and Byzantium,<sup>38</sup> but we find no mention of them.<sup>39</sup> The position remained the same during the reign of Igor' and that of his wife Ol'ga and for a long time afterwards.

All the chief figures in war and peace-time government were Varangians: Svenel'd (Norse Sveinald),<sup>40</sup> Asmud or Asmold (Norse Asmund),<sup>41</sup> Blud or Budy (Norse Bondi)<sup>42</sup> and so on. Right into the 11th century there are no Polyanians among the names of the princes' entourage.<sup>43</sup>

To maintain their domination the Rus'ian princes established *grady* (castles, cities) with strong Varangian garrisons, and placed their most trusted and experienced warriors in command of these and of the surrounding countryside.<sup>44</sup>

In the 10th and 11th centuries the Rus'ian princes often sought aid from their fellow-Scandinavians,<sup>45</sup> whose assistance more than once decided the course of events on Lake Ilmen', the Dnepr and elsewhere. Rurik and his successors married Norse women,<sup>46</sup> whose influence as wives and mothers should not be underestimated; in the 12th century the princes were well aware that their 'Rus'ian' names were of Norman origin,<sup>47</sup> and even in the 13th they sometimes used them in the Norman form.<sup>48</sup> All this goes to show that although the ties with Scandinavia were loosened in the course of time,<sup>49</sup> the Rurikides over a surprisingly long period continued to regard themselves as Varangians and as racially different from their subjects.

Despite many difficulties, the Rus' achieved a dominating position over a large part of Eastern Europe. One factor with which they had to contend was their numerical inferiority to the local tribes. The emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus and, indirectly, the Kiev chronicler both give us to understand that the Varangians were outnumbered by their subjects, though it would be wrong to suppose that their numbers were insignificant—a mistake often made, chiefly on the strength of archaeological finds.<sup>50</sup> The fortified towns were generally small in extent, but nevertheless big enough to require sizable forces of Varangians for purposes of garrison and defence. Moreover, there were many such towns distributed over an enormous area. As Feodosy Pechersky wrote in the 11th century,<sup>51</sup> 'there are Varangians all over the land' (*po vsei zemli Varyazi sut*). All this points to a conclusion lying between the two extremes. There were not enough Varangians in Eastern Europe to affect the ethnic character of the conquered peoples, but they cannot have been very few



either, or they would not have been able to rule over such a large population for a very considerable period.

As time went on, however, it became more difficult to maintain their privileged position, owing to the size of the area and continued local resistance by Slavs and non-Slavs. The account of the 9th and 10th centuries in the *Povest'* is a continuous tale of revolt by one or another of the conquered tribes. The Varangians overcame their resistance by a combination of organizing ability and ruthlessness. Already in 867 Photius remarked on the cruelty of the Rus' towards recalcitrant tribes. Thus the rule of the Rurikides was mainly external, superficial and based on military force;<sup>52</sup> it did not penetrate deeply into the lives of the conquered, a fact which can also be seen in the field of language.<sup>53</sup>

The Rus'ian princes naturally understood the weakness of their position in the long term, and at an early stage they took a bold initiative designed in some measure to smooth over the ethnic differences between themselves and their various subjects, to link the people with the dynasty and lay the foundation of a new political and cultural life. The instrument they chose for this important purpose was the Christian faith, which was to be shared by both conquerors and conquered.

## Notes to Chapter 2

1. The term *Rus'* (with palatalized 's', the 'u' pronounced as in 'put') should be carefully distinguished from *Rossiia*, which occurs in later written sources and has a different connotation. For the sake of accuracy it is necessary to use both. Unfortunately West European languages possess only one word (Russia, *Russie*, *Russland*), which has led to many misconceptions in historical literature and to a great confusion of ideas. Rus'ian is the adjectival form of Rus'.

2. D. Likhachev, ed., *Povest' vremennykh let*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1950 (the text used for quotations from the chronicle in the present work); D. Tschizewskij, *Die Nestor-Chronik*, *Slavistische Studienbücher* 6, 1969. The *Povest'* has been translated into many languages; English version by S. Cross and O. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, *The Russian Primary Chronicle. Laurentian Text*, MAA, LX, 1953.

3. According to the Bertinian Annals a group calling themselves Rus'ians travelled through Germany in 839 on the way from Constantinople to their homeland. The emperor Louis the Pious, curious to know what people they belonged to, had a thorough investigation

made—showing that he had not heard of them before. ('Misit Theophilus etiam cum eis quosdam, qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant, quos rex illorum chakanus vocabulo ad se amicitiae . . . cause direxerat, petens per memoratam epistolam, quatenus benignitate imperatoris redeundi facultatem atque auxilium per imperium suum toto habere possent. . . . Quorum adventus causam imperator diligentius investigans, comperit . . .'): *Annales Bertiniani*, ed. G. Waitz, *MGH*, SS in usum scholarum, 1883, pp. 19–20. The *Povest' vremennykh let* (vol. I, p. 17) gives the first use of the term "the land of Rus'" ("nacha sya prozyvati Ruska zemlya") under the year 852 (corrected to 842, *ibid.* II, p. 230). The patriarch Photius in his epistle of 867 states that the Russes, till then little known, had suddenly become noted for their warlike exploits: Photius, *Epistola* 13, Sec. 35; *PG*, CII, cols. 736–7.

4. 'Po mnozekh zhe vremyanekh seli sut' sloveni po Dunaevi, gde est' nyne Ugor'skaya zemlya i Bolgar'ska': *Povest' I*, p. 11.

5. ' . . . ugri nasledisha zemlyu tu [sloven'sku], i vedosha s sloveny, pokorivshe ya pod sya, i ottole prozvasya zemlya Ugor'ska': *Povest' I*, p. 21. The chronicler explains the origin of the term 'Rus'ian land' in the same way: 'I ot tekh varyag prozvasya Ruskaya zemlya', *ibid.*, p. 18.

6. The connotation of the terms Rus' and Rus'ian land varied in the course of centuries. In the present study the earliest phase of their use has been described in very general terms, as the whole problem has been examined in detail in my *The Origin of Russia* (1954, repr. 1969) and *The Making of the Russian Nation* (1963, repr. 1977).

7. This is shown clearly by Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the middle of the 10th century, when he gives the names of the Dnepr cataracts in both the Rus' and the Slav language: *De Administrando Imperio*, ed. G. Moravcsik, tr. R. Jenkins, vol. I, 1949; vol. II, Commentary (1962), pp. 38–52. Constantine is supported by Ibrahim ibn Yakub (966): T. Kowalski, *Relatio Ibrahim ibn Jakub de itinere slavico quae traditur apud al-Bekri*, *MPHNS*, I, 1946, p. 52. The *Povest'* relates that the people who had formerly called themselves Slavs, or strictly speaking Polyanians, later adopted the name of Rus', though in spite of this they retained their Slavonic speech (' . . . prozvashasya rus'yu, a pervoe besha slovene; ashche i polyane zvakhysya, no sloven'skaa rech' be': vol. I, p. 23). Thus the Rus' language at that time was not Slav, or the chronicler, would not have spoken of their retaining the Slav language. Although this fact is attested by independent sources it is still vigorously though arbitrarily denied by many writers on the subject. For instance A. Tolkachev (*O nazvanii dneprovskikh porogov v sochinenii Konstantina Bagryanorodnogo, De administrando imperio*, in: *Istoricheskaya grammatika i leksikologiya russkogo yazyka. Materialy i issledovaniya*, 1962, p.

41) states that the 'unexpected' use of the Rus'ian names of the cataracts is due to 'imperfect knowledge' (*nedostatochnaya osvedomlennost'*) of Eastern Europe on the part of the Emperor and those around him. This is an old technique of arbitrarily 'correcting' source materials, or, to speak more precisely, distorting them.

8. *Povest' I*, pp. 17, 18, 20, 21 etc.

9. See below, Chapter 4, p. 47.

10. 'I ot tekh varyag prozvasha Ruskaya zemlya', *Povest' I*, p. 18; '... ot varyag bo prozvashasya Rus'yu', *ibid.*, p. 23.

11. These are enumerated and analysed in H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 116-29, and *The Making*, pp. 158-62.

12. 'Quorum adventus causam imperator diligentius investigans, comperit eos gentis esse Sueonum': *Annales Bertiniani*, pp. 19-20. A. Riasanovsky ('The Embassy of 838 Revisited: Some Comments in Connection with a "Normanist" Source of Early Russian History', *JGO*, X, 1962, pp. 1-12) attempts to show that these Russes were Slavs returning from Constantinople to Kiev by way of Ingelheim, near Mainz(!), but the source text disproves this unfounded supposition. The matter is correctly stated by K. Falk in: *Kilka uwag o nazwie 'Ruś'*, *LP*, XII-XIII, 1968, pp. 9-19.

13. Luidprand, *Antapodosis*, ed. L. Becker 1915, 1, p. 11; 5, p. 15.

14. Cf. A. Vasiliev, *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860*, *MAA*, 1946.

15. *MGH*, *Script VII*, p. 18. This twofold terminology appears also in the narratives of the Rus' expedition against Constantinople in 941.

16. *MGH*, *Epist. VII*, p. 388.

17. Ibn Rosteh, an Arabic writer of Persian origin in the early 10th century; al-Gardizi, Persian historian, 11th century; *Hudud al-Alam*, anonymous Persian geographical treatise, end of 10th century.

18. Vladimir the Great and Yaroslav the Wise were both styled Kagans: (H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 158-9), and there is reason to think that Yaroslav's son Svyatoslav also bore this title: S. Vysotsky, *Drevnerusskie graffiti Sofii Kievskoi*, *NE*, III, 1962, pp. 157-8.

19. V. Istrin, *Khronika Georgiya Amartola v drevnem slavyano-russkom perevode I*, 1920, p. 567.

20. K. Yuzbatyan, "'Varyagi" i "proniya" v Povestvovanii Aristakesa Lastiverttsi', *VV*, XVI, 1959, p. 19.

21. V. Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State*, 1877 (last revised edn in his *Samlede Afhandlingar I*, 1919); A. Karlgren, *Dneprfossernes Nordisk-Slaviske Navne*, in: *Festskrift udgivet af Københavns Universitet i Anledning af Universitets Aarsfest November 1947*, 1947; K.-O. Falk, 'Dneprforsarnas Namn i Kejsar Konstantin VII Porfyrogenetos "De Administrando Imperio"', *LUA*, XXXVI, 1951, and others.

22. *Povest'* I, pp. 10, 12, 18, 33 etc.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

24. For the Rus'ian raids on the southern shores of the Caspian in the early 10th century see S. Aliev, O datirovke nabega rusov, upomyanutykh Ibn Isfandiariom i Amoli, in: A. Tveritinova, *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov Yugo-Vostochnoi i Tsentral'noi Evropy* 2, 1969, pp. 316–21.

25. Ibn Miskawaih, *The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate*, ed. H. Amedroz, tr. D. Margoliouth, 1921, pp. 67–74; A. Florovsky, *Izvestiya o drevnei Rusi arabskogo pisatelya Miskaveikhi X-XI vv.*, *SK*, I, 1927, pp. 175–86.

26. Other sources confirm this: e.g. Ibn Hauqal in the second half of the 10th century recounts that the Rus', having plundered the Volga Bulgars and the Khazars in 969, being unable to retreat by way of the Volga, returned home via 'Rome' (i.e. Byzantium) and Spain. The Norsemen possessed an excellent knowledge of European geography, and were aware that Scandinavia could be reached by way of the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

27. A. Stender-Petersen, *Varangica*, 1953, pp. 116, 121, 130 etc.

28. *Povest'* I, pp. 25–9, 34–9.

29. See p. 365.

30. See Appendix 3, *The Slavonic Descent of the Ancient Rus'*.

31. 'Sitse bo sya zvakhu t'i varyazi rus . . .': *Povest'* I, p. 18.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 18 (under year 862).

33. The dynasty which he founded, and which ruled until nearly the end of the 16th century, is thus known as that of the Rurikides.

34. Kiev was situated at the intersection of two important trade routes: from north to south along the Dnepr, and from east to west. Cf. A. Szelągowski, *Najstarsze drogi z Polski na wschód w okresie bizantyńsko-arabskim*, 1909; A. Spitsyn, *Torgovye puti Kievskoi Rusi*, in: *Sbornik statei, posvyashchennykh S. F. Platonovu*, 1911; M. Braichevsky, *Kiev nakanune obrazovaniya edinogo drevnerusskogo gosudarstva*, in: *Istoriya Kiya v dvukh tomakh* I, 1963, pp. 38–41; P. Tolochko, *Istoriko-geografichni umovi viniknennya Kiya*, *UIGZ*, I, 1971, pp. 60–71, and others. Igor's son Svyatoslav thought of transferring his capital from Kiev to Pereyaslavets on the Danube, as it was a meeting-point of trade routes from Byzantium, Bohemia, Hungary and Eastern Europe ('Ne lyubo mi est' v Kieve byti, khochu zhiti v Pereyaslavtsi na Dunai, yako to est' sereda zemli moei, yako tu vsya blagaya skhodyatsya: ot Grek zlato, povoloki, vina i ovoshcheve raznolichnyya, iz Chekh zhe, iz Ugor' srebro i komoni, iz Rusi zhe skora i vosk, med i chelyad': *Povest'* I, p. 48). This shows how loose a tie there still was between the Rus'ian princes and Kiev.

35. The famous Rus'ian raid on Constantinople in 860 followed the route of the Dnepr: A. Vasiliev, *The Russian Attack*, p. 43, etc.—W.

Wilinbachow ("Opowieść lat doczesnych" jako źródło wojskowo-historyczne, *SO*, IX (3), 1960, pp. 486, 489) recognizes that the distant seaborne raids of the Rus' against Byzantium in the 9th–10th centuries had much in common with the Viking raids.

36. Not many Byzantine coins of the period have been found in Eastern Europe. Cf. V. Yanin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy russkogo srednevekov'ya*, 1956, pp. 11, 58, 105; S. Yanina, *Nerevskii klad*, *MIA*, LV, 1956, pp. 184–5; V. Kropotkin, *Klady vizantiiskikh monet na territorii SSSR*, *Arkheologiya SSSR. Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov*, E 4–4, 1962, pp. 11–17; idem, *Novye nakhodki vizantiiskikh monet na territorii SSSR*, *VV*, XXVI, 1965, pp. 166–89; also E. Lönnroth in: *Varangian Problems* (Scando-Slavica, Suppl. 1), 1970, p. 166.

37. V. Pashuto (*Vneshnyaya politika drevnei Rusi*, 1968, p. 22; id., *Russko-skandinavskie otnosheniya i ikh mesto v istorii rannesrednevekovoi Evropy*, *SSB*, XV, 1970, pp. 60–1) argues that the chief dignitaries of the Rurikides and their immediate entourage were purely Slav: 'The new dynasty was little more than an instrument in the hands of the Slav upper class.' This statement is constantly contradicted by the *Povest'*: I, pp. 25, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 52, 54–6 etc.

38. *Povest'* I, pp. 25–9, 34–9.

39. In the treaty of 944/5 three Slav names—Svyatoslav, Volodislav and Predslava—appear in the prince's group, but it does not follow that their owners were Slavs. Svyatoslav, son of Igor', probably took this name on the occasion of his mother's (Ol'ga's) christening, but he himself remained a pagan, and all the incidents of his reign show him to have been a typical Varangian: Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 181–2. Little can be said of Predslava (a female name) except that her envoy, Kanitsar, was not a Slav. The name Predslava was, however, afterwards borne by the daughter of Vladimir the Great and the Polovtsian Rogned' (Norse Ragnheid), who was a Varangian on both sides: *Povest'* I, pp. 54, 56, 95, and II, p. 325. For the name Volodislav see Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 368n.

40. *Povest'*, I, pp. 39, 40, 42, 52, 53; M. Artamonov, *Voevoda Svenel'd*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 30–5.

41. *Povest'* I, pp. 40, 42.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 55, 97. In 1962 the ruins of a church at Smolensk dating from the 12th–13th century were excavated; on one wall was a painting of a battle-scene, and next to a knight in a helmet was the inscription 'bludo': N. Voronin, *Smolenskies graffiti*, *SA*, 1964, p. 172. If this is the Blud mentioned in the *Povest'* it would indicate that the Varangians at Kiev in the 10th–11th century maintained important links with the northern lands. Cf. S. Vysotsky, *Drevnie russkie nadpisi Sofii Kievskoi XI–XIV vv.* I, 1966, pp. 52–3.

43. Members of the entourage known to us by name or surname are: Varyashko (*Povest'* I, p. 55); Put'sha, Talets', Elovit', Lyash'ko (*ibid.*, pp. 90, 92); 'syn ugresk, imenem' Georgi' (p. 91); 'dva varyaga' (p. 91); Goryaser (p. 93); Torchin (p. 93); 'Tuky, brat Chudyin' (p. 114); Chyudin (p. 121); Byandyuk (p. 149); Snovid Izechevich (p. 173); 'torchin, imenem Berendi' (p. 173), Ulan (p. 173); Turyak (p. 177), and many others.

44. Writing (under the year 980) of the capture of Kiev by Vladimir's Varangian auxiliaries, the chronicler says: 'He [Vladimir] then selected from their number [from the Varangians] the good, the wise and the brave men, to whom he assigned castles' ('i izbra ot nikh muzhi dobry, smysleny i khrabry, i razdaya im grady': *Povest'* I, p. 56). The tendency to exclude Polyanians from political and military life is confirmed by the account, under the year 988, of Vladimir's building castles in the Kiev and Chernigov area as a defence against raids by the steppe nomads: he did not garrison them with local inhabitants but with men from the far north (*Povest'* I, p. 83), who were entirely dependent on him and obliged to serve him loyally.

45. *Povest'* I, pp. 33, 54, 89, 96, 100, 101 etc. Many prominent Normans whose names are known to us lived at the court of Vladimir and Yaroslav. See M. Sverdlov, *Izvestiya o rusko-skandinavskikh svyazyakh v khronike Adama Bremenskogo*, SS, XII, 1967, p. 276.

46. Cf. N. Baumgarten, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle', *OC*, IX (1), 1927.

47. A classic example is the passage in the Testament (*Pouchen'e*) of Vladimir II Monomakh, who writes about himself: 'I . . . named Vasily at my baptism . . . , but commonly known by my Rus'ian name Vladimir' ('rus'skym' imenem Volodimir': *Povest'* I, p. 153). The 'Rus'ian' name Vladimir or Volodimir is in fact the Norman Waldemar, as many examples show. Vladimir the Great used to be called Waldemar: e.g. Olaf Tryggvason came to England 'reversus a Rusciae partibus ubi nutritus et adiutus a Waldemaro rege fuerat' (S. Cross, *La tradition islandaise de saint Vladimir*, *RES*, XI, 1931, p. 142). Vladimir Monomakh was also called Waldemar, e.g.: 'Quos Sueno paterni eorum meriti oblitus, consanguinee pietatis more excepit, puellamque Rutenorum regi Waldemaro . . . nuptum dedit' (A. Holder, *Saxonis Grammatici Gesta Danorum*, 1866, p. 370). How strong was the tradition linking the name of Vladimir with its Norse origin appears also from the following example: in many Slavonic sources a son of Algirdas, Grand Duke of Lithuania in the 14th century, always figures as Vladimir; however, in the Lithuano-Livonian treaty of 1367 he appears as Waldemar (' . . . per Woldemarum, filium Olgherdem . . .'): *LECU*, II NO. 1041, pp. 772-3.

48. For instance Norman, 'Ingvarr' for Slav 'Igor'. Cf. 'Ingvor', 'Iz-yaslava Ingvorovitsya', 'Ingvorov brat', 'Roman Ingorovich' (A. Nasonov,

*Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov*, 1960, pp. 58, 63, 74, 267, 268 etc.); 'Ingvar'ia Yaroslavicha', 'Nigvar', 'Ingvar' (M. Priselkov, *Troitskaya letopis'*, 1950, pp. 285, 295, 305 etc.).

49. About the middle of the 12th century the Rus'ians began to strike deeper roots in Eastern Europe and to lose touch with their old Scandinavian homeland. The gulf between them and the Varangians was widened by the difference of religion, the Rus'ians having adopted the faith of Constantinople and the Varangians that of Rome, and also of language, as Slav was used in the Rus'ian church's liturgy and in political life.

50. A. Artsikhovskiy (Arkheologicheskie dannye po varyazhskomu voprosu, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, p. 41) makes light of the written sources on the ground that 'their statements on ethnic matters are subjective and it is generally impossible to check them'. The question arises: how do we know they are tendentious if we cannot prove it? D. Avdusin (Varyazhskii vopros po arkheologicheskim dannym, *KSII*, XXX, 1949, pp. 3-13; id., *Arkheologiya SSSR*, 1967) argues that very few Norman remains have been found in or near East European cities; but the ethnic classification of such remains is still very arbitrary, though it forms the basis of many analyses. G. Korzukhina (Novye nakhodki skandinavskikh veshchei bliz Toroptsa, *SS*, VIII, 1964, p. 312) comes closer to the source accounts when she writes: 'There is nothing rare or unexpected about the discovery of objects of Scandinavian origin. They occur in large quantity in many parts of Eastern Europe, especially in the north, as a rule in large cities and their immediate surroundings. There are well-known accumulations of Scandinavian objects at Kiev, Chernigov and its surroundings, Gniezdovo (near Smolensk) and round about, and in the regions of Yaroslav and Lake Ladoga. Separate, isolated finds of Norman artefacts are very rare, especially those of the 9th century, which are not found at all in the southern part of Eastern Europe.'

The problem of the quantity of Norman remains in Eastern Europe must be considered in the light of the situation in the West. For instance, in English towns apart from York there are scarcely any Viking antiquities (D. Wilson, *East and West: a Comparison of Viking Settlements*, in: *Varangian Problems*, *SS1* (Suppl. 1), 1970, p. 113); but no one on this account denies the importance of the Normans in English history. Again, very few runic inscriptions have been found in Eastern Europe: cf. V. Ravdonikas and K. Laushkin, *Ob otkrytii v Staroi Ladoge runicheskoi nadpisi na dereve v 1950 g.*, *SS*, IV, 1959, pp. 23-44; E. Makaev, *Runicheskaya nadpis' iz Novgoroda*, *SA*, 1964(4), pp. 309-11; N. Engovatov, *Nakhodki runicheskikh nadpisei na territorii SSSR*, *SS*, VI, 1963, pp. 229-57; id., *Runicheskaya epigrafiya s territorii SSSR i normanizm*,

SA 1964(4), pp. 214–20. As A. Liestl observes (Runic Inscriptions, in: *Varangian Problems*, pp. 124–5), '... the runic material from that time is extremely sparse and quite unsuitable for statistical analyses. Drawing conclusions *ex silentio* is a common pitfall. The fact that we may have no inscriptions at all from any region by no means precludes the existence of a permanent, literate Nordic population. ... For an analogy we may turn to Iceland, where not a single runic inscription from the Viking age has been found, and yet the remote colony in Greenland has yielded some. None has been found in Normandy ... , not a single trace in the form of runic inscriptions has been handed down to us from the Norse-speaking colony in Dublin. Even the very centre of Nordic culture, Birka ... has yielded no more than the remains of at the most six inscriptions of an early type, and most of these remain only because they represent the local custom of erecting memorial stones.'

51. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 39.

52. It appears from contemporary sources that the dependence of East European peoples on the Rus' consisted mainly in paying tribute and occasionally sending contingents to take part in military campaigns. Probably the degree of dependence varied from one region to another according to the amount of resistance offered by particular tribes, territorial distances etc.

53. H. Sørensen (The So-called Varangian-Russian Problem, *SS1*, XIV, 1968, p. 148) says: 'There is a conspicuous contrast between the scarcity of Scandinavian loan-words of political and cultural significance and the comparatively large amount of loan-words in the form of personal names of Scandinavian origin found in Old Russian literature. This contrast is not without significance for the evaluation of the role played by the Nordic-Scandinavian ethnic element in the history of the political and cultural creation and early development of the ancient Russian state.' Cf. G. Vinokur, *Drevnerusskii yazyk*, 1961, pp. 47–8.



## The beginnings of Christianity in Eastern Europe

Along with the expansion of the Varangian Rus', the adoption and spread of Christianity in Eastern Europe is a main theme of the history of our period in relation to the area as a whole.

Under the year 898 the *Povest'* includes a text known in historical literature as 'the Tale of the First Spread of Christianity in Rus' '.<sup>1</sup> This was written in the Slav language at a much earlier date than the chronicle itself. It owes its preservation to being included in the *Povest'*, as the original has been lost.

The account of 898 describes the institution of the 'Slav rite', or more precisely the Slav liturgical language (Old Church Slavonic) used in the Slav lands. The origin and development of the rite are associated with the activity of the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius.<sup>2</sup> Although these 'apostles of the Slavs' were chiefly active in Moravia, the Slav rite did not maintain itself there for long. After the death of Cyril and Methodius their disciples continued their work in various countries, especially among the Balkan Slavs. In Bulgaria they found conditions favorable to an extensive missionary effort, and it was from there that the 'faith of the Slavs' reached Kiev.

The *Povest' vremennykh let* has much to say about the beginnings of Christianity on the Dnepr. This is natural, as the chronicler was himself a monk and an inhabitant of Kiev, so that he would have been interested on geographical grounds alone. He had plenty of information to go on in the shape of written sources and live tradition among the local population.

The account in the *Povest'* concentrates on the character of the new faith and the territory over which it first extended. The chronicler states that Christianity as it existed in Eastern Europe, with its own church organization, originated in and was identical with the rite and the organization instituted by Cyril and Methodius.

The statement 'A sloven'skyi yazyk<sup>3</sup> i ruskyi odno est'<sup>4</sup> signifies that the metropolitan see of the Slavonic rite and the Rus'ian metropolitan see established at Kiev after Vladimir's baptism<sup>5</sup> were one and the same.

Many facts confirm the accuracy of the account. There was in Eastern Europe a cult of the two 'Slav apostles'. The Life of Methodius was preserved only in copies made in Rus', and the liturgical language of the Rus'ian church was Old Church Slavonic.

It is generally and rightly assumed that the beginning of literacy in the Dnepr region must be dated to the first half of the 10th century, some decades before Vladimir's official baptism<sup>6</sup> in 988.<sup>7</sup> After 988 there was a rapid development of literature in the Slav language, which can hardly be explained unless there was already a firm tradition.

The literature in question sprang from the needs of the Christian faith and, especially at the outset, was predominantly ecclesiastical.<sup>8</sup> If, as is generally accepted, Kiev adopted the Slav system of writing from Bulgaria, it must automatically have adopted Christianity in the Slav-language form for which that system was devised. Given the circumstances of the time, these two aspects are indistinguishable.

Vladimir's grandmother Ol'ga was herself a Christian, and was probably baptized according to the Slav rite. This is suggested by the Slav name Svyatoslav which she gave to her son—although he remained a pagan and, as the course of his reign indicates, a typical Varangian surrounded by Varangians.<sup>9</sup> The suggestion is also borne out by the close contacts Ol'ga maintained with Constantinople, which she visited, and Rome; she sent envoys to the West asking that missionaries be sent to Kiev.<sup>10</sup>

The career of Constantine and Methodius gave birth to the idea of the Slav rite serving the unity of all Christendom. If it were not for the existence and influence of this rite on the shores of the Dnepr it would be hard to understand salient facts of the second half of the 10th century and part of the 11th, such as the despatch of a Rus'ian embassy to the West to discuss church matters, or the appearance of Latin missionaries in the Kiev principality. In Slav literary monuments (translations from Latin) that were preserved in Rus' we find traces of the cult of saints as observed by the Roman church.<sup>11</sup>

The *Povest'* states that originally the 'Slav faith' spread, in Eastern Europe, only among the Polyanians of Kiev. The chronicler connects this tribe with the Slav peoples of Central Europe, many of whom were converted by disciples of Cyril and Methodius. The author of the *Povest'* lays such stress on the new community of religion that he does not hesitate to oppose the Dnepr Polyanians to other East Slav tribes who were close to them ethnically and geographically but who still clung to the old pagan beliefs.<sup>12</sup>

Vladimir's decision to adopt the new faith was taken for political reasons, but was not an easy one. Under the years 986 and 987 the *Povest'* gives a plausible account of his hesitation between different religions.<sup>13</sup> If he did not even exclude Islam from his calculations and enquiries, as is stated by the Kiev chronicle and also by Marvazi,<sup>14</sup> we may no doubt regard this as a tactical move, a threat or a form of pressure *vis à vis* Constantinople.

Independently of the Moravians and Bulgarians, and even before them, the Greek patriarchate had made efforts towards the conversion of Rus', but despite some success<sup>15</sup> they did not have lasting or extensive results,<sup>16</sup> and until Vladimir's time the situation remained fluid.

The Roman church had very little chance of influencing Rus', above all because most of the Popes disfavoured the liturgical use of the Slav language.<sup>17</sup> Hence in effect Vladimir had to choose between the Greek and the Slav rite, the difference being purely one of language and not of dogma. The existence of antagonisms and rivalries between the Greek and Slav clergy in Rus' is shown by the fact that two conflicting traditions as to the place of his baptism persisted until later times, the Greeks claiming it was at Kherson (Korsun') in the Crimea, while the Slavs maintained it was at Kiev or near-by Vasiliev.

In all these complications much depended on Vladimir himself. Being politically and militarily independent of Byzantium, he could negotiate on equal terms. It is noteworthy that a proposal to canonize him soon after his death was rejected by the Greeks on the ground that a period of 200 years must elapse: they were evidently not over-pleased by Vladimir's decisions in 988 and subsequently.

There was much in common between Kiev and Constantinople, and much to separate them. Ethnically, the Eastern Empire was

'an artificial conglomerate of many tribes and peoples.'<sup>18</sup> There was no such thing as a Byzantine nation in the strict sense, but only a number of peoples conquered by the Empire over the centuries and linked by a common political organization, culture and religion and by the Greek language in church and state. In these conditions, as many writers point out (Baynes, Dawkins, Diehl, Grégoire, Guerdan, Pernice and others), religion served as the chief mark of nationality and his Greek language was a 'native' language for Greeks and non-Greeks alike.

As is universally known (cf. Dölger, Michel, Moss, Ostrogorsky, Runciman, Schneider, Ziegler and others), the Eastern church was indivisibly bound up with the Empire. The emperor, as defender of the faith, was part of the church's internal organization. Collaboration between the highest representatives of secular and spiritual authority was designed to ensure the security and development of the 'Byzantine nation'.

All these considerations drew Vladimir towards Constantinople. Christianity, with its emphasis on humility and obedience to the ruler who derived his authority from God, would legalize the Varangian conquest of Rus', form a link between rulers and subjects, and consolidate the position of the Rurikides in Eastern Europe.

Vladimir's policy towards the church must be understood in terms of the affinities and conflicts of interest between Rus' and Byzantium. The latter were indeed considerable. Apart from old antagonisms attested by numerous Rus'ian raids on Constantinople for nearly two centuries, from 860 to 1043, there was the fact that Byzantium wished to assert its hegemony over the whole world and to treat Rus' as a province, whether in political or ecclesiastical terms. This had far-reaching political and cultural consequences; the latter were especially actual at the time of Vladimir's baptism, since he had to choose a liturgical language for his converted people which would at the same time become the state language, given the close connection between church and state.<sup>19</sup>

There is no doubt that Constantinople would have preferred Greek to be the language of the Rus'ian church, but it met with a refusal from Vladimir, conscious of the fact that his state comprised many Slav tribes. If the Gospel were preached in a language similar to that of the Polyanian population,<sup>20</sup> or at least

intelligible to them, and through them to the other Slav tribes,<sup>21</sup> it would be more effective than if it were preached in Greek. In this way the Slav rite, which had already been spreading for some decades among the Polyanians of Kiev (and, which is all-important, had brought its system of writing with it), became a primary instrument and advantage of Vladimir's policy.

Given the various difficulties which confronted the Rurikide state, it would have been hard to find a better solution to the problem of Christianizing Rus' than that adopted by Vladimir. On the one hand he established a link with Byzantium, taking from thence the ideas and models which were likely to consolidate the Varangian conquests<sup>22</sup> and, what is more, to justify further conquests in Eastern Europe with the avowed object of spreading the faith; while, on the other, he stood out against the political and cultural aspirations of the Empire which constituted a threat to him and his successors. By placing the Slav language in the forefront of Rus'ian political and ecclesiastical life he set up an effective barrier to Byzantine expansionism.<sup>23</sup>

In all these moves and decisions we can clearly perceive Vladimir's own ambitions and aspirations. In opposition to the 'Byzantine world'<sup>24</sup> he desired to create on similar lines a separate 'Rus'ian world' (*ruskii mir*)<sup>25</sup> of equal standing.<sup>26</sup> It was not by chance that, in the mid-11th century, the metropolitan Hilarion compared the exploits of the Rus'ian prince to the historic role of the emperor Constantine. In contrast to the 'Byzantine nation' Vladimir wished to create a 'Rus'ian nation' composed of many races with a Slav veneer, like the Greek veneer which united many races in the Byzantine state. This grandiose scheme of Vladimir's was continued by his successors and, despite immense difficulties, was eventually crowned with success.

The beginnings of Rus'ian church organization are very vaguely described in the sources. Under the year 1039 the *Povest'* states that the Metropolitan of Kiev was then Theopemptos, a Greek. But we do not know when he became Metropolitan, or what predecessors he may have had in the office, either Greeks or non-Greeks: the latter is not impossible.<sup>27</sup>

The difficulty of establishing the facts is increased by the existence in 11th-century Rus' of a second metropolitan see at

Pereyasavl' on the river Trubezh, a left-bank tributary of the Dnepr. This fact is referred to in three contemporary sources, not to mention later ones. A Greek polemical tract against the Roman church refers in its title to a Metropolitan Leontius of 'Preslav' in Rus'.<sup>28</sup> Nestor in the Life of Feodosy Pechersky mentions one Ephraim, consecrated in Constantinople 'as Metropolitan in the city of Pereyasavl',<sup>29</sup> and the *Povest'* states under the year 1089 that 'the church of St Michael at Pereyasavl' was consecrated by Ephraim, the Metropolitan of that church . . . for there had previously been a metropolitan church at Pereyasavl'.<sup>30</sup>

It is hard to say when Pereyasavl' acquired metropolitan status. The treatise by Leontius, referred to above, might be of importance in this connection, but unfortunately there is disagreement as to when it was written. Some authorities think it belongs to the end of the 10th or the beginning of the 11th century, their chief argument being that later sources speak of Leontius as the first or one of the first Rus'ian metropolitans after Vladimir's baptism; others, however, think that in view of its content the treatise must have been written after the final breach between the churches in 1054.

The enhancing of the status of the metropolitanate at Pereyasavl' owed much to Ephraim, whose career was an unusual one. His nationality is unknown; Ephraim was his name in religion. He was at first a high dignitary in the service of Izyaslav, son of Yaroslav the Wise,<sup>31</sup> and afterwards entered the Crypt Monastery at Kiev. Later he lived for some time in a monastery at Constantinople, and finally returned to Rus' as metropolitan of Pereyasavl'.

Ephraim's life-story gives the impression that he was shrewd and cunning (since he managed to ingratiate himself first with Izyaslav and then with the Patriarch), able and ambitious (witness his unusual success both in secular and in clerical affairs), and a man of all-round energy and drive, as he showed while metropolitan of Pereyasavl'. In my opinion, whatever his nationality may have been, during his extended stay at Constantinople he was trained in Greek methods of political thought, while his personal ambition guaranteed his loyalty to the Patriarch in executing the latter's ecclesiastical and political plans. His merits were enhanced by his knowledge of conditions on the banks of the Dnepr, and he was probably the best candidate available to

the Patriarch at that time for the difficult post assigned to him.

Although Ephraim did not hold office at Pereyaslavl' for very long,<sup>32</sup> he was responsible for the erection of several walled churches, especially St Michael's cathedral, and other important buildings. The huge cathedral was richly decorated inside, and Ephraim's own residence was a luxurious one.<sup>33</sup> The *Povest'* expatiates on these achievements,<sup>34</sup> and archaeological finds confirm and complete what the chronicler tells us.<sup>35</sup> The floors incrustated with Byzantine-type mosaics; a marble capital, perhaps brought in a finished state from Constantinople; numerous marble fragments of different colours, the remains of flagstones, columns or cornices; portions of fresco paintings; numerous objects of stone, metal, glass and bone; pieces of ceramic drainpipes of the Byzantine type, etc.—all these impressive finds (there is also a lead seal with a Greek inscription) prompt us to wonder whether they had anything to do with the needs of the local population.

The land of Pereyaslavl' covered a large area from the left bank of the Dnepr to the Seim (a tributary of the Desna), extending also to a point on the upper Donets and to the Vorskla.<sup>36</sup> Its eastern and southern frontiers, in particular, were fluid and subject to frequent change. This vast territory, cutting deeply into the steppe, was very thinly populated and exposed to destructive raids by the steppe nomads, especially the Pechenegs.<sup>37</sup> To judge from the account in the *Povest'*, the inhabitants of the territory were Severians,<sup>38</sup> but in reality it was a sort of no man's land, large areas in the east and south being practically deserted. Vladimir was the first ruler to attempt to promote settlement in the steppe borderlands. He did so by means of a system of military colonies, drawing settlers from various lands,<sup>39</sup> so that the area became ethnically mixed.

Clearly there was an immense gulf between the luxurious buildings of Pereyaslavl' and anything the local inhabitants needed. We shall revert later to this unusual state of affairs, but the explanation is of wider scope than the land of Pereyaslavl' itself.

### Notes to Chapter 3

1. *Povest'* I, pp. 21–3.

2. We may recall here the generally known facts about the lives of Constantine and Methodius. They were the sons of a high Byzantine official at Salonica (Thessaloniki); they were born there, and received

their higher education at Constantinople. Having known the Slav language from childhood they were well suited for missionary activity among the Slavs, in which they engaged from 863, first in Moravia and later in Pannonia. By translating the liturgical texts and some prayers into Slav they aroused the violent opposition of the Latin clergy, mostly Germans, whereupon they went to Rome to defend their orthodoxy and the use of Slav in the liturgy. Constantine died in Rome in 869 after taking religious vows and the name of Cyril, under which he appears in the Roman canon of saints. Methodius then continued his missionary activities in the same territories as before, and was appointed by Pope John VIII (872–82) to a newly created Slav archiepiscopal see. The Latin clergy, however, persisted in their opposition, which occasioned visits by Methodius to Rome and Constantinople. His death in 885 was the signal for an open conflict which led to the abolition of the Slav rite in Moravia and most of the surrounding territory.

3. In Slav literature of the period the term *yazyk* not only signifies 'language, people' etc. but was also used in an ecclesiastical sense to denote a metropolitan province or eparchy. See Appendix 3, *The Slavonic Descent of the Ancient Rus'*.

4. *Povest'* I, p. 23.

5. Just as the Slav tribes conquered by the Varangian Rus' adopted the latter's name, so the church in the Rus' state, and the metropolitan see at Kiev, are referred to in the sources as 'Rus'ian' ('... mitropol'ya rus'skaya . . .', *Povest'* I, p. 102).

6. P. Chernykh, *Yazyk i pis'mo*, in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi* II, 1951, p. 130; B. Angelov, *K voprosu o nachale russko-bolgarskikh literaturnykh svyazei*, *TODRL*, XIV, 1958, pp. 132–5; M. Tikhomirov, *Istochnikovedenie istorii SSSR*, 1962, p. 31, and others. As F. Filin rightly states (*Obrazovanie yazyka vostochnykh slavyan*, 1962, p. 224), the many hypotheses designed to show that Slav writing existed in Eastern Europe before the second half of the 9th century are no more than conjectures. 'As of now we have the scientifically established fact that the art of writing spread to ancient Rus' from Bulgaria as a result of the seminal activity of Constantine and Methodius.'

7. As to the exact date of Vladimir's baptism, the sources vary between 987 and 989; 988 is considered the most likely.

8. Constantine-Cyril was one of the creators of the Slav script and literature. Translations into Slav at this time were confined to liturgical texts and the most essential prayers.

9. For instance Svyatoslav's envoy mentioned in Igor's treaty with the Greeks bore the purely Norman name of Vuesfast.

10. For details see H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 90–5.

11. F. Dvornik, *Les Bénédictins et la christianisation de la Russie*, in: 1054–1954. *L'Eglise et les Eglises*, pp. 323–49.



12. See Appendix 3, *The Slavonic Descent of the Ancient Rus'*.
13. *Povesť* I, pp. 59–75.
14. P. Kawerau, Arabische Quellen zur Christianisierung Russlands, *MAGKO*, VII, 1967, pp. 23–6. See also *ZVO*, IX, 1896, pp. 262–7.
15. The most important reference in the sources is an epistle of 867 in which the patriarch Photius speaks of the conversion of an unnamed Rus'ian prince: Photius, *Epistola* 18, Sec. 35; *PG*, CII, cols. 736–7. Cf. K. Ericsson, The Earliest Conversion of the Rus' to Christianity, *SEER*, XLV, 1966, pp. 98–121.
16. In Igor's treaty with the Greeks (944/5) the Rus' are divided into two groups, Christian and pagan. It is hard to be certain whether the former were converted from Constantinople or by Slav missionaries working among the Polyanian tribes.
17. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 44–8; id., *The Making*, pp. 22–95.
18. M. Levchenko, *Ocherki po istorii russko-vizantiiskikh otnoshenii*, 1956, p. 498. The problem has been extensively studied by various authors: A. Andreades, H. Beck, P. Charanis, A. Ducellier, F. Haenssler, D. Jacoby, R. Jenkins, A. Kazhdan, W. Ramsay, G. Stadtmüller, F. Uspensky and others.
19. The Norse language of the Rus' could not come into consideration, given the ethnic situation in Eastern Europe.
20. The Slav language which Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius knew from childhood was the Bulgaro-Macedonian dialect spoken in the vicinity of Salonica. The brothers carried on their missionary activity in this language, and the literature of the Slavonic church was composed in it, hence the name Old Church Slavonic. As the rite was extended to many other Slav peoples, the question arises whether they understood the dialect used by Cyril and Methodius. Scholars vary in their opinions, but most believe that they did. Some authorities, including N. Troubetzkoy, R. Avanesov and P. Kuznetsov, consider that a general Slav tongue with various dialects continued to exist until the 10th–12th century; others, including F. Filin, believe that primitive Slav split up into separate though similar languages much earlier, around the 6th and 7th century. By the 11th century at latest there were separate Slav languages (A. Vaillant), but at the time of Constantine and Methodius the language they used was intelligible to other Slav peoples (M. Cheika-A. Lamprecht, Ya. Bauer and others). The debate is hampered by the scarcity of source material and the lack of a clear distinction between 'language' and 'dialect'.
21. In the work of conversion, oral preaching played a much greater part than church books. The missionaries who appeared at this time in various Slav territories must have been chiefly recruited from among the Polyanians, who were converted much earlier than other tribes of similar language.

22. N. Baynes, *The Byzantine Empire*, 1925, p. 232: 'Though it may sound a paradox, the assertion that the early Russian State owed its very existence to Constantinople would hardly be an exaggeration.' Other scholars agree in emphasizing the cardinal role played by Byzantium in the history of Rus'. Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 236-44.

23. For the same reasons, a hundred years earlier, the Bulgarian ruler Boris-Michael welcomed the followers of Methodius and gave firm support to the Slav rite.

24. Cf. P. Arnott, *The Byzantines and their World*, 1973.

25. This term is found in contemporary sources: see H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 218-19.

26. This is shown e.g. by Vladimir's coinage: cf. M. Sverdlov, *Izobrazhenie knyazheskikh regalii na monetakh Vladimira Svyatoslavicha*, VID, IV, 1972, pp. 151-9. Yaroslav followed his father's lead, as is shown by his use of the title 'tsar': R. Rybakov, *Russkie datirovannye nadpisi XI-XIV vekov*, in: *Arkheologiya SSSR, Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov*, E 1-44, 1964, pp. 14-16. Cf. M. Priselkov, *Istoriya russkogo letopisaniya*, 1940, p. 81.

27. The *Povest'* states under the year 1039 that 'the church of the Holy Virgin, founded by Yaroslav's father Vladimir, was consecrated by the metropolitan Theopemptos' (*Povest'* I, p. 103). Likhachev (*Povest'* II, p. 378) believes that this is incorrect and that the church consecrated in 1039 was not that of the Virgin but of St Sophia. (There is a controversial literature on the origin of this church: cf. S. Vysots'ky in: *UIZ*, N 7, 1966, pp. 103-6; A. Poppe, *ibid.*, N 9, 1968, pp. 93-7; *id.*, *ibid.*, N 6, 1969, pp. 91-105). Likhachev's main argument is that the church of the Virgin was dedicated much earlier, as stated in the *Povest'* (I, p. 83) under the year 989. But the chronicler expressly recalled this when he stated under the year 1039 that that church was founded by Vladimir, while at the same time stating that the church of the Virgin was consecrated in 1039. Likhachev overlooks the fact, important for those times, that if a non-Greek had occupied the metropolitan see of Kiev in opposition to the Patriarch's authority, his Greek successor would have re-consecrated the church in which the other had been enthroned and had conducted services, thus profaning it in the eyes of Constantinople. Now in 1051 Yaroslav, without consulting the Patriarch, appointed as metropolitan of Kiev the Rus'ian Hilarion (*Povest'* I, p. 104; for his origin see H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 100-2, 105), and therefore his Greek successor re-consecrated the church of St Sophia. Cf. V. Yanin, *Iz istorii*, p. 126. The same happened in the 12th century when another non-Greek, Kliment Molyatich, became metropolitan. In my opinion Theopemptos's predecessor must also have been a non-Greek. In other words, the issue between Constantinople and Kiev regarding appointments

to the Rus'ian metropolitan see dated back to before Hilarion's time.

28. V. Beneshevich, *Pamyatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, RIB, XXXVI, 1920, pp. 73–101.

29. A. Shakhmatov and P. Lavrov, *Sbornik XII veka Moskovskogo Uspenskogo Sobora*, COID, 1899 (2), p. 64; C. Knyazevskaya—V. Dem'yanov—H. Lyapon, *Uspenskii sbornik XII-XIII vv.*, 1971.

30. *Povest'* I, p. 137. Note should also be taken of the seal which has survived, with a Greek inscription, of the Rus'ian metropolitan Ephraim. V. Yanin (*Iz istorii russkoi khudozhestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni XII veka*, SA, 1957, pp. 126–8) connects it with the metropolitan of Pereyasavl' mentioned in the text, while other authors relate it to a Kiev metropolitan of the same name. The question is still a matter of controversy.

31. It is often supposed on this ground that Ephraim was a Slav of Polyanian origin, but this seems unlikely. The *Povest'* repeatedly shows that the high dignitaries of the Rurikides and the immediate entourage of the Kiev princes were not Polyanians. On the other hand there is no doubt that Ephraim knew the Slav language.

32. Ephraim became Metropolitan in the 1070s, probably 1077 or 1078, and died towards the end of the century.

33. V. Moshin (*Poslanie russkogo mitropolita Leona ob opresnokakh v Okhridskoi rukopisi*, BS, XXIV (1), 1963, p. 93) points out the Greek character of the residence of the metropolitan of Pereyasavl'.

34. 'In this year [1089] the church of St Michael at Pereyasavl' was consecrated by Ephraim, the metropolitan of that church, which he had constructed on a magnificent scale. For there had previously been a metropolitan church at Pereyasavl' to which he constructed a large addition, adorning it with all sorts of decorations and church vessels . . . At that time he erected many buildings: he completed the church of St Michael and founded a church at the city gates dedicated to the holy martyr Theodore, as well as another church dedicated to St Andrew near the church by the gates, and he also constructed a stone bathhouse such as had never before existed in Rus'. He likewise constructed a palisade of stone which started from the church of the holy martyr Theodore, and embellished the city of Pereyasavl' with church buildings and other structures' (*Povest'* I, p. 137). Further details concerning Ephraim's activity—though their source is not clear—are related in *PSRL*, IX, p. 116.

35. M. Karger, *Pamyatniki Pereyaslavskogo zodchestva XI-XII vv. v svete arkhologicheskikh issledovani*, SA, XV, 1957, pp. 44–63; id., *Raskopki v Pereyaslave-Khmel'nitskom v 1952–1953 g.*, SA, XX, 1954, pp. 5–30; id., *Pamyatniki drevnerusskogo zodchestva v Pereyaslave-Khmel'nitskom*, in: *Zodchestvo Ukrainy*, 1954, pp. 272–82; id., *Drevne-*

*russkii gorod Pereyaslav*, 1960; Yu. Aseev—M. Sikorsky—R. Yura, *Pamyatnik grazhdanskogo zodchestva XI v. v Pereyaslave-Khmel'nitskom*, SAR, 1967 (1), pp. 193–214, and others.

36. A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', p. 51. See also V. Lyaskoronsky, *Istoriya pereyaslavskoi zemli s drevneishikh vremen do poloviny XII stoletiya*, 1897, p. 9. O. Sukhoborov (Naselennyya dniprovskogo livoberezhzha pored utvorenniyam Kiivs'koi Rusi, UIZ, 1971 (6), pp. 63–70) describes the results of archaeological work in the area on the left bank of the Dnepr.

37. The *Povest'* mentions the first Pecheneg raid on the Rus'ian land in 915, but they had inhabited the area as nomads for some time previously, in the 8th and 9th centuries, before the idea of the 'Rus'ian land' was associated with Kiev. After the Pechenegs Rus' was gravely threatened by the Polovtsians, who appeared in the steppes around 1030–50.

38. *Povest'* I, p. 11.

39. 'Then Vladimir reflected that it was not good that there were so few towns round about Kiev, so he founded cities-castles (*gorody*) on the Desna, the Osetr, the Trubezh, the Sula and the Stugna. He gathered together the best men of the Slovenes [Novgorodians], the Krivichians, the Chud' and the Vyatichians, and peopled these cities with them' (*Povest'* I, p. 83). Yaroslav continued his father's policy of colonizing the borderland steppes and settled captives from Poland on the river Roś, a right-bank tributary of the Dnepr: *Povest'* I, p. 101.

## II

### The Upper Volga Region in the Pre-Muscovite Period

## The Upper Volga region in the 9th-11th centuries

The author of the *Povest' vremennykh let* shows unexpectedly wide geographical interests, extending to the far north and more easterly parts of the Arctic Ocean and to the Ural mountains. He enumerates many peoples, especially Finno-Ugrians,<sup>1</sup> inhabiting these areas, and mentions a tribe in the Upper Volga region known as the Merya.

The chronicler does not say to what race the Merya belonged, but implies that they were a Finno-Ugrian tribe.<sup>2</sup> He believes them to have been the original inhabitants of the area<sup>3</sup> and describes them as living in the vicinity of Lakes Rostov and Pereyaslavl'.<sup>4</sup> This area can be considerably enlarged if account is taken of geographical names associated with the word 'Merya', such as river-names (Mera, Merskaya, Meryanka, Merenka, Mereya etc),<sup>5</sup> towns (e.g. Galich Merskii), villages (Merya, Staraya Merya, Merya Molodaya, Merinov, Meryalovo etc.),<sup>6</sup> major subsequent territorial and administrative units (Merskii Stan, Meretsskii Stan, Merskaya volost')<sup>7</sup> and so forth.

It is difficult to determine more precisely the territory occupied by the Merya, as the sources are fragmentary and the indications they provide are hard to localize with the accuracy of present-day cartography. However, it can be said in a general way that the Merya inhabited the greater part of the area between the Volga and the Oka, as well as extensive regions on the left bank of the Volga further north.<sup>8</sup>

Some publications seem to suggest that the Merya settlements reached as far, or nearly as far, as the river Unzha.<sup>9</sup> In that case it could be supposed that the Merya were separated from the Cheremisians by the large, densely-wooded area between the Unzha and the Vetluga, which are both left-bank tributaries of the Volga;<sup>10</sup> This would be especially the case in the upper reaches

of those rivers. We have a clearer picture of the ethnic situation on the right bank of the Unzha, in the region extending to the Kostroma, another tributary of the Volga: here there is no doubt that the Merya<sup>11</sup> inhabited the greater part of the Kostroma land,<sup>12</sup> though there is some uncertainty, owing to the dearth of source material, as to how far it extended eastward. As a rule the most thickly populated areas at the time we are concerned with, and to a large extent in later centuries as well, were the banks of rivers; yet the banks of the Volga between its junction with the Kostroma and the Unzha remained uninhabited, and only in the 14th-16th century do we hear of settlements along that section of the Volga.<sup>13</sup>

The extremely marshy area<sup>14</sup> known as the Poshekon'e, extending along the river Sheksna (a left-bank tributary of the Volga), was occupied by mixed settlements of the Merya and Ves'. It is not possible to draw a line between them: their archaeological remains are very similar, and we do not know what languages they spoke.<sup>15</sup> It would seem that the basin of the Mologa, a left-bank tributary of the Volga, belonged to the Merya, as it later belonged to the Yaroslavl' principality.<sup>16</sup> We may suppose that from the mouth of the Mologa to that of the Medveditsa and beyond, the territory of the Merya was more or less bounded by the Volga,<sup>17</sup> though in some places it extended across to the left bank.

To westward the Merya territory was adjoined by the endless forests, marshes and bogs of the later principality of Tver'.<sup>18</sup> Further to the south-west were vast forest areas (the *Okovskii les*)<sup>19</sup> which remained uninhabited even in later times. In the western part of the area between the Volga and the Oka, archaeologists and linguists tell us that the Merya were neighbours of the Balts, who were racially distinct from both Finns and Slavs.<sup>20</sup> According to Tret'yakov the western boundary of the Merya territory was formed by a straight line joining Yaroslavl' and Kolomna;<sup>21</sup> Goryunova, however, regards this as artificial and unjustified by the archaeological evidence.<sup>22</sup> Tret'yakov's view is not acceptable to historians either, as it would mean that the territory around Lakes Rostov and Pereyasavl', which the *Povesi'* describes as the chief areas of Merya settlement, were wholly or in large part outside the boundaries of Merya occupation.

The southern part of the Merya territory extended along the rivers Moskva<sup>23</sup> and Klyaz'ma,<sup>24</sup> which are left-bank affluents of

the Oka. The area of the lower Klyaz'ma, with its left-bank tributaries the Teza, Lukh and Lyulikh, seems to have been occupied by the Murom tribe;<sup>25</sup> the latter were neighbours of the Cheremis, as also were the Merya. It has not so far been possible to ascertain the boundary between the Merya and the Cheremis.

At the period we are discussing, the territory in question was inhabited, besides the Merya, by Norman Varangians. According to the chronicler the Merya were the original inhabitants and the Varangians had come from overseas in the 9th century. The *Povest'* emphasizes their different origins and the politico-military system whereby the Varangians held a dominant position and the Merya were subject to their commands.

The evidence of the *Povest'* requires to be compared with that of other source materials. Valuable testimony is afforded by Arab coins, the silver dirhems that are found in great quantity in Eastern Europe, and attention must also be paid to contemporary Arabic writers.

The Varangian conquests and the commercial relations of the Arabs with Eastern Europe extended far beyond the Merya territory; but the latter was involved in both these important processes, and consequently the source material of the period throws light on the situation in the Upper Volga region in the 9th and 10th centuries.

By their conquests in the Near East, a large part of Asia, northern Africa and elsewhere<sup>26</sup> the Arabs had rapidly become not only a military but also an economic power of the first rank. Baghdad, the capital of the Eastern Caliphate, and other cities were flourishing centres of production and trade. For the purpose of trading with near and distant countries, and to meet the needs of their internal market, the Arabs evolved a monetary system based on precious metal—a process facilitated by the abundant silver deposits in the conquered territories, especially Iran, Armenia and Central Asia.

Eastern Europe was part of the enormous area embraced by Arab trade.<sup>27</sup> There is little reason to think that Arab traders voyaged far to the north of that part of Europe, however: for the most part they used intermediaries such as the Volga Bulgars,<sup>28</sup> who were especially suited to the role on account of their geographical position on the lower Kama and middle Volga.<sup>29</sup>



Eastern Europe's chief exports to the Muslim East consisted of forest products—furs of various animals, hides, honey, wax etc.—and also slaves.<sup>30</sup> The Arabs had much to offer in return: precious textiles and high-quality weapons, wines, southern fruit, perfumes, spices and condiments, but for the most part these were luxury goods. Hence the volume of East European demand was very small, as is shown by the paucity of archaeological finds, and the trade was largely one-sided. The demand in the opposite direction was very great, and the Arabs or their agents paid almost exclusively in silver, as witness the large quantities of dirhems found in Eastern Europe. It would appear that the initiative in establishing trade relations came chiefly from the Arabs as the more enterprising and better-organized party, who moreover had more to gain from the trade in question.<sup>31</sup>

It is hard to analyse the earliest phase of trade relations between the Arabs in the south and the East European territories in the north, but some light is afforded by the inscriptions on Cufic dirhems,<sup>32</sup> which record important details in addition to their religious content: e.g. they show the year in which they were coined, of course according to the Muslim calendar, and the mint from which they originated.<sup>33</sup> Many problems remain, however: e.g. we do not know how long the coins were in use in the Arab world before finding their way to Eastern Europe, how long they circulated there, who their possessor was, why he buried them and so on. In my opinion conclusions on these points will always be hypothetical: it is hard to establish hard-and-fast principles, and it is not surprising that scholars differ in their views on these questions.<sup>34</sup>

Cufic dirhems were first coined in the last decade of the 7th century. Some authors believe that they appeared in Eastern Europe from the very first, or at least between 700 and 750, but the prevailing opinion now is that they did so in the last quarter of the 8th century, and were not seen in Eastern Europe in any quantity before the beginning of the 9th.<sup>35</sup>

Arab coins thus found their way to Eastern Europe for two hundred years, from the beginning of the 9th to the beginning of the 11th century: the influx came to an end by 1120. In some years the flow was greater, in others less. The actual number of Cufic dirhems circulating in Eastern Europe is hard to estimate, for many reasons. For centuries no record of monetary finds was

kept, so that the evidence they would have afforded is lost. Even when records began to be kept in Russia, early in the 19th century, in practice many people did not report their finds but concealed them for their own satisfaction or profit. Many coins were destroyed in ancient times, or were not buried, but were melted down into silver bars, women's ornaments etc. Above all, a vast number of dirhems are still buried in the soil, and the number of finds increases every year.<sup>36</sup>

The hoards of course vary in size, from single coins to large numbers.<sup>37</sup> From the places in which they occur we can trace contemporary trade routes and gain some idea of the area in which a particular coinage circulated. A topographical survey of all the finds in East European territory remains a desideratum, although much has already been done in this direction.<sup>38</sup> Such studies can never be regarded as complete, since new finds modify and supplement the conclusions based on earlier ones.

The largest concentrations of Cufic dirhems in Eastern Europe are in forest areas, as forest resources constituted the major part of exports to the Arabs. The trade route led from the territory of the Volga Bulgars by way of the lower Oka and Moskva, eastward along the Klyaz'ma, then northward to the area between the Volga and the Oka.<sup>39</sup> The main direction of this route is indicated by Lakes Pereyasavl' and Rostov, the upper Volga and its northern branch (the Sheksna and Mologa)<sup>40</sup> and, to the west, the headwaters of the Volga, the Velikaya and Lovat' rivers, Lakes Ilmen' and Ladoga.<sup>41</sup> Another, more northerly route skirted the region between the Volga and the Oka.<sup>42</sup> No doubt the location of trading centres and trade routes varied during the 200 years from the beginning of the 9th to the beginning of the 11th century, but it remains true that trade with the Arabs was concentrated along the course of the Volga.<sup>43</sup>

The Arabs did not trade only with Eastern Europe, but also with the Baltic area to the north-west. A key point in this area was the island of Gotland, where many Cufic dirhems have also been found.<sup>44</sup>

Up to 1968 a total of 1600-1700 treasures comprising 2-300,000 coins have been registered in Eastern Europe and further west, and these are only a fraction of all the Arab silver coinage that once circulated there: between the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 11th the total probably reached several

million. The finds are concentrated in three main areas: (1) the northern part of Eastern Europe and the adjacent Baltic lands (280 collections); (2) the south-eastern coasts of Sweden and the islands, especially Gotland (520 collections); and (3) the southern coasts of the Baltic inhabited by Polabian Slavs, Poles and Prussians (350 collections). Each of these regions is surrounded by territory in which Arab coins were much less plentiful.<sup>45</sup>

This rich numismatic material requires to be put in chronological order by assigning dates to the different hoards. This is a difficult and hypothetical enterprise, but some attempts have been made, more especially the study by Yanin in which the numbers of finds from different periods are compared.<sup>46</sup> It would be useful for general guidance and for the sake of accuracy if authors would give more details than they do at present, especially the number of coins in particular collections<sup>47</sup> and also their weight: dirhems circulated not only intact but also in the shape of fragments or parings.<sup>48</sup>

The most notable intensification of trade with the Arabs took place in the first half of the 10th century, to about 960. In 900-38 the number of hoards rises<sup>49</sup> to 75, including 33 in Eastern Europe and 42 in the West, whereof Gotland and Sweden account for 31.<sup>50</sup> In the next decade, from 939 to 949, we find 60 in Eastern Europe and 65 in the West, with Gotland and Sweden again occupying first place.<sup>51</sup> This predominance of the West over the East continues until about 980. From about 990 Cufic coins cease to appear in Western Europe, and about 20 years later they no longer occur in the East: the cessation of the flow is due to internal political and economic conditions in the Arab world.

The basic question that arises is: who were the Arabs' trading partners? Writers on the subject give widely differing answers. Some believe that each particular East Slav tribe, and perhaps also the Finnic ones, traded with the Arabs on the one hand and with Scandinavia on the other.<sup>52</sup> Others, including most Western scholars, think that trade with the Arab world was carried on by Norman Varangians, who were widely dispersed throughout Eastern Europe. Arab writers, who took a great interest in Eastern Europe,<sup>53</sup> give considerable help in elucidating this thorny problem. Most of their accounts date from the 10th century, when the Arabs were trading intensively with Eastern Europe; they do not

contradict, but complement one another's testimony, so that what they say is the more convincing.

The Arab writers speak of two East European peoples, the Rus' (ar-Rus)<sup>54</sup> and the Slavs (as-Saqaliba).<sup>55</sup> They do not expressly define the ethnic character of the Rus', but give some indirect indications and, in particular, draw a clear distinction between the Rus' and the Slavs.<sup>56</sup> According to them the Rus' carried on a lively trade in which the Slavs figured chiefly as a commodity, i.e. they were sold as slaves.

The Arabs depict the Rus' as a tall, robust, well-built race of people. Ibn Fadhlān, who lived among the Volga Bulgars in 921-2, compared them to palm-trees and said that while the Slavs humbly accepted the dominion of the Khazars, the well-armed Rus' were full of bravery and aggressiveness towards other peoples. According to Ibn Rustā (early 10th century) and Gardīzi (a Persian historian of the 11th century), 'the Rus' go out to raid the Slavs in boats and they take the Slavs prisoner and sell them to the Khazars and Bulgars. They have no cultivated lands, and obtain grain from the Slavs.' Other Arabic writers, whom I have quoted at length in my previous works, also state that the Rus' did not live a settled life, till the soil or breed cattle.<sup>57</sup> Their expansion took place along waterways, and Arab sources have much to say about their boats and the rivers and seas over which they sailed to conquer or plunder foreign territories. All this is contrary to everything we know about the Slavs, but fully in accordance with the record of Norman conquest in Eastern or Western Europe.

This observation is supported by many facts. The Arab sources clearly suggest that the original home of the Rus' was in the far north.<sup>58</sup> Norman expansion in Eastern Europe coincides in time with the development of trade with the Arabs (9th-10th centuries), and it is reasonable to suppose that the two important events are causally connected. There is good reason to think that the Varangians were the Arabs' principal trading partners. It is generally known that they were much interested in commercial and economic gain (plundering expeditions, exaction of tribute from conquered peoples, trade etc.). In the 9th-10th centuries the Varangians dominated Eastern Europe in a military sense, and to maintain their rule they garrisoned the fortress-towns of the Slav and Finnic tribes.<sup>59</sup>

The Varangians were concentrated not only on the Upper Volga but on the river's middle reaches, where they remained as late as the 13th or 14th century.<sup>60</sup> These settlements were no doubt trading posts dating from the period of intensive exchanges between them and the Arabs.

The Arab world did not need to trade with the Baltic countries, especially Scandinavia, to such an extent as it actually did. Some of the goods it obtained from the Baltic<sup>61</sup> could have been obtained from the northern part of Eastern Europe. Evidently there was an element in Eastern Europe which sought to encourage the Arabs to trade with the Baltic countries because of its own connections with them. It is significant that the *Povesť* refers to the Baltic as the 'Varangian sea' (*more Varyazh'skoe*).

Trade with the Arabs took place on a scale exceeding the scope of individual East European peoples whose highest form of organization was that of the tribe. The Normans, on the other hand, played an important part in international trade, and their organizing abilities were well known. Ali al-Mas'udi in the first half of the 10th century relates that the Rus' merchants brought their goods to Spain,<sup>62</sup> Rome, Constantinople and the Khazars.<sup>63</sup> In the middle of the 10th century the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus refers to Rus'ian traders visiting Byzantium, and in about 966 a Spanish Jew, Ibrahim ibn Yakub, states that the Rus' bring their merchandise to Prague in Bohemia. Many other examples could be quoted.<sup>64</sup>

As we know, not all the Arab silver found its way from Eastern Europe to the Baltic: some of it remained on the Volga and the Oka, around Lake Ilmen' etc. It is hard to say for certain whether it entered into the economic life of those lands and was used as a local currency, or for transit purposes only: not surprisingly, expert opinions differ on this subject.<sup>65</sup>

Apart from the *Rūs* and the *Saqāliba*, Arab writers say little or nothing of racial differences in Eastern Europe.<sup>66</sup> One would not suppose from their accounts that there were any individual Slav or Finno-Ugrian tribes, although these did exist in large number. For our purposes it is especially regrettable that they say nothing of the peoples between the Volga and the Oka, especially the Merya, and also those of the Muroma, Meshchera etc. The inference must be that although many Cufic coins have been found on these peoples' territory, they cannot have been in direct

commercial contact with the lands to the south, since otherwise the Arabs would certainly have known something of them.<sup>67</sup>

Arab writers who contribute directly or indirectly to our knowledge of the ethnic character of the Rus' confirm and complete what Western sources tell us about them. The *Povesť vremennykh let* is in full agreement with both the Eastern and the Western sources. Hence all efforts by more or less recent authors to 'correct', or rather distort, the chronicler's account<sup>68</sup> are doomed to failure. It is hard to imagine that so many independent sources could have all have made the same mistake.

Trade between the Rus' and the Arabs goes some way to explain the genesis of Norman expansion in Eastern Europe. The *Povesť* mentions a number of towns—Novgorod, Polotsk, Beloozero, Rostov, Murom etc.—which were garrisoned by detachments of Varangian Rus'.<sup>69</sup> It is not by accident that collections of Cufic coins have been found near those towns. Apart from their other duties, the garrisons were there to protect trade routes and ensure that travelling merchants could stay in the towns unmolested.

For geographical reasons it is clear that the Merya territory must have played an important part in the Varangians' ambitious enterprises. Accordingly the Merya and their neighbours are linked by the chronicler with the first appearance of the Varangians in Eastern Europe in 859 and 862. The link is maintained until the entry for 907, after which there is no reference to the Merya-Varangian connection until the time of Vladimir the Great. Much importance is generally attached to this hiatus, from which it is inferred that the real history of the Upper Volga area dates only from the end of the 10th century; the chronicler's earlier references to the Merya are thought to be legendary, or at all events improbable.

A curious fact attracts our attention, viz. that the period of most intensive trading between the Rus' and the Arabs is in the 10th century, the time of Igor', Ol'ga, Svyatoslav and probably Vladimir,<sup>70</sup> exactly when the above-mentioned hiatus occurs. Two possibilities suggest themselves: either these rulers were so concerned with the needs and problems of the Kiev state that they lost touch with the north-eastern lands, or else they had established so strong a position there that they could leave the

task of government, and of trading with the Arabs, to their local deputies. In my view the second hypothesis is the most likely.

The treaty of 944/5 between the Rus'ians and the Greeks mention in the first place Igor', and the princes and princesses associated with him, all of whose names are given, and next the dignitaries, merchants and warriors who treated with the Greeks on his behalf.<sup>71</sup> Most of these envoys have Norman names.

The names of estates in the Merya territory which continued to exist in later times were sometimes derived from those of their first owners.<sup>72</sup> Among the envoys mentioned in the treaty of 944/5 are some whose names appear—a fact of particular importance—in the geography of the Upper Volga region. Thus Ivor is represented by 'Ivorovo', 'Ivorovskaya volost', 'Ivorovskoe selo', Istr or Ister (*Istr Aminodov*) by 'Isterva volost'; Karsh or Karash (*Karshov Turdov*) by 'Karash volost'; and Klek (*Kol Klekov*) by 'Klekovskii stan'.<sup>73</sup> The same happened in the lands of Great Novgorod.<sup>74</sup>

From the text of the treaty it appears that Ivor, who was certainly a Varangian,<sup>75</sup> played an especially important part among the non-princes. He represented the Grand Duke himself, and is named first and separately from the other envoys. He was evidently the chief of the Rus'ian mission to Constantinople, and was rewarded with a large tract of Merya land. He must have enjoyed high authority there as a representative of his prince, and so in their degree must the other envoys, whose estates were so large that even the rivers and lakes were named after them: the river Istra, Lake Karash. It is not a hypothesis, but a fact that Igor exercised authority over the Upper Volga area in the broad sense of the term.

This fact has important implications, the first of which is to invalidate the idea that the *Povest'* says nothing of the Merya connection between the beginning and end of the 10th century. The treaty with the Greeks shows that in mid-century, as well as earlier and later, Merya was a dependency of the Rus'ians and formed part of their state without interruption. Its main obligation was to pay tribute<sup>76</sup> and take part in military expeditions.<sup>77</sup> To enforce these duties, Varangian garrisons were stationed from the second half of the 9th century onwards, in the towns of the Merya and of other tribes. Under the year 862, when the chronicler speaks of Rurik's government and the presence of Varangian

warriors in Polotsk, Rostov, Beloozero<sup>78</sup> and elsewhere (Novgorod, Murom), he adds, in accordance with his custom of relating history to the present day,<sup>79</sup> that the garrisoning of northern towns by Varangians was still in force at the beginning of the twelfth century ('I po tem gorodam sut' nakhodnitsi varyazi').<sup>80</sup> This testifies to the strength of the resistance offered by the Merya and other tribes, although it is very seldom mentioned in the sources.

There is no reason to suppose that Rurik and his immediate successors (Oleg, Igor', Ol'ga and Svyatoslav) themselves dwelt in the Upper Volga area and governed it directly. It appears from the treaty of 944/5 that the north-east was governed in the prince's name by his 'men' or 'servants' (*muzhe, lyud'e*), such as Ivor and the others who are named there. We may assume that this privileged group disposed of large amounts of money, including tribute imposed on the local population, the proceeds of foreign trade,<sup>81</sup> the revenue from their estates etc.; in addition they controlled substantial military forces. For practical reasons they would have to know the Merya language, a rare accomplishment at Kiev and one which would increase their local influence and importance.

After the time of Vladimir I the picture changes inasmuch as the sources speak of princes residing in the Upper Volga area. What we are told of these sons and grandsons of Vladimir suggests, however, that they were mainly concerned with events in the south or in Novgorod, and that their rule in the north-east was of a nominal character and did not radically affect the local authority of the prince's representatives.

The first prince who is mentioned by name as receiving a grant of the Rostov territory at the end of the 10th century is Yaroslav, son of Vladimir the Great. The chronicler's very laconic statement allows us only to conjecture that Yaroslav did not remain long on the Upper Volga and that the same is true of his successor at Rostov, his younger half-brother Boris.<sup>82</sup>

After Vladimir's death in 1015 violent strife broke out among his surviving sons, as a result of which Yaroslav finally occupied the throne of Kiev. There is no doubt that the Upper Volga region was part of Yaroslav's dominions:<sup>83</sup> in his will, dated 1054, he bequeathed it to his son Vsevolod, then resident at Pereyaslav'.



There is no trace, however, of Vsevolod having lived in the Merya territory. His son Vladimir Monomakh in turn inherited the 'Rostov land', as it was called after its capital city, and from then on the Upper Volga area was governed by princes in more than a nominal fashion. None the less, Monomakh himself was deeply involved in the politics of southern Rus' and only fitfully concerned with the north-east, so that he cannot be regarded as the first of the separate Volga branch of the Rurikides. In his own account of his long life (1053-1125) Monomakh states that he made 83 major journeys altogether<sup>84</sup> as well as shorter ones—e.g. he travelled from Chernigov to Kiev about 100 times—but only four of these were to Rostov,<sup>85</sup> a fact which speaks for itself.

The chroniclers' lack of interest in the Merya territory in the 10th and 11th centuries is largely explained by the fact that the princes did not reside there and the area was, so to speak, outside the range of high politics. Only twice does it come into the limelight, on account of rebellions which took place in 1024 and 1071. In both cases they were ruthlessly suppressed, but the account of events throws some light on the internal situation of the region in the period we are concerned with.

The revolts of 1024 and 1071 took place in years of bad harvests and starvation. Periodic famines were a scourge to the people of those days: as later sources indicate, they led to desperate acts such as panic and random flight, abandoning children, eating the flesh of cats and dogs, and even cannibalism.<sup>86</sup> Thus the rebellions in the Rostov-Suzdal' area took place in a disturbed atmosphere leading to violent though ill-prepared outbreaks. However, the unrest had deeper roots than the famine which was its immediate cause.<sup>87</sup> These must be sought in the internal situation and especially the hatred of the masses for those who oppressed them by extorting tribute and in other ways.

Among the East European peoples at this period, whether Slav or Finnic, it is possible to observe social differentiations, more marked in some tribes and less in others, between at least two groups, the chiefs or notables and the mass of the people. How far this process had gone among the Merya is difficult to ascertain, as the sources are scarce and uninformative. In accounts of the events of 1024 and 1071 use is made of social terms whose meaning varied in the course of time and is hard to determine for the date in question,<sup>88</sup> so that interpretations are more or less

arbitrary. The *Povest'* says that the rebels of 1071 were *smerdy*,<sup>89</sup> which means, broadly speaking, small farmers.<sup>90</sup> Those who fell victims of the revolt of 1024, on the other hand, are called *staraya chad'*,<sup>91</sup> which, as the context shows, refers to the better-off inhabitants.<sup>92</sup> We may of course identify these with the Merya notables, and in that case it would seem that the latter played an important part in local political and economic life in the 10th-12th centuries. Unfortunately, however, there is no confirmation of this in the sources, which tell us nothing of relations between the Varangian overlords of the Upper Volga area and the chiefs of the Merya tribe.

The *Povest'* also makes frequent use, from the time of the Rus'-ian-Greek treaties onwards,<sup>93</sup> of the term 'boyars' to denote the ruling classes in the Merya and other territories. They are as a rule referred to collectively as the 'strong boyars' (*sil'noe boyarstvo*),<sup>94</sup> 'local boyar magnates' (*mestnaya boyarskaya znat'*),<sup>95</sup> 'local boyar elders' (*mestnoe staroe boyarstvo*),<sup>96</sup> 'powerful and numerous boyar elders' (*sil'naya i mnogochislennaya boyarskaya znat'*),<sup>97</sup> 'leading local chiefs' (*rukovodyashchie mestnye verkhi*)<sup>98</sup> and so on. None of these designations throw light on their ethnic character.

As a rule, the development in the Merya territory of a privileged ruling class is rightly connected with the system of large estates. This is generally believed to date back to the 11th century,<sup>99</sup> but in my opinion it must have begun much earlier. Indeed, Igor's treaty of 944/5 with the Greeks shows that there was such a privileged group in the first half of the 10th century, and the Varangian name Ivor throws light on its ethnic composition.

The outbreaks of unrest in the Upper Volga area had an ethnic background (the antagonism between Merya and Varangians) and a social one (Varangian landowners and the impoverished masses), and in addition they had a religious aspect.<sup>100</sup> It is not by chance that both revolts were led by heathen priests (*volkhvy, volsvi*), who took advantage of famine and other discontents to strike a blow for the old beliefs.<sup>101</sup>

While the date of the second rebellion (1071) appears doubtful,<sup>102</sup> there is no reason to question that of 1024,<sup>103</sup> which is of importance in dating the beginnings of missionary activity in the area. The more or less effective conversion of the Merya to

Christianity was a long-term process measured in decades or even centuries. If the pagan priests felt their position threatened as early as 1024 and were able to stir up the people to active revolt, the work of Christianization must have begun in the time of Vladimir the Great<sup>104</sup> and already achieved some success, though it is hard to say how much.<sup>105</sup> This leads to the conclusion that when Vladimir decided to accept baptism his intention was not confined to his Slav subjects. Political reasons prompted him and his successors to spread the new faith among the Finns and especially the Merya, so as to weld the conquered peoples into a multi-ethnic state. Missionary effort was not confined to the area of the Dnepr or Lake Ilmen', but was pursued no less vigorously on the Upper Volga. If, as is generally assumed, the first bishoprics in Slav territory (Belgorod, Novgorod etc.) were established in Vladimir's time, there is no reason to suppose that matters were different in the Merya territory. The Rostov bishopric was probably created before 1015, or at latest shortly after that date.<sup>106</sup>

This view of the history of the Rus'ian church is shared by Golubinsky, Kartashev and others.<sup>107</sup> It is, however, disputed in the literature, and it is preferable therefore to base ourselves on undisputed facts. There is no doubt that the see of Rostov was occupied successively in the second half of the 11th century by two monks from the Crypt Monastery at Kiev, named Leontius and Isaiah. Isaiah was still bishop of Rostov in 1089,<sup>108</sup> and died shortly after; the see then ceased to exist and was absorbed into that of Pereyasavl near Kiev. These facts are generally known and are rightly undisputed.

Many recent writers on the subject of church origins in the north-east (Priselkov, Voronin, Nasonov and others) believe that Leontius was the first bishop of the territory<sup>109</sup> and that the alleged existence of the see before the middle of the 11th century is mere legend. But this view, although put forward with confidence, is open to question.

The difficulty of determining the date of origin of the Rostov see is due to disagreement between two sources, the *Life of Leontius*<sup>110</sup> and the testimony of Simon, bishop of Vladimir-Suzdal'.<sup>111</sup> The first redaction of the *Life* seems to date from the 1160s,<sup>112</sup> while Simon wrote in about 1222. The *Life* states that two Greeks, Fedor and Hilarion, were bishops of Rostov before

Leontius, whereas according to Simon he had no predecessor. Another contradiction is that the *Life* says Leontius died a natural death, whereas Simon declares that he was murdered by pagans.

At first sight it may be supposed that the *Life*, being earlier, is closer to the truth; but to this it can be objected that Simon speaks of an 'old' Rostovian chronicle, which he may himself have used, containing information on Leontius's life. This earliest written document from north-eastern Rus' has not survived, and scholars are not agreed as to its date, which remains a matter of conjecture.<sup>113</sup>

Those who accept Simon's account consider it a wholly reliable source and argue that the *Life*, being partly based on oral tradition, was distorted to suit the church policy of Andrei Bogolyubsky (d. 1174), the grandson of Vladimir Monomakh;<sup>114</sup> Simon, in their opinion, wrote his own work as a corrective. Both these contentions are open to doubt, however. In the first place there is no proof that Simon was acquainted with the *Life*,<sup>115</sup> as he does not join issue with it but writes his own account independently. Secondly there is no evidence that the *Life* is based wholly on oral tradition; and, even if it were so, it does not follow that at the time when the *Life* was first compiled, 90 years after the bishop's death, 'all recollection of [Leontius's] actual life had disappeared.'<sup>116</sup>

It is usually held that the *Life* was materially distorted in consequence of Bogolyubsky's desire, to which we shall revert, to found a metropolitan see of his own, independent of Kiev, and to have Leontius canonized as its patron. The sources, however, do not confirm this conjecture, but indirectly refute it.<sup>117</sup>

The *Life* states that the bishop died a natural death, and this appears to be an unbiased record of fact. If, as Simon says, Leontius was murdered by pagans, the *Life*, supposedly inspired by Bogolyubsky, would have laid stress on his martyrdom as a compelling argument for his canonization.

In my opinion we should avoid the common practice of summarily discounting sources on the ground that they are intentionally biased in some way or other. Both Simon and the author of the *Life* set out, I believe, to state what had actually happened, and any differences between them can be largely attributed to the sources they used.

We do not know when Leontius's predecessors, Fedor and Hilarion, were bishops. Unlike Leontius and Isaiah, they did not leave the purlieus of the Crypt Monastery. The 'old' Rostov chronicle to which Simon refers, consists of records compiled in that monastery;<sup>118</sup> it knows nothing of Fedor and Hilarion, as the records had to do with the monastery and not the Rostov bishopric. Thus Simon, basing himself on the chronicle and the monastery records, could not know anything about the origins of the Rostov bishopric and naturally assumed Leontius to have been its first occupant, whereas in fact he was the inaugurator of its second phase. The first phase dates from the first half of the 11th century, the time of Vladimir and Yaroslav.<sup>119</sup> The 'great rebellion' of 1024 was stirred up and led by heathen priests whose position was threatened by the advance of Christianity, which shows that the missionaries had made appreciable progress in Vladimir's time. In my opinion the activity of the first two bishops of Rostov should be linked with that period. According to the *Life of Leontius*, they were both driven out after a short time by violent local resistance. It is possible that either Fedor or Hilarion built the old cathedral of Rostov,<sup>120</sup> or at least laid its foundation. Although the beginnings of Christianity in the north-east are shrouded in obscurity, we should not ignore or underestimate them.

After the death of Leontius's successor Isaiah in the 1090s, the see of Rostov was abolished and it became subject to Pereyasavl', far away in the south. To understand this surprising fact we must examine the church history of Pereyasavl' and connect it as far as possible with the fortunes of the Rostov area from the late 10th to the early 12th century. Unfortunately the subject is beset by many difficulties: we do not know how the church at Pereyasavl' came to be raised to metropolitan rank, when this happened and for how long, and what was its exact status. Other problems are the existence of imposing buildings at Pereyasavl' in semi-steppe country, the lack of territorial connection between it and the vast northern areas that were put under its authority, and so on.

Two northern lands were attached to Pereyasavl', viz. Rostov-Suzdal' and Smolensk. It is often supposed that this piece of ecclesiastical organization was the work of Vladimir Monomakh

at the end of the 11th century, but in my opinion this is untenable. In the first stages of Rus'ian church organization there was no question of Rostov or Smolensk being placed under the metropolitan church of Kiev,<sup>121</sup> and in the present case there must have been some substantial reason.

In general writers on this subject do not pay much attention to the elevation of Pereyasavl' into a see of special importance: it is treated as an accidental occurrence<sup>122</sup> or an episode of no particular importance.<sup>123</sup> The facts are against this, however: the erection of magnificent buildings at great expense,<sup>124</sup> and the ecclesiastical links with huge northern areas, are beyond the scope of a mere episode. The basic question is: who was the initiator and patron of the metropolis of Pereyasavl', or, to put it negatively, who would *not* have been in a position to take this initiative? Those whose attitudes have to be considered are the metropolitans of Kiev, the Rurikides and the patriarchs of Constantinople.

There is no doubt that the metropolitan see of Pereyasavl' detracted from the authority and importance of Kiev, which stood for the unity of Rus'ian Christianity. When Rostov-Suzdal' and Smolensk acquired bishops of their own in the 12th century, having previously been placed under Kiev instead of Pereyasavl', this must be regarded as the final triumph of the Kiev metropolitans, who had long striven to deprive Pereyasavl' of its special privilege and subordinate it to themselves.

For political reasons the church policy of the Kiev princes must have been opposed to giving Pereyasavl' any special status, since the unity of the state was buttressed by that of the church. They could hardly have agreed to it except under some form of constraint; at any rate, it is difficult to imagine them taking the initiative in creating a second metropolitan see. This leaves only the third possibility, viz. the patriarch in Constantinople,<sup>125</sup> who, in my opinion,<sup>126</sup> could have and did promote Pereyasavl' to a special position in the church organization of Eastern Europe.

Many arguments support this. It was within the patriarch's authority to decide whether there should be one or more metropolitan churches in Rus', and he was in a position to finance sumptuous buildings in Pereyasavl' out of all proportion to purely local needs. As to the northern lands that were placed under its authority, the interest that Constantinople took in them is shown by the fact that the two first bishops of Rostov, Fedor and Hilarion,

were consecrated by the patriarch himself and were directly subject to him.

The patriarchs always attached great importance to newly-converted peoples using Greek in the liturgy, though they allowed church books to be translated into the local languages. There was thus nothing unusual in Constantinople endeavoring to make the Rus'ian church use Greek.<sup>127</sup> they would only have departed from this principle under pressure of necessity, such as obtained on the banks of the Dnepr. Vladimir and his son Yaroslav well understood the importance of the language problem, not only in the sphere of religion and public worship, but also in the cultural and political domain, given the close relation between church and state. Both these princes firmly opposed the claims of Greek in order to assert their political and cultural independence of the Empire and prevent Rus' from sinking to the rank of a province.<sup>128</sup>

The practical problems of Christianizing Russia made necessary at all times an adjustment of the positions of Constantinople and Kiev. This was not easy to achieve: each side defended its own interests tenaciously, though neither wished to break off contact with the other, nor did they do so. It was a long time before a degree of accommodation was reached between the principles of canon law by which the patriarch was largely guided and, on the other hand, the *raison d'état* of the Kiev state as represented by Vladimir and his successors. For this reason I believe that at the time of Vladimir's baptism many points must have been left unsettled, especially those concerning the metropolitan role of Kiev. These would not have related to the canonical situation—the links between Kiev and Constantinople gave rise to no controversy—but to the question who should occupy the see of Kiev and whether it should be a Slav or a Greek metropolitanate.

We know little of the earliest phase, or phases, of Rus'ian-Greek negotiations. More concrete data are provided by the agreement reached at the end of Yaroslav's reign, but we can only infer details of this agreement from later events that seem to have been a consequence of it.

The agreement was preceded by two anti-Greek actions on Yaroslav's part: in 1043 he conducted an unsuccessful campaign against Constantinople,<sup>129</sup> and in 1051 he appointed Hilarion to be metropolitan of Kiev without the patriarch's knowledge or consent.<sup>130</sup> This did not entail a breach with Constantinople in

the canonical sense, but it struck a blow at Greek ambitions with regard to the Rus'ian church. Yaroslav's actions, however, while dangerous to the Greeks, did not bring the desired success, and both sides found it necessary to compromise. The Slav character of the metropolis of Kiev, and above all its liturgical language, were preserved for good and all, but in return for this concession Hilarion was deposed and it was agreed that in future the metropolitan of Kiev would invariably be a Greek, chosen and consecrated by the patriarch; there is no evidence that the appointees knew the Slav language.

The arrangement whereby a Greek occupied the Slav metropolitan see of Kiev did not prevent further disputes and friction, but it made co-operation possible in the short term. The solution did not mean that Greek ceased to be used in the Rus'ian church. It would have been hard to expect Greek metropolitans and bishops of the Rus'ian hierarchy to conduct services in a language they did not know. Chanting was taught by the Greeks to the Rus'ians, and Greek singing was heard in Rus'ian churches.<sup>131</sup> Greek inscriptions are found on the seals of Rus'ian metropolitans and bishops<sup>132</sup> and on mosaics in St Sophia's cathedral at Kiev;<sup>133</sup> Rus'ian church dignitaries carried on correspondence in Greek, and so on.

The Rus'ian-Greek agreement gave rise to many practical difficulties. Not many Greek clergy came to Kiev, and only a few of them knew the Slav language. It is unlikely that they could themselves carry on the work of converting the masses throughout the huge territories of Eastern Europe, and the highest dignitaries of the church took no more than a nominal part in this. The Rus'ian metropolitans of the 10th century, as far as their appearance in the *Povest'* goes, are shadowy figures of whom we learn next to nothing beyond their date of arrival or death, or participation in some church solemnity. The chronicler in general shows a reserved and somewhat hostile attitude towards these nominees of the Greek patriarch.<sup>134</sup>

The real burden of missionary work fell on the non-Greek clergy,<sup>135</sup> who were more attached to Vladimir's interests<sup>136</sup> than to those of Constantinople. Their dependence on the Greeks was largely a fiction, and in these circumstances antagonism was bound to occur.



The patriarch's agreement to respect the Slav character of the see of Kiev was qualified by the provision that the highest positions should be held by Greeks, and also by limiting the geographical scope of Kiev's authority. Seen from Constantinople, the mixture of races in the Rurikide state—Slavs, Varangians, Finns—justified the creation of a second metropolitanate to which the non-Slav or partially non-Slav territories would belong. In view of their ethnic composition it seems likely that the liturgical language would not have been Slav, but Greek.

It seems to me that towards the end of his life, when he was perhaps succumbing to the effects of age, Yaroslav (who died in 1054)<sup>137</sup> fell under the influence of the Greeks among his entourage at Kiev, or was taken in by their intrigues, as is shown by his last will and testament. The distribution of lands among Yaroslav's heirs was quite different from that instituted by his father Vladimir.<sup>138</sup> Whereas Vladimir had conferred on his sons the lordship of particular tribes, making them reside at Kiev, Novgorod, Polotsk, Turov, Rostov, Murom etc., under Yaroslav's will these old tribal capitals took second place. This was particularly the case with Novgorod, which had been the Rus'ian city next in importance to Kiev but now fell to the rank of a subject territory, being supplanted by Chernigov and especially Pereyasavl'—the cities to which extensive non-Slav territories had been attached.<sup>139</sup> In this way Pereyasavl', a recently founded fortress city<sup>140</sup> on the borders of the steppes,<sup>141</sup> unexpectedly became one of the three chief cities of the 'Rus'ian land'.<sup>142</sup>

Yaroslav granted Pereyasavl' to his favourite son Vsevolod (born in 1030),<sup>143</sup> who he hoped would work for cooperation and harmony between Rus'ians and Greeks. Vsevolod knew five languages,<sup>144</sup> of which Greek must have been one, and was thus suited for the role by education as well as by his conciliatory temperament and aversion from conflict.<sup>145</sup> He married Maria,<sup>146</sup> daughter of the Greek emperor Constantine IX Monomachus.<sup>147</sup> This marriage, which probably took place in 1052,<sup>148</sup> shows the extent to which relations with the Greeks had improved, in accordance with Yaroslav's policy of impressing his subjects by an alliance with the imperial court.<sup>149</sup>

The apauage of Pereyasavl' seems a surprisingly poor one for Yaroslav's favourite son<sup>150</sup> and the husband of a Byzantine princess. Its importance, however, lay in its destined future role

rather than in the present. In my opinion the Rus'ian-Greek treaty of 1052 must have embodied the acceptance by Constantinople of the non-Greek character of the Kiev metropolitanate, in return for the creation of a Greek one at Pereyasavl'. Then, under Yaroslav's will, large northeastern territories were attached to Pereyasavl', including the homes of at least two Finnic tribes, the Merya and the Ves'. If it were not for these, Pereyasavl' would never have acquired metropolitan status. It seems likely that Vsevolod's Byzantine consort energetically fostered the Greek policy in the non-Slav areas and was aided in this by her husband, who continued the policy after her death in about 1067. Vladimir Monomakh may well have had his own mother in mind when, in his famous Testament, the *Pouchenie* (incorporated into the *Povest*),<sup>151</sup> he warned his sons that, while loving their wives, they should not be unduly influenced by them.<sup>152</sup>

It may seem at first sight that the agreement of about 1052 was more favourable to the Greeks than to the Rus'ians. In the long run, however, the reverse was the case. Constantinople was unable to put its elaborate plans into effect or impose its will by force. Despite the political and financial efforts of the patriarchs, including the embellishment of Pereyasavl', the metropolis established there did not stand the test of time. The rulers of Kiev, with their well-defined plans for unifying the Rus'ian state and its church organization, and for imposing the Slav language on all its inhabitants including the Varangians and Finnic tribes, finally succeeded in thwarting Greek designs. They were supported not only by the non-Greek clergy but often enough by many of the Greeks as well, as the metropolitans of Kiev and many bishops in the Slav lands became involved in Rus'ian affairs and tended to look out for their own immediate interests,<sup>153</sup> which did not always accord with the patriarch's intentions. Being on the spot, they were perhaps better able to see how unrealistic the Greek policy was.

The importance of Pereyasavl' in the history of the Rus'ian church lasted approximately from 1050 to 1150.<sup>154</sup> It came to an end when Rostov-Suzdal' and Smolensk<sup>155</sup> obtained bishops of their own, subordinate to the Kiev metropolitan.

Two notable facts occurred in about 1090: Pereyasavl' lost its metropolitan status and became subordinate to Kiev, while the bishopric of Rostov was suppressed and it became part of the

Pereyaslavl' diocese. There was a logical connection between these more or less simultaneous<sup>156</sup> events, which I regard as constituting a second phase (i.e. subsequent to the agreement of 1052) in the ecclesiastical organization of Rus'. As before, negotiations between Kiev and Constantinople resulted in a compromise, but in this case the advantage was clearly on the Rus'ian side: the patriarch accepted the down-grading of Pereyaslavl', and by way of compensation the latter diocese was enlarged by the addition of Rostov. This in effect represented the abandonment of Greek plans for Rus', though the final solution was neither rapid nor easy.<sup>157</sup>

The second agreement with the patriarch dates from shortly before Vsevolod's death in 1093.<sup>158</sup> The latter was already infirm, and his son Vladimir, then aged nearly 40, no doubt played an important part in the negotiations.<sup>159</sup> Vladimir, surnamed 'Monomakh' after his imperial grandfather and in his own opinion of himself, was well placed to negotiate with the Greeks, but he was also a Norman, conscious of his Viking origin expressed in the name Vladimir which corresponds to the Norse Waldemar (*rus'skym' imenem' Volodimir*);<sup>160</sup> through his Scandinavian connections he was married to an English princess, Gyda,<sup>161</sup> and had given the name Harald to one of his sons.<sup>162</sup> The Norman political tradition for which he stood ruled out a policy of passive obedience to Constantinople. Realizing the importance of Christianity for the maintenance of his dynasty in Eastern Europe, he sought to preserve good relations with both the patriarch and the emperor. Aware of the importance of his success in obtaining the suppression of the metropolitanate at Pereyaslavl', he was ready to accommodate the Greeks by uniting Rostov to Pereyaslavl' and did not press for an independent bishopric at Smolensk, although he desired this in later years and perhaps previously.<sup>163</sup>

Vladimir's political skill and experience are shown in his cooperation with Ephraim, a zealous defender of the patriarch's 'Pereyaslavl' policy. It is hard to suppose that Ephraim did not know who was responsible for the suppression of his metropolitan see, or that Monomakh was unacquainted with the sumptuous buildings erected by the metropolitan at Pereyaslavl'. None the less Vladimir was able to win over Ephraim to his side, making use of his energy and experience and persuading him to join in

building a cathedral at Suzdal', the most important Merya city next to Rostov.<sup>164</sup>

Monomakh was the last of the outstanding rulers who, from their throne at Kiev, watched over the general interest of the whole Rus'ian state.<sup>165</sup> He must be recognized as a worthy successor of Vladimir the Great and Yaroslav the Wise; but with his reign the glory of Kiev comes to an end. As members of the dynasty grew more numerous there was increasing strife among them; in each successive generation the unity of the state became visibly weaker, and the southern lands were subject to wars and devastation.<sup>166</sup> The lack of proper frontier defence encouraged aggression by the steppe nomads, especially the Polovtsians, who ranged over a vast area.<sup>167</sup> The Rurikides often sought aid from the nomads in their intestine quarrels, thus enabling the latter to commit fresh depredations.

The dissolution of the Kiev state had different effects on its respective component lands. For some it meant increasing political and economic decline, while to others it gave an opportunity to assert their strength and independence and to embark on a period of vigorous development. Among these were the lands of the Upper Volga.

#### Notes to Chapter 4

1. See Appendix 2, *The Finno-Ugrian Tribes*.
2. ' . . . merya, muroma, ves', mordva . . .', *Povest'* I, p. 10; ' . . . chud', merya, ves', muroma . . .', *ibid.*, p. 13. The Merya belong to the eastern group of Finno-Ugrians.
3. ' . . . a per'vii nasel'nitsi . . . v Rostove merya . . .', *Povest'* I, p. 18. It is generally supposed that the Merya were already on the Upper Volga towards the end of the first millennium BC: cf. *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya* 9, 1966, p. 378. Jordanis in the 6th century AD mentions the Merya (*Merens*) but does not say where they lived: *Jordanis Getica*, ed. Th. Mommsen, *MGH, Auctores Antiquissimi* V, 1882, p. 88; English tr. by Ch. Mierov, *The Gothic History of Jordanes*, *PUP*, 1915, p. 84.
4. ' . . . sedyat' . . . na Rostov'skom ozere merya, a na Kleshchine ozere [i.e. Lake Pereyaslavl'] merya zhe', *Povest'* I, p. 13; ' . . . sut' . . . v Rostove merya . . .', *ibid.*, p. 18. The two lakes are joined to the Volga by its right-bank tributaries the Kotorosl' and the Nerl'.

5. M. Vasmer, *Wörterbuch der russischen Gewässernamen*; 1964, pp. 258–62.

6. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii Velikorusskoi narodnosti*, 1929, p. 10.

7. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya*, MIA, XCIV, 1961, p. 248.

8. Cf. *Ocherki istorii SSSR*, IX-XIII vv., 1953.

9. M. Lyubavsky, op. cit., pp. 62–3, 94.

10. A. Uvarov (*Meryane i ikh byt po kurgannym raskopkam*, 1872, p. 15) says that in the second half of the 19th century the region was still covered by impenetrable forest.

11. M. Vasmer, *Beiträge zur historischen Völkerkunde Osteuropas*, SPAW, XIX (2), 1935, p. 514; id., *Beiträge zur slavischen Altertumskunde*, ZSP, XVI, 1939, p. 98. Among earlier works may be noted V. Samaryanov, *Sledy poselenii meri, chudi, cheremisy, emi i drugikh inorodtsev v predelakh Kostromskoi gubernii*, DTMAO, VI, 1876, pp. 47–67.

12. The chief towns in this region are Kostroma, at the mouth of the river of the same name, and Galich Mer'sky.

13. A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya' i obrazovanie territorii drevnerusskogo gosudarstva*, 1951, p. 173; V. Kuchkin, *Rostovo-Suzdal'skaya zemlya v X—pervoi treti XIII vekov (tsentry i granitsy)*, ISSR, 1969 (2), pp. 89–90.

14. N. Zhuravlev, *Putevoditel' po Yaroslavskoi gubernii*, 1859, p. 98; A. Uvarov, *Meryane i ikh byt*, p. 16.

15. E. Goryunova, *Meryanskii mogil'nik na Rybinskom more*, KSDPI, LIV, 1954, pp. 159–61.

16. A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya'*, p. 179.

17. N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, 1885, p. 51.

18. V. Preobrazhensky, *Vody v Tverskoi gubernii*, in: *Pamyatnaya knizhka Tverskoi gubernii na 1861 g.*, 1861 (unavailable to me).

19. Yu. Kizilov, *Geograficheskii faktor v istorii srednevekovoi Rusi*, VolI, 1973 (3), p. 54.

20. V. Sedov, in: *Baltskaya gidronomika Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya*, MIA, CLXXIV, 1971, pp. 108–9, argues from the origins of river-names that the eastern boundary of Baltic settlements ran to the west of Dmitrov and east of Moscow. In his opinion the boundary began somewhere on the Volga near the mouth of the Sestra, then ran southward along that river and along the north-west borders of Dmitrov to the Vorya, a left-bank tributary of the Klyaz'ma; it crossed the Klyaz'ma near the mouth of the Vorya and followed the Pekhorka to where that river joins the Moskva, thence south-eastward along the Moskva to its junction with the Oka. For more information on the Balts see Appendix 5, *Slav Colonization of the Merya Territory*.

21. P. Tret'yakov, K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya v I tysyacheletii n.e., *SAr*, 1957 (2), pp. 65, 77; id. in *SAr*, 1962, pp. 265, 267.

22. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 63.

23. See below, Chapter 7.

24. N. Barsov, op. cit., p. 51; N. Voronin, Iz rannei istorii Vladimira i ego okrug, *SAr*, 1959 (4), pp. 76, 81.

25. A. Dubynin, O plemennoi prinadlezhnosti naseleniya severnoi okrainy Muromskoi zemli, *SAr*, 1966 (3), pp. 67-79.

26. We leave out of account here the Western Caliphate with its capital at Córdoba in southern Spain; the trade links of Eastern Europe were mainly with the Eastern Caliphate.

27. For the Arabs' knowledge of Eastern Europe see B. Zakhoder, Sredneaziatsko-khorsanskaya geografiya IX-X vv. o Povolzh'e i Vostochnoi Evrope, *UZIV*, XIV, 1956, pp. 5-30; id., *Kaspiiskii svod svedenii o Vostochnoi Evrope I* (Gorgau i Povolzh'e v IX-X vv.), 1962; II (Bulgary, mad'yary i slavyane), 1967.

28. Ibn Fadhlán in his *Travels* (921-2) states that the Arab merchants reached the Volga Bulgars: I. Krachkovsky, *Puteshestvie Ibn-Fadhlana na Volgu*, 1939. The value of Ibn Fadhlán's account is discussed in M. Kowalska, Średniowieczna arabska literatura podróźnicza, *ZNUJ*, CCCXVII, 1973, pp. 25-35.

29. It is possible that the Khazars on the lower Volga may also have been intermediaries in the trade in question, especially in its earliest phase: cf. V. Kropotkin, Novye materialy do istorii denezhnogo obrashcheniya v Vostochnoi Evrope v kontse VIII—pervoi polovine IX veka, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, pp. 72-9. V. Yanin (Numizmatika i problemy tovarno-denezhnogo obrashcheniya v drevnei Rusi, *Vol*, 1955 (8), p. 137; id., in *SAr*, XXV, 1956, p. 363, considers, and is not alone in doing so, that some authors have exaggerated the part played by the Khazars. Yanin believes that Arab coins came into Eastern Europe chiefly through the territory of the Volga Bulgars.

30. R. Hennig, Der mittelalterliche arabische Handelsverkehr in Ost-europa, I, XXII, 1935, pp. 248-51; F. Mikhalevsky, *Ocherki istorii deneg i denezhnogo obrashcheniya I*, 1948, p. 218; B. Rybakov, Torgovlya i torgovye puti, in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi I*, 1951, pp. 319-26; P. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, I, 1956, p. 94, and others.

31. Prices were determined by the Arab market, which was supplied from various countries and did not depend exclusively on Eastern Europe. Merchants offered the market price, taking into account their own costs and profit margin, and the East Europeans evidently accepted this, or the trade would not have grown to such dimensions. A. Bartol'd, *Istoriya izucheniya Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii*, 1925, p. 168.

32. The Arabic script is called Cufic after the city of Al-Kufa, and the dirhems are called 'Cufic coins'.

33. The coins did not reach Eastern Europe from all Arab mints at the same time, or in equal quantity. In the early 9th century (c. 800-25) they were mainly Abbasid dirhems from North Africa. Later, from about 825 to 905, these dirhems still formed the bulk of the total but were minted in the central parts of the Eastern Caliphate: Baghdad and its environs, (Iraq and western Iran). In the 10th century most of the coins were Samanid (from lands south and east of the Aral Sea), but by the end of the century these no longer constituted the whole supply. Cf. R. Fasmer, *Zavalishinskii klad kuficheskikh monet VIII-IX vv.*, *IGAIMK*, VII (2) 1931, pp. 1-20; id., *Ob izdanii novoi topografii nakhodok kuficheskikh monet v Vostochnoi Evrope*, *IANOON*, 1933 (71), pp. 476-9; S. Yanina, *Nerevskii klad kuficheskikh monet X veka*, *MIA*, LV, 1956, pp. 183-4.

34. P. Lyubomirov, *Torgovye svyazi drevnei Rusi s Vostokom v VIII-XI vv.*, *UZSGU*, I (3), 1923, pp. 5-38; R. Fasmer, *Ob izdanii*, pp. 476-7; G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady IX-XIII vv.*, 1954, pp. 15, 36; V. Yanin in *SAr*, XXV, 1956, p. 361; S. Yanina, *Nerevskii klad*, p. 183; E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 231; G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Monety rasskazyvayut (Numizmatika)*, 1963, pp. 117-22, etc.

35. So far no 8th-century hoards of Cufic coins have been discovered, though a few 8th-century coins have been found in hoards of the 9th century.

36. V. Yanin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy russkogo srednevekov'ya. Domongol'skii period*, 1956, p. 12.

37. Among the largest hoards are one found near where the Volkhov flows into Lake Ladoga (said to weigh 115 kg) and another near Velikie Luki (c. 100 kg). Large hoards are found not only in the north-west but elsewhere, e.g. on the Oka. One at Murom weighed 42 kg and contained over 11,000 dirhems.

38. A. Markov, *Topografiya kladov vostochnykh monet (sasanidskikh i kuficheskikh)*, 1910; R. Fasmer, *Spisok monetnykh nakhodok, zaregistrovannykh Sektsiei numizmatiki . . .*, *SGAIMK*, I, 1926, pp. 289-93; id., *Zavalishinskii klad*, pp. 11-19; id., *Ob izdanii*, pp. 473-84, and others.

39. Cf. V. Kropotkin, *Novye materialy*, pp. 74-5; id., *Torgovye svyazi Volzhskoi Bolgarii v X v. po numizmaticheskim dannym*, *MIA*, CLXXVI, 1970, pp. 146-50.

40. A. Mongait, in: *Zadachi i vozmozhnosti arkhologicheskoi kartografii*, *SAr*, 1962 (1), pp. 33-4, expresses the view that the trade route did not follow the course of the Volga between the mouth of the Oka and Yaroslavl', as no Cufic coins have as yet been found there.

41. G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady*, pp. 34, 76; E. Goryunova, *Meryanskii mogil'nik*, p. 161; ead., *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 231; V. Yanin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy*, p. 106.

42. This route ran via the upper Kama, Vychehda and Sukhona rivers, Beloozero etc.: E. Goryunova, *Meryanskii mogil'nik*, pp. 160-1; ead., *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 231.

43. E. Kletnova, *Drevneishi torgovyi put' iz Varyag v Khazary*, ZRIOP, I, 1927, p. 16; G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady*, pp. 34-6; V. Yanin, *Numizmatika i problemy*, p. 137; V. Vilinbakhov, *Baltiisko-Volzhskii put'*, SAr, 1963 (3), pp. 126-35. For another water route between Lake Ladoga and the Volga see S. Kochkurkina, *Svyazi yugo-vostochnogo Priladozh'ya s zapadnymi stranami v X-XI vv.*, SS, XV, 1970, p. 145.

44. M. Sternberger, *Die Schatzfunde Gotlands der Wikingerzeit*, 1947. According to G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady*, p. 33, up to 1910 there were found in Eastern Europe 274 hoards of Cufic dirhems, and in Gotland alone 233. By now the number found in Gotland is over 350, totalling several tens of thousands of coins. Cf. R. Kiersnowski, *Początki pieniądza polskiego*, 1962, p. 48.

45. F. Kmietowicz, *Drogi napływu srebra arabskiego na południowe wybrzeża Bałtyku i przynależność etniczna jego nosicieli*, WN, XII (2), 1968, p. 66.

46. V. Yanin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy*, Chapter IV. The author distinguishes four periods: (1) end of the 8th century to 833; (2) 833-900; (3) 900-38; (4) 939 to the end of the 10th century.

47. The term 'hoard' is ill-defined: it may range from a few coins to thousands. Cf. V. Yanin, op. cit., p. 65. This lack of precision often leads to misunderstanding and conflicting calculations among various authors.

48. R. Fasmer, *Ob izdanii novoi topografii*, pp. 481-2; T. Lewicki, *Z dziejów pieniądza arabskiego w Europie Wschodniej*, Arch., III, 1949, 1952, pp. 224-8; V. Yanin, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

49. V. Yanin, op. cit., pp. 100-3. The author states that from this first period altogether 41 hoards of Cufic coins have been found and from the second 51, whereof in each case 16 come from the Baltic region; this shows that the latter played a considerable part from the very beginning.

50. V. Yanin, op. cit., pp. 118-21.

51. V. Yanin, op. cit., pp. 128-32.

52. V. Potin, *Nekotorye voprosy torgovli drevnei Rusi po numizmaticheskim dannym*, VIMK, 1961 (4), pp. 67-79; M. Fekhnner, *Nekotorye dannye arkhologii po torgovle Rusi so stranami Severnoi Evropy v X-XI vv.*, in: *Novoe o proshlom nashei strany*, 1967, pp. 33-41; V. Potin, *Russko-skandinavskie svyazi po numizmaticheskim dannym (IX-XII vv.)*,



*TIIL*, XI, 1970, pp. 64–80; I. Săskol'skij, Recent developments in the Normanist controversy, in: *Varangian Problems (Scando-Slavica, Supplementum, I)*, 1970, pp. 35–6, and others.

53. Cf. T. Lewicki, Die Vorstellungen arabischer Schriftsteller des 9. und 10. Jahrhunderts von der Geographie und von den ethnischen Verhältnissen Osteuropas, *I*, XXXV, 1960; id., Znajomość krajów i ludów Europy u pisarzy arabskich IX i X w., *SA*, VIII, 1961; id., Ze studiów nad źródłami arabskimi, *SA*, XII, 1965, etc.

54. V. Bartol'd, Arabskie izvestiya o rusakh, in his *Sochineniya* II (1), 1963, pp. 810–58.

55. The Arab name Saqlab probably represents an original form *Sklav* which may be related to either the Greco-Byzantine or the Latin name of the Slavs. T. Kowalski, in: *Relatio Ibrahim ibn-Jakub de itinere slavico quae traditur apud Al-Bekri*, *MPHNS*, I, 1946, pp. 55–6, states that although Arab authors also use the terms Saqālib, Saqāliba to designate various non-Slav peoples, as a rule they use them in the same sense as our 'Slav'.

56. F. Kmietowicz, Kupcy "ar-Rūs" źródła arabskich, *SPANK*, 1966, pp. 93–6; id., Stosunek nazwy Rus do Sakaliba w źródłach arabskich, *ibid.*, 1967, pp. 686–8. We cannot accept the view of A. Novosel'tsev (*Vostochnye istochniki o vostochnykh slavyanakh i Rusi VI-IX vv.*, in: *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie*, 1965, p. 408) that oriental writers used the term 'Rus' to denote the Slavs and Finns dwelling in the north.

57. This is supported by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who states that the Rus'ians bought large quantities of horses, cattle, sheep etc. from the nomadic Pechenegs.

58. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 154–7.

59. *Povest'* I, p. 18.

60. The Hungarian Dominican missionary Julianus, who visited the banks of the middle Volga and Kama in about 1237–8, relates that he met, beyond the Volga, a Tatar envoy who knew many languages of the Volga tribes including 'Teutonic' (. . . invenit . . . nuntium ducis Tartarorum, qui sciebat . . . Theotonicum). The Hungarian Franciscan brother Johanca, with three other friars of whom one was English, carried on missionary activities among the riparian population of the middle Volga. In a letter of 1320 to the General of the Order he states that it might be possible to win these people over to the Catholic church if English and German missionaries were sent to them (. . . fratres ydoneos providere ad hoc inspiratos et ibidem destinare, de Anglicis . . . et Teutonicis precipue, qui levius linguam scient'): L. Bendeŷy, *Fontes authentici itinera (1235–1238) fr. Iuliani illustrantes*, *AFCO*, III, 1937, pp. 24–5, 47–50. Both these statements indicate that part of the Volga

population was still Norse, using a language related to English and German.

61. G. Jacob, *Der nordisch-baltische Handel der Araber im Mittelalter*, 1887; id., *Welche Handelsartikel bezogen die Araber des Mittelalters aus den nordisch-baltischen Ländern?*, 1891.

62. Cf. V. Minorsky, *Kuda ezdili drevnie rusy*, in A. Tveritina (ed.), *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov Yugo-Vostochnoi i Tsentral'noi Evropy*, 1964, pp. 19–28.

63. The trade of the Rus'ians with the Khazars (and the Volga Bulgars) is also mentioned by Ibn Rusta and Gardizi, quoted above.

64. Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 119–21, 126, 128, 156 etc., id., *The Making*, pp. 153–6.

65. F. Mikhalevsky, *Ocherki po istorii deneg i denezhnogo obrashcheniya* I, 1948, p. 221; V. Yanin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy*, pp. 71–8; M. Luchinsky, *Den'gi na Rusi IX-XII vv.*, UZK, XII, 1958, pp. 173–4; M. Sverdlov, *K voprosu o denezhnom obrashchenii u vostochnykh slavyan v X-XII vv. (po musul'manskim istochnikam)*, VLU (Seriya ekonomiki, filosofii i prava), 1965 (5), pp. 132–6; P. Rappoport, *O tipologii drevnerusskikh poselenii*, KSDPI, CX, 1967, p. 4, and others.

66. An exception is constituted by Arab references to the *Wisū* or *Isū*. The identification of this mysterious tribe with the Finno-Ugrian *Ves'* is linguistically possible, but the details that Arab writers give concerning them do not accord well with the Beloozero region: R. Hennig, *Der mittelalterliche arabische Handelsverkehr in Osteuropa*, I, XXII, 1935, pp. 252–7.

67. It is a different matter as regards tribes in the far north-east, where Rus'ian domination was much weaker on account of the distance. The Arab sources show considerable interest in these regions. Al-Biruni, al-Marvezi, al-Garnati and others know of the existence of the Yugra or Ugra tribe in the form 'Yūrā', i.e. the present-day Ostyaks and Voguls who inhabit part of the Ob' basin: cf. R. Hennig, op. cit., pp. 254, 255, 260; I. Hrbek, *Arabo-Slavica*, AO, XXIII, 1955, p. 117. The Yugra formerly lived further west, on both slopes of the northern Urals. The Arab interest seems to have been based on old traditions. Archaeological finds and Sassanian coins from regions north of the Kama suggest that the Yugra traded with the far south as early as the 6th century. The prevailing view in the literature, however, (R. Fasmer, V. Yanin and others) is that this trade was unconnected with the later flow of Cufic coins to distant parts of Eastern Europe as a result of the Rus' conquests.

68. This comment relates to the general patterns of events and their logical connection, not to particular details which might be falsified by the chronicler, deliberately or otherwise.

69. *Povest'* I, p. 18.

70. The date of Vladimir I's death (1015) coincides with the disappearance of this trade. The flow of Cufic coins to Eastern Europe ceases in 1014-15, although trade with the Arabs continued for a time. Cf. A. Oreshnikov, *Denezhnye znaki domongol'skoi Rusi*, *TGIM*, VI, 1936, p. 31; V. Yanin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy*, p. 152.

71. *Povest' I*, pp. 34-5. Oleg acted similarly in his relations with Byzantium: *Povest' I*, pp. 24, 25.

72. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 13, 15-17. Cf. K. Gorbachevich, *Russkie geograficheskie nazvaniya*, 1965, pp. 40-2.

73. If Igor's treaty mentioned only one person whose name was reflected in the place-names of the region in question, this might be put down to accident; but since there are as many as four, it cannot be due to chance. I confine myself here to comparing the envoys' names with the historico-geographical information collected by M. Lyubavsky in: *Obrazovanie*, pp. 11, 12, 14, 50, 56, 113, 117, 120 etc. The study should be extended to cover other areas besides the Merya territory, as well as other historico-geographical works and, above all, other sources than those used by Lyubavsky. This is not so much a task for the historian as for historical geographers and etymologists.

74. B. Grekov (*Krest'yane na Rusi s drevneishikh vremen do XVII veka*, 1952, pp. 100, 103; *Kievskaya Rus'*, 1953, 135) connects the names of some Novgorod estates with persons mentioned in Oleg's and Igor's treaties (and in a document of Oleg's son Svyatoslav dating from 1137: M. Tikhomirov—M. Shchepkina, *Dva pamyatnika Novgorodskoi pis'mennosti*, in: *Pamyatniki kul'tury* 8, 1952, pp. 18-24).

75. Ivor was a Norse (Swedish) name: a Swedish commander of this name is mentioned in the mid-15th century. A. Nasonov, *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov*, 1950, p. 426.

76. 'Imakhu dan' varyazi iz zamor'ya na chyudi i na slovenekh, na meri . . .': *Povest' I*, p. 18. 'Se zhe Oleg . . . ustavi dani slovenom, krivichem i meri . . .': *ibid.*, p. 20. The Novgorod Chronicle says that it was Igor' (not Oleg) who imposed tribute on the Merya and other tribes. 'I sede Igor', knyazha, v Kyeve . . . Sei zhe Igor' . . . dani ustavi Slovenom i Varyagom dayati, i Krivichem i Meryam dan' dayati Varyagom . . .': *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov*, 1950, pp. 107, 434, 514.

77. 'Poide Oleg, poim voya mnogi, varyagi, chyud', sloveni, meryu, ves' . . .': *Povest' I*, p. 20. 'Ide Oleg na Greky . . . , poya zhe mnozhestvo varyag, i sloven . . . , i krivichi, i meryu . . .': *ibid.*, p. 23.

78. 'I priya vlast' Ryurik, i razdaya muzhem svoim grady, ovomu Polotesk, ovomu Rostov, drugomu Beloozero': *ibid.*, p. 18. Rurik's successors acted similarly. ' . . . Oleg poim voya mnogi, . . . pride k Smolen'sku . . . , i priya grad, i posadi muzh' svoi . . . i vzya Lyubets'

i posadi muzh' svoi': *ibid.*, p. 20. 'I izbra [Volodimer] ot nikh [ot varyag] muzhi dobry, smysleny i khrabry, i razdaya im grady': *ibid.*, p. 56; etc.

79. *Povest' I*, pp. 11-17, 20, 21, 40, 43, 50 etc.

80. *Povest' I*, p. 18. The present tense (*sut'*) shows that the reference is to the author's lifetime, i.e. the early 12th century. D. Likhachev in his Russian translation (*Povest' I*, p. 215) puts simply a dash, omitting the all-important verb ('varyagi v etikh gorodakh—nakhodniki'), and in an English translation he falsifies the meaning by substituting the past tense: 'And in these towns the Varangians were [*sic*] invaders' (D. Likhachev, *The Legend of the Calling-in of the Varangians . . .*, in: *Varangian Problems*, SS1 (Suppl. 1), 1970, p. 181). The account in the *Povest'* is confirmed by two pieces of evidence, one dating from before the beginning of the 12th century and the other from a subsequent time. Speaking of the religious (and ethnic) conditions in Eastern Europe in the second half of the 11th century, Feodosy Pechersky complained that there were 'Varangians all over the land' (sc. in city-fortresses): ' . . . po vsei zemli Varyazi sut' . . . ' (H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 39). Feodosy, like the author of the *Povest'*, uses the present tense, showing that he is speaking of his own time. Secondly, during the minority of Yury Dolgoruky, which will be discussed further in the present work, a Varangian was again in charge of the Merya country, showing the persistence there of a strong Varangian tradition.

81. Some of the estates belonging to envoys mentioned in Igor' 's treaty with the Greeks were situated on the river trade routes between the Baltic region and the Arab world. Ivor's large estate (Ivorovo, Ivorovskaya volost') extended along the Volga (chiefly the left bank) in what was later the principality of Tver', north of Staritsa. He may have possessed lands elsewhere, e.g. the village of Ivorovo (Ivorovskoe selo) on the right bank of the Nerl', a tributary of the Klyaz'ma, north of Yur'ev: M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 56, 117, 120. (Archaeological investigations of the 'Ivorovian group of kurgans' are discussed by E. Erofeeva in *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki Ivanovskoi oblasti. Materialy k arkheologicheskoi karte*, 1965, p. 20). The large estate of Karsh or Karash (Karash volost') was in the former principality of Rostov, on the left bank of the Nerl' north-east of Pereyasavl': M. Lyubavsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 113. Furthest south was the Klekov estate on the right bank of the Klyaz'ma (on the rivers Buzha and Pola) south of Vladimir: M. Lyubavsky, *op. cit.*, p. 50. The old domain of Istr (Ister) survives in place-names north of Zvenigorod: Isterva volost', Isterva slobodka and the river Istra, a left-bank tributary of the Moskva: Lyubavsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 14. These estates of Igor's envoys should be compared with the map in M. Fekhnér, *Vazhneishie torgovye puti severo-zapadnoi i severo-vostochnoi Rusi X-XIII vv.*, *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956.

82. Vladimir conferred large territories on his sons, giving Novgorod to Vysheslav and Rostov to Yaroslav. On Vysheslav's death he transferred Yaroslav to Novgorod and gave Rostov to Boris. ('Volodimer . . . posadi Vysheslava v Novegorode, . . . a Yaroslava Rostove. Umershyy zhe stareishemu Vysheslavu Novegorode, posadisha Yaroslava Novegorode, a Borisa Rostove . . .': *Povest'* I, p. 83). Many details are missing from this account: we do not know when Vladimir assigned these lands to his sons (the passage quoted appears under the year 988, but it is a general summary of events over a period of time); we do not know when Vysheslav died, and consequently when Boris succeeded Yaroslav at Rostov; it is hard to say whether the princes had to reside in the lands assigned to them—e.g. Boris, while holding Rostov, spent some time with his father at Kiev in 1015; and so on. Boris was murdered soon after Vladimir's death, so his connection with Rostov would seem to have been tenuous.

83. Yaroslav suppressed the Merya rebellion in 1024: *Povest'* I, pp. 99–100. The city of Yaroslavl', at the confluence of the Kotorosl' and the Volga, is probably connected with his rule. There is other evidence that he held the Merya territory: cf. *Povest'* II, p. 368.

84. *Povest'* I, p. 162.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 158, 161.

86. I. Bozheryanov, *Golodovki russkogo naroda s 1024 po 1902 god. Istoricheskii ocherk*, 1907; S. Knyazkov, *Golod v drevnei Rusi*, 1908; M. Bogolepov, *Kolebaniya klimata i istoricheskaya zhizn'*, COID, CCXXXIX, 1911; id., *Prichiny neurozhaev i goloda v Rossii v istoricheskoe vremya*, 1922; A. Emel'yanov, *Golod v otrazhenii russkoi literatury i publitsistiki*, 1922; I. Buchinsky, *O klimате proshlogo russkoi ravniny*, 1957; V. Pashuto, *Golodnye gody v drevnei Rusi*, EAIVE, 1962, 1964, etc.

87. Cf. N. Voronin, *Vosstaniya smerdov v XI veke*, *IsZ*, 1940, pp. 54–61; M. Tikhomirov, *Krest'yanskie i gorodskie vosstaniya v drevnei Rusi XI-XIII vv.*, 1961; V. Mavrodin, *Narodnye vosstaniya v drevnei Rusi XI-XIII vv.*, 1961; L. Cherepnin, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskie otnosheniya v drevnei Rusi i Russkaya Pravda*, in: *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie*, 1965, pp. 154–8, 181–95; I. Froyanov, *Kharakter sotsial'nikh konfliktiv na Rusi v X—na pochatku XII v.*, *UTZ*, 1971 (5), pp. 71–9, and others. Soviet literature on the subject is listed in I. Froyanov, *Sovetskaya istoriografiya o formirovanii klassov i klassovoi bor'be v drevnei Rusi*, in: *Sovetskaya istoriografiya klassovoi bor'by i revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Rossii I*, 1967, pp. 18–52.

88. Even having regard to the social terminology of the period as it is found in Slav lands, it is not easy to be certain whether the terms had the same meaning in Merya territory.

89. 'Yan zhe, ispytav, ch'ya esta smerda i uvedev, yako svoego knyazya, poslav k nim, izhe okolo eyu sut', reche im: Vydaite volkhva

ta semo, yako smerda esta moya i moego knyazya': *Povest'* I, p. 117. Other terms that appear in the sources, such as *lyud'e* ('people') and *muzhi* ('men'), are too vague to be satisfactorily defined, though attempts are constantly made to do so.

90. For a more detailed analysis of the term *smerd* see V. Klyuchevsky, *Terminologiya russkoi istorii*, 1884–6 (reprint in his *Sochineniya* VI, 1959, pp. 152–3); N. Voronin, *K istorii sel'skogo poseleniya feodal'noi Rusi*, IGAIMK, CXXXVIII, 1935, pp. 24, 34, 44; V. Lyubimov, *Smerd i kholop*, *IZ*, X, 1941, pp. 66–83; B. Syromyatnikov, *O "smerde"* drevnei Rusi (k kritike tekstov Russkoi Pravdy), *UZMGU*, CXVI, 1946, pp. 26–40; B. Grekov, *Krest'yane na Rusi* I, 1952, pp. 181–213; I. Smirnov, *Problema "smerdov"* v Prostrannoii Pravde, *IZ*, LXIV, 1959; id., *K probleme "smerd'ego kholopa"*, in: *Voprosy ekonomiki i klassovykh otnoshenii v Russkom gosudarstve XII–XVII vekov*, 1960, pp. 306–26; A. Zimin, *O smerdakh Drevnei Rusi XI—nachala XII v.*, in: *Istoriko-arkheologicheskii sbornik*, 1962; K. Rahbek Schmidt, *Soziale Terminologie in russischen Texten des frühen Mittelalters*, 1964, pp. 139–40, and others.

91. '. . . izbivakhu staruyu chad' . . .': *Povest'* I, p. 99.

92. The collective term *chad'* has the broad meaning 'people in general, servants, retinue etc.': cf. S. Pushkarev, *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, 1970, p. 6. The adjective *staraya* is noteworthy. M. Tikhomirov (*Krest'yanskii i gorodskii vosstaniya na Rusi XI–XIII vv.*, 1955, pp. 75–6) thinks that in this context it means *starshii*, *pervenstvuyushchii* (elder, senior, prior), i.e. the upper ranks of society in contrast to the masses (*prostaya chad'*). D. Likhachev (*Povest'* I, p. 299) translates *staraya chad'* by *zazhitochnye lyudi* (the well-to-do). V. Mavrodin interpreted the term similarly: *K voprosu o vosstaniyakh smerdov*, *PIDO*, 1934 (6), p. 77.

93. *Povest'* I, pp. 26, 35, 39 etc.

94. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva*, 1918, pp. 32, 34.

95. N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi*, p. 26.

96. Id., *K istorii sel'skogo poseleniya*, p. 52.

97. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 202.

98. A. Nasonov, *Maloissledovannye voprosy Rostovo-Suzdal'skogo letopisaniya XII v*, *PI*, X, 1962, p. 362.

99. *Ocherki istorii SSSR, IX–XIII vv.*, 1953, p. 321.

100. Cf. A. Artsikhovskiy, *Arkheologicheskie dannye o vozniknovenii feodalizma v Suzdal'skoi i Smolenskoi zemlyakh*, *PIDO*, 1934 (11–12), pp. 59–60.

101. R. Zguta, *The Pagan Priests of Early Russia*, *SR*, XXXIII, (2), 1974, pp. 259–66. The scanty evidence of the sources concerning pagan Merya beliefs is supplemented by archaeological finds, as many graves contain

objects or traces of religious worship. Cf. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 138–48, 194, 198; M. Fekhner, *Predmety yazycheskogo kul'ta*, in: *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e X-XI vv. po materialam Timerevskogo, Mikhailovskogo i Petrovskogo mogil'nikov*, 1963, pp. 86–9, and others.

102. The chronicler assembled under a single year (we do not know why he chose 1071) information about the revolts incited and led by *volkhvy* at various times and in various lands, both Slav and Finnic; D. Likhachev, *Povest' II*, pp. 401–2.

103. The date 1024 is supported by other details: Yaroslav sets out for Rostov from Novgorod and returns to it, so the events took place before he finally established himself at Kiev: *Povest' I*, pp. 99–100.

104. The rebellion broke out scarcely nine years after Vladimir's death in 1015. It is unlikely that missionaries could have achieved much in that time, especially without help from the state authorities: the period was one of chaos and internecine feud among Vladimir's sons.

105. Igor's treaty of 944/5 with the Greeks refers to (Varangian) Rus'ians, both Christian and pagan. It is hard to say whether the envoys who were given estates in Merya territory were Christians or not. In any case it seems certain that after the official Christianization in 988 the Varangians of the Upper Volga, who were close to the Grand Dukes would have been the first to be baptized and to support missionary activity among the Merya.

106. This is not invalidated by the undoubted fact that the mass of the Merya people remained pagan well after the 10th–11th century. The same was true in the Slav lands for centuries after the creation of bishoprics. In both cases the bishoprics were missionary centres: not so much evidence that the new faith had become established, as that it had begun its work among the heathen.

107. E. Golubinsky, *Istoriya russkoi tserkvi I* (1), 1901, pp. 199–205; A. Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkvi, I*, 1959, p. 182.

108. D. Likhachev, *Povest' II*, p. 415.

109. The Monastery of the Caves (Crypt Monastery) at Kiev was founded in 1055–60. As Leontius was a monk there, he could not have become a bishop before the 1060s. He is generally believed to have died in 1071, but it does not seem likely that his death was connected with the pagan revolt in or about that year: the accounts of the revolt say nothing about him, whereas if he had died a martyr's death the fact would have been of great interest, at any rate to church chroniclers.

110. A short version of the *Life* is in *PSO*, 1858 (part 1), pp. 301–7, and a fuller one in A. Titov, *Zhitie sv. Leontiya episkopa rostovskogo, COID*, 1893, pp. 1–2.

111. D. Abramovich, *Kievo-Pechers'kii Paterik, PMPDU*, IV, 1930.

112. V. Klyuchevsky, *Drevnerusskie zhitiya svyatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik*, 1871, pp. 4–6; A. Boguslavsky, *Rostovskie zhitiya*, in: *Istoriya*

*russskoi literature* (by several hands) II (part 1), 1946, p. 65; N. Voronin, *Zhitiye Leontiya Rostovskogo i vizantiisko-russkie otnosheniya vtoroi poloviny XII veka*, VV, XXIII, 1963, pp. 24–9; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi Rusi*, 1967, p. 27.

113. A. Nasonov, *Maloissledovannye voprosy*, p. 361; N. Voronin, *K voprosu o nachale Rostovo-Suzdal'skogo letopisaniya*, AE, 1964 (1965), pp. 22–4; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, pp. 21, 26–33, 78, 185; and others.

114. M. Priselkov, *Ocherki po tserkovno-politicheskoi istorii Kievskoi Rusi X-XII vv.*, 1913, pp. 135–7; N. Voronin, *Politicheskaya legenda v Kievno-Pecherskom paterike*, TODRL, XI, 1955, p. 101; id., *Andrei Bogolyubsky i Luka Khrizoverg* (Iz istorii russko-vizantiiskikh otnoshenii XII v.), VV, XXI, 1962, pp. 31–2; id., *Zhitie Leontiya Rostovskogo*, pp. 24–30, and others.

115. Simon mentions the 'old' Rostov chronicle, but says nothing about the *Life of Leontius*, though by analogy one would have expected at least a brief reference to it.

116. N. Voronin, *Zhitie Leontiya Rostovskogo*, p. 29. The author underrates the strength of oral tradition in those days. A man aged 70 and thus born in about 1090 could easily have heard about Leontius from people of his father's generation, or, if he were younger, of his grandfather's. According to Limonov (*Letopisanie*, p. 27) Leontius was already regarded as a saint at Rostov in the 1160s, so he was not someone seldom mentioned or easily forgotten.

117. Bogolyubsky's letter to Constantinople about this metropolitan see has not survived; it is only known from the patriarch's reply, which does not mention Leontius. We do not know whether the efforts to canonize Leontius coincided with attempts to obtain a second metropolitan see for the north-east.

118. Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, pp. 21, 22, 32.

119. The Rus'ian bishops of the 11th and 12th centuries were almost all recruited from the Monastery of the Caves at Kiev. As neither Fedor nor Hilarion came from that monastery we may suppose that they were made bishops before it was founded, i.e. before the 1050s.

120. The chroniclers mention Rostov cathedral for the first time under the year 1160, when it was burnt down. They say it stood for 168 years, i.e. it was built in 992: PSRL, XV, p. 230. As regards Leontius they say he was buried in the church of the Virgin at Rostov, built by his predecessor: A. Nasonov, *Russkaya zemlya*, p. 181. All this information is hypercritically rejected by writers on this subject. Those who believe Leontius to have been the first bishop of Rostov base themselves on Simon's account while recognizing that it contains many errors. For instance, Simon states that the old cathedral at Rostov was of stone, whereas it was wooden; he mentions a non-existent bishop of Suzdal'



named Ephraim, and so on: N. Voronin, *Politicheskaya legenda*, pp. 98–100. Those who deny that there was a bishopric of Rostov in the first half of the 10th century maintain that Leontius built the church in question, since, they argue, no one else could have done so. Thus we have one hypothesis based on another.

121. A. Nasonov, in: *Ob otnoshenii letopisaniya Pereyaslavlya Rus-skogo k Kievskomu (XII vek)*, *PI*, VIII, 1959, p. 49, makes an observation which is of interest though it does not solve the problem. He believes that the ecclesiastical subordination of the northern lands to Pereyaslavl' 'was influenced to some extent [difficult to estimate] by conditions [*poryadki*] or rather survivals . . . of the [pre-Monomakh] era.'

122. V. Yanin, in: *Iz istorii russkoi khudozhestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni XII v.*, *SAr*, 1957 (1), pp. 126–9, suggests that Ephraim (see Chapter 3, p. 32) was simultaneously bishop of Pereyaslavl' and nominal metropolitan of Kiev. It is hard to believe that such a situation, unusual in Rus'ian conditions, prevailed also in the time of Leon, who was metropolitan of Pereyaslavl' (not of Kiev); and if it were so, it would still not explain why the northern lands were placed under Pereyaslavl' and not Kiev.

123. A. Poppe, in *Państwo i kościół na Rusi w XI w.*, 1968, pp. 164–70, suggests that the metropolitan rank of Pereyaslavl' was merely titular, i.e. that Leon and Ephraim enjoyed this honorific title for life or for a limited time.

124. The expense was beyond the resources of any individual. I cannot accept Poppe's view (as above) that Ephraim, who had till recently been a poor monk, himself bore the cost of these imposing buildings. If he did, he must have been uncommonly vain (to spend so much for a mere honorific title) and imprudent (since he did not know for long the title was bestowed, or when it might be taken away from him).

125. This possibility is not excluded by A. Kuz'min, *Drevnerusskie istoricheskie traditsii i ideinye techeniya XI v.*, *Vol*, 1971 (10), pp. 59–60.

126. See Chapter 3, p. 32.

127. Cf. M. Priselkov, *Russko-vizantiiskie otnosheniya IX-XII vekov*, *VDI*, 1939 (3), p. 103.

128. See Chapter 3.

129. *Povest' I*, pp. 103–4; M. Salyamon, *K voprosu o date glavnogo srazheniya russkikh s grekami v iyule 1043 g.*, *VV*, XXXIII, 1972. V. Bryusova, in: *Russko-vizantiiskie otnosheniya serediny XI v.*, *Vol*, 1972 (3), pp. 51–62, puts forward the unlikely suggestion that the Rus'ians also made another expedition, this time successful, against the Crimea.

130. *Povest' I*, pp. 104–5. A. Poppe, in: *Russko-vizantiiskie otnosheniya v seredine XI v.*, *ISSSR*, 1970 (3), pp. 108–24, suggests that Hilarion's elevation to the metropolitan throne did not adversely affect relations

between Rus' and Byzantium, which were good at the time; but it is difficult to accept this.

131. D. Razumovsky, *Tserkovnoe penie v Rossii*, 1867; V. Metallov, *Ocherk istorii pravoslavnogo peniya v Rossii*, 3rd edn, 1900; M. Lisitsyn, *Pervonachal'nyi slavyano-russkii tipikon*, 1911; N. Uspensky, *Vizantiiskoe penie v Kievskoi Rusi*, in *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses, München 1958, 1960*; id., *Drevnerusskoe pevcheskoe iskusstvo*, 1965; id., *Obraztsy drevnerusskogo pevcheskogo iskusstva*, 2nd edn, 1971. See also N. Voronin, *Zhitie Leontiya Rostovskogo*, p. 42.

132. V. Yanin—G. Litavrin, *Novye materialy o proiskhozhdenii Vladimira Monomakha*, in *Istoriko-arkheologicheskii sbornik*, 1962, p. 207, and others.

133. A. Beletsky, *Grecheskie nadpisi na mozaikakh Sofii Kievskoi*, in V. Lazarev, *Mozaiki Sofii Kievskoi*, 1960, pp. 159–62; B. Rybakov, *Russkie datirovannyye nadpisi XI-XIV vekov*, p. 20.

134. In connection with the death of the metropolitan John in 1089 the chronicler, who admired him greatly (an unusual occurrence) remarks: 'There never was his like in Rus' before him, nor will there be in later days': *Povest'* I, p. 137. As a rule the Rus'ian chroniclers present the Greeks unfavourably, as a sly and crafty lot: 'Se zhe resha gr'tsi, l'styache pod Rus'yu; sut' bo gretsi lstivy i do sego dni' (*Povest'* I, p. 50). Of Antony, bishop of Chernigov, we read: '... se zhe molvyashe im, lest' taya v sobe—byashe bo rodом grechin' (*PSRL*, II, p. 523).

135. In my opinion the new faith was propagated in Eastern Europe in the 11th century not only by Slav missionaries, mostly Polyanians, but also by Rus'ian Varangians who had learnt to speak Slav after dwelling for many years on Lake Ilmen', the Dnepr etc. We know that for political reasons Vladimir attached importance to his aides having a knowledge of the Slav language. By his orders, the children of these privileged warriors and administrators were sent to school at an early age for instruction in book-learning ('Poslav nacha poimati u narochitnye chadi deti, i dayati nacha na uchen'e knizhnoe': *Povest'* I, p. 81); they were taught from church books written in Slav.

136. The metropolitan Hilarion was right when, disputing with the Greeks as to their supposed missionary activity in Eastern Europe, he declared that the main credit was due to Vladimir and those in his service. Cf. D. Likhachev, *Povest'* II, p. 70.

137. B. Rybakov, *Zapis' o smerti Yaroslava Mudrogo*, *SAr*, 1959 (4), pp. 245–9.

138. Yaroslav assigned the following territories to his sons (apart from the two youngest and least important, Vyacheslav and Igor'): Izyaslav was given Kiev, Novgorod and several cities in the Kiev district; to Svyatoslav went Chernigov and the whole eastern region as far as

Murom, the chief city of the Finnic tribe of that name; while Vsevolod obtained Pereyaslavl', Rostov, Suzdal', Beloozero and other lands on the Volga. 'I razdelisha zemlyu, i vzya bolshii Izyaslav Kiyev i Novgorod i inyi gorody mnogy kiev'skyya vo predelekh; a Svyatoslav Chernigov i vsyu stranu vostochnuyu i do Muroma a Vsevolod Pereyaslavl', Rostov, Suzdal', Beloozero, Povolzh'e': Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov, 1950, p. 160.

139. The policy of Constantinople was to reduce the territory of the Kiev metropolitan and to see that the princes' domains were ethnically as mixed as possible, thus affording grounds for the patriarch's policy of introducing Greek as the liturgical language.

140. The origins of Pereyaslavl' are hard to establish, as the *Povest'* (very unusually) gives two conflicting accounts. In the treaties of Oleg and Igor' with the Greeks it is mentioned among the chief Rus'ian cities, immediately after Kiev and Chernigov (*Povest'* I, pp. 24, 25, 36), which would mean that it was founded before the 10th century. It seems to me a plausible supposition, however, that the original texts spoke merely of Kiev 'and other Rus'ian cities' (*i prochii grady*), and that the other names were inserted by a later copyist on the basis of Yaroslav's testament. The *Povest'* says elsewhere that Pereyaslavl' was founded by Vladimir the Great in 992 at the site of a victorious battle against the Pechenegs (*Povest'* I, pp. 84-5). Other passages confirm this: Vladimir says there were too few city-fortresses around Kiev and he therefore founded those on the river Trubezh (where Pereyaslavl' is) and other tributaries of the middle Dnepr: *Povest'* I, p. 83. This suggests indirectly that Pereyaslavl' did not exist before these strongholds were built. Another noteworthy point: Vladimir established his sons in the chief cities of the realm (*ibid.*, p. 83), but Pereyaslavl' and Chernigov are not mentioned: they were part of the principality of Kiev, and could not have played the independent part suggested by the texts of the treaties of Oleg and Igor with the Greeks. Constantine Prophyrogenitus, enumerating Dnepr fortresses in the middle of the 10th century, does not mention Pereyaslavl' (*De Administrando Imperio* I, Text ed. by G. Moravcsik, 1949), though he does know of Chernigov (*ibid.*, II. Commentary, ed. by R. Jenkins, 1962, pp. 30-1).

141. See Chapter 3, pp. 31-2.

142. In my opinion the evolution of the idea of the 'Rus'ian land' in the narrower sense (Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslavl') as opposed to Novgorod, Polotsk, Smolensk etc. (H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 6-10) is connected with contemporary plans of Rus'ian church organization.

143. ' . . . Vsevolodu zhe togda sushchyu u ottsya, be bo lyubim ottsem' pache vseya brat'i, ego zhe imyashe prisno u sobe': *Povest'* I, p. 108.

144. *Povest'* I, p. 158.

145. Vsevolod's later career shows that he had no taste for the internecine feuds that were so common among the Rurikides; if he was drawn into them, he was always conciliatory and avoided bloodshed (*Povest'* I, pp. 121, 132, 142).

146. *Povest'* I, p. 108.

147. V. Yanin and G. Litavrin, *Novye materialy*, pp. 204–21; A. Soloviev, Marie, fille de Constantin IX Monomaque, *B*, XXXIII, 1963, pp. 241–8; V. Yanin, *Aktovye pechati drevnei Rusi X-XV vv.*, 1, 1970, pp. 17–19, 170. However, V. Bryusova (*K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii Vladimira Monomakh*, *VV*, XXVIII, 1968, pp. 127–38) does not exclude the unlikely possibility that her name was Anastasia.

148. Vladimir Monomakh, the son of this marriage, was born in 1053: *Povest'* I, p. 108. His sisters must have been younger, for it is hard to suppose that the marriage took place before 1052, since it was in 1051 that Yaroslav raised the non-Greek Hilarion to the see of Kiev.

149. The Greek inscription on Monomakh's seal, discovered at Novgorod in 1960, shows that he used grandiloquent Byzantine titles and himself used the style Monomakh: V. Yanin, *Aktovye pechati*, pp. 16, 17, 170.

150. This is the more striking if one considers that Yaroslav's eldest son, Izyaslav, was granted the two largest and richest centres of Rus'ian life, Kiev and Novgorod.

151. N. Voronin, *O vremeni i meste vklyucheniya v letopis' sochinenii Vladimira Monomakh*, in: *Istoriko-arkheologicheskii sbornik*, 1962, pp. 265–71.

152. 'Zheni svoyu lyubite, no ne daite im nad soboyu vlasti': *Povest'* I, p. 158.

153. An illustration of this is the violent dispute which arose in the first half of the 12th century over the foundation of the bishopric of Smolensk. The metropolitan of Kiev and the bishop of Smolensk were opposed in this matter to the bishop of Pereyaslavl'; all three were Greek.

154. It is not possible to reconstruct the history of the second Rus'ian metropolitan see in greater detail, as the sources are scanty and disjointed. We know of two occupants of the see of Pereyaslavl' Leontius and Ephraim (Chapter 3, pp. 32–3). But Chernigov also laid claim, though with less success than Pereyaslavl', to the role of a second metropolitane (and, as Yaroslav's testament shows, some non-Slav lands on the Oka were attached to it). In 1072 we hear of a metropolitan of Chernigov named Neophytus, while at the same time Peter, head of the church at Pereyaslavl', is referred to as a bishop and not a metropolitan. These facts suggest various possibilities. We do not know whether there was

a rivalry at Constantinople as to the seat of the second metropolis between the brothers Svyatoslav of Chernigov and Vsevolod of Pereyasavl'; nor whether Peter held the see of Pereyasavl' before Leontius, or the other way round. In the former case it would seem that Pereyasavl' was a bishopric before it became a metropolitan see; in the latter case, Peter's title seems to indicate that Pereyasavl' lost its metropolitan status, at least for a time (and if so, was it subordinated to Kiev or to Chernigov?). Ephraim, the metropolitan of Pereyasavl', and Isaiah, bishop of Rostov, held office simultaneously, but we do not know what was the relationship between them, i.e. whether Isaiah was Ephraim's suffragan; and so on. All these problems can only be treated on a highly conjectural basis.

155. For the history of the attachment (for church purposes) of the Smolensk land to Pereyasavl' cf. Appendix . . .

156. The chronicler refers to Ephraim under the year 1089 as metropolitan, but under 1091 only as bishop of Pereyasavl': *Povest'* I, pp. 137-9. Isaiah, bishop of Rostov, was still alive in 1089: (*Povest'* II, p. 415); he died soon after.

157. The fact that, as compared with other Rus'ian sees, Pereyasavl' retained its huge size (including Rostov and Smolensk) for a considerable time indicates that Constantinople long cherished the ambition of maintaining a second metropolis in conditions more favourable to Greek interests; these hopes, however, proved illusory.

158. S. Vysotsky, *Zapis' o sarkofage Vsevoloda Yaroslavicha*, *SAr*, 1963 (4), pp. 228-32.

159. Monomakh had a direct interest in the treaty, as after Vsevolod's death he obtained both Pereyasavl' and Rostov. Previously, as the *Pouchen'e* shows, he had visited both territories several times—especially Pereyasavl'—on missions for his father.

160. See Chapter 2.

161. Gyda was the daughter of Harold, the English king slain at the battle of Hastings (1066).

162. Mstislav, the eldest son of Vladimir Monomakh, was given the second name Harold after his maternal grandfather. On Monomakh's relations with the Anglo-Saxon world see M. Alekseev, *Anglo-saksonskaya parallel' k Poucheniyu Vladimira Monomakha*, *TODRL*, II, 1935.

163. The bishopric of Smolensk was founded in the 1130s during the reign of the local prince Rostislav. His father Mstislav, son of Monomakh, had made efforts in the same direction but had met with resistance. Rostislav, when he founded the bishopric, commended Smolensk to the protection of God and the prayers of his father and grandfather (' . . . i ustavil esmi episkop'yu, poruchen Smolensk Bogom i dedneyu i otsovoyu molitvoyu'), which seems to imply that he expected them to approve the work. (A. Zimin, *Pamyatniki prava feodal'no-razdrobленно*

Rusi, in: *Pamyatniki russkogo prava* 2, 1953, pp. 39–44; T. Sumnikova and V. Lopatin, *Smolenskie gramoty XIII-XIV vv.*, 1963, pp. 75–80. From the account in the Hypatian Chronicle (*PSRL*, II, p. 250) of the building in 1101 of a stone cathedral in Smolensk some scholars have concluded that the creation of a bishopric there was Monomakh's idea. Thus P. Golubovsky, *Istoriya smolenskoi zemli do nachala XV v.*, 1895, p. 234; M. Priselkov, *Ocherki po tserkovno-politicheskoi istorii Kievskoi Rusi X-XII vv.*, 1913, pp. 309–10; A. Nasonov, *Ob otnoshenii letopisaniya*, p. 492; M. Karger, *Zodchestvo drevnego Smolenska (XII-XIII vv.)*, 1964, p. 13. Others dispute this, e.g. Yu. Shchapov, *Smolenskii ustav knyazy Rostislava Mstislavicha*, *AE*, 1962 (1963), pp. 39–40; id., *Knyazheskie ustavy i tserkov' v drevnei Rusi XI-XIV vv.*, 1972, pp. 136–50; A. Poppe, *Uchreditel'naya gramota Smolenskoi episkopii*, *AE*, 1965 (1966), pp. 69–70. Rostislav's document, dated 1136, gives an insight into social and economic conditions in the Smolensk territory: cf. L. Alekseev, *Ustav Rostislava Smolenskogo 1136 g. i protsess feodalizatsii Smolenskoi zemli*, in *Słowianie w dziejach Europy*, 1974, pp. 85–113.

164. In the 1220s a new cathedral was built at Smolensk, as the old one was in a dilapidated state. The chronicler states under the year 1222 (*PSRL*, I, p. 445) that the old building was 'sozdana . . . Volodimerom Monomakhom i blazhenym episkopom' Efremom'. The remains excavated by Varganov and Dubynin (A. Varganov, *K arkhitekturnoi istorii Suzdal'skogo sobora (XI-XVII vv.)*, *KSDPI*, XI, 1945, pp. 99–101; id., *Ob-zhigatel'nye pechi XI-XII vekov v Suzdale*, *ibid.*, LXV, 1956, pp. 49–54; A. Dubynin, *Arkheologicheskie issledovaniya g. Suzdalya (1936–1940)*, *ibid.* XI, 1945, pp. 91–9) give an idea of the plan and dimensions of the old cathedral, building techniques etc.

165. A. Orlov, *Vladimir Monomakh*, 1946. Cf. V. Yanin, 'Mezhduknyazheskie otnosheniya v epokhu Monomakha i "Khozhdenie" igumena Daniila', *TODRL*, XVI, 1960.

166. P. Tolochko, *Nashchadky Monomakha*, 1972 (unavailable to me).

167. K. Kudryashov, *Polovetskaya step'*, 1948.

## The Upper Volga region in the twelfth century<sup>1</sup>

Vladimir Monomakh's death in 1125 was followed by a basic regrouping of political forces in Rus': the southern lands became less important than the north-eastern, Kiev declined in importance, and the centre of gravity shifted permanently to the Upper Volga region. This was a gradual but fairly rapid process, taking barely a century to complete.

While the fortunes of the Rostov-Suzdal' area in the earlier period, from the 9th to the 11th century, could not be treated in isolation from the history of Rus' as a whole—a fact reflected in the foregoing chapters—the events of the 12th century in the Upper Volga region introduce a "new" phase of East European history with its own character, problems and purposes.

Monomakh's heirs in the north-east were his son Yury (George), who died in 1157, and his grandsons Andrei (d. 1174) and Vsevolod (d. 1212).<sup>2</sup> All three were men of strong character whose ambitions transcended those of the nominal or episodic princely regimes of the area. The period of their rule forms a single story of continuous effort to maintain their position in the 'new' territories. Eventually they succeeded, though the struggle was neither short nor easy.

Before the period in question the authority of the Rurikides in the north-east was exercised by their Rus'ian (Varangian) dignitaries such as Ivor and others, who were lavishly rewarded for their services with extensive grants of land. These local governors commanded, or were assisted by, strong Varangian forces which were garrisoned in the cities and kept the local Merya tribes in subjection.<sup>3</sup> As the *Povest'* tells us,<sup>4</sup> the Varangian garrisons introduced in the 9th century were maintained in the area until the 12th. Thus there was a powerful group of *de facto* rulers,

established for the most part at Rostov,<sup>5</sup> who were not disposed easily to abandon their entrenched positions; and Monomakh's descendants automatically found themselves in conflict with this privileged Varangian element.

Monomakh himself well understood the difficult position of his son Yury Dolgoruky when he placed him in charge of Rostov-Suzdal'. Dolgoruky was the first of the Rurikides to be associated with that territory in a real sense, though his political aims and military activities were to extend far beyond Merya territory. When, by his father's order, he made for the north-east he was still a minor, and a prominent part was played by the individual who acted as his guardian and in later years his adviser and confidant. This was a Varangian—since no one else could have borne rule on the Upper Volga—named George, son of Simon.<sup>6</sup> It was not by chance that Monomakh appointed this particular Varangian, loyal to Kiev and to the ruling dynasty, to conciliate or overawe the powerful local Varangian element, making him *tysyatsskii* or head of the military force at Rostov. Thanks to his military and political abilities and long life,<sup>7</sup> Georgy did much to consolidate Dolgoruky's position. This illustrates the fact that there were antagonisms and rivalries not only among the Rurikides and among Greek and Rus'ian church dignitaries,<sup>8</sup> but also among different groups of Varangian warriors.

Georgy established the young Dolgoruky at Suzdal', where the prince remained throughout this reign.<sup>9</sup> This elevation of Suzdal' to the rank of a capital considerably weakened Rostov.<sup>10</sup> The primacy of Suzdal' did not last long, however (although, like Rostov, it continued to be one of the important centres of a large region),<sup>11</sup> as Andrei Bogolyubsky transferred the capital to Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma. This must have been a true reflection of the state's vital interests, as Vladimir continued to be the capital—effectively at first, afterwards only formally—for a surprisingly long time, until Moscow finally came to the fore.<sup>12</sup>

The prominence of Vladimir was not especially helped by natural conditions. Large forests extended along the Klyaz'ma; the countryside there was sparsely populated,<sup>13</sup> full of bogs and marshes and unattractive to settlers. To the north, however, in Suzdal', Yur'ev and Pereyasavl', there was an extensive though narrow tract of more open, fertile land known as the 'field' or 'plain' (*opol'e*, *opol'shchina*).<sup>14</sup> The fact that the site of the capital



moved from north to south (Rostov-Suzdal'-Vladimir), away from this richer agricultural area, shows that the decisions of Bogolyubsky and his successors in this matter were not governed primarily by economic considerations.

The lands north of the middle course of the Klyaz'ma were at the extremity of the 'plain'.<sup>15</sup> The princes' internal difficulties are illustrated by their choosing a site for the capital on the periphery of the most fertile and thickly populated part of their dominions.<sup>16</sup> They had trouble not only with formerly dominant Varangians entrenched mainly at Rostov and Suzdal'<sup>17</sup> but with the mass of the Merya population, who had rebelled in 1024 and 1071 and from whom further resistance might be expected. According to the *Povest'*, at the beginning of the 12th century the Merya settlements were concentrated chiefly around Lake Kleshchino (Pereyaslavl') and Lake Rostov.<sup>18</sup> It would seem that Pereyaslavl', with its central position in the richest and most populous part of the country, and with a convenient network of waterways, was in itself the most suitable place for a capital, but that the princes avoided it because it was a centre of Merya population.

Bogolyubsky took up his abode on the Klyaz'ma and made Vladimir his capital; his successors, who maintained it as such, evidently thought he had made the right decision. In those days the border areas between tribes were always thinly populated, making it easier to establish a base which would ensure the rulers' safety and enable them to control the whole country. Vladimir was endowed with elaborate fortifications for this purpose,<sup>19</sup> on a scale comparable only to Kiev and Novgorod.<sup>20</sup>

Even on the Klyaz'ma, however, Bogolyubsky must have reckoned with the possibility of rebellion, as in 1158-65 he built for his own safety<sup>21</sup> the stronghold of Bogolyubovo,<sup>22</sup> which he made his personal residence.<sup>23</sup> Its geographical position<sup>24</sup> and strong fortifications<sup>25</sup> throw light on Andrei's intentions. In the southern side Bogolyubovo commanded the river route into and from the Rostov-Suzdal' territory, and its situation also enabled the prince to suppress any revolt by the people of Vladimir. From the point of view of crushing resistance there is an analogy between Bogolyubovo and Dolgoruky's stronghold of Kideksha.

Vladimir, Bogolyubovo and Kideksha were only a part of the extensive programme of buildings and fortifications undertaken

by the 12th-century princes in Merya territory. Fortified cities arose at numerous key points chosen for strategic and other reasons—political, administrative and commercial—the sites being determined by the needs of agriculture, trade and craftsmanship or by natural features such as river-junctions, marshes, steep hills and so forth, as well as by the nature of the local population.

The typical Merya landscape consisted of dense forests full of marshes intersected by rivers,<sup>26</sup> which constituted the main lines of communication. To rule over the Rostov-Suzdal' area it was necessary first of all to control the system by building riverside fortresses and cities.

Cities of earlier date, and those built in the 12th century, were concentrated in the central and western part of Merya territory, i.e. mainly the area bounded by the Volga on the west and north and the Klyaz'ma on the south.<sup>27</sup> These two rivers were linked, since the Klyaz'ma was a tributary of the Oka and the Oka of the Volga, and in addition there was an important route within Merya territory which provided a link between the Klyaz'ma and the Upper Volga.<sup>28</sup> This was formed by two rivers both called the Nerl' (a left-bank affluent of the middle Klyaz'ma, and a right-bank tributary of the Upper Volga), rising from points very close together in the vicinity of Lake Pereyasavl'. The northern route from the area round that lake to the Volga ran via the Sara river (whose source is close to that of the Klyaz'ma Nerl'), Lake Rostov and Kotorosl',<sup>29</sup> and its strategic and economic importance was well understood by the first half of the 10th century.<sup>30</sup> The route was in constant use in a northward direction, and the river-banks along it were more thickly populated than those of the Nerl' that flows into the Volga.<sup>31</sup> At either end of this route two important towns came into existence, Pereyasavl' and Yaroslavl'.

Unexpectedly, Pereyasavl' is mentioned by the sources no earlier than the 1150s. Situated at the mouth of the Trubezh, it was founded by Dolgoruky, who according to the chroniclers transferred it there from Kleshchino.<sup>32</sup> An old town of the latter name<sup>33</sup> (on the north-eastern shore of the lake: the remains of the fortifications are near the present-day village of Gorodishche) must have played an important part in its day, as in the early 12th century Lake Pereyasavl' was still called Lake Kleshchino<sup>34</sup> and the memory of the town lived on long after Dolgoruky.<sup>35</sup>

Voronin believes that the shallowness of the lake near Kleshchino was the reason why a new town was built in a more convenient location three or four kilometres to the west.<sup>36</sup> This town was soon of such importance that the chroniclers mention it as second only to Rostov and Suzdal'.

As to Yaroslavl', at the other end of the river route from Pereyasavl' to Rostov and the Volga, the chroniclers tell us nothing about the date and circumstances of its foundation, so we are reduced to conjecture. On account of its name, it is usually supposed to have been founded by Yaroslav the Wise. Its situation at the junction of the Kotorosl' with the Volga suggests that it was intended to protect the Rostov district from raiders approaching by way of the Volga and its tributaries, as well as to keep the conquered population in subjection: it was well situated for these purposes, being defended by the Volga on the east and the Kotorosl' on the west and south.<sup>37</sup>

In 1024 a revolt broke out among the population of Suzdal' and was bloodily suppressed by Yaroslav, who came from Novgorod for the purpose.<sup>38</sup> It is usually supposed that this was what led him to found Yaroslavl' in the 1020s or 1030s.<sup>39</sup> The first mention of Yaroslavl' in the sources, under the year 1071,<sup>40</sup> speaks of a revolt by the Merya in the surrounding countryside in defence of their old pagan beliefs.<sup>41</sup>

Archaeological evidence seems to show that the Yaroslavl' area played an important part in trade relations between the Varangian Rus' and the Arabs. Yaroslavl' was probably an intermediate stopping-place for Rus'ian merchants, who could store property there while they made the long river-journey from the Baltic to the Caspian Sea.<sup>42</sup> This trade flourished in the 9th and 10th centuries, however, and it may be that the town was founded at that earlier period; it could have been enlarged by Yaroslav and renamed after him in consequence. It is often stated that Yaroslavl' was built on the site of an old Merya settlement named Medvezhy ugol.<sup>43</sup>

The area round Yaroslavl' was thinly populated owing to the dense, marshy forests and bogs.<sup>44</sup> The chief settlements were in river valleys, where the land was more open and fertile. Archaeological evidence shows that the inhabitants lived by hunting, like most forest-dwellers, and also by fishing,<sup>45</sup> animal breeding<sup>46</sup> and agriculture.<sup>47</sup> Up to the present, however, only

scanty finds relate to the 11th and 12th centuries,<sup>48</sup> and the chroniclers do not show much interest either.

The town of Ksnyatin (Kosnyatin, Konstantin), founded by Dolgoruky in the 1130s,<sup>49</sup> played a similar part to Yaroslavl'. It was situated at the confluence of the Nerl' and the Volga, at the extremity of the other branch of the river route from the Klyaz'ma to the Upper Volga, which divides in the Pereyaslavl' district.

Other important towns founded by Dolgoruky were Uglich, Dmitrov and Yur'ev Pol'skyi. Uglich is first mentioned in the sources in 1149; the statements of some authors,<sup>50</sup> based on a later tradition, that it existed in the 10th century are more than doubtful.<sup>51</sup> Uglich lay on the right bank of the Volga, in an open and fertile area (its original name was *Ugleche pole*, the 'Uglich plain'): it was thus hospitable to settlers, and the banks of the Volga from Uglich to the mouth of the Mologa were fairly densely populated.<sup>52</sup>

In 1154 Dolgoruky founded the town of Dmitrov at the birthplace of his son Dimitry-Vsevolod, the later Vsevolod III. The choice of situation was not accidental. There was already a local settlement of some importance, as is shown by archaeological remains of the 11th-12th century.<sup>53</sup> Dmitrov was on the river Yakhroma, on a route leading to the Upper Volga,<sup>54</sup> and the prince fortified it strongly to guard against danger from the west.<sup>55</sup> The town was built on a small hill in a marshy plain near the river, and was surrounded by a high wall.<sup>56</sup>

The situation of Yur'ev was similar to that of Dmitrov: it too lay on a marshy plain and was protected by a high rampart.<sup>57</sup> Yur'ev lay on the right bank of the Koloksha, a left-bank tributary of the Klyaz'ma, at its confluence with the river Gza. It is first mentioned under the year 1177,<sup>58</sup> although there is no doubt that it existed earlier: it was founded by Dolgoruky, whose name it bears, probably in the mid-12th century. The surrounding area was fertile and treeless, as is indicated by its name Yur'ev Pol'sky.

These fortified towns established by Dolgoruky or his predecessors demarcate the original frontiers of the principality in the Merya area. In the north<sup>59</sup> and west the boundary was formed by the Volga and its right-bank tributaries, as is shown by the location of Yaroslavl', Uglich, Ksnyatin and Dmitrov; in the south, by the Moskva river (see Chapter 7) and the Klyaz'ma (Vladimir). In the east Dolgoruky did not build towns beyond

the Nerl', a tributary of the Klyaz'ma.<sup>60</sup> In other words, until the mid-12th century the princes' rule was in practice largely confined to the western part of the Merya territory.<sup>61</sup>

Other towns known from later periods were built by Dolgoruky's sons. They are hard to identify with precision, as the chroniclers do not always give foundation dates: they generally mention them as already existing, in the context of particular events, so that we learn nothing of the time or circumstances of their origin. For this reason it is most convenient to treat the building activity of Andrei Bogolyubsky and Vsevolod III as a single phenomenon.

The building policy of these two rulers was carried out in several directions, and considerably shifted the borders of the Rostov-Suzdal' principality. In the west it reached as far as the sources of the Volga, a particularly important stronghold being Tver', where the Volga is joined by the Tvertsa.<sup>62</sup> Archaeological finds indicate that there was already a considerable settlement on the site of the city founded by Vsevolod III.

The principality was also enlarged at the other end of the river route running south-east along the two Nerl' rivers. Starodub and Gorokhovets were founded on the right bank of the lower Klyaz'ma. Though mentioned rather late in the sources (Starodub first under the year 1218, Gorokhovets under 1239), they certainly existed in the 12th century. The exact date of their foundation is not known, however.<sup>63</sup> Some authors think they were founded under Monomakh,<sup>64</sup> while others place them in Dolgoruky's reign.<sup>65</sup> At latest they were founded by Bogolyubsky.<sup>66</sup> The purpose of both fortresses was to defend Vladimir-Suzdal' against outside attack, and they may also have served the Rus'ian princes as a base for aggressive operations. The area of the lower Klyaz'ma was then very thinly populated,<sup>67</sup> and the inhabitants belonged to the Muroma tribe rather than the Merya.<sup>68</sup> The two fortresses, both of great auxiliary importance, were built to fend off raids by the Volga Bulgars into Rus'ian territory and as a base for sorties against them; as such operations were frequent, it is hard to relate the foundation of Starodub and Gorokhovets to any particular episode. The creation of Gorodets Radilov is indirect evidence that the foundation on the lower Klyaz'ma was primarily directed against the Bulgars. The foundation of Gorodets also shows that in Bogolyubsky's time the eastern border of Vladimir-Suzdal' on that section of the river extended as far as the Volga.<sup>69</sup>

In contrast to the ethnic situation on the lower Klyaz'ma, the lower Oka and the Volga, with a non-Merya population, the expansion of Vladimir-Suzdal' in the 12th century, this time in a north-easterly direction, extended over wide areas inhabited by Merya tribes, as is confirmed by archaeological finds<sup>70</sup> and place-names.<sup>71</sup> The new town of Galich was called Mersky ('Meryan'), and the region south-west of it must for geographical reasons have been still more Merya in character, being close to the tribe's central settlements.

The north-easterly expansion of Vladimir extended chiefly along the Solonitsa, a right-bank tributary of the Volga. This is suggested by the fact that two fortresses were built on that river: Nerokhot' (Nerekhta) and Sol' Velikaya, both being first mentioned under the year 1214. When the prince's troops had subdued the Solonitsa area and reached the Volga on that sector, they could cross the great river and advance northwards up the Kostroma, a left-bank tributary of the Volga, continuing by water along the Veksa to Lake Galich, whence a river route led to Unzha.<sup>72</sup> This led to the foundation of the towns of Kostroma (where the river of that name flows into the Volga), Galich (on the south-eastern shore of the lake; first mentioned in 1238),<sup>73</sup> and Unzha (1219). The most important of these was Kostroma,<sup>74</sup> which appears rather late in the sources (1213, 1214) but certainly existed in the 12th century,<sup>75</sup> though there is no reason to place it earlier.<sup>76</sup> It is correctly held that the expansion of the Vladimir principality belongs chiefly to the reign of Vsevolod III, in the latter 12th and early 13th century.<sup>77</sup>

The newly conquered lands were among the richest parts of the north-east, comprising large tracts of fertile land (most of all in the southern part of the later principality of Kostroma)<sup>78</sup> and a wealth of minerals, particularly salt, as witness the place-names Sol' Velikaya, Solonitsa, Galich,<sup>79</sup> Sol' Galitskaya etc. Hence the banks of the Volga near Kostroma were densely populated, as archaeological finds confirm.<sup>80</sup> Despite their economic wealth, however, these lands did not especially attract the princes of Vladimir-Suzdal': the initiative for their domination came fairly late, and the centre of political life shifted from the old tribal capital of Rostov not in a north-easterly direction but towards the south (the Klyaz'ma river).

The princes not only founded cities, but built churches in them. Church-building on a large scale was begun by Monomakh (the cathedral at Suzdal', the Saviour's church at Vladimir, and others) and continued vigorously by Dolgoruky, who completed or rebuilt Suzdal' cathedral and erected the church of SS Boris and Gleb at Kideksha, the cathedral of the Saviour at Pereyasavl', St George's church at Vladimir etc. Dolgoruky's sons carried on the work with no less energy. In the 1150s and 1160s Bogolyubsky built the *Uspensky sobor* (cathedral of the Assumption or Dormition) at Vladimir and a cathedral of the same title at Rostov, the Saviour's church at Vladimir, the cathedral at Bogolyubovo and the Church of the Intercession of Our Lady at the mouth of the Nerl' about 1.500 m from Bogolyubovo, known as *Pokrov na Nerli*. After the fire of 1185 Vsevolod III rebuilt the *Uspenskii sobor* at Vladimir and erected another cathedral there dedicated to St Dimitry, as well as other churches.

The Cathedral of the Assumption at Vladimir is rightly considered the most imposing building of its time, while the *Pokrov na Nerli* is outstanding for its harmony and refinement of design. The cathedral of St Dimitry is noted for the richness of its carved decorations.<sup>81</sup> Many of these precious memorials of the past were destroyed or damaged in the course of time by enemy raids, fires, rebuilding, neglect of necessary repairs etc.<sup>82</sup>

Dolgoruky and his sons, aware of external dangers and still more of internal disaffection, used the building programme as the chief means of safeguarding their position in an unruly country. The building of fortresses and churches was closely connected. The former were important from the politico-military point of view, defending the frontiers against raids from far and near, and suppressing the rebellions which broke out from time to time in various regions. They were also administrative and economic centres, where the population paid tribute and performed services, e.g. labour on buildings and fortifications. War booty was collected in the towns, and from them were issued orders summoning the people to arms in case of need. All these were important ways of consolidating princely rule, but they were of a coercive character.

The churches and the new faith differed in this respect. The effect of the latter was, if not to eliminate, at least to assuage the hostility between the conquerors and their subjects, and to

bring about a sense of solidarity between them. As in the Slav regions, this reconciliation could only take place on a Rus'ian basis, i.e. by the Merya population belonging to the Rus'ian state and adopting the 'Rus'ian faith'.

The church buildings were an extremely important means of propaganda to this end. By their size, massiveness and sheer physical strength they overawed the simple inhabitants, impressed them by their wealth and beauty and dazzled them by the pomp of religious ceremonies. The churches enhanced the authority of the prince and endowed him with a kind of aureole, while instilling in the population feelings of humility and helplessness.

Various questions arise in connection with the building programme: how did the princes obtain the necessary money and raw materials for such a great enterprise, and where did the designs and skilled craftsmen come from? Opinions vary widely, and only conjectures can be offered. We may, by way of an instance, consider the problem of the nationality of the expert architects, painters, sculptors etc. According to the chroniclers, Bogolyubsky enjoyed unusual help: 'God sent him craftsmen from all lands' (privede emu Bog iz vseh zemel' mastery) or 'from many lands' (izo mnogikh zemel');<sup>83</sup> they were 'skilled workers of all kinds' (mastery vsyakiya),<sup>84</sup> i.e., it would appear, specialists in a wide variety of crafts. Art historians have suggested a great many places from which these helpers may have come: the various hypotheses include not only the southern lands of the Rurikides (Kiev, Pereyaslavl', Galich), but places as far afield as Bohemia, Moravia, Germany, Italy and Dalmatia, as well as Byzantium, the territory of the Volga Bulgars and elsewhere.<sup>85</sup>

The building material used by Dolgoruky and his sons was the so-called 'white stone', i.e. limestone of a gleaming white colour.<sup>86</sup> Transporting huge quantities of this material must have been a major problem in the conditions of the time. We do not know where it was brought from: the *Life* of Bogolyubsky, a fairly late document, speaks of the Volga Bulgar region, but some scholars doubt this.

Taking into account the problems of transporting materials, the size of the many fortresses and their earthworks, the need to garrison them and to encourage settlement round about, and the magnificence of the church buildings, one conclusion stands out in spite of uncertainties of detail, namely that the whole ambitious



operation must have involved huge masses of people by the standards of those days. Even if we grant that some of them were local Merya inhabitants, working of course under compulsion, the princes must also have had to bring in large numbers of people from elsewhere in order to carry out their ambitious but necessary plans. Thus the problem of the building programme is linked with that of colonization.

After a long interval,<sup>87</sup> the influx of foreign elements into Merya territory can be traced in the 12th century: it coincides in time with the building programme and reaches a peak during Bogolyubsky's reign. A contemporary witness from Kiev notes that in the Vladimir state there were people of many countries, both merchants and others. These were Greeks from Constantinople, inhabitants of the 'Rus'ian land', Latins (i.e. Roman Catholics), Volga Bulgars, Jews and others.<sup>88</sup> Bogolyubsky himself informed the Patriarch that he had assembled large masses of people in Vladimir.<sup>89</sup> This is borne out by the 18th-century accounts of Tatishchev, which have a general air of probability although caution is required, as we do not know whether they are his own invention or based on early sources which have since disappeared.<sup>90</sup> Tatishchev states that (1) the influx of foreigners into Vladimir-Suzdal' began before Bogolyubsky, in Dolgoruky's time (who, as we know, followed in his father's footsteps), and (2) these foreign elements were of varied origin, including both Slavs (from Chernigov, Smolensk and 'beyond the Dnepr') and non-Slavs (Mordvians, Bulgars and Ugrians from the lower Oka and the middle Volga).<sup>91</sup>

The sources thus show that the Suzdal'-Vladimir princes in the 12th century endeavoured to attract to their state as many inhabitants of different races as possible. This was the traditional policy of the Rurikides in conquered territories.<sup>92</sup> The newcomers, whether warriors or settlers, were divided from one another by ethnic difference but collectively owed much to the princes, Monomakh's descendants, who thus relied on them to maintain their rule over the Merya population.

Some of the settlers, as the sources indicate, were Slavs, and the princes no doubt recruited them from various lands so as to exploit their tribal antagonisms; they would mostly come from the south, however, as the Rurikides of Rostov and Suzdal' sprang from the Pereyaslavl' branch of the ruling dynasty.

Many writers take the view that the migration of Slavs from Kiev, Chernigov and Pereyaslav' to the north-eastern lands took place peacefully, without conquest or violence, and on such a large scale that the Merya territory was soon Slavized.<sup>93</sup> The chief argument for this view lies in the toponymy of the Upper Volga region, where we find new towns (Pereyaslav', Vyshgorod, Starodub, Zvenigorod etc.) and small rivers (the Trubezh, Irpen', Lybed', Pochaina etc.) bearing identical names with corresponding features in the south.<sup>94</sup> The question arises, however, whether these names were bestowed by settlers from the south or by the princes themselves. In the former case it is an argument to support the view that 'the population of the north-eastern towns included many migrants from Kiev,'<sup>95</sup> and even that 'from the beginning of the 12th century the influx of Slavs into the "lands beyond the forests" takes on the character of a mass movement.'<sup>96</sup> In the second case, however, the argument for mass colonization falls to the ground; and I believe that—as has been suggested before me<sup>97</sup>—this hypothesis is the only correct one. It was in fact the princes, and not the new settlers, who built towns and named them. The names were often those of the princes themselves or their close relations (Vladimir, Yaroslav', Ksnyatin-Konstantin, Yur'ev, Dmitrov, Yaropolets etc.). A fact worthy of note in connection with the renaming of geographical features is that in 1221 Yuri II, son of Vsevolod III, founded the city of Nizhny Novgorod ('Lower Novgorod') at the junction of the Oka and the Volga. 'The fine position of Nizhny Novgorod, situated on hills overlooking a mighty river, was reminiscent of Kiev, and accordingly Kievan names were transferred to the new locality, so that there is a small river called the Pochaina, and the monastery came to be called Pechersky [of the Caves].'<sup>98</sup> But it is out of the question that his frontier fortress, so eminently exposed to outside attack, could in the 13th century have been populated by settlers from Kiev or Pereyaslav'.

Thus the geographical nomenclature of the Upper Volga region proves nothing as to the mass migration of Slav settlers. At this period there were no Slavs in high military or administrative positions in Rostov-Suzdal', which there would have been if Monomakh and his successors had based their rule on Slav elements. The one man who played a decisive part in the north-east during and after Dolgoruky's minority—George, son of Simon,

whom we have already mentioned—was a pure-blooded Varangian, which in itself refutes the hypothesis that the Slavs were prominent in the affairs of the region. In any case, that hypothesis is strikingly artificial. It is hard to believe that the Slav influx could have been so huge as to outweigh the mass of the indigenous Merya, the long-standing Varangian community and the new arrivals from various countries. If it were so, the passivity of all these elements *vis-à-vis* the Slavs would be unintelligible, nor has anyone explained why Slav peasants should have rushed in such numbers to populate the Upper Volga region.<sup>99</sup> The chroniclers are remarkably silent on the subject. As Presnyakov correctly observed, 'the whole theory of a migration from the south to the north-east . . . has not been historically substantiated, for the good reason that our sources provide no evidence for it.'<sup>100</sup>

Authors who believe that the Merya were Slavicized by a mass immigration in the 12th century take too little account of the settlement policy of the local rulers, which is bound to have had a major effect on the colonization process. The question to be considered is whether Dolgoruky and his sons would have desired such a mass influx: what was their attitude towards the Slavs in general, and Kiev in particular?

Whereas Bogolyubsky continued his father's policy in building cities and churches on the Upper Volga and inviting settlers and others from various countries, there are clear differences in the Slav policies of the two princes.

The situation on the Dnepr and elsewhere differed considerably from that on the Upper Volga. The members of the dynasty ruling in Slav lands occupied the strongholds of the conquered tribes and conquered tribes and governed directly from them. At that time, until the 12th century, none of the princes resided permanently or for any length of time on the Upper Volga. As the dynasty increased in numbers the Slav lands under Rurikide domination were partitioned, and as time went on fathers left smaller and smaller appanages to their sons. In contrast to this process, Rostov-Suzdal' remained unpartitioned for a surprisingly long time, so that Dolgoruky and his sons were stronger than their near or distant kinsfolk. On the other hand Rostov, or Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma, did not as yet enjoy the same prestige in the eyes of the population as Kiev, whose special position

dated back to the 10th century and was sanctioned by the church.

As the dynasty grew more numerous, however, and the feuds between its members consequently became more frequent, the importance of Kiev declined, and in the 12th century the suzerainty of its prince over his kinsfolk became more nominal as each generation passed. None the less, tradition was so strong that the lordship of Kiev was contested for a considerable time longer, and Dolgoruky took an active part in it.

Whereas, to Vladimir Monomakh, Rostov-Suzdal' was of secondary importance in the political life of Rus',<sup>101</sup> in Dolgoruky's eyes it was no less important than the other principal territories. Dolgoruky remained linked with Suzdal' throughout his life and did much to raise its economic and cultural level as well as to strengthen his own power base. His chief aim, however, was to recover a leading role in the south by winning back Pereyasavl'<sup>102</sup> and other ancestral towns<sup>103</sup> and by becoming the ruler of Kiev.<sup>104</sup>

The strength of Dolgoruky's roots in the tradition of southern Rus', although he had lived in the north-east from childhood, is shown by the offer he made to his brother Yaropolk, to give up the greater part of Rostov-Suzdal' if he might have old Pereyasavl' in return.<sup>105</sup> This 'southern orientation' of Dolgoruky is also shown in his testament. By his two marriages he had eleven sons and two daughters. On his eldest sons (by his first wife, a Polovtsian) he bestowed the southern cities of Pereyasavl', Kanev, Belgorod etc.; the chief personality among these princes was Andrei Bogolyubsky, who received Vyshgorod. Dolgoruky's sons by his second wife, including the later Vsevolod III, were to rule the Rostov-Suzdal' territory.

The prince's attachment to southern lands and ambition to possess them had more to do with dynastic tradition than with any 'Slav' sentiment. Dolgoruky well knew that he was hated by the people of Kiev, and he did not trust them. When he finally became ruler of Kiev in his last years, he settled his Suzdal' warriors in the surrounding towns and villages. As soon as he died in Kiev the population rebelled; they destroyed Dolgoruky's palace and that of his son Vasily, massacred the 'Suzdalians' and ransacked their possessions,<sup>106</sup> thus showing what the Slavs of Kiev thought of their ruler from the Merya country.<sup>107</sup>

Another blow was struck at Dolgoruky's 'Kievan' policy by his own son, Andrei Bogolyubsky. That policy in fact failed completely, as it was bound to do. Dolgoruky himself is a borderline figure in history. On the one hand he stands for the outdated principle of the unity of the Rurikide state based on Kiev, while on the other he is the precursor of a new order in Eastern Europe.

Bogolyubsky took an active part in his father's southern campaigns<sup>108</sup> and understood the political situation there. He showed his realism by deciding in 1155 to relinquish the territory assigned to him and seize power in the north-east. There was a personal factor in this decision, since by giving up the small area of Vyshgorod and its surroundings he obtained the much larger area of Rostov-Suzdal'; but it would be wrong to suppose that this motive alone prompted him to rebel against his father's wishes. In any case Dolgoruky died soon after, thus enabling Andrei to carry out his ambitious plans.

When Bogolyubsky left Vyshgorod he took with him an icon of the Virgin and Child which was especially revered in local tradition as the work of St Luke the Apostle (it is in fact a fairly late Byzantine painting). It was transferred to Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma, where miraculous powers were attributed to it by the population,<sup>109</sup> so that Our Lady of Vladimir became the patroness of the principality, its ruler and his subjects.<sup>110</sup> While Andrei's action was primarily religious in intent, it contributed to the decline of Kiev by accentuating the Rus'ian character of the Upper Volga region from the ecclesiastical and political point of view: in this respect it was in accord with Bogolyubsky's policy throughout his reign.

Bogolyubsky, now in the prime of life—he was aged about 45 when he began to rule in Rostov-Suzdal'—seems to have acted in concert with the local boyars,<sup>111</sup> who, apart from personal advantage, were motivated by the interests of their territory which differed from, if they did not conflict with, those of Kiev.<sup>112</sup> The unhappy experience of his father's intervention in the south led Andrei to enter into this understanding with the boyars, which was to the immediate advantage of both parties but was to prove short-lived. Soon after his assumption of power in the Upper Volga region Bogolyubsky encountered an opposition movement with which, the chronicler tells us, he dealt drastically by expelling its leaders: they were 'his father's chief men' (*muzhi ottsa svoego*

*perednii*).<sup>113</sup> With them he expelled his stepmother, Dolgoruky's second wife, and her children. She must have been a woman of great energy and initiative, passionately devoted to her sons' interests and a source of danger to Andrei, who apparently regarded the boys' existence as a threat although they were still of tender years. All this, however, would not have passed the bounds of a family quarrel but for the fact that Dolgoruky's widow was a Byzantine princess and, as events were to show, had considerable influence at the Emperor's court.<sup>114</sup>

In assessing the reigns of individual princes we cannot entirely ignore the part played by their wives. Dolgoruky's second wife seems to have been influential with her husband in the same way as was her Greek predecessor the wife of Vsevolod I, Dolgoruky's grandfather. The Patriarchate once again tried to exploit the opportunity, though circumstances were much less favourable to it than before.

Dolgoruky to a large extent continued the church policy of Monomakh. Both father and son tried to maintain friendly relations with Byzantium while protecting Rus'ian interests as seen from Kiev. Monomakh was opposed to creating a second metropolitan see, preferring a unified church organization to match the political unity of the Rurikides, of which Kiev was the symbol. Partly in order to over-persuade the prince, the patriarch chose Pereyaslavl'—a town of especial interest to Monomakh—as the second metropolis and spent large sums on adorning it with fine buildings. Dolgoruky followed his father's policy when, in the 1130s or 1140s, he revived the bishopric of Rostov and thus diminished the ecclesiastical importance of Pereyaslavl'.

Dolgoruky's position in the southern lands, however, was weaker than his father's. In order to maintain it he had a greater need of the patriarch's help, and this led him to make concessions in Kiev and elsewhere.

In 1147 Dolgoruky's nephew and rival for the throne of Kiev, Izyaslav (son of Mstislav and grandson of Monomakh), succeeded against the patriarch's will in having a metropolitan appointed by the synod of Rus'ian bishops: the appointee, Kliment Smolyatych, was himself a Rus'ian and not a Greek.<sup>115</sup> Dolgoruky stood firmly on the side of Constantinople and, after capturing Kiev, ostentatiously welcomed the new metropolitan consecrated by

the patriarch; in accordance with tradition, this incumbent was a Greek (Constantine).

In the north-east Dolgoruky adopted a similar policy, and it was no doubt in agreement with Constantinople that he assigned the Upper Volga districts to the sons born of his Greek wife. Byzantium was interested in the north-eastern territory for various reasons; but Dolgoruky's plans, like those of the patriarch, were thwarted by Bogolyubsky. Following the latter's assumption of power in the north-east, events took a violent course, as he behaved ruthlessly not only towards his stepmother and her sons and supporters, but also in church matters. The sources tell us of three bishops of Rostov: two Greeks, Nestor and Leon, and a third candidate named Fedor, who was supported by Bogolyubsky and was probably not a Greek. Either directly or indirectly (through certain 'Rostovians' and 'Suzdalians' mentioned by the chroniclers) the prince alternately removed and reinstated the different dignitaries, put forward other candidates etc., using as a pretext the gravest charge that could be levelled against churchmen, namely that of heresy.<sup>116</sup> The exact situation cannot be reconstructed with any certainty owing to the chroniclers' partiality, their brief and contradictory accounts and their unreliable chronology, obscuring the causal connection of events. What is certain, however, is that Bogolyubsky desired to establish a metropolitan see at Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma, independent of Kiev and directly subject to the patriarch. For this purpose he addressed some very interesting letters to Constantinople, which have not survived textually but are known from the patriarch's answer. We do not know when Andrei sent his message or exactly when the patriarch replied, and some details of the reply are also uncertain.<sup>117</sup> Its date is usually put at about 1160, but Voronin is probably right when, following Sokolov,<sup>118</sup> he suggests a date around 1164–8.<sup>119</sup>

Bogolyubsky was able to advance strong arguments for a separate metropolitan see at Vladimir: the ancient Christian tradition of Rostov-Suzdal', going back to Vladimir the Great (I see no reason to doubt what the sources say about this) and his own services in building and endowing churches etc. The patriarch, as his reply shows, fully appreciated these.

Golubinsky observed, rightly in my opinion, that 'there was one episcopal see [in Rus'] which, owing to special circumstances, the Greeks were able to replace unusually often [i.e. to appoint

new clergy to it although the previous bishops were still alive]. The Greeks . . . regarded it as, so to speak, their own bishopric, and, according to [sources cited] made it a kind of semi-Greek see. This was the bishopric of Rostov.'<sup>120</sup> Voronin, who shares Golubinsky's view, states that 'the patriarch and the emperor wished to keep the see of Rostov under [their] particular supervision.'<sup>121</sup> We may conclude from this that the patriarch wanted to keep the 'half-Greek bishopric' under his own direct authority. There was a good reason for this: it was the only bishopric in the Rus'ian state of the Rurikides whose population was not Slav but Finnic (Merya).

The patriarch refused Bogolyubsky's request, although it might have been expected that the two sides would reach some more or less durable understanding on the basis of their common interest in breaking up the ecclesiastical unity of Rus'—the metropolitanate of Pereyaslavl' being of importance to the Greeks in this respect.

On the basis of later source material which has little relevance to the 12th century, Voronin takes the view that Bogolyubsky's object in pressing for a metropolitan see in his own dominions was to unite the whole of Rus' under his rule and make it independent of Constantinople as far as church government was concerned.<sup>122</sup> The sources of the period do not justify such far-reaching assumptions.<sup>123</sup> But it must in fairness be admitted that Bogolyubsky was the first of the princes to formulate the principle of *raison d'état* from the point of view of Vladimir (later Moscow) and transmit it to his successors.

Bogolyubsky's conception of state-church relations was in fact the last of three 'grand designs' to take shape in Eastern Europe, the previous two being the aspiration to sovereignty of the Rurikides at Kiev and Greek attempts to transform Rus' into a province of Byzantium. Bogolyubsky's aims were essentially anti-Greek and anti-Kiev,<sup>124</sup> and in consequence the patriarch and the Kiev metropolitan united in opposing his efforts to create a new metropolitan see.

By introducing and maintaining the use of the Slav language on the upper Volga in both church and state affairs<sup>125</sup> Bogolyubsky thwarted the hopes which the Greeks had reposed in the Merya and other Finnic tribes. In this far-reaching policy he followed in the footsteps of his Kiev ancestors, who wished to break once



and for all with the political aspirations of Constantinople. Apart from other irritants to the Greeks,<sup>126</sup> one feature of Bogolyubsky's policy was of particular consequence to both sides and was certain to be opposed by the patriarch, viz. his insistence on a deciding voice in regard to senior church appointments in Vladimir-Suzdal'. This was clearly seen when he removed the Greek Leon from the see of Rostov and pressed the candidature of his own nominee, Fedor.

In view of this and other actions on Andrei's part, it is easy to understand the patriarch's opposition to the creation of a metropolitan see at Vladimir. Choosing the lesser evil, Constantinople upheld the right of the Kiev metropolitan to appoint to the see of Rostov; it demanded the removal of Fedor and the reinstatement of Leon (whom Andrei had banished), while consenting that he should reside at Vladimir rather than Rostov.

The increasingly violent dispute between Bogolyubsky and the patriarch eventually resulted in a stalemate: each side was strong enough to thwart the other, but too weak to enforce its own designs. The patriarch was unable, in the face of princely opposition, to create a Greek metropolitan see on the Upper Volga; but, armed with the weapon of excommunication, he was able to prevent Bogolyubsky setting up a metropolis of his own under Fedor.

The dispute went on for some time, and had many dramatic moments. Fedor was handed over to the metropolitan of Kiev,<sup>127</sup> and died after being cruelly tortured. It is hard to believe that Bogolyubsky did not know of the massacre of Suzdalians that had taken place at Kiev when his father died there in 1157, or that he forgot his own past failures and humiliations. Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma did not get its metropolitan, but Kiev paid a fearful price for preventing it. The retribution came in 1169, when the prince's troops captured the old Rus'ian capital and devastated it on a scale which was probably without a parallel until the conquest by the Tatars under Batu Khan in 1240. Young and old were slaughtered without pity, churches and convents were plundered, books, vestments and icons were carted off and the city was robbed of all its wealth.<sup>128</sup> 'And all the people of Kiev were filled with groans and sadness, and inconsolable grief and unceasing tears.'<sup>129</sup> According to the north-eastern chronicler Bogolyubsky's men returned home covered with glory, but the

southern annalist records that they were cursed by everybody in the land.

'The prestige of Kiev, both in political and in church affairs, was irreparably undermined.'<sup>130</sup> From the church point of view everything apparently remained as before—the Greek Leon once again occupied the see of Rostov—but in politics it was soon evident that a new era had dawned.

Up to now, ambitious princes had fought for Kiev and, when successful in the field, had generally occupied the grand ducal throne there; but Bogolyubsky did not do so,<sup>131</sup> as he no longer regarded Kiev as the Rus'ian capital. As Yushkov observes, 1169 was 'a crucial date in the history of the Rus'ian state. Andrei's decision not to remain in Kiev but to transfer the capital to Vladimir meant that the Kiev state ceased to exist. A period of complete feudal disintegration followed.'<sup>132</sup> It is often contended that Rus'ian unity was only broken up by the Tatar onslaught of 1237–40; in my opinion, however, the Tatar raids merely set the seal on a process that began in Bogolyubsky's time, and from this point of view we may say without hesitation that his reign was a turning-point in Rus'ian history.

This fact throws light on the character. He was certainly a man of broad political horizons, full of ambition and energy, with grandiose schemes for turning Vladimir into a powerful state. The complicated ethnic structure of his dominions was firmly subordinated to political interests, the more easily as he himself was of mixed race, his mother being a Polovtsian.<sup>133</sup> His programme was realistic and well calculated to succeed, as indeed it eventually did, so that Andrei can be said to have triumphed from the grave.

At the same time Bogolyubsky had many shortcomings which delayed, if they did not prevent, the realization of his plans. He had an autocratic sense of his power and dignity; he was impulsive rather than circumspect in taking decisions, imprudent in his choice of counsellors, ruthless and ferocious towards opponents. All these qualities he displayed both in external relations and in home affairs. A ruler of this type cannot be popular, though he may deserve well of his people.

On a June night in 1174 Andrei was attacked by conspirators as he slept alone in the castle at Bogolyubovo; he resisted violently, being a man of strong build and great physical strength, but they

hewed him to pieces and threw the remains into the castle grounds to be devoured by dogs.<sup>134</sup> There was nothing very unusual about this episode in itself: such atrocities occur in the history of many nations; but several facts connected with Bogolyubsky's downfall throw considerable light on the internal situation and social conditions on the Upper Volga at that time.<sup>135</sup>

The conspirators, led by the son and son-in-law of the boyar Kuchka,<sup>136</sup> were men of the prince's immediate entourage and well knew what fearful vengeance would have befallen them if they had failed. They were only some twenty in all, and had spent their lives in daily fear of the prince's outbursts of rage,<sup>137</sup> but it is unlikely that they would have resolved to do away with him if they had not been aware of the people's attitude. The reactions to Bogolyubsky's death indeed show that he was viewed with hostility by some sections of the population. Even the clergy seem to have been remarkably indifferent to his tragic fate. One man alone, 'Kuzmishche Kiyanin', took pity on Andrei's remains and transported them to a church porch, where they lay unregarded for two days and nights. On the third day Arsenii, abbot of Bogolyubovo, grew tired of waiting for orders and ventured a remarkable action, considering the atmosphere that prevailed to admit the body to the church, where a requiem was sung.<sup>138</sup> Six days later the remains were buried at Vladimir.

The events of the first few days after Andrei's death showed that matters were worse than could have been foreseen. The conspirators, despite all they owed to their former master,<sup>139</sup> not only went unpunished but won over the greater part of the prince's bodyguard,<sup>140</sup> while his 'enormous' wealth<sup>141</sup> was pillaged by all and sundry—not only the conspirators<sup>142</sup> and others at court, but the whole population of Bogolyubovo.<sup>143</sup>

Andrei's death, and especially the day it came about, acted as a signal inciting the dregs of society to violence. It is hard to say whether the disorders extended all over the country or only to certain regions.<sup>144</sup> The principal victims were senior servants of the state—economic, financial, military, judicial etc.—in towns and their immediate environs in various parts of the country. These suffered the same fate as their master: they were murdered and their houses plundered.<sup>145</sup> Such was the masses' eloquent answer to the cruelty which had marked the prince's administration.

Thus Bogolyubsky's reign, despite the promise with which it had begun, ended in tragedy.

Violent and bloody as the revolt was, it did not bring about any basic change in the country's internal affairs. In the conditions of those days princely power was indispensable, and the crisis of 1174 was resolved by the choice of a new prince. Four of Dolgoruky's posterity were claimants for the succession: Mstislav and Yaropolk,<sup>146</sup> whose father Rostislav had died, and Mikhalko (Michael) and Vsevolod, Dolgoruky's two sons by his second marriage. There ensued a short period of increasing chaos and internecine war, in which fortune varied from one side to the other.

On the news of Andrei's murder the 'Rostovians', 'Suzdalians' and 'Pereyaslavlans',<sup>147</sup> accompanied by their men-at-arms, assembled at Vladimir to elect a new prince.<sup>148</sup> They there decided to invite all four candidates to the succession,<sup>149</sup> as it was in the interest of the upper class to have a plurality of rulers, preferably under age. The princes would thus be weaker and the boyars stronger, in contrast to the position under Andrei, who with good reason was freshly remembered by the population at large as a despot and autocrat.

Almost at once, however, there was a split, as the Rostov party favoured the sons of Rostislav while Vladimir on the whole took Mikhalko's side. After some fighting Mikhalko was ousted from Vladimir and Mstislav and Yaropolk enjoyed a short period of joint rule; however, the oppression and rapacity of their officials caused discontent at Vladimir, and Mikhalko was recalled. He then unexpectedly died, and Vsevolod, who had till then played a secondary role in relation to his brother, came to the fore. Vsevolod III, as he is known, offered a compromise to Mstislav whereby the country would be divided and the two capitals enjoy equal status, with Vsevolod ruling at Vladimir and his nephew at Rostov; the fate of Suzdal' would be decided later.<sup>150</sup> However, the Rostov party rejected these terms and an armed conflict broke out, resulting in Vsevolod's victory at a bloody battle near Yur'ev (1177). Many of the Rostov boyars were slain, while others were taken prisoner and their estates and property confiscated.<sup>151</sup> This greatly weakened the political and economic status of Rostov and enabled Vsevolod to rule over the whole country.

It is clear from this account that there was, and no doubt had been for some time, a pronounced antagonism between the two 'capitals': Rostov (with which Suzdal' was associated) and Vladimir. The Rostovians treated Vladimir with disdain, regarding it as a dependent city of theirs<sup>152</sup> and its people as servants, craftsmen and farm labourers of the most menial kind.<sup>153</sup> The Vladimirians were moved to resistance: they rejected this humiliation,<sup>154</sup> regarded the people of Rostov and Suzdal' as their enemies<sup>155</sup> and did all they could to thwart their political designs.<sup>156</sup> The mutual animosity was deep-rooted: Rostov, as the older city, regarded Vladimir in the light of its own record as 'young', 'new' and inferior,<sup>157</sup> and ethnic and economic factors also came into play.

Dolgoruky and his sons, whose ambition and purpose was to rule effectively over the whole district, had been at pains to reduce the preponderance of Rostov. The strength of the latter city is indicated by the fact that they established the new capital of Vladimir not in the centre of their territory, where they knew resistance would be formidable, but on the Klyaz'ma, in the thinly populated intertribal area.

The ethnic character of Rostov and its surroundings at the beginning of the 12th century is known to us. The town itself had been a powerful Varangian centre since early times; prominent members of the Varangian Rus' had been given large estates populated chiefly by the conquered Merians, who were fairly numerous in that region.<sup>158</sup> The ethnic situation on the Klyaz'ma, on the other hand, is a matter of conjecture. There was probably a mixture consisting of a rather sparse indigenous population together with immigrants brought in from various lands and, in the nature of things, dependent on the prince's favour. The larger the proportion of these ethnically miscellaneous immigrants, the stronger would be the position of Andrei Bogolyubsky and Vsevolod.

It was a natural policy for the princes to man the administration with trustworthy people for whom their offices meant an advance in the social hierarchy. Government could not be entrusted to disaffected or positively hostile elements. The 'new men' who were placed at the head of state affairs formed a loyal and privileged group which was destined to counterbalance and even

exceed in importance the already established notables with their large estates and assured position.

The rivalry between the 'Rostovians' and 'Vladimirians' for first place in state affairs ended in the latter's victory. Vsevolod III was himself the main agent in this, as from this time onwards he whole-heartedly followed his brother's line of according pre-eminence to Vladimir. Vsevolod, while an outstanding personality, was in general a steadfast continuer of Bogolyubsky's policies rather than an originator of new ones. Of the two, Andrei had more dash and energy but Vsevolod was superior in prudence, deliberation and single-mindedness, with the result that he achieved more than his brother.

Vsevolod based his government on Vladimirians, boyars and warriors,<sup>159</sup> and although the country did not remain free from occasional disturbances they did not threaten the established order. It was in fact chiefly the Vladimirians who caused unrest,<sup>160</sup> as they took up a more implacable attitude towards their neighbours, both close at hand and further off, than did the prince himself.<sup>161</sup> Both the townsfolk and Vsevolod himself championed the interests of Vladimir, but the citizens understood these in a local, immediate sense whereas the prince took a broader political view. Vsevolod took care to fortify his own residence and that of the bishop at Vladimir, evidently to guard against not only external attack but any treachery on the part of those who might seem most closely bound to him.<sup>162</sup>

Vsevolod used the boyars in his government, but did not allow them to become too powerful, warned perhaps by the sad events which had terminated his brother's reign. By means of the courts he protected the lower orders against excessive oppression and exploitation by the boyars, and endeavoured to preserve a degree of social equilibrium.<sup>163</sup>

He showed similar prudence and deliberation in his policy towards the church. Unlike his brother, he did not press for a metropolitan see independent of Kiev; he did not clash with the patriarch or the Kiev metropolitan, but induced the latter to agree, not only formally but in practice, that the prince of Vladimir should have a deciding voice in episcopal appointments for the north-east.<sup>164</sup>

Vsevolod intervened directly or indirectly in the affairs of other principalities such as Smolensk, Riazan' and Murom, often taking

advantage of disputes among the local rulers.<sup>165</sup> He was at pains to maintain his position in Great Novgorod, but did not involve himself too deeply in the question of the Kiev throne and the continuing rivalries among princes in the south. He took care, however, to preserve links with his father's domain of southern Pereyaslavl', and saw to it that Kiev did not become too strong or recapture its former position. By reason of his strong internal position and wide 'sphere of influence' abroad, Vsevolod ranked in practice as the 'grand duke of all Rus' '.<sup>166</sup> There were thus in effect two grand princes ruling simultaneously,<sup>167</sup> but Kiev was more and more visibly declining. Vladimir had better prospects for the future, though it was too early to predict the outcome, and in fact a period of weakness ensued after Vsevolod's death in 1212.

Because of his large progeny Vsevolod was surnamed 'the Big Nest' (Bol'shoe Gnezdo). Six of his sons survived him,<sup>168</sup> and apapages had to be found for all of them. This involved dividing the state territory, with all the untoward consequences familiar from the early history of the Rurikides. The prince on his deathbed would divide up the state among his sons and adjure them to maintain concord among themselves and to obey the eldest, but experience showed how little heed was paid to such entreaties. Vsevolod too desired his successors to maintain solidarity among themselves,<sup>169</sup> but he left behind him a complicated situation full of difficulties for the future.

Vsevolod's first intention was to entrust his eldest son Konstantin with authority over his brothers: in 1207 he summoned him from Great Novgorod, over which he had recently been placed, and 'attached him to himself' with the gift of Rostov and five other towns, not named in our sources,<sup>170</sup> which were included in the Rostov district. Soon, however, this led to disagreement between the father, who wished to maintain Vladimir as the capital, and the son, who was inclined to maintain the traditional primacy of Rostov. Vsevolod put an end to the dispute by leaving Konstantin in Rostov but conferring seniority on his second son, Yury, to whom he left Vladimir.<sup>171</sup> Yury was also to act as guardian of the two youngest brothers, Svyatoslav and Ivan, and to assign lands to them later on.

Vsevolod's decision made it certain that there would be dissension between Konstantin and Yury. The latter for a short time

maintained the position conferred on him by his father, but in 1216 he was defeated by his brother at the battle of Lipetskoe pole near Yur'ev and had to relinquish his claim to seniority, to which Konstantin's age entitled him. 'And Konstantin became the ruler of Vladimir and Yuri of Suzdal', and there was great joy in the land of Suzdal', and only the devil mourned at the event.<sup>172</sup> The dispute was settled by subsequent events: in 1219, Konstantin died and Yuri returned to Vladimir, whence he ruled the whole country for nearly twenty years.

To all appearances everything was as before. In his relations with other states, including Novgorod, Riazan' and Chernigov, Yuri followed his father's policy, as he did in defending the country's eastern borders against invaders, especially the Volga Bulgars. From time to time he took offensive action, and in 1221, as the result of an eastern campaign, he founded the stronghold of Nizhny (Lower) Novgorod at the junction of the Oka and the Volga. None the less, despite his unquestionable efforts and frequent successes, Yuri's position was weaker than his father's had been. The chief reason for this was the state of relations among Vsevolod's posterity.

From the course of events we can reconstruct the principles governing relations within the large princely family. Vladimir itself and the title of 'grand duke' were to pass from one brother to the next in order of age. Thus the possession of Vladimir (the city and its immediate surroundings) was of a transient character, whereas the other apanages were each the 'patrimony' (*votchina*) of an individual prince, belonging to him permanently and hereditary within his family.

This settlement bore within itself many seeds of conflict. The sons of Vsevolod III themselves had a large progeny, so the dismemberment of what had been a single territory in the 12th century increased with every generation, despite the efforts of the grand princes to preserve its unity. Vsevolod's sons received domains of different sizes; the elder ones were privileged in this respect, and when they became grand dukes they tried to gain as much as possible for their own descendants, often at the expense of their brothers and nephews. Those of Vsevolod's grandsons who were treated preferentially by their fathers were sometimes stronger than their uncles with a claim to the title of



grand duke. All this created an extremely difficult situation for the future.

Those of Vsevolod's sons who acquired wealth and influence in this way were the three eldest: Konstantin (Rostov), Yury (Suzdal') and Yaroslav (Pereyaslavl'). The chroniclers, while enumerating the chief towns belonging to these princes, do not give a full idea of the extent of the lands bequeathed to them, but some indication is afforded by the description of areas which were carved out of these in subsequent generations. Thus it appears that 'Rostov' covers an enormous territory along the Volga from its junction with the Medveditsa on its left bank to the Kotorosl' on its right; the territory in question also stretched northward beyond the Volga, along the Sheksna (a left-bank tributary) to Lake Beloe, and eastward as far as the Ustyug district, watered by the river Yug, the Sukhona and the Northern Dvina. When Vsevolod III, as the chronicler tells us, gave his son Konstantin Rostov and five other towns in 1207, these were probably Uglich, Mologa, Yaroslavl', Beloozero and Ustyug.<sup>173</sup> It appears from this allocation that Vsevolod's plan was to content the ambition of the Rostovians to play an important part, but that to divert them from rivalry with the new capital on the Klyaz'ma the aged prince endeavored to divert their energy and initiative northwards, where they would bear the brunt of extending the Vladimir state into fresh territory.

In the same way, Vsevolod urged the Suzdalians to press eastward. Yury's Suzdalian principality reached the Volga at Nizhny Novgorod, Gorodets and Kostroma, and perhaps extended further north-east to Galich Mersky. On the other hand, Yaroslav's apanage of Pereyaslavl' was intended to expand mainly in a western direction.

Compared to Vsevolod's three elder sons, the three younger—Vladimir, Svyatoslav and Ivan—seem to have been very poorly endowed and correspondingly deprived of influence.<sup>174</sup> Svyatoslav played a certain part in this group, mainly as the result of chance. Originally assigned the small territory of Yur'ev, after the death of his elder brothers he occupied the throne of Vladimir, but for so short a time that his reign was of little consequence. The role of grand duke could only be enjoyed by those descendants of Vsevolod whose territorial base made them strong enough to keep the lead among their ambitious and factious brothers and

other relations. The hereditary principle as it operated within the dynasty was not adequate to the challenge of reality.

The political situation in the Upper Volga area during the first 25 years after Vsevolod's death more or less conformed to his intentions: Vladimir was confirmed as the capital<sup>175</sup> and, with some difficulty, the solidarity was preserved among Vsevolod's descendants:<sup>176</sup> this was largely due to Yury's merits, but also to good fortune.<sup>177</sup> At this juncture the great Tatar invasion led by Batu Khan shook the whole of Eastern Europe. Thus began a new epoch in the history of Rus'.

### Notes to Chapter 5

1. This chapter also covers part of the 13th century, down to the time of the great Tatar invasion of the Rus'ian lands under Batu Khan in 1237–40.

2. Yury (George), the son of Monomakh and Gyda of England, styled by later chroniclers Dolgoruky ('of the long arm'), was probably born in the mid-90s of the 11th century. His father married him to the daughter of a Polovtsian khan; the son of this marriage was Andrei Bogolyubsky, surnamed after the stronghold of Bogolyubovo which he founded. Vsevolod III was a much younger half-brother of Andrei's, the son of Dolgoruky's second wife, a Byzantine princess.

3. The chief administrative function of these officials was to collect tribute from the conquered local inhabitants, which could only be done by force of arms.

4. 'I po tem gorodam sut' [NB present tense] nakhodnitsi varyazi . . .' (*Povesť* I, p. 18): these are the words of the Kiev chronicler, writing at the beginning of the 12th century. There is no reason to question the accuracy of this statement, as is often done in the literature on this subject.

5. We cannot accept V. Kuchkin's hypothesis (*Rostovo-suzdal'skaya zemlya v X—pervoi treti XIII vekov* [Tsentry i granitsy], *ISSSR*, 1969 (2), pp. 64–5) that Rostov was not founded until the end of the 10th century or the beginning of the 11th. Rostov was an ancient stronghold of the Merya and was the chief centre of local resistance against foreign invasion, and for this very reason it saw the strongest concentration of Varangians.

6. ' . . . a voevoda u nego [sc. Dolgoruky] byl i boyarin bolshei Georgii Simonovich', vnuk' Afrikano [v'], Varyazhskogo knyazya, brata Yakunu slepomu': *PSRL*, XV, p. 193. Similarly in the *Kievan Paterikon*: D. Abramovich (ed.), *Kievo-Pechers'kii Paterik*, *PMPDU*, IV, 1930, pp.

1-5. See also A. Stender-Petersen, *Varangica*, 1953, pp. 147-50; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, p. 24.

7. N. Voronin, *K voprosu o nachale Rostovo-Suzdal'skogo letopisaniya*, AE, 1964, (1965), pp. 31, 38; Yu. Limonov, op. cit., p. 26.

8. As may be seen e.g. in connection with the foundation of the see of Smolensk.

9. Strictly speaking, he resided 3 km. outside Suzdal', in the small fortress of Kideksha at the confluence of the Kamenka (on which Suzdal' lay) and the Nerl'. The fact that Dolgoruky founded this stronghold indicates that he felt safer there than in Suzdal' and was able to threaten the latter city, since Kideksha commanded the river route from Suzdal' via the Nerl' to the Klyaz'ma and thence to the Oka and the Volga. Cf. P. Rappoport, *I polukruglye gorodishcha Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi*, SAr, 1959 (1), p. 122; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, pp. 55, 56, 59, 67; id., *K voprosu o nachale*, p. 37.

10. In this connection, the chroniclers begin to use the term 'land of Suzdal'' to denote the whole of the Merya territory, though they also speak of the 'land of Rostov': the terms are used indiscriminately in the sources to designate the same area.

11. N. Voronin, *Vladimir, Bogolyubovo, Suzdal', Yur'ev Pol'skoi*, 1958, pp. 159-280 (2nd ed., 1965).

12. N. Voronin, *ibid.*, pp. 11-120.

13. L. Maikov, *Zametki po geografii drevnei Rusi*, ZMNP, CLXXIV, 1874, pp. 269-70; I. Smirnov, *Geografiya Vladimirskoi gubernii*, 1896, pp. 9-11, 33; V. Klyuchevsky, *Skazaniya inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve*, 1918, pp. 179-80, 185; A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya'*, pp. 180-91, and others.

14. See Appendix 5, Slav colonization of the Merya territory, A. Nasonov, op. cit., p. 246.

15. The Klyaz'ma near Vladimir, and its tributary the Nerl', formed the approximate boundary of the 'plain': D. Petryaeva, *Vladimirskoe Opol'e*, VG, IL, 1960, p. 151.

16. The hypothesis has been advanced that the foundation of Vladimir on the high left bank of the Klyaz'ma was due to an external threat, i.e. the need to defend the duchy of Rostov-Suzdal' against incursions by the Rurikides of Chernigov (A. Nasonov, op. cit., p. 183) or of Ryazan' (N. Voronin, *Kul'tura Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi zemli XI-XIII vv.*, IsZ, 1944, p. 36; id., *Zodchestvo*, p. 39), or by the Volga Bulgars, who attacked Suzdal' in 1107.

If the siting of Vladimir was determined by military considerations it should have been at the confluence of the Nerl' and the Klyaz'ma. However, in Bogolyubsky's time a threat from the south was not taken seriously. Had it existed, the capital of the state would not have been

established at Vladimir, a location especially threatened from outside, but rather in the depths of Merya territory.

17. If Bogolyubsky regarded Vladimir as more important than Suzdal' from the point of view of state interests, he must have done so on the basis of experience during his father's rule. It is likely that the transfer of the capital to the banks of the Klyaz'ma was planned in Dolgoruky's lifetime, as it took place immediately after his death.

18. The chronicler, writing at the beginning of the 12th century, speaks of this in the present tense: '... sedyat' ... na Rostov'skom ozere merya, a na Kleshchine ozere merya zhe': *Povest'* I, p. 13. The eastern part of the Pereyasavl' territory was called 'Meryan' until the 16th century. Cf. D. Korsakov, *Merya i Rostovskoe knyazhestvo. Ocherki iz istorii Rostovo-Suzdal'skoi zemli*, UZIKU, VII, 1871 (1872), p. 14; N. Ushakov, *Sputnik po drevnemu Vladimiru i gorodam Vladimirskoi gubernii*, 1913, p. 5.

19. Cf. P. Rappoport, *Drevnie russkie kreposti*, 1965.

20. N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, pp. 128–148. Of special interest among Bogolyubsky's buildings at Vladimir are the Golden Gates, an outstanding piece of Rus'ian military architecture of the 12th century.

21. The chronicler emphasizes that he built the fortress 'for himself' (*sobe*): *PSRL*, II, p. 580.

22. N. Voronin, *O dvortse Andrey a v Bogolyubove*, *KSDPI*, 1939; id., *Zamok Andrey a Bogolyubskogo*, *ASSSR*, 1939; id., *Nekotorye istoricheskie vyvody iz arkheologicheskikh issledovaniy vo Vladimire i Bogolyubove*, *IM*, 1940; id., *Gorod Vladimir i (selo) Bogolyubovo. Arkheologicheskie issledovaniya v RSFSR 1934–1936*, 1941; id., *Osnovnye voprosy rekonstruktsii Bogolyubovskogo dvortsa*, *KSDPI*, 1945; id., *Vladimir, Bogolyubovo*; id., *Zodchestvo*.

23. Although the prince resided at Bogolyubovo, Vladimir remained the capital, and Bogolyubsky and members of his family were buried there.

24. Bogolyubovo was situated about 10 km. from Vladimir, at the confluence of the Nerl' and the Klyaz'ma.

25. P. Rappoport, *Ocherki po istorii russkogo voennogo zodchestva X–XIII vv.*, *MIA*, LII, 1956, pp. 116–18.

26. The fertile belt of open country known as the 'field' (*opol'e*) was no more than an oasis amid the Merya territory.

27. See map of the 'Rostov-Suzdal' territory' (in the 12th century and the beginning of the 13th) in A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya'*, pp. 184–5; B. Rybakov, *Skhematiceskaya karta naselennykh punktov domongol'skoi Rusi, upominaemykh v russkikh pis'mennykh istochnikakh*, in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi* I, 1951, pp. 30–1.

28. This 'internal' waterway, shortening the route from the Baltic to the Caspian, was known and used from very early times. This is shown

by the hoards of Cufic coins connected with trade between Rus' and the Arabs in the 9th and 10th centuries.

29. These river communications in the Rostov-Suzdal' territory are more fully described in N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, 1885, pp. 30–1.

30. The Rurikides in the 10th century generally settled their trusted military retainers and administrators at strategic points in the system of waterways. Igor's treaty of 944/5 with the Greeks mentions a Varangian Rus'ian named Karsh-Karash (Karshev Turdov, *Povest' I*, p. 34) who was granted a large estate (Karash volost'—N. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 12, 113) on the upper Nerl' (tributary of the Klyaz'ma) near the source of that river, a very short distance from Lake Pereyaslavl' and from the sources of the Sara: this was a key area from the communications point of view.

31. See map: A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya i kurgannye mogil'niki*; A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya'*, p. 174.

32. PSRL, VIII, p. 13; IX, p. 197; XXIV, p. 77.

33. P. Tret'yakov, *Drevnerusskii gorod Kleshchin*, in: *Problemy obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Rossii i slavyanskikh stran*, 1963, pp. 49–53.

34. *Povest' I*, p. 13.

35. 'A se imena vsem gradom ruskym, dalnim i blizhnim', *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis'*, p. 477; M. Tikhomirov, *Spisok russkikh gorodov dal'nikh i blizhnikh*, *IZ*, XL, 1952, p. 250.

36. N. Voronin, *Pereyaslavl' Zaleskii*, 1948, pp. 5–7; id., *Raskopki v Pereyaslavle Zalesskom*, *MIA*, XI, 1949, p. 193.

37. N. Voronin, *Raskopki v Yaroslavle*, *MIA*, XI, 1949, pp. 177–92.

38. *Povest' I*, pp. 99–100.

39. M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, pp. 415–16.

40. *Povest' II*, pp. 401–2. The date 1071 is uncertain.

41. *Povest' I*, pp. 117–19.

42. N. Nedovshina, *Torgovyi inventar'*, in: *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e po materialam Timerevskogo, Mikhailovskogo i Petrovskogo mogil'nikov*, 1963, pp. 71–4; M. Fekhner, *Vneshneekonomicheskie svyazi po materialam Yaroslavskikh mogil'nikov*, *ibid.*, pp. 75–85.

43. V. Ivanov, *Yaroslavl'*, 1946, p. 5; N. Voronin, *Raskopki*, pp. 177, 191; E. Goryunova, *K istorii gorodov Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi*, *KSDPI*, LIX, 1955, p. 19; eadem, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 91, 202, and others.

44. G. Bondaruk, *Mestnye geograficheskie terminy v toponimii Yaroslavskoi oblasti*, *VG*, LXX, 1966, pp. 166–8.

45. N. Voronin, *Raskopki*, p. 191.

46. V. Mal'm, *Orudiya truda*, in: *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e*, pp. 32–5; E. Andreeva, *Fauna Yaroslavskogo Povolzh'ya po kostnym ostatkam iz kurgannykh pogrebenii X-XI vv.*, *ibid.*, pp. 92–5.

47. V. Mal'm, op. cit.; A. Smirnov in *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e*, p. 3.
48. N. Voronin, *Raskopki*, p. 191; M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, p. 416.
49. A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 185.
50. A. Yanovsky, *Yury Dolgoruky*, 1955, p. 92.
51. M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, p. 417.
52. See map: A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya i kurgannye mogil'niki*.
53. N. Milonov, *Dmitrovskoe gorodishche*, *SAr*, IV, 1937, pp. 147-67.
54. The Yakhroma flows into the Sestra and the Sestra into the Dubna, a right-bank tributary of the Volga.
55. N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, p. 56.
56. M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, pp. 234, 411; P. Rappoport, *Kruglye i polukruglye gorodishcha*, p. 118.
57. M. Tikhomirov, op. cit., pp. 244, 413; P. Rappoport, op. cit., p. 117.
58. N. Voronin, *Vladimir, Bogolyubovo*, pp. 281-326.
59. We do not take account here of distant Beloozero: it is usually reckoned as belonging to the Rostov-Suzdal' duchy, but it was in Ves', not Merya territory.
60. V. Kuchkin, *Rostovo-Suzdal'skaya zemlya*, p. 86.
61. It is hard to accept the general view that the Merya 'disappeared' in the 10th-11th century, as there is no evidence that the Rurikides extended their rule to the eastern part of the Merya territory even by the middle of the 12th.
62. V. Kuchkin (op. cit., p. 81) ascribes the foundation of Tver' to Dolgoruky himself, but his arguments are very conjectural. Another important stronghold in this area was Zubtsov, where the Vazuza flows into the Volga: it is first mentioned in the sources under the year 1216, but probably existed earlier.
63. Archaeological investigations, carried out rather superficially at the former stronghold of Starodub (now in ruins), have not produced much material: A. Ivanov, *Klyazemskii gorodok, byvshii udel'nyi gorod Starodub*, in: *Trudy Vladimirskego gosudarstvennogo oblastnogo muzeya* II, 1926, pp. 51-65 (unavailable to me).
64. N. Voronin, *Vladimiro-Suzdal'skaya zemlya v XI-XIII vv.*, *PIDO*, 1935 (5-6), p. 214; id., *Zodchestvo*, p. 39.
65. A. Yanovsky, *Yury Dolgoruky*, p. 144.
66. Gorokhovets is called 'Our Lady's city' (*grad svyatyya Bogoroditsy*), signifying that its revenues were used to support the church of Our Lady at Vladimir: this was probably a donative of Bogolyubsky's.
67. See map: A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya i kurgannye mogil'niki*.

68. A. Dubynin, *O plemennoi prinadlezhnosti*, pp. 67–79.

69. Situated on the left bank of the middle Volga, Gorodets Radilov first appears in the sources in 1172, during Bogolyubsky's reign. Archaeological evidence confirms that it was founded in the second half of the 12th century: A. Medvedev, *Pervye raskopki v Gorodtse na Volge*, KSDPI, CX, 1967, pp. 73–85. Vsevolod III played an important part in the erection of its powerful fortifications, which extend along the river for nearly 11.200 m. (P. Rappoport, *Kruglye i polukruglye gorodishcha*, p. 122).

70. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 150, 220–47 etc.

71. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 10, 53.

72. A. Nasonov, op. cit., p. 193.

73. P. Rappoport, *Oboronitel'nye sooruzheniya Galicha Mer'skogo*, KSDPI, LXXVII, 1959, pp. 3–9.

74. For the origin of the name 'Kostroma' cf. A. Popov, *Iz istorii leksiki yazykov Vostochnoi Evropy*, 1957, pp. 33–4; V. Nikonov, *Kratkii toponimicheskii slovar'*, 1966, pp. 208–9, and others.

75. M. Fekhner, *Raskopki v Kostrome (K voprosu o vremeni vozniknoveniya Kostromy i ee pervonachal'nom mestopolozhenii)*, KSDPI, XLVII, 1952, pp. 101–8.

76. N. Voronin, in: *Kul'tura Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi zemli XI-XIII vekov*, *IsZ*, 1944 (4), p. 36, ascribes its foundation to the 10th or 11th century, but gives no grounds for doing so.

77. A. Nasonov, op. cit., p. 196.

78. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 49, 52.

79. A. Popov, *Geograficheskie nazvaniya. Vvedenie v toponimiku*, 1965, pp. 69–72.

80. See map: A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya i kurgannye mogil'niki*.

81. It is beyond our present scope to discuss the artistic merits of the monuments in question. The basic work on the subject, already often cited, is N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XV vv.*, Vol. I, 1961, where a full bibliography will be found.

82. The best preserved, relatively speaking, is the cathedral at Peremyaslavl'.

83. *PSRL*, I, p. 351; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, p. 329.

84. *PSRL*, IX, p. 220.

85. Many writers believe that 'local' craftsmen played a large part in the building operations. There is little reason to suppose that such craftsmen were Varangians, and the role of the Merya was probably confined to heavy physical labour. One cannot speak of local architects before, at the earliest, the time of Vsevolod III, when some of the foreign craftsmen who had arrived at or before the middle of the 12th century settled permanently in Vladimir-Suzdal'.

86. The oldest specimen of white-stone building is the church of Boris and Gleb at Kideksha.

87. The first incursion was that of the Varangians, who appeared on the Upper Volga in the second half of the 9th century.

88. '... inogda bo ache i gost' prikhodit iz Tsaryagoroda i ot inykh stran iz Ruskoï zemli, i ache Latinin, i do vsego khrest'yan'stva, i do vse pogani ...—i Bolgare i Zhidove i vsya pogan' ...': PSRL, II, s.a. 1175.

89. From the Patriarch's reply: 'Skazyvaet zhe nam pisanie tvoe, izhe grad Volodimer' iz osnovania vozdvigl esi velik so mnogom chelovek': RIB, VI, 1908, p. 63, PSRL, IX, p. 223. V. Klyuchevsky (*Kurs russkoï istorii*, in his *Sochineniya* I, 1956, p. 349) states that Bogolyubsky expressed pride in the fact that the land of Suzdal' was populated during his reign by the establishment of towns and large villages, a view criticized by A. Presnyakov in *Obrazovanie*, p. 28. For the attraction of numerous merchants and craftsmen to Vladimir see V. Klyuchevsky, op. cit., p. 322.

90. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 204.

91. '... k tebe [sc. Dolgoruky] ... idut lyudi ne tokmo ot Chernigova i Smolenska, no koliko tysyach, iz-za Dnepra ...': V. Tatishchev, *Istoriya Rossiyskaya* II, 1963, p. 182; '... i nachal [Dolgoruky] te grady naselyat' sozyvaya lyudei otvsyudu, kotorym nemaluyu ssudu daval i v stroeniyakh, i drugimi podayaniyami pomagat. V kotorye prikhodya, mnozhestvo iz bolgor, mordvy i vengrov, krome ruskikh, selilis' i predely ego mnogimi tysyachi lyudei napolnyali': ibid., III, 1964, p. 44.

92. *Povest'* I, pp. 83, 101.

93. For references see C. Goehrke, Wüstungsperioden des frühen und hohen Mittelalters in Osteuropa, *JGO*, XVI (1), pp. 22–5.

94. V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs russkoï istorii* I, pp. 289–90; M. Lyubavsky, *Istoricheskaya geografiya Rossii v svyazi s kolonizatsiei*, 1909 (unavailable to me). Large rivers kept their names, while small rivers were frequently given new ones. Cf. P. Tret'yakov, Volgo-Okskaya toponimika i nekotorye voprosy etnogeneza finno-ugorskikh narodov Povolzh'ya, *SE*, 1958 (4), p. 9; V. Zhushkevich, K voprosu o baltiiskom substrate v etnogeneze belorusov, *SE*, 1968 (1), p. 111.

95. N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, p. 45.

96. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 205. P. Tolochko, in *Etnicheskoe i gosudarstvennoe razvitie Rusi v XII–XIII vv.*, Vol. 1974 (2), pp. 57–8, also maintains that the Merya territory received 'a particularly large influx of colonists from southern Russia, from the lands of Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslavl' and elsewhere.'

97. Many years ago A. Spitsyn, in: *Istoriko-arkheologicheskie razyskaniya*, ZMNP, 1909 (1), pp. 90–8, argued that it was impossible—



if only for purely physical reasons—for the sparse population of the steppe borderlands to have colonized the Merya territory *en masse*. Moreover the sources indicate that that population was still in its old places of settlement in the twelfth century.

98. M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, p. 418. It was already noted by contemporaries that the princes were inspired by Kiev traditions in choosing the site of new towns: thus, e.g., Bogolyubsky erected a 'gorod kamen, imenem' Bogolyubyi tol' daleche yako zhe Vyshegorod ot Kiev tak zhe i Bogolyubyi ot Volodimerya': *PSRL*, II, p. 580.

99. It is generally supposed that the Slav population of the southern lands fled from their homes for fear of invasion by the steppe nomads, especially Polovtsians. The nomads indeed carried out raids, but the sources also tell us of reprisals by the Rus'ian princes. It was in the latter's interest to have as large a defensive force as possible, and both Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise brought in settlers from other lands to protect their borders. Thus the alleged colonization of Merya territory would have been contrary to the princes' policy, which is impossible.

100. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, p. 5.

101. This can be seen, for instance, in his readiness to agree to the abolition of the see of Rostov and its incorporation in that of Pereyasavl', which was of great importance not only ecclesiastically but politically as well.

102. The Suzdal'-Vladimir line of Monomakh's posterity maintained remarkably strong links with Pereyasavl', which persisted into the middle of the 12th century despite the altered political conditions.

103. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, p. 35.

104. After Monomakh's death in 1125 the government at Kiev was exercised in order of seniority by his two sons Mstislav and Yaropolk. From 1138 to 1146 Kiev was ruled by Vsevolod of Chernigov (son of Oleg), who named his brother Igor as successor. The latter, however, was unable to maintain himself in power, and in 1147 the principality fell under the rule of Mstislav's son Izyaslav. This exacerbated the already hostile relations among the Monomashichi, leading to armed intervention in the south by Dolgoruky and to a succession of conflicts in which fortune changed from side to side: Dolgoruky conquered Kiev and lost it again, though he was its ruler at the time of his death in 1157. The other Rurikides supported one or other of the two main rivals, Dolgoruky and Izyaslav, so that the conflict became a general one among the princes.

105. ' . . . isprosi u brata svoego Yaropolka Pereyasavl' a Yaropolku vda Suzhdal' i Rostov i prochuyyu volost' svoyu, no ne vsyu': *PSRL*, I, p. 302. Cf. L. Cherepnin, *K voprosu o kharaktere i forme Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva X—nachala XIII v.*, *IZ*, LXXXIX, 1972, p. 389. It is hard to

tell from this statement by the chronicler which lands, apart from Suzdal' and Rostov, Dolgoruky intended to make over to his brother, since they did not comprise 'his whole' domain. By way of comparison and analogy we may cite another plan for the partitioning of the Rostov-Suzdal' territory, which Vsevolod III later proposed to his kinsman and rival Mstislav, son of Rostislav: the latter was to get Rostov, while Vsevolod kept Vladimir; Suzdal' was to belong to them jointly, or its inhabitants could decide by election which prince they preferred (A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, p. 45). This plan clearly looked towards a division of the territory into a northern portion based on Rostov and a southern one based on Vladimir.

106. 'I mnogo zla stvorisya v t den': rozgrabisha dvor ego krasnyi, i drugi dvor ego za Dneprom razgrabisha, ego zhe zvashet' sam Raem, i Vasilkov dvor syna ego razgrabisha v gorode; izbivakhut' Suzhdaltsi po gorodom i po selom, a tovar ikh grabyache': PSRL, II, p. 489. Voronin comments: 'We may infer from this account that, having captured Kiev, Yury mistrusted the local officials who held administrative posts and governed the prince's fortresses and estates . . . Consequently he changed the whole administration, replacing [the former office-holders] by Suzdaliens whom he had brought with him. These [Suzdaliens] hastened to enrich themselves and behaved like greedy conquerors in a subjugated territory . . . Yury's murder was the signal for a general revolt which overthrew the "Suzdalian" administration that had been imposed on the Dnepr lands" (N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, pp. 61-2). The chroniclers do not expressly say that Yury died an unnatural death, but the circumstances of his last few days suggest that he was poisoned: this view is advanced by B. Rybakov ('*Slovo o polku Igoreve' i ego sovremenniki*, 1971, p. 115) and other authors before him.

107. Against this background of animosity it is hard to believe that the population of Kiev and other southern lands would have voluntarily quitted their ancestral homelands and migrated *en masse* to the remote north-east in order to come under Dolgoruky's rule.

108. Cf. Yu. Limonov, *Letopisets Andreya Bogolyubskogo*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 113-17.

109. Skazanie o chudesakh vladimirskoi ikony Bozhiei Materi, *IOLDP*, XXX, 1878. For analysis of the *Skazanie* and other works relevant to this problem see N. Voronin, *Skazanie o pobede nad Bolgarami 1164 goda i prazdnik Spasa*, in: *Problemy obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Rossii i slavyanskikh stran*, 1963, pp. 88-92; id., ' "Zhitie Leontiya Rostovskogo" i vizantiisko-russkie otnosheniya vtoroi poloviny XII veka', *VV*, XXIII, 1963, pp. 27-8; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, pp. 73-6, and others.

110. W. Philipp, *Die religiöse Begründung der altrussischen Hauptstadt*, in: *Festschrift für Max Vasmer*, 1956, pp. 375-87; N. Voronin, *Arkheo-*

logicheskie zametki, *KSDPI*, LXII, 1956, pp. 19–22; id., Pokrov na Nerli, *SAr*, 1958 (4), pp. 70–95; I. Budovniats, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya mysl' drevnei Rusi (XI–XIV vv.)*, 1960, pp. 238, 242, 243; N. Voronin, Iz istorii russko-vizantiiskoi tserkovnoi bor'by XII veka, *VV*, XXVI, 1965, pp. 190–218.

111. The contemporary chroniclers give a rather subjective account with many details which are not always reconcilable, so that it is difficult to reconstruct the course of events before and after Dolgoruky's death. Thus we are told that the 'Rostovians' and 'Suzdalians' swore an oath to fulfil Yury's intentions (i.e. to defend the rights of his sons by his second wife to the Rostov-Suzdal' territory), while Yury entrusted administrative posts and fortresses in the Kiev area to 'Suzdalians'; yet 'all' the 'Rostovians' and 'Suzdalians' recognized Andrei and 'placed him on his father's throne at Rostov and at Suzdal'. It might have seemed that Bogolyubsky would have found specially strong support in these two centres, but he did not: Dolgoruky's second wife was at Suzdal' with her followers, asserting the right of her sons to their father's inheritance, and so on. The sources are collated and the facts discussed in A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 32–3; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, pp. 113–17; A. Nasonov, *Maloissledovannye voprosy*, pp. 350–7; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, pp. 80–4, and others.

112. It may have been under the influence of these boyars that Dolgoruky released the Rostov-Suzdal' territory from the obligation to pay tribute to Kiev: A. Nasonov, *Russkaya zemlya*, pp. 168–71, 187.

113. *PSRL*, II, under the year 1162.

114. For evidence as to her personal appearance, based on a fragment of fresco, discovered in 1946, from the church of Boris and Gleb at Kideksha, see N. Sychev, *Predpolagaemoe izobrazhenie zheny Yuriya Dolgorukogo*, *SIII*, 1951, pp. 51–62.

115. 'Iziaslav postavi mitropolita Klima, kalugera, Rusina, osob' s shest'yu episkopy': *PSRL*, I, p. 315. Cf. M. Priselkov, *Russko-vizantiiskie otnosheniya IX–XII vv.*, *VDI*, 1939 (3), p. 107.

116. These events, which are generally known, are discussed in the works, already cited, by Golubinsky, Nasonov, Priselkov, Voronin and others; most fully in N. Voronin, Andrei Bogolyubsky i Luka Khrizoverg, *VV*, XXI, 1962, pp. 29–50.

117. The Patriarch's answer to Andrei's letter is not preserved in the original Greek but only in two Slav translations, a shorter and a longer. The texts were re-edited with an important commentary by A. Pavlov in *RIB*, VI, 1908, pp. 63–76.

118. P. Sokolov, *Russkii arkhieri i vizantii i pravo ego naznacheniya do nachala XV v.*, 1913, p. 134.

119. N. Voronin, Andrei Bogolyubsky, p. 33.

120. E. Golubinsky, *Istoriya russkoi tserkvi* I (1), 1901, p. 359.

121. N. Voronin, Andrei Bogolyubsky, p. 34.

122. N. Voronin, Andrei Bogolyubsky, p. 50: the object of Bogolyubsky's struggle with the patriarch was 'not to secure the ecclesiastical independence of Vladimir from Kiev, but that of Rus' from Tsar'grad [Constantinople]'; id., *Skazanie o pobede nad Bolgarami*, pp. 90-1.

123. If Bogolyubsky had wished to unite all Rus' under his own rule he would have urged the patriarch to transfer the metropolitanate from Kiev to Vladimir, not to create a second metropolitan see: the latter would have meant breaking up the ecclesiastical—and political—unity of Rus'.

124. Bogolyubsky showed by his political and military actions that he felt the interests of the Rus'ian north-east to be not only different from, but contrary to, those of the Rus'ian south.

125. It should not be forgotten that the Slav language was that of Bogolyubsky's own upbringing. It was more intelligible to the Merya population than the totally foreign Greek language, especially in the Western areas where they had Slav tribes as neighbours—the Novgorodian Slavs, Krivichians and Vyaticians.

126. We should not lose sight of the influence and intrigues of Bogolyubsky's Greek stepmother, whom he expelled in violent fashion: she received a welcome at Constantinople, and her sons were put in command of imperial strongholds (PSRL, IX, p. 229). The patriarch seems to have hoped that these sons would play an important part.

127. The last phase of relations between Bogolyubsky and Fedor is obscure. The chroniclers say that the prince quarrelled with his former 'favourite', but these clearly tendentious accounts are chiefly aimed at exonerating the prince and blackening Fedor's character still further.

128. '... vzyasha Kyev, egozhe ne bylo nikogdazhe . . . i ves' Kyev pograbisha, i tserkvi i monastyre, za 3 dni, i ikony poimasha i knigi i rizy': PSRL, I, p. 354.

129. PSRL, II, p. 373.

130. N. Voronin, Andrei Bogolyubsky, p. 49. However, and despite the evidence of the sources, B. Rybakov belittles the importance of the events of 1169 in "Slovo o polku Igoreve" i ego sovremenniki, 1971, p. 141.

131. He bestowed Kiev first on his younger brother Gleb and, after the latter's death, on his kinsmen the princes of Smolensk.

132. S. Yushkov, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskii stroi i pravo Kievskogo gosudarstva*, 1949, p. 143. Yushkov's view is sometimes questioned in the literature (e.g. P. Tolochko, *Politichne stanovishche Kieva v period feodal'noi rozdroblennosti*, UIZ, 1966 (10), pp. 63-73), but without sufficient grounds.

133. From his mother, a daughter of the Polovtsian khan Aepa, Bobolyubsky took his appearance, which was that of a Polovtsian, with broad nose and high cheek-bones, as well as his second name, Kitai. In connection with the opening of Andrei's tomb much careful study was devoted to the prince's skeleton. Cf. D. Rokhlin and A. Rubasheva, *Rentgeno-paleo-patologicheskoe issledovanie kostnykh materialov*, PIDO, 1934, pp. 89-91; D. Rokhlin and V. Maikova-Stroganova, *Rentgeno-antropologicheskoe issledovanie skeleta Andrey a Bogolyubskogo*, PIDO, 1935 (9-10), p. 158; V. Ginzburg, Andrei Bogolyubsky, *KSDPI*, XI, 1945, pp. 86-8; M. Gerasimov, Andrei Bogolyubsky, *ibid.*, pp. 89-91. A likeness of Bogolyubsky, reconstructed by Gerasimov, is to be found: in: *Istoriya kul'tury drevnei Rusi* 1, 1951, p. 32. There is a fresco from Andrei's castle at Bogolyubovo which may represent his features: N. Voronin, *Zhitie Leontiya Rostovskogo*, pp. 30-1. Bogolyubsky's court was visited by Polovtsians and by Ossetians from the Caucasus: his wife was herself a Caucasian of Ossetian origin. Armenian and Georgian sources artificially exaggerate Andrei's power and strength: S. Eremyan, Yury Bogolyubsky v armyanskikh i gruzinskikh istochnikakh, *NTEGU*, XXIII, 1946, pp. 389-421 (unavailable to me); H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, p. 294; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, p. 126. See also *Pamyatniki epokhi Rustaveli*, 1938.

134. For a description and analysis of the events connected with Bogolyubsky's death see N. Voronin, "'Povest' ob ubiistve Andrey a Bogolyubskogo" i ee avtor', *ISSSR*, 1963 (3), pp. 80-97.

135. M. Tikhomirov, *Krest'yanskije i gorodskie vosstaniya*, pp. 226-35; L. Cherepnin, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskie otnosheniya v drevnei Rusi i Russkaya Pravda*, in: *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie*, 1965, pp. 268-76; *id.*, *K voprosu o kharaktere i forme*, pp. 390-3, and many others.

136. For the boyar Kuchka and his family see chapter 7.

137. *PSRL*, II, p. 585.

138. *Ibid.*, pp. 590-1; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, p. 82.

139. An example of the conspirators' ingratitude is furnished by one of them, an Ossetian from the distant Caucasus and a steward of the prince's ('Ambal klyuchnik, Yasin rodom') who enjoyed Andrei's special confidence: he exercised much power over the other courtiers and quickly rose from rags to riches (' . . . pomnish' li . . . , v kotorykh portekh prishel byashet'? ty nyne v oksamite stoishi . . .': *PSRL*, II, pp. 590-1).

140. ' . . . a sami vozem'she na sya oruzh'ya knyazhe, milost'noe, pochasha sovokupiti družhinu k' sobe . . . , i skupisha polk': *ibid.*, p. 589.

141. ' . . . imenie, emuzhe ne be chisla': *ibid.*, p. 592.

142. '[After murdering Andrei, the conspirators] idosha na seni, i vyimasha zoloto i kamen'e dorogoe i zhemchyug i vsyako uzoroch'e, i

do vsego lyubimago imeniya, i v'skladshe na milost'nye kone poslasha do sveta proch' . . . I raziidošhasya i v'legosha grabit', strashno zveti': *ibid.*, pp. 589–90.

143. 'Gorozhane zhe Bogolyub'skyi i dvoryane razgrabisha dom knyazh'': *PSRL*, I, pp. 369–70.

144. The chroniclers use the term *volost'* for the area covered by the disorders (' . . . i mnogo zla stvorisya v volosti ego': *PSRL*, I, p. 370): this may mean either a small or a very large territory, or even the whole principality. Cf. *ibid.*, under the year 1175.

145. 'I velik myatezh' byst' v zemli toi i velika beda, i mnozh'stvo pade golov, yako i chisla netu': *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis'*, p. 34. ' . . . posadnikov i tivunov domy pogradisha, a samekh i detskie ego i mechnikiy izbisha, a domy ikh pogradisha . . . , grabiteli zhe i is' sel prikhodyache grabyakhu': *PSRL*, II, p. 592. For the nature of the various offices referred to, and the part played by their holders, see K. Schmidt, *Soziale Terminologie in russischen Texten des frühen Mittelalters (bis zum Jahre 1240)*, 1964; S. Pushkarev, *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, 1970, with bibliography.

146. Rostislav, prince of southern Peryaslavl', was a son of Dolgoruky's by his first marriage.

147. These terms have a purely local or geographical significance: what social or ethnic implications they may have can only be a matter of conjecture.

148. 'Uvedevshe zhe smert' knyazhnyu, Rostovtsi i Suzhdaltsi i Pereyaslavtsi i vsya družhina, ot mala do velika sekhshasya k Volodimeru . . .': *PSRL*, I, p. 371. From the continuation of the account it will be seen that the principal role at and after the council was played by the družhina. ('I priekhavshe sli, povedasha rech' družhin'nyu . . .'; 'pomozi Bog družhine'; 'Yaropolk zhe poekha otai brata k družhine Pereyaslavlyu', etc.: *ibid.*).

149. ' . . . sdumavshe sami rekosha: lyubo likho, lyubo dobro vsim nam, poidem vsi chetyre i Yur'evicha dva, Rostislavicha dva': *PSRL*, II, p. 596.

150. 'Knyaz' zhe Vsevolod . . . posla k Mstislavu, glagolya: "brate! ozhe tya priveli stareishina družhina, a poedi Rostovu, a ottole mir vzmeve; tobe Rostovtsi priveli i bolyare, a mene byl s bratom Bog privel i Volodimerts, a Suzdal' budi nam obche, da kogo vskhotyat', to im budi knyaz' "': *PSRL*, I, p. 380.

151. ' . . . a Rostovtsi i bolyar vse povyazusha . . . a sela bolyar'skaya vzyasha, i koni i skot': *PSRL*, I, p. 382.

152. ' . . . Volodimer' est' prigorod nash'': *PSRL*, I, p. 378.

153. The 'Rostovians' said of the 'Vladimirians': 'poz'hzhem i, paky li a posadnika v nem posadim; to sut' nashi kholopi kamen'nitsi': *PSRL*,

I, p. 374; 'te bo sut' kholopi nashi, kamenosechsi i drevodeli': PSRL, IX, p. 253.

154. ' . . . Volodimertsi . . . ne khotyashche pokoritisya Rostovtsem': PSRL, I, p. 374.

155. The Vladimirians speak of ' . . . vorozi . . . nashi Suzh'dal'tsi i Rostovtsi': PSRL, II, p. 605.

156. After Bogolyubsky's death the people of Vladimir supported Mikhail, although they had nothing against the sons of Rostislav ('Ne protivu zhe Rostislavichema b'yakhutsya Volodimertsi . . .': *ibid.*, p. 374), in order to thwart the plans of the Rostovians.

157. ' . . . otkryl esi mladentsem . . .': PSRL, I, p. 378; ' . . . novii zhe lyud'e mezinii Volodimer'stii . . .': *ibid.*

158. *Povest'* I, pp. 13, 18.

159. 'Vsevolod zhe poekha protivu emu [sc. Mstislav] s Volodimertsi i s družinoyu svoeyu, i chto byashe boyar ostalosya u nego': PSRL, I, p. 380. The Vladimirian boyars had grants of land outside the city: ' . . . okolo Volodimerya . . . sela . . . boyar'skaya': *ibid.*, p. 383.

160. N. Voronin, Nekotorye istoricheskie vyvody iz arkhеologicheskikh issledovaniy vo Vladimire i Bogolyubove, *IM*, 1940 (2), p. 168; *id.*, 'Sotsial'naya topografiya Vladimira v XII-XIII vv. i "chertezh" 1715 goda', *SAr*, VIII, 1946, p. 168; *id.*, *Zhitie Leontiya Rostovskogo*, p. 41.

161. Two examples may suffice. Gleb, prince of Ryazan', actively took Mstislav's part against Vsevolod; this led to a struggle between Vsevolod and Gleb, which ended tragically for Ryazan' (1177). Gleb and his boyars were taken prisoner, and the people of Vladimir wanted to execute them. This was evidently against their prince's wishes, as it led to a serious rebellion (*myatezh velik*) of the Vladimirians against their ruler, who always showed deliberation and aversion to drastic solutions. Again, in 1178, during the siege of Torzhok (on the Tvertsa, a left-bank tributary of the Volga), Vsevolod was prepared to content himself with a ransom levied on the local population, but his Vladimirian družina demanded that he capture the city, burn it down and share out the property of its inhabitants.

162. N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, pp. 346-7, 446-60.

163. Vsevolod 'sudya sud istinen i nelitsemeren, ne obinuyasya litsa sil'nykh svoikh boyar, obidyashchikh menshikh i rabotyashchikh siroty i nasil'e tvoryashchikh': PSRL, I, p. 437.

164. When, in 1185, the bishopric of Rostov fell vacant, the metropolitan of Kiev consecrated and sent to Vladimir his own nominee, a Greek named Nicholas. Vsevolod, however, refused to accept him and demanded the installation of his own candidate, named Luke, on the ground that the bishop must be one 'called by God and His mother, and desired by the prince and people'. To avoid a dispute, the metropolitan

complied. After Luke's death in 1190 Vsevolod nominated a certain John, who became bishop as it were automatically, with no opposition on the metropolitan's part.

165. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, p. 38.

166. Cf. Goetz, 'Der Titel "Grossfürst" in den ältesten russischen Chroniken', *ZOG*, I, 1911, pp. 59–60; Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie*, pp. 86–9.

167. V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii* I, p. 330.

168. Of Vsevolod's eight sons, two—Gleb and Boris—died before their father. The other six were aged as follows in 1212: Konstantin 27, Yury 25, Yaroslav 21, Vladimir 18, Svyatoslav 16, Ivan 14.

169. ' . . . i ne mozete ratitsiya sami mezhdub soboyu, no ashche na vas vstanet' kto inekh knyazii, to vy vsi sovokupivshesya na nikh budite, i budi vam Gospod' pomoshchnik i svyataa Bogoroditsya, i molitva deda vashego Georgiya i pradeda Volodimira i potom i az blagoslovlyu vy': M. Obolensky (ed.), *Letopisets Pereyaslavlya Suzdal'skogo*, 1851, p. 110.

170. ' . . . a Konstantina ostavi u sobe i da emu Rostov, i inekh 5 gorodov da emu k Rostovu': *PSRL*, I, p. 434.

171. For an analysis of the chroniclers' accounts of Vsevolod's last will, which differ in detail, see A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 39–47.

172. *PSRL*, I, p. 440.

173. A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 194; V. Kuchkin, *Rostovo-Suzdal'skaya zemlya*, p. 92.

174. Vladimir, who received Starodub from his brothers, died shortly after the age of 30. Starodub then passed to Vsevolod's youngest son Ivan and to his descendants, of whom we know little.

175. This was reflected in church organization also: in 1214 a separate bishopric, independent of Rostov, was created for Vladimir and Suzdal'.

176. The most serious threat came from the dispute, already mentioned, between Konstantin and Yury. In 1229, after Konstantin's death, Yaroslav of Pereyasavl' attempted to undermine Yury's dominant position in concert with Konstantin's sons, who had inherited from their father the lands belonging to Rostov; the attempt, however, was unsuccessful.

177. E.g. Konstantin's death in his thirty-fourth year in 1219, which diminished the importance of his sons for the future, and thus weakened Rostov in its rivalry with Vladimir.



### III

Moscow's way to predominance

## The Tatar conquest

Until the late 12th century there was no general name for the races and tribes inhabiting Mongolia (Keraits, Merkits, Mongols, Naimans, Tatars etc.), who spoke different Mongolian dialects<sup>1</sup> and were at different cultural levels. The Tatars, who led a nomadic life in eastern Mongolia, must have played an important part in the 12th century, as other related peoples adopted their name. The ethnic term 'Mongols' would probably be forgotten if it were not for the fact that the famous conqueror Chingis Khan sprang from that race. His exploits were continued by his descendants, and it is not surprising that the Mongols aroused universal interest in their time, as many contemporary sources testify.<sup>2</sup>

The term 'Mongols' began to be used in Chingis Khan's lifetime to denote the state and dynasty, and afterwards the people. It remained in use in Mongolia and Central Asia, but in the western part of the newly founded empire, as well as in Europe, the newcomers from the east were called 'Tatars' (or 'Tartars'), although in the stricter sense this term had lost its former meaning.<sup>3</sup> In Rus' the name 'Tatars' (*tatare, tatary, tatarove*) was used not only for the Mongol warriors but also for the tribes, chiefly of Turkic origin,<sup>4</sup> who were conquered by and mixed with them. These peoples served in the Mongol armies and were therefore 'kinsfolk' of the Mongols, chiefly by virtue of brotherhood-in-arms.

The nomad society of the Mongol steppes<sup>5</sup> was originally on a generic basis, i.e. composed of the descendants of a common ancestor. Property distinctions began to emerge, however; families increased in size and new family groups split off from them (voluntarily or otherwise), becoming richer or poorer as the case might be. Social differentiation arose both from internal causes and from the influence of other, more highly civilized regions (China, Central Asia). Differences of wealth caused the population

to divide broadly into two groups. A small number of rich families constituted a kind of aristocracy, maintaining in their service—chiefly as herdsmen—a mass of poorer and very poor elements who depended on them for a living. The steppe aristocracy, dominating the group of tribes and races, clung jealously to its privileged position, which enabled it to maintain large bands of élite warriors.<sup>6</sup>

Property took the form chiefly of extensive pasture-lands and large numbers of livestock.<sup>7</sup> The steppes were grazed by sheep, goats, horned cattle, camels<sup>8</sup> and other animals, which provided food (milk, meat)<sup>9</sup> and materials (leather, fur, wool etc.). The animal most valued by the Mongols was the horse, which they looked after with special care.<sup>10</sup> On warlike expeditions a rider would often change horses (they usually had several in reserve) to save his mount from undue exhaustion.

The Mongols were expert riders. Children were taught to ride from the age of three or four. The armies of the khans, which of course consisted of cavalry,<sup>11</sup> aroused wonder by the swiftness of their raids and their capacity to endure hunger, thirst and hardships of travel.

Life on the steppes was a constant state of tension and fighting. The Mongol shepherd was a first-class soldier. He had a sharp eye for terrain, developed in migrating from one pasture to another or prospecting for sources of water; he was alert to constant threats of danger, such as unexpected attacks on his flocks and herds by human enemies or wild animals, and he was a keen observer, quick to notice if, for instance, any of his animals went astray. In addition he was physically toughened by the severe climate.

Hunting was not only an additional source of food for the Mongol herdsmen, but a favourite recreation, engaged in by both individuals and groups. Collective hunts, sometimes involving great numbers of people, covered wide areas which the huntsmen used to surround before gradually closing in on the game: the hunted animals thus had no escape and were caught without much difficulty.

The Mongols' chief weapon for hunting and fighting consisted of bows and arrows, which they shot with unerring aim while riding at full gallop. When the herdsman was called up he was already for practical purposes a trained soldier. The favourite

tactic used in conquering foreign lands was to encircle the enemy—a repetition of their hunting technique, except that this time the game consisted of human beings.

The constant fighting between nomadic hordes of the steppes usually led to one group being subjugated to another, and the victors would in their turn become the subjects of some more powerful conqueror. This state of affairs naturally led to the formation of larger unions composed of tribes that were usually, but not always, linked by kinship. Only in this way was it possible to achieve some degree of security for human life and some stability of relationships. But ties of this sort were formed and generally dissolved quickly, and everything was in a constant state of flux. The 12th century saw the emergence of two 'states', on the territory of the Naimans and Keraites respectively, with a fairly well developed administrative system and appreciable military forces.<sup>12</sup> In the second half of that century a similar type of state was formed by purely Mongol tribes, headed at its apogee by Kabul Khan, great-grandfather of Chingis Khan. This union did not last long, but Kabul Khan left a tradition behind him.

Kabul's grandson Esugay, though a stout warrior, was only the leader of a small Mongol group. His son Temuchin<sup>13</sup> grew up in difficult circumstances. As a young man he is described by the sources as a Mongol tribal leader, in alliance or conflict with other warring leaders, but by degrees he attained a position of leadership as a result of successful fighting which increased his own power. In 1206 he became the ruler of all Mongolia, his supremacy being solemnly acknowledged by a large assembly (*kurultay*) of representatives of subject tribes and races. This set the seal on the name and dignity of Temuchin, who became known as Chingis Khan.

Chingis Khan's first concern after 1206 was to organize the army and state.<sup>14</sup> The army, with units organized on a decimal basis,<sup>15</sup> was transformed from an agglomeration of diverse, often mutually hostile tribes into a unified and strongly coherent whole. From its leaders, who were many and skilled,<sup>16</sup> Chingis demanded absolute obedience, and strict discipline was enforced on the rank and file.<sup>17</sup> The unit commanders also performed administrative functions, as the state organization was completely subordinated to military needs. Chingis Khan was protected by a personal guard of up to 10,000 picked warriors, mostly of aristocratic

origin. These kept watch over his 'divine' person<sup>18</sup> and fought under his orders: the guard was an institution or training school from which came Chingis's most trusted servants, known to him personally and performing duties suited to their individual abilities. As military successes increased, the civil administration also grew in size.

Military success came with extreme rapidity and resulted in the accession of huge territories. When Chingis died in 1227 his dominions included, besides Mongolia proper, vast areas of Siberia and northern China, the kingdom of the Tanguts (a people of Tibetan origin) bordering on China, part of eastern Turkestan, Central Asia and eastern parts of Iran.<sup>19</sup> Although much of the success was due to favourable circumstances, especially political and social conditions in the conquered territories, there is no doubt that a crucial part was played by Chingis himself. The course of his life is known, though not always in detail. His unusual military, political and administrative talents enabled him to create an empire on a world scale,<sup>20</sup> which he treated as his own property and that of his family. His family became the ruling dynasty, and in the eyes of conquered peoples the Mongols were a symbol of military triumph. Many tribes, especially those akin to the Mongols, felt themselves to be of common origin and regarded the fact with pride.

Chingis Khan's principal conquest in Central Asia was the empire of Khorezm Shah, which had a highly developed agricultural system and was rich in crafts, industry and international trade. Chingis attacked this large and powerful state in 1219 and subdued it in a few years. Always cautious, he preferred not to move too far away from his own base, but left a garrison in the newly conquered territories and returned with his main forces to Mongolia. Two of his experienced commanders, however, Jebe and Subudey (Subutay), continued the campaign with a small force, not so much for the sake of fresh conquest as to penetrate those distant lands and improve the state of reconnaissance about them.<sup>21</sup> Having become masters of the southern coast of the Caspian they advanced in 1222 towards the north-west, plundering Azerbaijan, northern Armenia and Georgia; then, by way of Shirvan and by-passing Derbent, they reached the northern slopes of the Caucasus,<sup>22</sup> where a vast steppe territory lay before them.

A new period had begun in the history of all Eastern Europe, and Rus' in particular.

That vast area of open country, known as the 'field' (*pole*)<sup>23</sup> and full of rich pasture-land,<sup>24</sup> was inhabited at the time by nomadic Polovtsians,<sup>25</sup> a people shown by their language to be of Turkish origin.<sup>26</sup> The Polovtsians roamed over huge areas<sup>27</sup> in order to feed their numerous herds of cows, sheep, horses, camels etc.<sup>28</sup> In winter they generally withdrew to the coast of the Sea of Azov, and in summer they moved a long way north. Having conquered or driven out other nomadic peoples of the steppes (Pechenegs, Torks), from the mid-11th century<sup>29</sup> they became troublesome neighbours to the Rus'ians, on whom they made constant plundering raids. Sometimes the Rurikides, quarreling among themselves, appealed to the Polovtsians for help, which of course contributed to the downfall of Rus'. But on the other hand there must also have been a degree of peaceful coexistence, as a surprising number of Rus'ian princes married daughters of Polovtsian khans.<sup>30</sup>

The Polovtsians were alarmed by the appearance of 'Tatars'—by which we mean Mongolo-Tatars<sup>31</sup>—in the northern Caucasus. It would seem that individual Polovtsian khans pursued different Tatar policies of their own. To begin with, the Polovtsians supported the Alans, who inhabited the northern Caucasus and were for geographical reasons most threatened by the forces of Jebe and Subuday. Later they made agreements with the Tatars, but events showed that the latter had no intention of keeping them.<sup>32</sup>

A Polovtsian khan named Kotyan, together with other khans, appealed to his son-in-law Mstislav of Galich for help against the common danger. Mstislav agreed, and persuaded several of the Rus'ian princes, his kinsfolk, to take up arms with the Polovtsians against the Tatars. The latter, in accordance with their usual tactics, tried to entice the Rus'ian troops as far as possible from their original base. Small Tatar forces fled before the advancing Rus'ian and Polovtsian troops, tempting them to engage in pursuit.<sup>33</sup> This led in 1223<sup>34</sup> to a decisive battle on the river Kalka on the shore of the Sea of Azov,<sup>35</sup> where the Rus'ian forces, surrounded and outnumbered by the Tatars, were decisively beaten.<sup>36</sup>

The Tatars did not intend to engage in further combat with the Rus'ians but preferred to return home: after their signal success they moved off in the direction of the Asiatic steppes. On the way they met with firm resistance from the Bulgars on the Volga and the Kama river, and even suffered heavy losses at their hands, but this did not prevent them from marching on through the lands north of the Aral Sea, with the purpose of rejoining Chingis Khan's main forces.

The battle on the Kalka was a grim warning to the whole of Eastern Europe, but it had no practical consequences apart from causing general fear and agitation.<sup>37</sup> The disintegration of Rus' had already gone too far for it to be possible to organize any elaborate defence against a fresh attack from the east. Events in the immediate future depended entirely on the Tatars' initiative.

Chingis Khan divided his empire among his four sons and close relatives. Despite the partition, the state constituted the common property of the dynasty founded by him and remained a closely-knit whole under the supreme authority of the Great Khan. Chingis named as his own successor his third son Ugedey, who was best fitted to rule by reason of his military and administrative qualities, though he lacked his father's intelligence, energy and *élan*. In 1229 the kurultay confirmed the last will of their great leader. Each of his sons' appanages (*ulus*)<sup>38</sup> was to be hereditary, and as the sons' descendants increased in number this arrangement bore within it seeds of dissension which would weaken the state. The Great Khan's authority was concentrated at his capital of Karakorum, on the Orkhon river in northern Mongolia.<sup>39</sup>

Ugedey continued his father's course of conquest, or confirmed his rule over threatened territories. He did not confine his military activity to large areas of Asia and the southern borderlands of Asia and Europe, but advanced far westward into regions which had played scarcely any part in Chingis's plans. The western part of the empire (the lands on the lower Amu Darya, the Syr Darya, the steppes west of the Irtysh and to the north of the Aral Sea, also to the north of the steppes, and the forest regions of Siberia) were allotted to Chingis's eldest son Juchi,<sup>40</sup> who did not survive his father but left many sons. One of them was Batu, a name famous in the history of Rus' in its Rus'ian form Batyi.<sup>41</sup>

Preparations for an invasion of Eastern Europe were begun in 1235, involving the assembly of great hordes of warriors; the expedition was set on foot at Ugedey's command, and several of Chingis's progeny took part. The army was nominally commanded by Batu and in fact by Subudey. The appearance of Tatar forces on the eastern borders of Europe took the local populations by surprise. The first victim of the invasion was the Bulgar state on the Volga and Kama, which suffered conquest and fearful devastation; so did its neighbours, the Finno-Ugrian tribes, and the nomadic Polovtsians of the steppes. Towards the end of 1237 Batu's army crossed into Rus'ian territory—a crucial moment in the history of all Rus'<sup>42</sup>—and penetrated deeply into the principality of Ryazan' on the middle Oka.<sup>43</sup> The Tatars advanced along the upper waters of the Voronezh, a tributary of the Don, to Pronsk and Ryazan',<sup>44</sup> inflicting one defeat after another despite the heroic resistance of the local princes. Ryazan' itself fell on 21 December 1237 after a five days' siege.<sup>45</sup> Batu then pressed rapidly forward along the Oka to Kolomna, where that river is joined by the Moskva.<sup>46</sup>

The then reigning Grand Duke Yuri (George) sent a contingent led by his son Vsevolod to repel the invader. A bloody battle at Kolomna ended in disaster for the Rus'ian forces. The whole region of Vladimir-Suzdal'-Rostov now lay open to the enemy. Moscow was captured and plundered. The Tatars laid siege to Vladimir on 3 February and captured it on the 7th; during the siege, another Tatar force took possession of Suzdal'. The victorious Tatar forces divided into several corps which advanced simultaneously at great speed in several directions (February 1238): one towards Rostov and Yaroslavl', another towards Kostroma and Galich, others towards Yur'ev, Pereyaslavl', Dmitrov, Volok, Tver' etc. All fortresses of any military importance were captured and destroyed. Yuri made desperate efforts to collect new forces in the north, but in vain: his troops were cut to pieces in a battle on the Sit',<sup>47</sup> and on 4 March 1238<sup>48</sup> Yuri himself was slain in battle.<sup>49</sup> The Tatars moved on towards Great Novgorod,<sup>50</sup> whose wealth they coveted; but at the end of March or beginning of April they turned back owing to the spring thaw<sup>51</sup> and retreated to the southern steppes. Their southward route led through the territories of Smolensk and Chernigov, further west than those they had already plundered, and thus provided them



with fresh booty.' Details of the route are not known, but it ran from the north along the upper Oka and then south-east towards the lower Don and lower Volga.<sup>52</sup>

The extent of Batu's conquests made it necessary to call a halt for the time being. His troops were exhausted by long forced marches; losses had to be made good by reinforcements, his rule over the steppe territories had to be consolidated and the remnants of Polovtsian opposition destroyed. In 1239, however, he already embarked on another major campaign, this time against southern Rus' and further west. The southern city of Pereyaslavl' and Chernigov were captured in 1239 and Kiev in 1240,<sup>53</sup> after which Podolia, Volhynia and Galicia were overrun.

The conquest of Rus' clearly illustrates all the features of Tatar military tactics evolved by Chingis Khan: an extremely mobile army, the ability to operate with large forces moving in various directions but maintaining communication among them; lightning attacks on an enemy disconcerted by the invader's movements, crafty deception of the adversary, the technique of approaching and encircling his forces in open territory, skill in capturing fortified positions by assault or strategem.<sup>54</sup> The Tatars generally outnumbered the defenders of the invaded territory,<sup>55</sup> and, if they did not, the difference was made up for by their speed and skill in manoeuvre. One Rus'ian fortress after another was captured in an extraordinarily short time, usually after a siege of four or five days; a longer period of defence was exceptional.<sup>56</sup>

The conquest of Rus' encouraged Batu to push further into Europe. The Tatar armies were divided into several groups, one of which operated in Hungary and another in Poland. The forces of both countries were defeated at the same time: the Poles at Legnica in Silesia on 9 April 1241, and the Hungarians on 11 April at the confluence of the Sajó and the Tisza. It would seem that the Tatar attack on Poland was not an end in itself but was rather intended to protect their right flank as they moved south into Hungary and the Balkans. The Tatar forces turned back from Silesia and rapidly crossed Bohemia and Moravia, plundering as they went, so as to link up with the main forces in Hungary. In the second half of December 1241 Batu advanced across the frozen Danube into Croatia. His troops spread widely over the Balkan lands and reached the Adriatic coast in the west. It appears from the Tatars' actions that they were not so much concerned

with the permanent conquest of these lands as with extracting as much plunder as possible.

It is hard to judge what Batu's plans were at this juncture, but in view of the ease of his successes it seems very likely that he meant to advance further into Europe.<sup>57</sup> From the terror which prevailed in the West it is clear that this was regarded as a serious possibility.<sup>58</sup> However, the threat was removed by an unexpected combination of circumstances. Ugudey died in December 1241, and Batu was too much concerned with his share in the succession to Chingis Khan to remain passive in the new situation thus created within the Horde. Ugudey's death brought about a general withdrawal of the Tatar forces towards the Volga. Poland, Hungary and the Balkans were unexpectedly saved, at least for the immediate future. The Great Khan's ambitious widow, Teregene Khatun, was determined to secure the succession for Guyuk, her son by Ugudey. Taking advantage of her own regency, which lasted for some years, she attained her object thanks to energetic efforts and intrigue: the kurultay summoned in 1246 conferred the supremacy on Guyuk. Guyuk had previously taken part in the European expedition under Batu's command, and violent disputes had broken out between them, to the prejudice of military discipline. The situation altered when Guyuk became the Great Khan, but the hostility between Chingis's two grandsons persisted. Batu, playing a waiting game, stayed away from Guyuk's election on the ground of ill-health.

The new Great Khan, who was young and ambitious, dreamt of far-reaching conquests in Europe. Within the Horde his object was to maintain his supremacy by limiting the power and importance of the khans with their subordinate appanages. This was a vital threat to Batu's interests, and tension rapidly increased to such a pitch that the rivals mustered large armies and marched against each other, though without declaring open war. There was no armed conflict, however: in 1248 Guyuk suddenly died of drink and debauchery,<sup>59</sup> after which the tension within the Horde subsided. Although Batu was the eldest of the family, he was preoccupied with consolidating his rule in Eastern Europe and therefore did not aim at the Great Khanship for himself; he did his best, however, to keep Ugudey's children out of the succession and to secure the election of Möngke, the eldest son

of Tuluy.<sup>60</sup> In 1251 the *kurultay* elected Möngke to the Great Khanship.

Möngke (1251–9), an able soldier, politician and administrator, well knew that he largely owed his advancement to Batu. A determined and purposeful ruler, he desired to restore the old lustre to Chingis Khan's empire as far as the outside world was concerned, and to preserve its internal cohesion. He made an exception only for Batu, both for personal reasons and as a matter of political calculation: for Batu was already the *de facto* ruler of a powerful state consisting of the outlying regions of Chingis Khan's empire in the proper sense of the term.

Batu's state as it took final form in 1242–3 was a product of conquest and comprised various ethnic elements. It had no precisely defined name, but is usually called the Golden Horde. The attribute 'Golden' is unknown to oriental sources;<sup>61</sup> it arose in Rus' in the fourteenth century at earliest, and even then was mainly a colloquial term. The Rus'ian chroniclers of that time do not use it, though as early as the thirteenth century they sometimes speak simply of 'the Horde'.<sup>62</sup> Persian, Arabic and other Oriental sources refer to Batu's state as *Desht-i-Kypchak*, using the old geographical name of the Polovtsian steppes for the new political entity. They also sometimes call it 'the *ulus* of Juchi', which, however, is too wide a term. Batu only ruled over the western part of that *ulus*; the eastern and south-eastern portions went to Juchi's other sons (*Orda*, *Shiban*, *Tuka-Timur* etc.) and were not in practice dependent on the Golden Horde. Batu's state also went under the name of the White (or Blue) Horde.<sup>63</sup>

The European territory of the Golden Horde<sup>64</sup> was in the shape of a triangle, its base formed by the Caspian Sea, the Yaik (now Ural) river and the Ural Mountains, and its apex probably at the mouths of the Danube. Its northern boundary ran from the west obliquely in a north-easterly direction, approximately following a line from east of Kiev to Kursk, Ryazan', Murom and beyond, crossing the Volga above its junction with the Kama and continuing to the Ural Mountains.<sup>65</sup> To the west and north of this line were Rus'ian principalities under the suzerainty of the Golden Horde.

The basis of Batu's state and the most valuable part of his conquests consisted of the extensive steppe area north of the

Caspian, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. This area was especially coveted by the Tatars and remained under their direct rule.<sup>66</sup> The steppes of Eastern Europe, known for their excellent pasturage, enabled the victorious invaders to continue their nomad life.

The Polovtsians' fate was decided by the pressure of the Tatars towards the steppe country. They had never succeeded in creating a state organization on any major scale, owing to internal divisions and strong antagonism among tribes, due perhaps to ethnic differences.<sup>67</sup> Consequently the Tatars had little difficulty in defeating them, and they disappear henceforth from the historical scene. This does not mean that they ceased to exist, but they survived for the most part in altered conditions and not always on the same territory. Some fled from the Tatar invasion westward and southward, to Hungary, the Balkans and the shores of the Black Sea.<sup>68</sup> Most, however, appear to have stayed on their own lands. Many who did not even resist were wiped out, as were the tribal chiefs. The Tatars treated all the Polovtsians as slaves<sup>69</sup> and decided their fate in accordance with their own interests, which on the whole meant exploiting rather than destroying them.

The Rus'ians, no less than the Polovtsians, were terrorized by the Tatar incursions. Their chroniclers, as well as those of other nations, saw the Tatars as primitive barbarians of the steppes; they profess complete ignorance as to the invaders' origin, speech, beliefs and customs, the regions they have come from and so on.<sup>70</sup> This is surprising, as Eastern Europe, and especially the southern part of it, lay on the ancient trade routes between West and East, and information might have been got from the caravans of travelling merchants.

The idea that the Tatars were nothing but savage barbarians is one-sided and false. It was due, no doubt, to the cruel massacres of large numbers of people and the frightful destruction of their property. Unquestionably there were atrocities on an unusual scale, but they were to some extent a matter of cold calculation. Apart from such immediate motives for violence as the thirst for booty, other long-term considerations were at work.

In Eastern Europe as in Asia, the Tatars' conquests were not followed by a mass influx of Tatar population into the newly subdued areas. The Tatar masses continued to lead a nomadic life in their old territories.<sup>71</sup> After the withdrawal of the great

armies of the khan's military detachments were left in the conquered lands, but their numbers should not be exaggerated. Groups of Tatars settled in the broad steppe-lands of Eastern Europe, but they formed only a small section of the population, mostly of the ruling class. Apart from military campaigns very few Tatars were to be found in the Rus'ian lands in the 13th century, and their presence was mainly sporadic. The slaughter and destruction of 1237-40 and later years was intended to strike fear into the defeated peoples and convince them of their own helplessness. Only by using this weapon of terror could Batu maintain his rule over Eastern Europe and proceed to build up a state of his own.

Chingis Khan's empire brought about notable changes in the nomadic life of many tribes who were subject to the Great Khan and directly connected with him. These changes were not due so much to the initiative of the tribes as to the needs of the new empire. The conquests made it necessary to consolidate Tatar rule in the subdued territories, which involved creating a special administrative system, though at the outset a fairly primitive one. Such administrative functions as extracting tribute from the conquered peoples could not be carried out if the seat of the central power was constantly changing. Places where the khan most often resided, surrounded by troops and officials, were fortified and became centres of state activity. They were primarily military in character, but soon became economically important also.

The Tatars had ample means of building fortress towns and ensuring their development. On the one hand they had quantities of cheap labour from the conquered peoples, while among the enslaved there were plenty of expert builders; and, on the other hand, their immense material resources in the form of plunder made it possible for them to attract craftsmen, merchants and architects from outside and thus help to build up a powerful state.<sup>72</sup>

Batu possessed the same kind of resources as his grandfather and kinsmen in the heart of Asia, and had similar aims in view when, after 1242, he set about creating his own fortified cities. These were not the result of gradually evolving conditions in Tatar society, but a response to vital needs. The fortress towns of the Golden Horde were as new as the state itself: archaeological

finds<sup>73</sup> show them to have been erected in open country, i.e. in places where there is no previous sign of any considerable settlement.

The khans of the Golden Horde, when founding their state, relied chiefly on the Tatar element and assigned the principal role to it; but it was too weak in numbers and, as a whole, too little organized. The great work called for the employment of the conquered peoples in so far as they possessed real qualifications, and the first to come in question here were the Polovtsians.

The Polovtsian masses—destroyed, defeated and deprived of their own leaders (khans), were made to serve their new masters. Plano Carpini (see p. 139 etc.) states that many Polovtsians who had fled from the Tatars soon returned to their old lands. The Polovtsians were a western branch of the Kypchak nomads who inhabited the depths of Asia; thus they were in fact Asians and, despite their migration to the west, had not lost the original features of their race. Their origin and nomadic way of life, marriages between Polovtsians and Tatars, the enlistment of Polovtsians in the Tatar forces, the Polovtsians' ability to adapt themselves to the needs of the Golden Horde, and subsequently the fact that they and the Tatars shared a common religion (Islam)—all this facilitated and accelerated the association and ultimately the merging of victors and vanquished.<sup>74</sup>

While some Polovtsians continued to be nomads, others settled in the new Tatar fortress towns. Even before Batu's conquests they had shown an interest in international trade: they had towns of their own (Sugrov, Sharukan'), they protected and assisted the merchant convoys that passed through their lands, and even sometimes joined them.<sup>75</sup> If Batu's state was known in the Orient by its Polovtsian name (Desht-i-Kypchak), this was not merely a relic of the past or a sign of attachment to the old geographical name but, it must be supposed, a reflection of the important part played by Polovtsians in the Golden Horde, especially at its capital city, Sarai.<sup>76</sup>

Founded by Batu after 1242 but before 1253, Sarai, generally referred to as Sarai Batu or Old Sarai, was situated in the eastern bank of the Akhtubia, a channel of the lower Volga delta, at what is now the village of Selitrennoe; it was two days' journey from the Volga estuary. Long before the appearance of the Tatars, the mighty river was an important trade artery connecting north-

eastern Europe with the lands around the Caspian Sea and further east.<sup>77</sup> Near Sarai it intersected with the land route into Asia from the Crimea and other Black Sea territories. This shows what great importance the Tatars attached to maintaining and developing international trade relations.

Sarai was founded in desert territory at Batu's winter headquarters. It had the character of a camp in which many nomads lived with their families, tents and carts. A Franciscan, William of Rubruck, whom Louis IX of France sent to the Tatars as a missionary and for political purposes, and who made his way as far as Karakorum, stopped at Sarai on the outward journey in 1253; he did not describe it in much detail, but was struck by the magnificent residence<sup>78</sup> in which the khan lived and performed state functions.

Craftsmen and merchants from many lands within the Golden Horde, or bordering upon it, made their way to Old Sarai and later to New Sarai, known also as Sarai-Berke.<sup>79</sup> They came from Bulgaria on the Volga, the Caucasus, Khoresm (Khiva), Bukhara and elsewhere<sup>80</sup>—i.e. from Asia or countries on the periphery of Europe.

The geographical position of the two Sarais and other cities founded by the invaders shows that the political centre of the Golden Horde was on the lower Volga. This fact throws light on the relations between the Tatars and conquered Rus'.

The Tatars showed concern for the future of conquered territories: they rebuilt fortresses destroyed in military operations, repaired roads, built new bridges, encouraged agriculture and trade and so forth.<sup>81</sup> Batu was no exception, as may be seen from his treatment of Great Bulgar, the capital of the Volga Bulgars. It was there that he, or more probably his brother Berke, struck the first silver and copper coins of the Golden Horde.<sup>82</sup> In Rus', however, he did not take any initiative of this sort. He did not consider the Dnepr as a location for his new capital, although Kiev would not have been too far from the steppes.

Batu wished to preserve the Asiatic character of the state created by him in Eastern Europe and western Asia.<sup>83</sup> He himself was a typical Asiatic by origin and in his political mentality; he did not intend to distance himself too far from Asia from either a territorial or an ethnic point of view, or to advance the frontiers

of the Golden Horde too far into Europe. The Tatar encampments on the southern steppes did not extend further west than the Don as far as large masses of people were concerned.<sup>84</sup> Batu did not want his subjects, who were already of mixed origin, to intermingle and merge with the Rus'ian population,<sup>85</sup> who differed from them in faith and culture and were overwhelmingly more numerous than the Tatars. Consequently Rus' remained outside the direct rule of the Golden Horde, although the indirect domination of Rus' by the Tatars continued for a long time and left deeper traces than may appear at first sight.

This domination went through several phases. The most tragic for Rus' was that of the first few years (1237–41), directly connected with Batu's main invasion. The unprecedented size of the enemy forces ('an uncountable multitude, like a swarm of locusts'),<sup>86</sup> the unusual number of inhabitants murdered<sup>87</sup> or taken off to slavery and dying of cold<sup>88</sup> and hunger on the way, the scale on which property was laid waste—all this is vividly recorded in the Rus'ian chronicles. Bishop Serapion of Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma, a gifted writer and preacher, recalling these events some 40 years later, wrote: 'The blood of our fathers and brethren drenched the ground like a great flood'; he added that the land was devastated, emptied of its population and overgrown with weeds.<sup>89</sup>

While this description is essentially true, we may wonder if the accounts of damage done by the Tatars in the north-east are not exaggerated. The source narratives concerning the Vladimir-Suzdal' lands, written by authors who probably did not witness events at first hand, are somewhat literary and generalized: they are lacking in colour and in specific details which would bring the tragedy to life, and which are clearly in evidence in the south and west. When, for instance, the chronicler tells us that during the siege of Kiev the townsmen could hear no sounds within the city because of the creaking of Tatar carts, the loud grunting of camels, the neighing of herds of horses and so on,<sup>90</sup> we can imagine the terrific din as we read the description. When we read that the Rus'ian princes could not ride over the fields along the Bug river (a tributary of the Vistula) because of the stench of rotting corpses,<sup>91</sup> we can smell the putrefaction. When Plano Carpini, the emissary of Pope Innocent IV to the Tatars, relates that, travelling through the south Rus'ian lands a few years after the conquest,<sup>92</sup> he saw on every roadside innumerable skulls and



bones of the dead,<sup>93</sup> we can ourselves visualize the macabre scene.

In my opinion, north-eastern Rus' can be presumed to have suffered less than the south-west. For reasons of climate and the nature of the terrain, the Tatars were more interested in possession of the southern lands, and during the period of conquest they spent more time there than in the north. The chronicler states that it took them no more than a month to overcome the grand duchy of Vladimir<sup>94</sup> (actually it was somewhat longer: January-February 1238). The northern lands, unlike the southern, were full of dense forest, swamps and marshes; the inhabitants knew the terrain better than the invaders, and were able to escape by hiding. This was so even in winter, as great snowdrifts hampered the Tatar forces, whose operations in the north were clearly carried out in haste. The local population who took refuge in towns were less fortunate.

In analysing these tragic events we must take account of the nature of the sources. Serapion, painting everything in the darkest colours, was more concerned with literary values than with historical accuracy. The chroniclers, recording for posterity the experiences of men and women of that time (whether the Tatar invasion or other events), often show an inclination to exaggerate the scale of catastrophes in order to excite the reader's pity for human misfortune. When we read descriptions of epidemics, cattle-plagues, fires, famine, floods and other natural disasters, we at first have the impression that all human life in the area in question must have been extinguished, but as the chronicle continues it is clear that life resumed its course and developed as before.

Batu's invasion, which the men of that time regarded as a divine punishment for the sins of men, is described as affecting 'the whole land of Rus''.<sup>95</sup> This again is an exaggeration of the extent of Tatar conquests. Batu's forces scarcely touched, if they did at all, the regions of Beloozero, Great Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Minsk etc. Large parts of northern and north-western Rus' were unaffected.

The remains of Prince Vasil'ko of Rostov, murdered by the Tatars in 1238, were brought soon afterwards to Rostov and bewailed by 'a multitude of people' (*mnozhstvo naroda*).<sup>96</sup> After the tragic death of Grand Duke Yury on the Sit' river in March

1238 the government at Vladimir was at once taken over by Yaroslav, the next eldest son of Vsevolod III. In 1239 he buried his brother Yury at Vladimir beside their father. The ceremony, in which several of the clergy took part—although a great many are said to have been murdered in 1238<sup>97</sup>—was on a remarkable scale considering the country's situation. 'The chanting could not be heard because of the weeping and wailing [of the people]. He [Yury] was lamented by the whole city of Vladimir. Yaroslav and Svyatoslav and the [other] Rus'ian princes mourned him together with their retinue. Many boyars (noblemen) and servants wept for the loss of their prince, and the poor [mourned for their] benefactor.'<sup>98</sup> One is bound to ask where these crowds of people came from in Vladimir and Rostov—presumably in other cities likewise—if the population had nearly all perished a short while before.

The solemn funeral held at Vladimir scarcely a year after Batu's invasion would have been unthinkable at Kiev. For many years after its destruction, as the eye-witness Plano Carpini tells us, Kiev was no more than a ruin: of the whole great city, only about 200 houses remained.<sup>99</sup> There is other evidence to support the view that things were better at that time in the north-east than in southern Rus'. In the same year 1239, surprising as it may seem, Yaroslav took the offensive against the Lithuanians near Smolensk and returned victoriously with booty;<sup>100</sup> in the following years he gave armed assistance to his son Aleksandr then established in Great Novgorod. Clearly, therefore, there were masses of the population on the Klyaz'ma and in neighbouring districts who were loyal to their prince, and he had troops at his command. Despite the tragic events of 1238, life in the north-east reverted to normal with surprising rapidity.<sup>101</sup> At the same time, we should not exaggerate the extent of that normality or underrate the severity of the blows the country had suffered.

Batu's invasion profoundly shook the north-eastern lands, its main effects being to reduce and impoverish the population. Masses of people left their homes and fled in panic. This was not an organized action, but a *saue qui peut*.<sup>102</sup> The same thing happened amongst the Volga peoples: Bulgars, Hungarians etc. Julianus, who was then in Eastern Europe, met the refugees and spoke to them about the Tatars.<sup>103</sup> From later events it appears that a good many of them, though it is difficult to be more

precise, soon returned to their old territory; but it certainly cannot be said that all of them did. Account must be taken of the existence of deserted settlements. If we also recall that large numbers of men and women were killed or led into slavery during the great invasion, and that there must have been universal famine and epidemics (as Serapion testifies),<sup>104</sup> then it seems unquestionable that the population of the north-east must have been greatly diminished, though not to such an extent as to ruin the further development of the region.

It is likewise impossible to establish with any precision the amount of destruction caused by the Tatars. While material losses could, given favourable circumstances, be made good or compensated for in a longer or shorter time, it was impossible to retrieve the losses in the cultural and especially the artistic field—painting, sculpture, architecture etc. Works of this kind were generally to be found in churches, which were plundered and destroyed by fire.

After the invaders withdrew, the population of Vladimir Rus' began to hope that the disaster was over and that 'God with his might hand would deliver them [the Christians] from the godless Tatars'.<sup>105</sup> These hopes proved to be premature and delusive. After conquering the upper Volga region Batu did not at first show particular interest in Rus'ian affairs: he was absorbed in preparations for fresh expeditions, and involved in a complex of victorious operations in southern Rus', Poland, Hungary and the Balkans; moreover, after Ugudey's death he and his kinsfolk were at variance over the succession to Chingis Khan. But the situation changed after the transitional period from 1238 to 1242, when conditions began to stabilize and the Golden Horde was firmly established on the lower Volga. From then on there ensued a long period of Tatar domination over Vladimir Rus'.

The reign of the new grand duke Yaroslav, can be variously judged, but it must be recognized that he came to power in 1238 in extremely difficult circumstances. He tried on his own initiative to heal the country's wounds, and meekly awaited the Tatars' orders. There could be no question of offering resistance. The Tatars, as Julianus tells us, were in the habit of murdering the local authorities and dignitaries of conquered countries as soon as they met with opposition or even the suspicion of it.<sup>106</sup> It is hard to suppose that Yaroslav did not know this. In any case,

his orders were not long in coming. The chronicler's record for 1242 contains the ominous statements: 'In that year Prince Yaroslav, son of Vsevolod, was summoned by the Tatar emperor and went to the Tatars, to Batu the Tatar governor.'<sup>107</sup> Another record in the Rus'ian annals is of interest here: it refers to Yaroslav's journey with his son Konstantin to Batu in 1243. Batu received him kindly, allowed him to remain in Rus' and conferred on him the chief rank among Rus'ian princes. Konstantin, however, was sent to Karakorum, no doubt to do homage and present gifts to the Great Khan.<sup>108</sup>

A comparison of the two records reveals some obscurity<sup>109</sup> and even apparent contradictions on points of detail. In the first account Batu appears to be completely dependent on the Great Khan, whereas in the second he figures as the supreme ruler of Rus', determining its fate and that of Yaroslav, while the Great Khan plays a secondary and rather a formal part. Yaroslav does not go to Karakorum himself but sends his son, and not even his eldest son at that. We may wonder who sent Konstantin on the long journey: was it his father's wish, as the chronicler suggests, or Batu's command? However, the present author agrees with Presnyakov<sup>110</sup> that only the second explanation is at all likely.

Batu, in fact, took an extremely skillful and cunning decision in 1243 when he sent Yaroslav back to Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma and Konstantin to the depths of Asia. On the one hand this meant recognition of the supremacy of the Golden Horde over Rus', while on the other he assured himself of *de facto* domination over Rus' by gaining a hold over Yaroslav, who was more important than Konstantin. In my opinion there was a clear rivalry between Karakorum and Sarai for control over Eastern Europe, as early as 1242-3.

Guyuk, aided by his mother, saw through Batu's intentions and replied with an equally skillful move: he kept Konstantin with him long enough to dazzle him with his power and make him an instrument of his own policy. In 1245 he let Konstantin return to the Klyaz'ma, but at once summoned Yaroslav to enhance the solemnity of his own enthronement as Great Khan.

The road from Vladimir to Asia led through Sarai. Batu could not remain a passive spectator of what was going on. He ordered Yaroslav to come to him with a group of relatives—brothers and

nephews—although some of them had already been at Sarai during the previous year. Having regard to the uncertainty of Yaroslav's fate, he relied on this group to maintain his own position.

Plano Carpini, who met Yaroslav at the Great Horde, is the most trustworthy witness to what took place, being impartial as between Tatars and Rus'ians. He relates that during the ceremonies especial attention was shown to Yaroslav and to himself. The presence of a Papal envoy and of the ruler, albeit only in name, of all Rus' enhanced Guyuk's authority and flattered his ambition. But a tragic reality underlay these artificial courtesies. The Tatars—undoubtedly on the orders of the khan, whom they implicitly obeyed—consistently treated Yaroslav with manifest indifference if not contempt.<sup>111</sup> Plano Carpini states on the basis of general opinion that Yaroslav was poisoned at the Great Horde, and the Rus'ian chroniclers also state that he died an unnatural death on the return journey. The Tatars often resorted to poison as a weapon in their political struggles. Guyuk's object at this time was not to liquidate all the Rus'ian princes, for in that case he would have summoned many of Yaroslav's relatives; all his animosity was in fact directed against Yaroslav alone. The new Great Khan, who was noted for his vanity, may have wished to avenge the slight he had received,<sup>112</sup> but he also had a more fundamental motive: he wished to show Batu that he had a voice in Rus'ian affairs, and at the same time to warn the Rus'ian princes that he had power of life and death over them. Everything goes to show that Yaroslav fell victim to the rivalry between Karakorum and Sarai.

The Rus'ians did not exploit these dissensions among the Tatars for their own purposes, and had no means of doing so. Yaroslav was only a pawn in the hands of Chingis's warring grandsons. If he had gained the confidence and favour of Guyuk he would have met with vengeance at the hands of Batu, who was no less cruel than his opponent. However, the struggle for power between the two ambitious rivals was short-lived: the tension between the Great Horde and the Golden Horde was assuaged by Guyuk's death in 1248.

Möngke, the new Great Khan (1251–2), was raised to supremacy by Batu's support despite the opposition of his own kinsmen, and in return he acknowledged the special position of the Golden

Horde within the empire. We do not know whether agreements were reached between the two sides spelling out their mutual understanding. It seems more likely that the personal friendship and familiarity between Möngke and Batu regulated their co-existence on a basis of compromise. This state of affairs was reflected in their respective relations with Rus'.

Möngke did not renounce his sovereign rights over the Golden Horde, as is shown for instance by the fact that Golden Horde coinage bearing his name was struck at Great Bulgar; nor did he relinquish the advantages deriving from the conquest of Rus'. The great Tatar invasions of Eastern and Central Europe in 1236-42 were carried out by the Great Horde as a whole. Batu, on Ugudey's orders, was merely the commander, and rather a nominal one, of the forces in question. Some of the Rus'ian population was deported into the heart of Asia. At this time and later, Rus'ian craftsmen and farmers, chiefly former captives and prisoners of war, were to be found both in Mongolia and in China, and Rus'ian warriors later served in the forces of the Great Khans.<sup>113</sup>

Möngke showed particular interest in financial matters. Previously, during the great invasions, rich booty had already been sent to Karakorum from Rus' as well as other countries. Möngke, like Guyuk before him, took care that tribute was regularly collected for his benefit from many East European lands. In 1257-9 the first census of Vladimir Rus' for tax purposes was carried out on his initiative and by his orders.<sup>114</sup> He probably shared the revenues with Batu during the whole period; at all events, we do not hear of any dispute between them on this score.

It would seem that apart from the financial side, which was regulated amicably, Möngke allowed Batu and his successors a free hand in all political matters connected with the Tatar domination of Rus'. Batu was certainly more experienced and better informed than Möngke as to Rus'ian internal affairs. The predominance of Sarai over Karakorum was assured by its geographical position, as the Golden Horde bordered directly on Rus'ian territory.

The co-operation between Batu and Möngke seems to have continued to the end of their lives (they died in 1256 and 1259 respectively), although by then Sarai had become considerably

more independent of Karakorum. The latter's supremacy became a mere formality after Möngke's death, and when in the 1260s the capital was transferred from Karakorum to Khanbalyk (Peking) the Great Horde ceased to exist as a political entity, though the khans at Peking still used the title 'Great Khan'.<sup>115</sup>

Experience showed that it was easier for Chingis Khan and his successors to make enormous conquests than to keep the conquered lands together over a long period. Their territorial expansion was out of all proportion to the strength of the links between the different parts of the new empire. The conquered peoples were not united by religion, culture, language or tradition; they were all subdued by physical force and by the ruling dynasty which was its expression. Chingis's descendants quarrelled violently among themselves as a result of overweening ambition, and this inevitably hastened the break-up of the empire.

The changes in the internal affairs of the Tatar realm brought an end to the double dependence of Rus' on the eastern invaders. The journeys of Yaroslav and his sons to the capital of the Great Horde thus became a passing episode. It is the more regrettable that no one in the princely entourage described those distant journeys or left any detailed account of various aspects of Tatar life. Rus'ian literature on this subject is unexpectedly scanty. Even later, when the journeys of the Vladimir princes were confined to Sarai and were constantly repeated, Rus'ian accounts tell us much less about the Tatars than might have been expected. The Rus'ians of those days knew much more about the subject than they chose to record. This was because of their conviction that for religious and political reasons they must above all bequeath to their descendants a sense of irreconcilable hostility towards the 'godless' invaders and must paint the blackest possible picture of them.<sup>116</sup> The subjective element in Rus'ian literature, understandable in view of the injuries and humiliations they had suffered, overshadowed the reality which had, so long before, been perceived impartially by Western travellers such as Plano Carpini and Rubruck.

The Golden Horde's independence of the Great Horde did not bring about any basic change in the position of Rus' and did not improve its fate. Sarai was already the *de facto* master and ruler of Eastern Europe and had at most shared this role with

the Great Khans, chiefly from the financial point of view.

Plano Carpini states that the Tatars made two principal demands on their subject peoples: military contingents<sup>117</sup> and various forms of tribute.<sup>118</sup> The Rus'ian chroniclers confirm the missionary's account and supply further details. Tithes 'of everything' were regularly exacted with the utmost ruthlessness, on a scale that depended on the arbitrary will of the khan's emissaries. The house or family was the fundamental basis for the payment of tithes. Those who could not comply with the obligations laid upon them were enslaved. The Tatars also enjoyed revenue from the trade carried on by merchants in Rus'ian territory and from the inhabitants' activity in the form of hunting, fishing, bee-keeping etc. It is hard to be certain whether these revenues were part of the ordinary tithes or were a separate source of enrichment; in practice the position probably varied. In addition the khan imposed special charges to meet particular needs of the Horde, and at regular intervals ordered a census (*chislo*, 'numbering') of the population for fiscal and military purposes. The first of these, as Carpini tells us, took place in southern Rus' as early as 1246; in the north it was somewhat later, in 1257-9, followed by another in 1274-5. If the results had been preserved we should have a first-rate source of information on the settlement and economy of the Rus'ian lands.

The princes were compelled to assist the Tatar administration in its various functions, including the extraction of tribute from their own lands; they had to provide the khan's emissaries with all possible facilities on their journeys, by requisitioning wagons, providing for road security etc. The princes' frequent journeys to Sarai on various errands and in different circumstances were linked with the ceremony of presenting rich gifts to the khan and his dignitaries. At all levels of the administration the Tatars were extremely receptive of presents, which were an additional form of tribute paid by the Rus'ians to the Horde.

The Tatar invasion of 1238 was a profound shock to every aspect of life in Vladimir Rus'. Among its many consequences were far-reaching changes in the balance of forces among the princes of the 'Big Nest'. Despite everything, the ruling dynasty managed to ride out the tempest and continued to be the chief force determining the country's future in new and tragic circumstances.



When the Tatars first made their appearance supreme authority over the Grand Duchy was exercised, in accordance with the law of inheritance, by Yury, son of Vsevolod III (after the death in 1219 of his elder brother Konstantin, to whom their father had given the appanage of Rostov). Yury's twenty years of rule passed without any major internal upheaval, though there was no lack of discord among the various princes.

Among the losses suffered in 1238, especial political importance is attached to the death of the Grand Duke Yury and his sons and that of Konstantin's son, Vasil'ko of Rostov. Events thus brought to the fore Vsevolod's next eldest son Yaroslav, prince of Pereyasavl'.

The two princes who had till then been most disadvantaged by the division of the patrimony were Yaroslav's younger brothers Svyatoslav and Ivan. To attach them to himself, or at least ensure their benevolent neutrality in the event of hostile action by other princes, Yaroslav, as soon as the Tatars had departed, gave Suzdal' to Svyatoslav (who had previously held the small appanage of Yur'ev) and Starodub to Ivan. This was not a particularly generous endowment. We do not know whether by 'Suzhdal'' the chronicler means the huge principality of Suzdal' or, which is more likely, the city of that name with its immediate surroundings. Presumably Svyatoslav received Suzdal' on a temporary and not a hereditary basis,<sup>119</sup> as his elder brother's deputy or lieutenant. Ivan, the youngest son of Vsevolod III, did not receive Starodub, a minor appanage in every way,<sup>120</sup> from Svyatoslav until 1238,<sup>121</sup> when he was already 40 years old. This unexpectedly niggardly treatment of his brothers was probably not due so much to lack of attachment<sup>122</sup> on Yaroslav's part as to the fear that his own sons might in the future be threatened by those of Svyatoslav and Ivan; from this point of view he achieved his aim.

Yaroslav was not popular among his kinsfolk. The events of 1238 connected with Yury's tragic death on the river Sit' did much to weaken the authority of the Grand Duke, who was seen to be as helpless *vis-à-vis* the invader as all the other appanage princes. All the posterity of Vsevolod III were reduced to a common sense of helplessness. Yaroslav's journey to Batu in 1243, when he sought the khan's favour and recognition of himself as Grand Duke certainly did not help to raise his prestige among contemporaries. Yaroslav exploited the country's misfor-

tunes for his own ends. By acquiring Vladimir and Suzdal' (together with some distant lands on the Volga belonging to the Suzdal' principality),<sup>123</sup> and being already in possession of Pereyasavl', he gained a decided territorial preeminence over the other princes, whose reaction can be imagined. If we review the state of forces within the 'Big Nest' at that time there can be no doubt that the main opposition to Yaroslav came from Rostov.

This extensive appanage, comprising Rostov, Uglich, Yaroslavl', Mologa, Beloozero etc., had been partitioned after Konstantin's death in 1219, but his sons continued to act in unison and agreement, so that its external importance was increased. In the tragic events of 1238 Konstantin's two eldest sons were killed, leaving sons who were not yet of age. The only possible leader of the opposition to Yaroslav as Grand Duke in 1243 was Vladimir of Uglich, the youngest and least well endowed of Konstantin's sons.<sup>124</sup>

The annalists relate that the Rostov princes made their way to Sarai in 1244, when Batu confirmed them in their patrimonies. They had not accompanied Yaroslav there in the previous year, which would have made the Grand Duke's retinue more impressive: they preferred to establish and maintain relations with the Tatars independently of Yaroslav, thus ignoring his sovereign rights. We must suppose that this attitude on their part provoked Yaroslav to intervene at the Horde, and he was evidently successful, as in the following year (1245) he presented himself to Batu accompanied by the Rostov princes and other kinsfolk.

Yaroslav's success was short-lived, however, and cost him his life. In my opinion his fate was decided by forces working simultaneously on two different planes: on the one hand the rivalry between Guyuk and Batu, the latter supporting Yaroslav, and on the other, perhaps, hostility to the Grand Duke among the princes of Vladimir Rus'.<sup>125</sup>

From the course of events before and shortly after 1246 it can be seen that the break-up of Vladimir Rus' was advancing rapidly. This was in large measure due to Yaroslav's own testament.

The testament has not survived: we know of it only from the chronicler's general statement that after Yaroslav's death his brother Svyatoslav succeeded as Grand Duke at Vladimir and endowed Yaroslav's sons with lands in accordance with their dead father's will.<sup>126</sup> The details of the territorial division of

Vladimir Rus' can only be inferred from subsequent facts. It is certain, however, that Yaroslav's eldest son Aleksandr, who obtained Pereyasavl', maintained an extremely important position among his brothers.

Yaroslav, it should be noted, disposed in his will not only of his patrimony of Pereyasavl' but of lands which had hitherto belonged directly to the Grand Duchy of Vladimir or had fallen to it upon the death of the local princes. This was a manifest weakening of the power, authority and importance of the ruler at Vladimir. Svyatoslav, who succeeded to the dignity of Grand Duke, was left only with Vladimir and its immediate surroundings.

Yaroslav's sole concern, as expressed in his testament, was to assure his sons of a proper endowment and consequently a leading role in the state. He did not break with the hereditary principle, but sought to limit it in practice to his own descendants.<sup>127</sup>

Yaroslav's sons were anxious to remove Svyatoslav from Vladimir as quickly as possible, and therefore acted according to their father's wishes. This, however, was the limit of their concerted action. No fewer than three of them simultaneously laid claim to the Grand Duchy the legal rule of seniority which had prevailed in the family of Vsevolod III<sup>128</sup> was broken, and force became the sole arbiter of the dispute. However, none of Yaroslav's sons was strong enough to impose his supremacy on his brothers and more distant relatives. Consequently a new principle began to assert itself and rapidly became decisive, namely the will of the khan. The ultimate effect of Yaroslav's testament was not only to weaken the power of the Grand Duke but to lay the foundation for Tatar rule over Vladimir Rus'.

Svyatoslav maintained himself at Vladimir for barely a year or so (1247-8). He may have hoped that if he scrupulously carried out Yaroslav's last will, his nephews would respect his seniority. Any such hopes proved vain. Andrei of Suzdal' went to Sarai in 1247 on his own initiative (the chronicler does not say that Batu summoned him); evidently in order to have himself made Grand Duke, for his elder brother Aleksandr, alarmed by his action, at once hastened after him to the Tatars.<sup>129</sup> From Sarai both the princes went on into Asia, to the Great Horde. Taking advantage of the absence of his elder brothers, Mikhail (who may have been the next eldest of Yaroslav's sons) ousted his

uncle Svyatoslav from Vladimir and made himself Grand Duke (1248). This episode had no lasting consequence,<sup>130</sup> but it throws light on the conditions then prevailing among Yaroslav's progeny.

Aleksandr and Andrei returned from their long journey in 1249. Neither had much reason to be satisfied with its result. For some time their fortunes had hung in the balance. The Tatars made a compromise decision whereby Andrei became Grand Duke of Vladimir and Aleksandr supreme ruler of all Rus' (and hence Andrei's sovereign); but this did not stand the test of time. Aleksandr felt aggrieved by the decision, which gave him a great deal in theory but in practice only the Duchy of Novgorod (it is unlikely that he had Pereyasavl' as well). It appears that the government at Vladimir was exercised by Aleksandr at the end of 1249 and by Andrei in 1250-1, Aleksandr being then at Novgorod. We do not know the state of relations at the time between the two warring brothers and the lesser princes, their allies. The situation was still fluid and contained the seeds of fresh conflict in the very near future.

The dispute was finally settled in 1252. Aleksandr went to Sarai to persuade the Tatars to send a force against Vladimir Rus' to depose Andrei and put him, Aleksandr, on the grand-ducal throne. He received the help he had asked for, using the decisive argument that Andrei had shown a hostile or at least unfriendly attitude towards the Khan. This was true to some extent,<sup>131</sup> although Aleksandr certainly did his best to exaggerate Andrei's hostility. In 1252 Andrei suffered the consequences of his policy, which was fundamentally correct but unrealistic in practice:<sup>132</sup> to save his life he had to flee from the advancing Tatar forces (they nearly captured him at Pereyasavl') and roamed through various lands, seeking help but finding none.<sup>133</sup> Realizing that his situation was hopeless, the son of Grand Duke Yaroslav surrendered, returned and abased himself before Aleksandr. So did Andrei's younger brother, Yaroslav of Tver', who had taken his part.<sup>134</sup> The return of the two brothers in 1255-6 was a personal and political triumph for the Grand Duke. More profoundly it was a success for the Tatars, consolidating the Khan's rule in the Upper Volga region.

Aleksandr began his rule as Grand Duke by gathering a large territory into his own hands,<sup>135</sup> thus gaining a clear preponderance of strength over his brothers and other relatives.<sup>136</sup> Feeling strong

in his own country,<sup>137</sup> he could undertake expeditions outside it, in the Smolensk region<sup>138</sup> and especially Great Novgorod. Aleksandr attached special importance to the possession of Novgorod, and did not hesitate to use force to establish his position there. He regarded himself as the prince of Novgorod, while his sons, whether settled on the Ilmen' or removed from there, were only their father's lieutenants, completely subject to his will. Aleksandr defended the Novgorod lands with his 'lowland' forces. Thanks to these troops and to Tatar help, the Grand Duke was able to maintain a dominant position in the north-west.

The Tatars no doubt kept a close watch on Aleksandr's political moves within and outside Vladimir Rus'; they supported them on the whole, as being in accord with their own interests. Aleksandr's policy was one of complete subservience to the Khan, whoever he might be,<sup>139</sup> and fidelity to the Horde.

The period of Aleksandr's rule in Vladimir was marked by the steady increase of Tatar influence on Rus'ian life. The Grand Duke suppressed all opposition on his subjects' part, all outburst of indignation or despair at the invaders' grievous policy of oppression, and himself actively seconded the khan's political plans.

In 1257-9 the Tatar officials carried out a census of the population of Rus' and demanded heavy tribute. Their activity comprised not only Ryazan' and Vladimir Rus' but also Great Novgorod. Aleksandr, attended by numerous princes, himself accompanied the Khan's envoys to the north-west so as to prevent any agitation by the Novgorodians and ensure their submissive obedience. Tatar rule must have been more and more irksome to the Rus'ian people, as in 1262 there was open rebellion throughout Vladimir Rus'. The inhabitants of Vladimir, Suzdal', Rostov, Yaroslavl' and other towns murdered the Tatars living there, in revenge for the wrongs and cruelty they had suffered. Fearing the wrath of the khan and a fresh invasion, the Grand Duke hastened off to the Horde. This was the last action of his life. Aleksandr died unexpectedly at Gorodets on the Volga in November 1262,<sup>140</sup> his age being at most 43.

Like his father Yaroslav, Aleksandr died on his way home from the Tatars. Though there can be no certainty, there is little doubt that he was poisoned.<sup>141</sup> Although a loyal servant of the Horde, as time went on he had ceased to be a useful vassal. He

had reigned long enough (1252–62)—frequent changes on the grand-ducal throne were in the Tatars' interests—and, above all, he had achieved too strong a position in Rus'.

Aleksandr Nevsky was undoubtedly a remarkable individual, especially compared to the rather mediocre princes of his time. It would seem, however, that his achievements were artificially exaggerated by contemporaries and posterity. The two military successes of his youth were both connected with Novgorod.<sup>142</sup> In the history of Vladimir Rus', with which we are chiefly concerned here, his role is not particularly impressive. His policy towards the Tatars as Grand Duke can be justified as displaying a realistic appreciation of necessity, but it affords no ground for excessive praise or historical celebrity.

Naturally enough, Aleksandr was concerned for the future of his own progeny. Like Yaroslav, his father, he disposed not only of his own patrimony (Pereyaslavl') but of the lands pertaining to the Grand Duchy. Aleksandr's eldest son Dmitry<sup>143</sup> received Pereyaslavl'; his second son, Andrei, the middle-Volga towns of Nizhni Novgorod and Gorodets Radilov. The youngest son was Daniil.

After Aleksandr the throne of Vladimir was occupied by two of his younger brothers: Yaroslav of Tver' (1263–71) and Vasily of Kostroma (1272–6).<sup>144</sup> Both devoted much effort and energy to maintaining the authority of the Grand Duchy over their close and distant relations, and both tried to impose their sovereignty on Novgorod by military means and by diplomacy in the form of amicable agreements. In the conditions of the time, their policy was unlikely to meet with much success.<sup>145</sup>

Yaroslav was a less outstanding character than his father and elder brother. It was also an important fact that he ruled after them, and with each passing decade the position of the grand duke grew weaker owing to the multiplication of the dynasty. Yaroslav was not strong enough to carry through his bolder political designs. He remained completely submissive to the Tatars, obeyed the khan's orders and saw in the latter's forces a guarantee of security and an effective means of imposing his supremacy on recalcitrant opponents.

Vasily of Kostroma during his short reign followed the general line of his predecessors, but had even less chance of achieving his ambition of restoring real significance to the grand duchy.

Although he behaved as a loyal servant of the Tatars he did not escape poisoning at the Horde, but died as his father and brothers had done; slightly more fortunate than they, he was at least allowed to reach home, whereas they had all died on the return journey.

With Vasily's death the sons of Grand Duke Yaroslav (son of Vsevolod III), who had played a dominant part in the political life of Vladimir Rus' for thirty years from 1246 to 1276, disappeared from the historical scene. Those years saw a considerable regrouping of forces among the members of the 'Big Nest', as the descendants of Vsevolod III became more or less equal in power: each of them disposed directly of his own appanage only, not counting Vladimir in the narrower sense. The khan's decision as to who should be grand duke was in practice a secondary process, being usually preceded by the formation of 'parties' among the princes. The leaders of the rival camps, vying for possession of the Vladimir throne, sought support among their lesser kinsfolk, which improved their chances of finding favour with the Tatar overlords.

The minor princes, on the other hand, desired to revive and maintain the principle of seniority applying to all branches of the 'Big Nest'. This was contrary to the practical situation that had emerged, according to which the grand duchy belonged to the sons of Yaroslav or Nevsky. There was very little chance of the princes' ambitions succeeding, but they caused general confusion and lent greater weight to the Horde's deciding vote.

After Vasily of Kostroma the throne of Vladimir was occupied by Aleksandr Nevsky's son Dmitry of Pereyaslavl', although he was not the eldest descendant of Vsevolod III.<sup>146</sup> He undoubtedly owed his elevation to the Tatars, but despite energetic efforts his position was not over-strong.<sup>147</sup> He was supported by one group of relatives but opposed by another. The minor princes of Vladimir Rus' were in a state of constant strife, and their petty territorial quarrels and personal jealousies often determined the general political configuration of the whole area. Dmitry's most dangerous opponent proved to be his brother Andrei.

In 1281 Andrei, having made large gifts to the khan, received in return the grand dukedom and also military assistance. The Tatar troops devastated the country without mercy. Dmitry was obliged to flee probably as far as Pskov (Novgorod would not

receive him). So far, however, events did not greatly strengthen Andrei's authority but were more of a success for the Tatars, who were interested in fomenting strife within the 'Big Nest' and intervening militarily for the sake of booty and other advantages.

Dmitry did not accept defeat: he returned shortly from exile to his patrimony of Pereyaslavl' and prepared to continue the fight with Andrei. Instead of an armed clash, however, negotiations then took place between the brothers; the details are hard to ascertain, owing to the poverty of sources. In order to crush his opponents and strengthen his own position Andrei caused the Tatars once more to invade and devastate Vladimir Rus' in 1283.<sup>148</sup> Dmitry, to thwart his brother's plans, went to the Tatars in his turn and was appointed grand duke. Andrei's third attempt to recover Vladimir in about 1285 was a failure.

After Dmitry established himself for the second time on the throne of Vladimir relations among the princes became relatively peaceful. For ten years there were scarcely any major struggles or internal upheavals, until in 1293 Andrei took the field against his brother and persuaded the Tatars to invade once more. The chroniclers state that at that time fourteen towns of Vladimir Rus' were mercilessly plundered.<sup>149</sup> The events of the previous years repeated themselves: Dmitry fled to Pskov, and Andrei recovered Vladimir. His position there was not very strong, however, once the Tatars had withdrawn. Dmitry did not intend to content himself with an exile's lot: he made ready to retaliate, and meanwhile tried negotiation.<sup>150</sup> The two opponents were both uncertain how the struggle would end, and therefore sought a compromise solution. However, Dmitry died unexpectedly in 1294, aged at most 53; this enabled Andrei to confirm his hold on the Vladimir throne, which he occupied until his death in 1304.

The political history of Vladimir Rus' in the second half of the 13th century is a dark period of the country's past. The process of disintegration and the lack of broad political ideas became more and more acute as each decade passed, and is especially evident in the dissensions and hostilities between Dmitry and Andrei, just mentioned. These two sons of Aleksandr Nevsky were not of a calibre to respond to the challenge of statecraft.



As for Aleksandr's youngest son Daniil, he was inevitably drawn into the internal conflict as one of the minor princes. The lands he inherited from his father possessed no historical tradition of their own, and it was only during his reign that they began to affect the wider political scene. Daniil's dukedom of Muscovy, with its capital at Moscow, was to be a power of the first rank in the ensuing centuries.

## Notes to Chapter 6

1. G. Sanzheev, *Mongol'skie yazyki i ikh dialekty*, *UZIV*, IV, 1952, pp. 32-3.

2. B. Spuler, *Geschichte der Mongolen nach östlichen und europäischen Zeugnissen des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts*, 1968 (English ed. 1972). For a general outline of Mongol history see id., *Les Mongols dans l'histoire*, 1961 (English ed. 1971).

3. V. Bartol'd in: *Chingis-khan*, in his *Sochineniya* (repr.) 5 (1968), p. 615, and A. Yakubovsky, *Mongol'skaya imperiya*, *IsZ*, 1940 (3), pp. 87 and 91, take the view that the Mongols called themselves Tatars until the time of Chingis Khan, which would indicate that they were previously subjected to the Tatars.

4. V. Bartol'd, *Istoriya turetsko-mongol'skikh narodov*, in his *Sochineniya* 5, 1968, pp. 193-229; id., *Obzor istorii tyurkskikh narodov*, *ibid.*, pp. 425-37; id., *Tatary*, *ibid.*, pp. 559-61.

5. We leave out of account here the not very numerous forest tribes of Mongolia, who lived chiefly by hunting and fishing. These tribes, which did not play much part in history, lived on Lake Baikal, the upper Yenisei and the banks of the Irtysh.

6. For an analysis of social conditions among the Mongols at that time see B. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi mongolov. Mongol'skii kochevoi feodalizm*, 1934; M. Kuz'min, *K voprosu o turetsko-mongol'skom feodalizme*, 1934 (unavailable to me); A. Yakubovsky, review of Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, in: *IS*, V, 1936, pp. 293-313; L. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*, *IUP*, XX, 1963; *Istoriya Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 1967, pp. 101-13.

7. B. Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-41.

8. Camels, which are more numerous in the southern steppes, were an important means of transport, either as pack-animals or harnessed to carts.

9. The Mongol pastoral nomads lived chiefly on milk products, other dairy produce and meat. The flesh of all domestic animals, boiled or roasted, was eaten to a moderate extent. Reserve rations of meat,

needed especially on military campaigns, were obtained by drying long strips in the sun or by freezing. Fish and fowl were regarded as inferior nourishment for the poor. The Mongol herdsman was, by and large, self-sufficient as regards food. The chief import was tea, together with small amounts of rice and flour. M. Kiełkiewicz, *Tradycyjne pożywienie mongolskich pasterzy*, *POR*, 1974 (1), pp. 17–29.

10. K. Vyatkina, *Kul't konya u mongol'skikh narodov*, *SE*, 1968 (6), pp. 117–22.

11. On their expeditions, which were often long, the Mongols also used carts to transport food supplies, booty etc. The wives and children of khans also rode on carts. V. Bartol'd, *O kolesnom i verkhovom dvizhenii v Srednei Azii*, in his *Sochineniya* 4, 1966, pp. 406–8.

12. S. Kiselev in *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* (by several hands), 1965, p. 15.

13. Temuchin's date of birth is uncertain (1155, 1162, 1167).

14. A. Yakubovsky, *Mongol'skaya imperiya*, *IsZ*, 1940 (3), pp. 90–1; V. Bartol'd, *Obrazovanie imperii Chingiz-khana*, in his *Sochineniya* 5, 1968, pp. 253–65; S. Kałużyński, *Imperium mongolskie*, 1970, pp. 63–9.

15. The army was divided into units of 10,000, 1,000, 100 and 10 men. The largest of these was called *tümen*, in Rus'ian *t'ma*.

16. The higher command was chiefly recruited from the steppe aristocracy, but included some officers of lower origin but outstanding ability. Chingis was an excellent judge of military leaders.

17. E. Razin, *Voennoe iskustvo vooruzhennoi organizatsii mongolov* in his *Istoriya voennogo iskustva* 2, 1957, pp. 202–25.

18. As military successes multiplied, the Mongols came to believe in the divine origin of Chingis Khan (and his successors). They were destined by heaven to rule the world, and all peoples must obey them absolutely. W. Kotwicz, *O rolę ludów koczowniczych w historii (na podstawie źródeł Dalekiego Wschodu)*, in: *Pamiętnik IV zjazdu historyków polskich*, 1925, p. 12; G. Seidler, *The Emergence of the Eastern World*, 1968, p. 161.

19. Almost all works describing the achievements of Chingis Khan are accompanied by maps showing the extent of his empire.

20. It is beyond the scope of this work to cite in detail the literature on Chingis's life and conquests, the military and political organization of the Mongols and their administration of conquered territories. It comprises studies by a great many authors, including J. Barckhausen, V. Bartol'd, L. Cahum, H. Cordier, D'Ohsson, V. Egorov, H. Franke, M. Gibson, F. Grenard, R. Grousset, E. Haenisch, H. Howorth, S. Kałużyński, S. Kiselev, H. Knizková, W. Kotwicz, M. Kutlukov, H. Lamb, I. Maisky, J. Marek, H. Martin, G. Melikhov, H. Morel, N. Munkuev, A. Okladnikov, I. Petrushevsky, E. Phillips, M. Prawdin, S. Sandag, H. Schaefer, N.

Shastina, B. Spuler, G. Vernadsky, B. Vladimirtsov, C. Walker, O. Wolff, A. Yakubovsky and many others. The question as to what led the Mongols to embark on the conquest of so many peoples can only be answered for certain in negative terms. No religious motive was present on such a scale as e.g. with the Arabs, nor were natural disasters at work such as famine or cattle-plague. The Mongols were not driven from their homes by more powerful invaders and forced to look for fresh territory. Cf. S. Kałużński, Introduction to *Tajna historia Mongołów*, 1970, pp. 27–8. The various positive explanations advanced by scholars are no more than hypotheses except for two undoubted facts: the Mongols' thirst for booty, and Chingis Khan's ambition.

21. The Mongols made elaborate preparations for every campaign. Their intelligence system was very highly developed for those days. By sending out numerous spies beforehand, disguised as merchants, beggars etc., they collected valuable information about the prospective enemy country: the nature of the terrain, state of the roads, military forces, wealth of the inhabitants etc., which served as a basis for their strategy and tactics in time of conquest. Such intelligence was of great value, as in those days little was known of Europe in Central Asia. Cf. H. Franke, *Europa in der ostasiatischen Geschichtsschreibung des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts*, *Saec.* 2, 1951 (1), pp. 66–7. It may be that Chingis Khan had plans to conquer Europe, or at all events Eastern Europe, and was only prevented by his death.

22. G. Altunian, *Die Mongolen und ihre Eroberungen in kaukasischen und kleinasiatischen Ländern im XIII. Jahrhundert*, *HS*, XCI, 1911, pp. 17–24; F. Uspensky, *Dvizhenie narodov iz Tsentral'noi Azii v Evropu*, *VV*, I (26), 1947, pp. 19–28; A. Ali-Zade, *Mongol'skie zavoievateli v Azerbaidzhane i sopredel'nykh stranakh v XIII-XIV vv.*, *VoI*, 1952 (8), pp. 59–65; S. Tikhvinsky, *Tataro-mongol'skie zavoievaniya v Azii i Evrope*, in: *Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope* (by several hands) 1970, pp. 3–21; and others.

23. The Slav word *pole* ('field') in those days denoted any open terrain, however large, not necessarily agricultural land. The southern steppes of Eastern Europe were called *pole* until the 17th century. I. Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlya slovary drevnerusskogo yazyka* 2, 1895, pp. 1125–6; F. Filin, *Obrazovanie yazyka vostochnykh slavyan*, 1962, p. 119; S. Pushkarev, *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, p. 90.

24. For the flora and fauna of the steppes see *Lesostep' i step' russkoi ravniny*, 1956 (by several hands); S. Kirikov, *Izmeneniya zhivotnogo mira v prirodnykh zonakh SSSR (XIII-XIV vv.)*. *Stepnaya zona i lesostep'*, 1959; V. Kotel'nikov, *Yuzhnaya polosna evropeiskoi chasti SSSR. Ocherk prirody*, 1963; etc.

25. A. Bruce Boswell, *The Kipchak Turks*, *SEER*, VI, 1927, pp. 68–85; D. Rasovsky, 'Polovtsy', *SK*, VII, 1935, pp. 245–62; VIII, 1936, pp. 161–82; IX, 1937, pp. 71–85; X, 1938, pp. 155–78; XI, 1940, pp. 95–128; and others. The Polovtsians (in Rus'ian *polovtsy*) were known in Western Europe as Cumans and in Asia as Kypchaks.

26. The remains of the extinct Polovtsian language have been studied by many scholars: K. Gronbech, T. Grunin, A. Kuryshzhanov, S. Malov, D. Rasovsky, A. Zajęczkowski and others. One of the most important sources is the *Codex Cumanicus*, a Latin-Persian-Polovtsian dictionary of the late 13th or early 14th century.

27. N. Aristov, *O zemle polovetskoi. Istoriko-geograficheskii ocherk*; K. Kudryashov, *Polovetskaya step'*. *Ocherk istoricheskoi geografii*, 1948.

28. *Povest'* I, pp. 149, 185 etc.

29. The first dated reference to the Polovtsians in the *Povest'* (I, p. 109) is s.a. 1054.

30. Rus'ian-Polovtsian relations at that time are discussed in A. Popov, *Kypchaki i Rus'*, *UZLGU*, CXII, 1949, pp. 94–119; K. Kudryashov, *Bor'ba russkogo naroda s nabegami kochevnikov prichernomorskikh stepei* in *Ocherki istorii SSSR* I, 1953, pp. 193–205; S. Pletneva, *Pechenegi, Torki i Polovtsy v yuzhnorusskikh stepyakh*, *MIA*, LXII, 1958, pp. 151–226; eadem, *O yugovostochnoi okraine russkikh zemel' v domongol'skoe vremya*, *KSDPI*, IC, 1964, pp. 24–33; V. Kargalov, *Vneshnepoliticheskie faktory razvitiya feodal'noi Rusi. Feodal'naya Rus' i kochevniki*, 1967, and others.

31. On the use of the names 'Mongols' and 'Tatars' see Kh. Gimadi, 'Ob upotreblenii nazvaniya "tatory"', *Vol*, 1954 (8), p. 116; N. Munkuev, *Zametki o drevnikh mongolakh*, in: *Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope*, 1970, pp. 374–5; G. Blagova, *Iz istorii razvitiya tyurkskikh etnonimov v russkom yazyke*, *VY*, 1974 (1), p. 93, etc. The term 'Mongolo-Tatars' or 'Tataro-Mongols', often used in the literature, is an artificial one but accurately reflects the ethnic situation. In the present work they are referred to as 'Tatars', following the Rus'ian sources.

32. In order to win over the Polovtsians, and above all to dissuade them from allying themselves with the Alans, the Tatars, according to Persian and Arab accounts, appealed to racial solidarity, claiming that they and the Polovtsians were of common origin. There was indeed a strong Turkic element in the Tatar forces.

33. The Tatars always tried to keep the initiative in fighting and impose on the enemy the time and place of battle. Ruses such as pretending flight were a favourite manoeuvre of theirs and were carried out with great skill.

34. N. Berezhev, *Khronologiya russkogo letopisaniya*, 1963, pp. 317–18.

35. K. Kudryashov, in: *O mestopolozhenii reki Kalki*, *Vol*, 1954 (9), pp. 118–19, takes the view that 'Kalka' refers to two rivers, the Kal'chik

and the Kalets (Rus'ian chronicles sometimes use the plural of Kalka—'na Kalkokh'): these are tributaries of the Kal'mius, which flows into the Sea of Azov. Cf. id., *Polovetskaya step'*, 1948, pp. 69–70. For the origin of the name Kalka see O. Pritsak, 'Der Flussname "Kalka"', *IJSLP*, VIII, 1964, pp. 61–6.

36. For the genesis of the account of the battle on the Kalka in Rus'ian chronicles, and an analysis of the long and short versions thereof, see M. Sverdlov, 'K voprosu o letopisnykh istochnikakh "povesti o bitve na Kalke"', *VLU*, II (1), 1963, pp. 139–44.

37. Cf. B. Rybakov, *Russkie datirovannye nadpisi XI–XIV vv.*, in: *Arkheologiya SSSR. Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov*, E 1-44 (1964), p. 37.

38. For the meaning of this term see B. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyy stroi mongolov*, pp. 100–1; G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy pod vlast'yu zolotoordynskikh khanov*. *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki*, 1966, pp. 240–8; V. Egorov, *Gosudarstvennoe i administrativnoe ustroistvo Zolotoi Ordy*, *VoI*, 1972 (2), p. 36.

39. Karakorum was the capital of the empire from approximately 1230 to 1260. Today only ruins are left. (V. Bartol'd, Karakorum, in his *Sochineniya* 3, 1965, pp. 443–4.) Recent archaeological research—see especially the studies by S. Kiselev, N. Merpert, L. Evtukhova and V. Levashova in: *Drevnemongol'skie goroda*, 1965, pp. 123–322—has provided much new material for the reconstruction of its past.

40. The lands which Juchi received from his father can be approximately defined on the eastern and southern sides, but the western borders remained in a fluid state, as they depended on further Tatar conquests. Cf. M. Schwind, *Die Goldene Horde. Ein Beitrag zur historischen Geographie*, *GH*, VII, 1952, pp. 351–2.

41. V. Bartol'd, Batyi, in his *Sochineniya* 5, 1968, pp. 496–9.

42. V. Kargalov, *Mongolo-tatarskoe nashestvie na Rus'. XIII vek*, 1966, pp. 29–88; L. Cherepnin, *Mongolo-tatary na Rusi (XIII vek)*, in: *Tatary-mongoly v Azii i Evrope*, 1970, pp. 179–203, and many others. The literature compares and analyses the source accounts, which are especially plentiful in the Rus'ian chronicles. The sources show some discrepancies of detail which have led to controversy among historians; but these are of small importance and do not basically affect the general picture of events.

43. A. Mongait in: *Ryazanskaya zemlya*, 1961, discusses the history of the land of Ryazan' from the earliest times to 1237.

44. Ryazan' (now called Staraya [Old] Ryazan') was on the high right bank of the Oka near its junction with the Pronya: A. Mongait, *Topografiya Staroi Ryazani*, *KSDPI*, XLIV, 1952, pp. 104–15. In the 14th century Pereyasavl' Ryazansky, at the confluence of the Trubezh and

the Oka, became the capital of the principality and was renamed Ryazan'.

45. The Rus'ian chronicles are of basic importance for the history of the conquest of the land of Ryazan': A. Kus'min, *Letopisnye izvestiya o razorenii Ryazani Batyem*, in his *Ryazanskoe letopisanie*, 1965, pp. 154-83 (see also id., VMU, 1963). The event was also reflected in foreign sources, even Chinese: H. Franke, *Europa in der ostasiatischen Geschichtsschreibung*, p. 69. A compilation entitled *Povest' o razorenii Ryazani Batyem* ('The Tale of the Destruction of Ryazan' by Batu'), much distorted by later alterations but purporting to date from the mid-14th century, exists in MSS not earlier than the 16th: D. Likhachev (ed.), *Povest' o razorenii Ryazani*, in: V. Adrianova-Peretts, *Voinskie povesti drevnei Rusi*, 1949, pp. 5-29, 119-42; 267-9, 284-96. The work is chiefly of interest for its literary value. Cf. I. Botosh, *Tekst povesti o razorenii Ryazani Batyem po Volokolamskomu spisku XVI v.* (N 523), SSASH, VI, 1960, pp. 5-27; D. Likhachev, 'Literaturnaya sud'ba "Povesti o razorenii Ryazani Batyem" v pervoi chertverti XV v.', in: *Issledovaniya i materialy po drevnerusskoi literature*, 1961, pp. 9-22; id., *K istorii slozheniya povesti o razorenii Ryazani Batyem*, AE, (1962), 1963, pp. 48-51; N. Vodovozov, *Istoriya drevnei russkoi literatury*, 1962, pp. 116-22, etc.

46. It can be seen from the Tatar's route that they were remarkably well acquainted with the terrain. Voronezh-Pronsk-Ryazan' was the northern section of the route which led in those days from the far south over the steppes: A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*' i obrazovanie territorii drevnerusskogo gosudarstva, 1951, pp. 198, 199, 201. Owing to the great forests and marshes extending from the left bank of the Oka, Kolomna (apart from Murom) afforded the only access to the interior of the grand duchy of Vladimir: A. Nasonov, op. cit., pp. 208, 215.

47. The Sit' is a right-bank tributary of the Mologa, which is a left-bank tributary of the Volga.

48. N. Berezhkov, *Khronologiya russkogo letopisaniya*, pp. 110, 318, 319.

49. B. Kudryavtsev, in: *Po sledam bitvy z tataro-mongolami na reke Sit' v 1238 g.*, ISSSR, 1963 (4), pp. 226-7, attempts to identify the place of the battle from surviving tradition among the local population, a rather uncertain criterion. Only archaeological finds could help towards a solution of this problem.

50. S. Il'in, *Seligerskii put' Batyya k Novgorodu v 1238 g.*, IsZ, 1944 (4), pp. 97-100.

51. The Hungarian Dominican Julianus, who was a missionary in Eastern Europe during the great Tatar invasion of Rus', learnt from refugees that the Tatars, in their plan to conquer Vladimir Rus', waited for the winter freezing of the rivers and marshes: L. Bendefy, *Fontes Authentici itinera fr. Juliani (1235-38) illustrantes*, AECO, III, 1937, p.

37. As the Tatars took much account of climatic conditions when planning their attacks, they must also have reckoned with the spring thaw. Other reasons suggested for their retreat (cf. E. Razin, *Istoriya voennogo iskusstva* 2, p. 221; V. Kargalov, *Vneshnopoliticheskie faktory razvitiya feodal'noi Rusi*, pp. 106-8, etc.) do not seem convincing.

52. See maps in *Atlas istorii SSSR* I, 1954, No. 14; L. Cherepnin, *Bor'ba russkogo naroda s ordami Batyya*, in *Istoriya SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, 2, 1966, p. 42.

53. M. Karger, in: *Kiev i mongol'skoe zavoevanie*, *SAr*, XI, 1949, pp. 55-102, shows the immense extent of the devastation at Kiev on the basis of archaeological materials.

54. The Tatars when besieging a fortress surrounded it on all sides to cut it off from the outside world; they exploited the terrain in constructing mines and other earthworks, destroyed the fortifications by means of machines which could hurl large rocks over a distance of several hundred paces (they had discovered the use of these machines in China and soon adopted them), discharged incendiary missiles and so on. They obliged the local population to assist them in heavy siege work, and drove them foremost into the assault. Cf. P. Rappoport, *Drevnerusskie kreposti*, 1965, pp. 43-4. As to the condition of Rus'ian fortresses at that time see A. Tverskoi, *Russkoe gradostroitel'stvo do kontsa XVII veka*, 1953, pp. 27-33.

55. The countries with a settled population, including Rus', which were conquered by the Tatars were doubtless more densely populated than the extensive lands of the steppe nomads. The Tatars, however, mobilized the whole of their male population that was fit for military service, whereas among the settled communities only part of the population went to war, so the numbers involved were more or less equal. Sources of the 13th and 14th centuries estimate the conquering Tatar forces at 400-500,000, but modern scholars regard this figure as inflated and consider that the invaders of Rus', for instance, numbered only about 100-150,000. The numerical superiority of the invaders was based on the fact that all their forces were under unified control, whereas each Rus'ian principality fought for itself and there was no extensive co-operation among them.

56. Amid the general defeat only two Rus'ian fortresses resisted for any length of time: Torzhok during the campaign against Great Novgorod, and Kozel'sk during the Tatar retreat to the southern steppes. Torzhok is on the right bank of the Tvertsa, a left-bank tributary of the Oka. Its history up to 1238 does not suggest that it was difficult to capture, yet according to the chroniclers it withstood a siege of two weeks before it fell in March 1238. Kozel'sk on the Zhizdra, a left-bank affluent of the Oka, does not appear in the Rus'ian chronicles till the mid-12th

century; it was a small wooded fortress which had not previously played an important part, and we may doubt that it withstood a siege of seven weeks by the Tatars. The statement that it did so can neither be rejected *a priori* (cf. F. Koneczny, *Dzieje Rosji* 1, 1917, p. 259) nor accepted without reserve as is generally done. There is need for closer analysis of the source accounts and further excavations to supplement the archaeological material. Even if we accept without reserve the statement as to the long resistance of Torzhok and Kozel'sk, it is hard to deny that these were secondary episodes compared to the general achievement of the Tatars in conquering huge territories and plundering them to a formidable extent.

57. Julianus, quoted above, states that while Batu was in Rus' he planned further conquests beyond the bounds of central Europe.

58. J. Umiński, *Niebezpieczeństwo tatarskie w połowie XIII w. i papież Innocenty IV*, 1922; E. Voegelin, *The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers*, 1245–1255, B, XV, 1940–1, pp. 378–413.

59. Excessive drinking was common among the Mongols, and many of Chingis's descendants died of it: S. Kałużyński, *Imperium mongolskie*, pp. 100, 108, 111.

60. Tuluy was Chingis Khan's youngest son.

61. B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 274, 429.

62. V. Egorov, *Gosudarstvennoe i administrativnoe ustroistvo Zolotoi Ordy*, Vol. 1972 (2), pp. 32–5.

63. The sources differ as to these colour-names, and scholarly opinion is divided. Cf. A. Yakubovsky, *Mongol'skaya imperiya*, p. 97; M. Safargaliyev, *Raspad Zolotoi Ordy*, 1960, pp. 14–15; G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy*, p. 242, and others.

64. On the possessions of the Golden Horde in Asia see A. Yakubovsky, *Feodalizm na Vostoke. Stolitsa Zolotoi Ordy—Sarai Berke*, 1932, p. 12; id., *Mongol'skaya imperiya*, pp. 96–7; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde und Russlands Schicksal*, *Saec*, VI, (4), 1955, p. 400; id., *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 274–80.

65. S. Kałużyński, *Imperium mongolskie*, p. 144.

66. V. Mavrodin, *Levoberezhnaya Ukraina pod vlast'yu tataro-mongolov*, *UZLGU*, XXXII, 1939, pp. 39–65.

67. Cf. A. Polyak, *Novye arabskie materialy pozdnego srednevekov'ya o Vostochnoi i Tsentral'noi Evrope*, in: *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov Yugo-Vostochnoi i Tsentral'noi Evropy*, ed. A. Tveritina, 1964, p. 42.

68. V. Pashuto, *Polovetskoe episkopstvo*, in: *Ost und West in der Geschichte des Denkens und der kulturellen Beziehungen*, 1966, pp. 39–40; G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy*, pp. 232–4; A. Polyak, *Novye arabskie materialy*, p. 43; and others.



69. According to the above-quoted missionary Julianus, the Tatars were angry with the Hungarians for harbouring Polovtsians on their territory, since they regarded all Polovtsians as their slaves. The Khan apparently wrote to the King of Hungary: 'Intellexi insuper quod Cumanos servos nostros sub tua protectione suscepisti . . .': *AECO*, III, 1937, p. 38.

70. 'Togo zhe leta yavishasya yazytsi, ikh zhe niktozhe dobre yasno ne vest', kto sut' i otkole izidosha, i chto yazyk ikh, i kotorogo plemeni sut', i chto vera ikh; i zovut' ya Tatory': *Lavr. let.*, *PSRL*, I, 1223.

71. A. Yakubovsky, *Feodalizm na Vostoke*, p. 13.

72. S. Kiselev and others, *Drevnemongol'skie goroda*, 1965; V. Egorov, *Prichiny vozniknoveniya gorodov u mongolov v XIII-XIV vv.*, *ISSSR*, 1969 (4), pp. 39-49.

73. G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Tri srednevekovykh nizhnevolzhskikh goroda*, *Vol.* 1974 (3), p. 212.

74. G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Goroda i kochevye stepi v Zolotoi Orde v XIII veke*, *VMU*, 1965 (6), pp. 50-1; id., *Kochevniki Vostochnoi Evropy*, pp. 204-12, 234-42; id., *Kurgany, idoly, monety*, 1968, pp. 82-7.

75. A. Yakubovsky, *Feodalizm na Vostoke*, pp. 13-15.

76. A. Polyak, *Novye arabskie materialy*, p. 42.

77. The north exported various goods, especially pelts of fur-bearing animals in considerable quantity (sable, fox, marten, beaver, squirrel etc.) and other hides for the tanneries of the south. From south to north were exported silk stuffs, wrought metal, rice etc.

78. The Turkish word *sarai*, meaning a court or palace, occurs in names of cities of the Golden Horde such as Old Sarai, New Sarai, Saraichik and Bakhchisarai. Cf. V. Egorov, *Prichiny vozniknoveniya*, p. 45.

79. New Sarai was founded by Batu's brother, Khan Berke (1257-67), on the upper reaches of the Akhtuba. Its ruins are near the modern Volgograd (Stalingrad). The capital of the Golden Horde was at Sarai Batu until the first half of the 14th century, and afterwards at Sarai Berke.

80. A. Yakubovsky, *Razvaliny Urgench*, *IGAIMK*, VI, (2); id., *K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii remeslennoi promyshlennosti Saraya Berke* *ibid.* VIII (2-3), 1931; id., *Feodal'noe obshchestvo Srednei Azii i ego trgovlya s Vostochnoi Evropoi v X-XV vv.*, in: *Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi SSR*, 1933; S. Tolstov, *Po sledam drevnekhorezmiiskoi tsivilizatsii*, 1948; G. Fedorov-Davydov, *O nachale monetnoi chekanki v Khorezme i Saraye v kontse XIII v.*, *EV*, XIV, 1961.

81. A. Yakubovsky, *Feodalizm na Vostoke*, p. 12.

82. S. Yanina, *Dzhuchidskie monety iz raskopok i sborov Kuibyshevskoi ekspeditsii v Bolgarakh v 1946-1952 gg.*, *MIA*, XLII, 1954, pp. 428-9.

83. B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 639 (map).

84. G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Kurgany, idoly, monety*, pp. 82-7.

85. Naturally individuals from Rus' were to be found in the territory of the Golden Horde in the 13th and 14th centuries, voluntarily or otherwise, both sporadically and permanently; but this was never a mass movement.

86. ' . . . mnozhestvo beshchisla, ako pruzi': *NPL*, p. 286.

87. The Tatars 'mowed people down like grass' (' . . . a vse lyud'e sekushche aky travu'), *ibid.*, p. 289.

88. ' . . . ovy zhe vedushche bosy i bez pokroven v stany svoe, izdykhayushcha mrazom': *Lavr. let.*, *PSRL*, I, 1237.

89. 'Krov' i otets' i brat'ya nasheya, aki voda mnoga zemlyu napoi . . . m'nozhaisha zhe brat'ya i chada nasha v plen vedeni bysha; sela nasha lyadinoyu porostosha': E. Petukhov, *Serapion Vladimirskii, russkii propovednik XIII v.*, 1888, *Prilozheniya*, p. 8.

90. 'I be Batyi u goroda i otrotsi ego obsedyakhu grad, i ne be slyshati ot glasa skripaniya teleg ego, mnozhestva reveniya vel'blud ego i r'zhaniya ot glasa stad kon' ego': *Ipat. let.*, *PSRL*, II, 1240.

91. 'Danilovi zhe so bratom prishedshu ko Berest'yu, i ne vozmogosta iti v pole, smrada radi mnozh'stva izb'enykh': *ibid.*

92. Plano Carpini left France in the spring of 1245, travelled through Bohemia, Poland and the southern Rus'ian lands and reached Sarai in April 1246.

93. ' . . . unde quando per illam terram (Russiae) ibamus innumerabilia capita et ossa hominum mortuorum, iacentia super campum inveniebamus.'

94. ' . . . i vzyasha gorodov 14, oproch' svobod i pogostov, vo edin mesyats' fevral' . . .': *Lavr. let.*, *PSRL*, I, 1237.

95. ' . . . Bozhie popushchenie se na vsei Ruskoi zemli': *NPL*, p. 289. Contemporary sources reiterate that Batu invaded and laid waste the whole of Rus': e.g. Plano Carpini, 'destruxerunt totam Russiam'.

96. *Lavr. let.*, *PSRL*, I, 1238.

97. 'I ub'en byst' [after the conquest of Vladimir] Pakhom arkhimandrit manastyrya Rozhestva svyaty Bogoroditsa, da igumen Usilen'skyi, Feodosii Spas'skyi, i prochii igumeni i chern'tsi i chernitsi, i popy i d'yakony . . .': *Lavr. let.*, 1238.

98. ' . . . izidosha iz grada protivu emu, episkop Kiril i Dionisii arkhimandrit, ponesosha i v grad s episkopom i igumeni i popove i chernoriztsi, i ne be slyshati pen'ya v plachi i velitsi vopli; plaka bo sya ves' grad Volodimer' po nem, Yaroslav zhe i Svyatoslav, i knyazi Rustii plakakhusya po nem s družhinoyu svoeyu, i mnozhestvo boyar i slug plakakhusya lishen'ya svoego knyazy, ubozii kormitelya': *Lavr. let.*, 1239.

99. 'Fuerat enim urbs valde magna et populosa, nunc quasi ad nihilum est redacta: vix enim domus ibi remanserunt ducentae, quarum etiam habitatores tenetur in maxima servitute.'

100. 'Togo zhe leta Yaroslav ide Smolin'sku na Litvu, i Litvu pobedi, i . . . sam so mnozhstvom polona s velikoyu chest'yu, otide vsvoyasi': *Lavr. let., PSRL, I, 1239.*

101. The Rus'ian chroniclers from the 14th to the 16th century have much to say, but in very general terms, about Yaroslav's restoration of the country. See V. Kargalov, *Mongolo-tatarskie vtorzheniya i pere-meshchenie naseleniya Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi vo vtoroi polovine XIII v., NDVS, 1961 (4), p. 135.* It is not clear, however, whether their accounts were based on earlier source material that has been lost, or were their own invention though with some elements of fact.

102. 'Togdy zhe be popolokh zol po vsei zemli, i sami ne vedyakhu i gde kto bezhit': *Lavr. let., 1239.*

103. ' . . . ipsi Rutheni, Hungari, Bulgari, qui ante fugerant nobis viva voce ferebant, quod . . .': *AECO, III, 1937, p. 37.*

104. V. Kargalov, *Posledstviya mongolo-tatarskogo nashestviya XIII veka dlya sel'skikh mestnostei Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi, Vol, 1965 (3), p. 54.*

105. ' . . . ikhzhe izbavi Bog rukoyu svoeyu krepkoyu ot bezbozhnykh Tatar': *PSRL, I, 1238.*

106. 'Omnium regnorumque obtinent reges et duces ac magnates, de quibus est spes quod aliquando possint facere aliquam resistentiam: interficiunt sine mora': *AECO, III, 1937, pp. 37-8.*

107. 'Togo zhe leta knyaz' Yaroslav Vsevolodovits pozvan tsesarem' Tatar'skym, i ide v Tatary k Batyevi, voevode tatar'sku': *NPL, p. 297.*

108. 'Velikiy knyaz' Yaroslav poekha v Tatary k Batyevi, a syna svoego Kostyantina posla k Kanovi; Batyi zhe pochti Yaroslava velikoyu chest'yu i muzhi ego, i otpusti i, rek emu: "Yaroslave, budi ty starei vsem knyazem v Russkom yazytse"': *Lavr. let., 1243.*

109. We do not know, for instance, which Great Khan it was that summoned Yaroslav in 1242. Ugudey was dead, and the Kurultay did not raise Guyuk to the dignity of Great Khan until 1246. It may however have been Guyuk or his mother Teregene Khatun, who was then acting as regent, or perhaps the order was given by Batu on behalf of the Great Khan as his sovereign, nominal or actual.

110. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva, 1918, p. 51.*

111. Plano Carpini wrote much about the Tatars' good and bad qualities. Among the latter was their pride and arrogance: 'Superbissimi aliis hominibus sunt, et despiciunt omnes: ideo quasi pro nihilo reputant, sive nobiles sint, sive ignobiles. Vidimus enim in curia Imperatoris nobilem

virum Ieroslaum, magnum ducem Russiae [and other rulers of conquered lands] nullum honorem debitum recipere inter eos. Sed Tartari qui erant eis assignati, quantumque erant viles, antecedeabant eos, et semper primum locum et summum tenebant: immo saepe oportebat eos post eorum posteriora sedere.'

112. In 1243 Yaroslav personally did homage to Batu but only sent his son to Guyuk (or the latter's mother). After Yaroslav's death his two eldest sons, Aleksandr and Andrei, went to the Tatars; after staying at Sarai, mindful of the sad experiences of their father's time, they went straight on to the Great Horde.

113. H. Franke, *Europa in der ostasiatischen Geschichtsschreibung des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts*, *Saec*, II (1), 1951, pp. 69–72; G. Rabich, *K voprosu o rusko-kitaiskikh otnosheniyakh XIII–XVII vv.*, in: *Sbornik studencheskikh rabot Sredneaziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, 1956 (unavailable to me); V. Kargalov, *Mongolo-tatarskie vtorzheniya*, pp. 144–7; id., *Posledstviya mongolo-tatarskogo nashestviya*, pp. 53–4; H. Franke, *Westöstliche Beziehungen im Zeitalter der Mongolenherrschaft*, *Saec*, XIX, (1), 1968, p. 93.

114. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus' (Istoriya tatarskoi politiki na Rusi)*, 1940 (repr. 1969), pp. 11–16; N. Merpert—V. Pashuto—L. Cherepnin, *Chingis-khan i ego nasledie*, *ISSSR*, 1962 (5), p. 108; G. Fedorov-Davydov, *Goroda i kochevye stepi v Zolotoi Orde v XIII veke*, *VMU*, 1965 (6), p. 51; V. Egorov, *Gosudarstvennoe i administrativnoe ustroistvo Zolotoi Ordy*, *Vol*, 1972 (2), p. 36.

115. A. Yakubovsky, *Mongol'skaya imperiya*, *IsZ*, 1940 (3), p. 98.

116. Cf. M. Shakhmatov, *Otnoshenie drevne-russkikh knizhnikov k tataram*, in: *Trudy IV s'ezda russkikh akademicheskikh organizatsii za granitsei* 1, 1929, pp. 171–3; J. Matl, *Zur Bezeichnung und Wertung fremder Völker bei den Slaven*, in: *Festschrift für Max Vasmer*, 1956, p. 302; M. Tikhomirov, *Vossozdanie russkoi pis'mennoi traditsii v pervye desyatiletiya tatarskogo iga*, *VIMK*, 1957 (3), pp. 3–4; I. Budovnits, *Ideinaya osnova rannikh narodnykh skazanii o tatarskom ige*, *TODRL*, XIV, 1958, pp. 169–75.

117. The Rus'ian princes were obliged to present themselves with their military contingents at a given place and time and to take part in the khan's expeditions according to his orders. However, comparatively few of the campaigns in question were unconnected with Rus'ian interests: an example is the military action against the Yasians in the Caucasus, in 1277–8. Or did the Rus'ian chroniclers mention fewer than actually took place?

118. The question of the financial burden laid on Rus' for the Tatars' benefit is discussed by many authors: A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, 1940, pp. 11–19 etc.; G. Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, 1953, pp. 214–27;

B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, 1965, pp. 332–9; L. Cherepnin, *Mongolotatary na Rusi (XIII v.)*, 1970, pp. 192–4, and others. The accounts in the sources—chiefly Rus'ian chronicles—concerning the tribute imposed on Rus' contain terms whose exact meaning cannot always be ascertained. In general these accounts are scanty and rather fragmentary: they contain gaps which scholars try to fill with their own conjectures. To obtain a broader basis on which to estimate the scale of tribute, account is taken of analogous conditions in other regions conquered by the Tatars, especially in Asia, but it is not known whether the burden was the same in both areas. Tatar-Rus'ian relations in the 13th century are often reconstructed with the aid of information from the 14th and 15th, but again we do not know whether the burden of taxation immediately after the conquest was the same as in later times, or whether all the Rus'ian lands were equally affected. Controversy surrounds the organization of the Tatar administration concerned with exacting tribute from Rus', and so on. Thus there can be no question of ascertaining in detail the extent of Rus'ian economic subjection to the Tatars.

119. Yaroslav in his will bequeathed the dukedom of Suzdal' to his son Andrei, and Svyatoslav carried out the former's intention. The chroniclers, before and after 1238, connect Svyatoslav with Yur'ev only; he was buried there, and there is no evidence that he reigned over Suzdal'. His son Dmitry inherited only Yur'ev from him.

120. Starodub (now Klyaz'mensky gorodok) was on the right bank of the Klyaz'ma. The region was thinly populated and had no past history of importance. Starodub itself first appears in the sources under the year 1218. Thanks to its geographical position the newly created appanage played an auxiliary role to the grand duke at Vladimir. The chroniclers scarcely mention the princes of Starodub, or at most laconically record the years in which they died. Evidently they played a very secondary part. As regards Ivan, B. Rybakov takes a different view in: *Russkie datirovannye nadpisi XI-XIV vv.*, 1964, pp. 40–1, but his hypothesis is not convincing.

121. Conjectures that Ivan acquired Starodub before 1238 are not adequately justified by the sources.

122. Yaroslav conferred the lands of the grand duchy of Vladimir on his brothers as supreme ruler of that principality, without Batu's knowledge and approval: Russo-Tatar relations had not yet taken shape at that time.

123. Nizhny Novgorod, Gorodets Radilov, Kostroma and perhaps Galich Mersky.

124. Konstantin left three sons; on the two eldest, Vasil'ko and Vsevolod, he bestowed Rostov and Yaroslavl' respectively. From the account of later events it appears that Vladimir, the youngest son,

received Uglich, but it is hard to say exactly when. When Vasil'ko and Vsevolod died in 1238 the former's sons, Boris and Gleb, were aged 6 and about 1 respectively, while Vsevolod's son Vasily was aged 9; their uncle and guardian, Vladimir of Uglich, was 24.

125. The Rus'ian chroniclers mention a certain Fedor Yarunovich as having used intrigue and slander to discredit Yaroslav with the Tatars during his visit to the Great Horde and thus caused him to be murdered by the Khan. 'Obazhen bo byst' tsaryu Fedorom Yarunovichem': Voskr. let., *PSRL*, VII, 1246. We do not know who this person was; A. Presnyakov, (*Obrazovanie*, p. 477) believes that he was a boyar. From his name it would seem that he came from Rus', and presumably acted in the interest of the Rus'ian princes who wanted Yaroslav removed. There can scarcely be any doubt of his Rus'ian origin: e.g. an eminent Novgorodian named Fedor Yakunovich fell in battle in 1234 (*NPL*, pp. 73, 284).

126. ' . . . Svyatoslav knyaz' . . . sede v Volodimeri na stole ottsa svoego, a synovtsi svoi posadi po gorodom, yako zhe be im ouryadil Yaroslav': *Lavr. let.*

127. When Yaroslav died his younger sons were minors (Vasily, the youngest, was 5), but the elder were quite old enough to rule on their own account: Aleksandr, the eldest, may have been as old as 26. Andrei was undoubtedly the second son; the third and fourth were Mikhail and Konstantin, it is not certain in which order. We do not know the dates of birth of Yaroslav's sons Andrei, Mikhail, Konstantin, Yaroslav and Daniil: they are first mentioned in the chronicles under the year 1238, among the princes who escaped destruction by the Tatars.

128. According to the law of inheritance in the family of Vsevolod III, Svyatoslav should have been succeeded on the grand ducal throne by Ivan of Starodub.

129. ' . . . i Oleksandr knyaz' poekha po brate zhe k Batyevi': *Lavr. let.*, 1247.

130. Mikhail only occupied the grand ducal throne for a few months: he was killed fighting the Lithuanians in the same year, 1248. His death did not, however, mean that Svyatoslav recovered Vladimir; the latter, realizing that in the new situation he had no chance of returning to power, withdrew to Yur'ev. He went to the Tatars in 1251, and died in the following year.

131. The chronicler places in Andrei's mouth the words, characteristic for that time: 'I had rather flee to a foreign land than be a friend and servant of the Tatars (' . . . lutchi mi est' bezhati v chyuzhuyu zemlyu, nezhe družitisya i sluzhiti Tatarom').

132. The mouthpiece of Rus'ian political resistance to the Tatar government at that time was Danilo of Galich (on the upper Dnestr). Although, under compulsion, he did homage to Batu and acknowledged

the supremacy of the Horde over his domain, he was also strongly influenced by the West. The Holy See intended to proclaim a crusade against the Tatars and desired to win over the Rus'ian princes for this purpose. The Pope's intentions were not realized, and Daniil's hope of aid from the crusaders was disappointed. Andrei remained close to Daniil, whose daughter he married in 1250; these contacts were an expression of political *rapprochement*.

133. Novgorod refused him asylum; the chroniclers mention his being in Sweden. It may be—this is merely a conjecture—that he tried to persuade the Swedes to resume the fight with Aleksandr and so avenge their defeat on the Neva in 1240.

134. Yaroslav had to flee from Tver' to escape Aleksandr's revenge for his support of Andrei. He went first to Ladoga and afterwards to Pskov and Novgorod.

135. At that time Aleksandr's possessions were: Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma with its immediate surroundings; his own patrimony of Pereslavl'; Muscovy, inherited from his brother Mikhail, who died in 1248; and Suzdal' and Tver', the lands of his exiled brothers Andrei and Yaroslav respectively. His younger brother Daniil died in 1256. We do not know for sure if Daniil had an appanage of his own, but if so the grand duke would have inherited it, as Daniil had no issue.

136. Aleksandr had partisans among the descendants of Vsevolod III: among these were probably his own brother, Konstantin of Galich Mersky, who died in 1255 (Aleksandr had him buried at Vladimir, not Galich—a fact of some political significance), as well as Boris of Rostov, Gleb of Beloozero and others. The political attitude of many of the princes is hard to determine on account of the scarcity of source material, but in any case Aleksandr had no formidable enemies among them.

137. Aleksandr accepted into favour his brothers returning from exile and conferred on them part of their former lands, which may be regarded as evidence of his unquestioned supremacy over the other princes. In my opinion—this is only a hypothesis—Andrei then received the Volga cities of Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets but not Suzdal' (later he was given Suzdal' on relinquishing the Volga cities: cf. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 62–3, 260), while Yaroslav obtained the duchy of Tver', but apparently with a reduced area. Both Andrei and Yaroslav were from then onwards supporters of Aleksandr.

138. Smolensk declined steadily from the 1230s onwards, both politically and economically. Taking advantage of the quarrels between local princes, Aleksandr secured the support of Fedor of Mozhaïsk, whose territory was at the eastern extremity of the Smolensk district. In about 1260–1 Fedor's wife Maria inherited Yaroslavl' on the Volga from her father Vasily, who had left no male issue, and Fedor recognized Aleksandr

as his overlord in respect of both Yaroslavl' and Mozhaïsk; the practical effect of this was to detach Mozhaïsk from Smolensk and attach it to Vladimir. This account of events, however, is conjectural, as there are many gaps in the sources.

139. Batu died in 1255 or 1256. After a brief period of about a year, during which the government was exercised by his son Sartak and the latter's son or brother Ulagchi, Batu was succeeded by his brother Berke (1257–67), who seems to have poisoned both Sartak and Ulagchi to gratify his ambitions. The princes of Vladimir Rus' had to make the journey to Sarai and pay extensive tribute in the form of gifts to the new Khan and his officials. Boris of Rostov presented himself at the Horde in 1256. In 1257 or 1258, or possibly both years, he once again visited the Tatars, as did Aleksandr and his brothers Andrei and Yaroslav. Other princes of Vladimir Rus' probably went to the Horde also, while Gleb of Beloozero took a Tatar wife.

140. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 67–9.

141. The likelihood of this is increased by the fact that Aleksandr's immediate successors as Grand Dukes also died in mysterious circumstances on the way back from the Horde.

142. Aleksandr defeated the Swedes on the river Neva in 1240—hence his surname 'Nevsky'—and in 1242 he won a victory against the Livonian Order on the frozen surface of Lake Peipus. Despite these successes he was not popular with the Novgorodians; only methods of compulsion enabled him to maintain his position on the Ilmen'.

143. Actually Nevsky's eldest son was Vasily, but he fell out of favour with his father in 1257 and ceases to be mentioned by the sources; he died in 1271. We do not know whether he was given any lands, left any children, or played any political role from 1262 onwards, and he is therefore left out of account here.

144. Andrei of Suzdal', who was older than the two princes mentioned, died in the spring of 1263 (H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa* 1, p. 204), which made it easier for Yaroslav to maintain his hold on Vladimir. Andrei was succeeded at Suzdal' by his son Yuri.

145. On receiving the news of Aleksandr's death in 1263 the people of Novgorod promptly deposed his son Dmitry, who was governing on his father's behalf, and called on Yaroslav of Tver' to rule them. They then concluded with him a well-known agreement imposing rigorous conditions, on which there has been much comment. The prince was to defend the Novgorod lands in their entirety (including those, specifically listed, which bordered on the Vladimir principality and were threatened by its policy of conquest); he was to govern jointly with the *posadnik*—the chief official of the Novgorodian administration; he was to appoint only Novgorodians to govern districts (*volosti*), was to abstain from 'acts



of violence' (*nasilie*) such as those committed in Novgorod by his brother Aleksandr, and so on. Yaroslav agreed to everything the Novgorodians asked, as the price of their support in his efforts to become Grand Duke: with Novgorod gold he could offer the Tatars lavish gifts and gain the Khan's favour. Once he had achieved his aim, he began to display tendencies contrary to his agreement of 1263 with the Novgorodians. However, his political and military efforts did not bring him any great success. His brother Vasily made equally strenuous attempts to tame the Novgorodians, but likewise achieved no lasting result.

146. Dmitry was born not earlier than 1241.

147. Dmitry's attempts to consolidate his position in Great Novgorod by curtailing its liberties provoked armed opposition. His struggle with the Novgorodians ended in his favour in 1280, but this was a transient success without important consequences.

148. The khan of the Golden Horde at this time was Tudan Menke (Möngkä). After the death of Berke, Batu's brother, the throne was occupied by the latter's grandsons, Menke Temür (1267-80) and Tudan Menke (1280-7).

149. ' . . . i vzyasha stolnyi grad slavyi Volodimer' i Suzhdal', i Murom, Yur'ev, Pereyasavl', Kolomnu, Moskvu, Mozhaesk, Volok, Dmitrov, Ugleche pole, a vsekh gorodov vzyasha Tatarove 14': *TL*, p. 345.

150. The sequence of events is given in N. Berezikov, *Khronologiya russkogo letopisaniya*, p. 322.

## The Origins of Muscovy

Some historians are of the opinion that the basin of the river Moskva, a left-bank tributary of the Oka, became a Slav land in the 12th century at the latest, when it was colonized by the Vyatichian tribe.<sup>1</sup> The *Povest' vremennykh let*, written at the beginning of that century, states that the Vyatichians settled on the Oka (*po Otse*). Since the chronicler also says that the lower reaches of the Oka were inhabited by Finno-Ugrian peoples, the Vyatichians must have lived along its upper or middle course.

The *Povest'* gives valuable details of the Vyatichians' earliest past. It states that they were a Polish tribe who for unknown reasons left their native home and—like the Radimichians, who were of the same race<sup>2</sup>—migrated a long way east<sup>3</sup> and occupied lands on the Oka.<sup>4</sup> They did so at a time when the Polish tribes were being combined into a broader unity (the '*Lyakhi*') and the Vyatichians and Radimichians had originally belonged to this union. The unification of Poland began around the second half of the 9th century and made considerable strides in the 10th.<sup>5</sup>

The *Povest'* also speaks of the earliest past of the 'Slav' tribes or, as we should call them today, the eastern Slavs.<sup>6</sup> From his list of these the chronicler excludes the Vyatichians and Radimichians, thus opposing the latter to all 'Slavs' who had long been settled in the east.<sup>7</sup> Thus the statement about the Polish origin of the Vyatichians and Radimichians is not a mere mechanical insertion based on an unknown source but reflects a general belief in the 12th century that these two tribes were of different origin to the Polyanians, Derevlians, Severians and so on.

The account in the *Povest'* of the Polish origin of the Vyatichians and Radimichians is categorically rejected by some writers, though without justification,<sup>8</sup> while others accept it in a distorted form based on a wrong interpretation of the source. The mistake is a

methodological one: a single statement (*'radimichi bo i vyatichi ot lyakhov'*) is taken out of its context and given a meaning at variance with it. It is thus asserted that the Vyatichians and Radimichians were not of Polish origin but that they formerly occupied lands bordering on Poland,<sup>9</sup> these lands being variously identified in an arbitrary fashion.<sup>10</sup> The idea that the district of Muscovy was populated by Vyatichians settled on the Oka leads automatically to the conclusion that the future Grand Duchy of Muscovy was basically Polish by race, which is highly improbable.

All conjectures about the colonization of the Moskva basin by the Vyatichians are based on archaeological finds, on certain burial customs and especially on the contents of barrows in that region. Archaeologists attach great importance to the evidence of ethnic conditions provided by the wealth of feminine 'jewellery'—rings, circlets, chains, beads, bracelets etc.—with which the heads, necks and arms of the dead are adorned. Because the same or similar ornaments are found in Vyatichian territory, it is supposed that the Vyatichians must have colonized the banks of the Moskva; but this ignores the influence of 'fashion', which has played a part in society everywhere and at all times. Articles from the Oka region may have appealed to women and been imitated on the banks of the Moskva and elsewhere. Moreover the argument ignores the possibility that the Vyatichians on the Oka may have taken over some types of articles from the inhabitants of the Moskva basin, before the supposed colonization by the Vyatichians.

In various parts of the territory between the Volga and the Oka, glass objects have been found dating from the 11th-13th centuries. Traces of the manufacture of glass bracelets have been discovered near Kostroma.<sup>11</sup> It seems likely that practically every town in the region produced glass rings, bracelets, drinking and cooking vessels etc.<sup>12</sup> It is hard to be certain where the chief manufacturing centre was, if it existed. It has been suggested that it was in the Moskva basin.<sup>13</sup> Such glass objects are also found in the Oka region.<sup>14</sup> On the lines of the argument so far advanced it might be affirmed that the Vyatichians on the Oka not only colonized the Moskva area but also many other lands between the upper Volga and the Oka, and that their settlements extended as far as Kostroma.

The archaeological finds in question show that there were contacts, especially commercial ones, between the inhabitants of

the Oka and Moskva basins. In spite of the difficult terrain (large forests and swamps), there was a convenient water route between the two, as the Moskva is a tributary of the Oka. But the existence of such contacts is very different from the supposition that the Moskva basin was colonized by the Vyatichians, that they drove out or very soon assimilated the previous inhabitants, and that the area thus took on a Slav character as early as the 12th or 13th century.<sup>15</sup>

Philologists also claim that the Vyatichians colonized the lands in question, as well as other distant territories. It is an open and controversial question<sup>16</sup> whether the dialects spoken today in what was formerly the Grand Duchy of Vladimir date from a remote tribal period or evolved in later centuries. The linguistic arguments contain too much conjecture and too little in the way of concrete, unassailable fact to justify historians in believing that the Vyatichians were present in large numbers in the 11th-13th centuries on the banks of the Moskva, not to mention other distant territories.<sup>17</sup>

Since neither the *Povest'* nor later chronicles written in and around Moscow have anything to say about Vyatichian settlements in the area,<sup>18</sup> the question of colonization can only be approached on grounds of general probability. It is generally held that the Vyatichians on the Moskva were mainly engaged in agriculture;<sup>19</sup> but, on the other hand, we know that the territory in question was one of dense forest, rivers, streams and marshes, with sandy, infertile soil.<sup>20</sup> It is a question what could have led the Vyatichians to occupy lands that were more calculated to repel farmers than attract them,<sup>21</sup> when they had extensive lands on the Oka which were well known for their fertility.<sup>22</sup> Those who maintain, though unconvincingly,<sup>23</sup> that the Rostov-Suzdal' country was colonized by the Krivichians are able at least to point to the fertile character of the *opol'e* which is supposed to have attracted the settlers, but in the case of the Moskva basin even this argument is lacking.

The oldest frontiers between different peoples in north-eastern Europe generally consisted of broad zones of naturally inaccessible territory, almost uninhabitable and easy to defend. When political conditions began to crystallize it became clear that the Moskva basin was on the border between four principalities: Rostov-Suzdal', Ryazan', Chernigov and Smolensk. It must therefore be

looked on as a frontier area, a fact confirmed by its dense forests and profusion of marshes and waterways.

Archaeological research in the area has been rewarded by the discovery of a surprising amount of material. When the results are recorded in the form of maps<sup>24</sup> it appears that the Moskva basin was not a mere wilderness but, on the contrary, contained so many settlements that it must have been one of the most thickly populated parts of the area between the Volga and the Oka.<sup>25</sup> This conclusion, however, must be treated with a good deal of caution.

Because of the importance of Muscovy in the subsequent history of Russia, archaeological research has been concentrated on the capital and its surroundings.<sup>26</sup> The variation in the amount of attention paid to different parts of the area between the upper Volga and the Oka has resulted in a one-sided picture of the state of population at the period we are concerned with.

The studies by different authors display a high degree of arbitrariness as regards the dating of archaeological relics. We do not know whether objects found in the Moskva basin, and supposedly proving that it was colonized by Vyatichians, really date from the period of colonization or from later centuries. Moreover the influx of Vyatichians is dated variously, which makes it even harder to reach any plausible conclusions. If, despite our reservations, it is accepted that the Moskva territory was thickly populated, it does not necessarily follow that the inhabitants were Vyatichians. Those who hold the colonization theory admit that considering the nature of the terrain, and for other reasons, the Slav influx cannot have been a mass phenomenon. The Moskva basin would only have been on the periphery of the Vyatichian territory, properly so called.

From maps showing contemporary trade routes<sup>27</sup> and afforestation<sup>28</sup> it can be seen that the Vyatichians would for the most part have migrated upstream along the Moskva from its junction with the Oka.<sup>29</sup> If so, their main point of entry into the territory in question would have been Kolomna. This town is first mentioned in the sources in the second half of the 12th century (1177); it is thought to have been founded earlier, in the first half or middle<sup>30</sup> of the century, but is unlikely to have existed before the end of the 11th.<sup>31</sup> If its foundation is connected with the arrival of Vyatichian settlers in the Moskva basin, then the

beginning of this influx, or at any rate its first intensification, must be dated to the 12th century. This would agree with the findings of some archaeologists who date the earliest barrows in the Moskva basin, which they believe to be Vyatichian, to the 12th century.<sup>32</sup> Thus the process of alleged colonization, which appears very uncertain and controversial even in the light of studies which purport to prove it,<sup>33</sup> becomes a phenomenon of strictly historical times, the evidence for which must be analysed not only in the light of archaeology but against the testimony of written sources.

In the earliest dated part of the *Povest'* the Vyatichians first appear in 859 and the Radimichians in 885.<sup>34</sup> Both passages refer to the tribute paid by these tribes to the Khazars. If the dates are right, of which it is hard to be certain, it would mean that both the Vyatichians and the Radimichians were somewhere in Eastern Europe by the second half of the 9th century, though not necessarily in the region of the Oka and the Sozh, where we find them subsequently. We do not know how long they took to migrate eastward, and, above all, we do not know whether the Vyatichians (with whom we are chiefly concerned here) were aiming for the Oka region from the beginning, or whether they traversed various thinly populated areas beyond the Dnepr before finally reaching the Oka. We may suppose that they reached the Oka region in the 10th century or not later than the 11th,<sup>35</sup> so that Vyatichian settlers would not have arrived in the Moskva basin until the 11th or 12th century at earliest.

Those who maintain the colonization theory believe that the newcomers from the Oka met with no resistance in the Moskva area, which thus soon became entirely Vyatichian. Rabinovich states that the original population of the city of Moscow was purely Vyatichian.<sup>36</sup> This coincides with the views of other writers who expatiate on the Vyatichian settlements on the banks of the Moskva and ignore other racial elements in that area. But are they right to do so?

If it is accepted that the Vyatichians appeared on the banks of the Moskva in the 11th or 12th century, the lands in question must previously have belonged to other inhabitants. If the Moskva basin was an uninhabited frontier zone, the intrusion of an alien element was bound to excite some reaction. Broad frontier zones were part of extensive territories inhabited by larger or smaller

tribes which depended on them for security and would resist fiercely if they were threatened.

In ascertaining the ethnic character of the population on the Moskva at the beginning of history, there is another criterion besides archaeology to which too little weight is attached, namely geographical nomenclature, which throws valuable light on this apparently obscure and controversial question.

It must be noticed that there is a left-bank tributary of the lower Moskva called the Mer'skaya.<sup>37</sup> Not far from it stood the village of Merya on the Vokhonka, a right-bank affluent of the Klyaz'ma. In the neighbourhood of Zvenigorod, around the middle course of the Moskva, are numerous villages named Merya, Staraya Merya, Merya Molodaya, Merya Staraya etc.<sup>38</sup> All these are clearly ethnic names and show that the lands on Moskva<sup>39</sup> were the tribal territory of the Merya.

According to the *Povest'*, the chief concentrations of Merya population were around Lakes Rostov and Pereyasavl',<sup>40</sup> so that the Moskva basin was on the periphery of their settlements. This does not mean that the border area was completely uninhabited, although such areas often were. The Moskva was at that time an important waterway for intertribal and international trade,<sup>41</sup> and could thus have attracted a Merian population for economic reasons. However densely or thinly the Moskva basin was populated by the Merya, it is hard to believe that they did not resist the Vyaticians advancing from the banks of the Oka.

Without going into the obscure question of the routes by which the Vyaticians reached the Oka, it remains a fact that the middle course of that river, i.e. the Ryazan' area, showed a large concentration of Vyatician settlement in the 11th-12th century.<sup>42</sup> Chroniclers of the 15th and 16th century rightly identify the Vyaticians with the people of Ryazan'.<sup>43</sup>

In the 11th-12th century the Ryazan' (Vyatician) territory scarcely extended beyond the Oka; while in the Oka basin, before the river turns southward, they possessed only the two strongholds of Rostislavl' and Kolomna, marking the furthest northern extension of the population of that area.<sup>44</sup> The boundary between Ryazan' and Chernigov<sup>45</sup> ran close to the Rostislavl'. We are struck by the tenuousness of the link between the Ryazan' (Vyatician) settlements and the section of the Oka referred to. There is no trace of major concentrations in that area from which large numbers

of settlers could have poured into the Moskva basin. If we suppose, as is often done, that Rostislavl' and Kolomna, especially the latter, were bases for the penetration of the lands on the Moskva, then, as both these towns were founded at a late date,<sup>46</sup> the beginnings of Vyatichian colonization must have been late also. Other needs and purposes may have led to the foundation of Rostislavl' and Kolomna; the latter, as subsequent events show, was intended to protect the Ryazan' land against invasion from the north.<sup>47</sup>

The discovery in eastern Europe of large quantities of Cufic dirhems dating from the early 9th to the early 11th century shows that the Varangian Rus' maintained lively trade relations with the Arab world (cf. chapter 4). River routes played an important part in this trade. The Rus' in eastern Europe, like the Norsemen in all their western conquests, attached particular importance to commanding the waterways in territories subdued by them. They treated the upper Volga area (using the term in a broad sense) primarily from the point of view of utilizing the main waterways, and they made a point of keeping a firm hold on the lands bordering the principal rivers. This can be seen from the grants bestowed on the Rus'ians whose names figure in Igor' 's treaty with the Greeks of 944/5.<sup>48</sup> The closest intimates of the grand duke and their envoys such as Ivor, Karsh, Klek etc., were given estates lying along the great waterways.<sup>49</sup> In the present context particular importance attaches to the envoy Istr or Ister (Istr Aminodov), who received lands in the neighbourhood of the middle course of the Moskva, probably extending to the banks of that river. As the owner of those lands he gave his name to the river Istra, a left-bank tributary of the Moskva; the Malaya Istra, which flows into the Istra; the large community of *Isterva volost'*, and the settlement of *Isterva Slobodka*.<sup>50</sup>

The place-names of the Moskva basin give a clear picture of ethnic conditions in the area in the middle of the 10th century (names derived from the Merya) and also of its political status (places named after Istr as owner of the land). This is in accordance with the chronicler's statement that Igor' ordered the Merya population to pay tribute to the Varangians.<sup>51</sup> Istr or Ister was probably a Varangian Rus', or possibly a Balt in Rus'ian service;<sup>52</sup> in any case he did not belong to the Vyatichian tribe.



It remains a fact that the Moskva basin, like that of the Klyaz'ma, was well known to the Rus'ian in the first half of the 10th century. These two tributaries of the Oka were closely linked for geographical reasons: the left-bank tributaries of the middle Moskva are only a short distance from the right-bank tributaries of the upper Klyaz'ma. Moreover—an important point—the basins of the two rivers constituted a border zone of the Merya territory. The Rus'ians must have been remarkably well acquainted with the terrain between the Moskva and the Klyaz'ma, since Klek, another intimate of Igor' 's, was given an estate south of the Klyaz'ma. An envoy of Klek's (Kol Klekov)<sup>53</sup> is mentioned in the treaty of 944/5. Klek's domain (*klekovskii stan*)<sup>54</sup> extended over a wide area south of the Klyaz'ma, a situation clearly analogous to Istr's ownership of a large part of the basin of the Moskva in its middle course. Subsequently Klek's possessions were concentrated on the rivers Pola and Buzha, but it seems likely that they originally extended as far as the Klyaz'ma.<sup>55</sup> If so, they would almost have included the site of Vladimir itself. This would also show that from the very beginning the Rus'ians attached great importance to the section of the Klyaz'ma around Vladimir.

In view of the importance of Vladimir in the pre-Muscovite period, there is much debate among historians as to whether it was founded by Vladimir the Great or Vladimir Monomakh. Likhachev, Limonov, Nasonov, Voronin and others pronounce firmly for Monomakh. The sources, listed in these authors' works, contain two versions, one ascribing the foundation to Vladimir the Great and the other to his great-grandson.<sup>56</sup> This is not the place to attempt to decide the question, and it probably will never be decided with certainty; but we would point out that the version according to which the city was founded around the year 1000 is not so unlikely as is generally supposed.

As far as general probability is concerned, it is quite possible that Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma was founded by Vladimir the Great.<sup>57</sup> Its origin may have been connected with economic and especially commercial developments in his day.<sup>58</sup> From the economic point of view Igor' in the first half of the 10th century already attached great importance to maintaining his hold on the Klyaz'ma and the Moskva, and settled his loyal followers in lands bordering on those rivers. If Vladimir the Great founded the city on the Klyaz'ma it would not have been particularly a sign of his own

initiative, but rather a matter of following in his grandfather's footsteps.

The first prince to be directly connected (by a grant of lands) with the Merya territory was Yury Dolgoruky. The sources show that he planted himself firmly on the banks of the Moskva, and it was he who built the city, named after the river, which was to become so famous. It is wrong to suppose that the territory was not conquered by the princes of Rostov-Suzdal' until the first half of the 12th century.<sup>59</sup> Dolgoruky only continued the policy of his great ancestors, who had at a much earlier date extended their rule over the whole Merya territory including the Moskva basin.

Moscow was founded on the territory of a boyar (nobleman) named Kuchka, and originally bore the name Kuchkovo.<sup>60</sup> Kuchka was undoubtedly a real person, though he is not mentioned in contemporary sources. Names of legendary founders were, of course, often deduced from place-names, but in the present case this seems out of the question. The sources speak of the 'sons of Kuchka' (*Kuchkovichi*), and their father must have been generally known since his sons and other relatives<sup>61</sup> are referred to in this way. They played an important part during the reign of Andrei Bogolyubsky, and we may suppose that this was due to the position already gained by Kuchka himself. This seems to be confirmed by the location of his estate on the border of the Merya territory: lands which were, in the nature of things, most exposed to attack were generally entrusted to men of military experience who had deserved well in the political sphere. Nothing can be said with certainty about the date at which Kuchka took possession of his estate on the Moskva.

Some very late stories (17th-18th century) about the origins of Moscow contain such a strong element of legend that they are rightly regarded as purely literary works;<sup>62</sup> yet some of the events they relate are not devoid of plausibility. For our present purpose we may note the reference to a powerful boyar Kuchka, unknown to the chroniclers, who fell into conflict with Dolgoruky and was put to death by his orders. It may be that this happened, and that the name of Kuchkovo was changed to *Moskva* (after the river) in order to blot out the memory of Kuchka. The Kuchkovichi may have taken part in the conspiracy which led

to the murder of Andrei Bogolyubsky, in revenge for Kuchka's death at the hands of Andrei's father.

Opinions vary as to the etymology of the name 'Kuchka'; it may be Slav or Finnic. Toporov and Trubachev,<sup>63</sup> for instance, hold the latter view, while others, including Tikhomirov, believe Kuchka to have been a Vyatichian magnate.<sup>64</sup> Whereas we know nothing for certain of Kuchka's origin and activity, many facts are recorded about his descendants, but they do not show whether the Kuchkovichi were connected in any way with the Vyatichians. Nasonov and Voronin believe that they were boyars of Rostov-Suzdal' who reflected the interests of their class in joining the conspiracy against Bogolyubsky.<sup>65</sup>

Moscow first appears in the sources under the year 1147. Excavations appear to show that the earliest settlement arose at the confluence of the Neglinnaya with the Moskva and covered a small south-western part of the site of the present Kremlin. Tales of its origin only mention villages belonging to the boyar Kuchka and say nothing of fortifications which would entitle it to the designation *grad*.<sup>66</sup> Scholars differ as to when Moscow became a fortress and a settlement on a larger scale than mere villages. Some maintain that Kuchkovo/Moskva already answered to this description in the second half of the 11th century or the first years of the 12th.<sup>67</sup> Others rule out the 11th century<sup>68</sup> and do not consider that the archaeological evidence points to a date earlier than the middle of the 12th.<sup>69</sup>

In 1147 a meeting took place between Yury Dolgoruky and Svyatoslav of Chernigov-Seversk, son of Oieg. Dolgoruky invited his ally to come to him, to Muscovy. The chronicler's account implies that the Moskva basin then belonged to Dolgoruky.

The second date in Moscow's history is 1156. The chronicler states that in that year Dolgoruky founded the *grad* of Moscow,<sup>70</sup> i.e. raised the first fortifications on the Kremlin. This date may be called in question, as Dolgoruky was then at Kiev (where he died in 1157),<sup>71</sup> but it may be correct, as the fortress may have been built on his orders. It is not so much a question of the year, however, as of the fact, which seems certain,<sup>72</sup> that the origin of the Moscow *grad* is connected with Dolgoruky. The Kremlin was enlarged in Bogolyubsky's reign.<sup>73</sup> In 1177 the town of Moscow and the surrounding villages were burnt down by Gleb of Ryazan', who invaded Rostov-Suzdal', but they seem to

have been rebuilt in a short time. The events of 1177 had no lasting effect on Moscow's development and the gradual increase of its military and political importance.

Moscow is mentioned several times in the Rus'ian chronicles in connection with events after Bogolyubsky's death, and later, but only as a place lying on the route of princes' journeys or military marches. We have no more details of it until Batu's great invasion of Vladimir Rus' in 1237-8, when we learn that after the capture of Moscow 'the Tatars slaughtered everybody, old and young, and burnt the city and the holy churches and all the monasteries and villages and went away, taking with them much booty.'<sup>74</sup> This was no doubt largely true, even if the chroniclers exaggerated the extent of slaughter and destruction as they were generally inclined to do.

It is hard to say when Moscow became the capital of a separate principality. The scanty and fragmentary sources have long been known to historians—no new information has come to light—yet authors still differ widely in their views. While Rabinovich inclines to a date at the end of the 12th century,<sup>75</sup> the more cautious Presnyakov doubts whether one can speak of a principality of Muscovy even in the middle of the 13th.<sup>76</sup> Both are right to some extent, the difference between them lying in their conception of what is meant by the formation of a new political unit. If a prince rules in a certain town for a very short time, say a year or two, followed by a long interruption, it is hard to say that the land in question retains the character of an independent principality. For a large part of the 13th century Moscow was sporadically ruled by princes in this way,<sup>77</sup> indicating that it was gradually becoming a separate political entity. Only under Aleksandr Nevsky's youngest son Daniil does Moscow come to be a new political centre of permanent significance, with interests and policies independent of other principalities. Daniil brought Moscow on to the wider historical arena, and is rightly to be regarded as the first real ruler of Muscovy.

The Rus'ian chronicles afford no more detailed information about Moscow for the whole period from 1238 to 1283, which indirectly shows that it was not regarded as specially important but merely as one of many component parts of the Grand Duchy. Daniil, as prince of Muscovy, is first mentioned in the sources only in 1283. We do not know when or in what circumstance

he came to power, and can only form conjectures on this subject.

Nevsky, like his father Yaroslav before him, allotted hereditary lands (*otchina*, patrimony) to his sons before he died. Moscow was assigned to Daniil, who was born in 1261 and was thus an infant when his father died in 1263. His uncle, Nevsky's younger brother Yaroslav of Tver', who was grand duke of Vladimir from 1263 to 1271, brought him up and ruled on his behalf in Moscow for seven years, thus respecting Nevsky's wishes. Princes were regarded as coming of age at 13, so presumably Daniil began to govern Muscovy on his own account in about 1274. By that time the grand duke was another uncle of his, Vasily of Kostroma, who also recognized Daniil's right to Moscow.

As the ruler of a separate principality, on a level with near and distant kinsfolk, Daniil was inevitably drawn into the tangle of dissensions which beset the grand principality. These related chiefly to the question of who should rule at Vladimir and Great Novgorod. Matters became critical after the death in 1276 of Vasily of Kostroma, the last son of the grand duke Yaroslav (see chapter 6). The general chaos was enhanced by frequent discord within the ruling dynasties of different principalities. Aspirants to the throne of Vladimir tried to win over the minor princes for their own ends, and for this purpose supported their local claims and ambitions, so that the descendants of Vsevolod III were constantly forming into hostile camps. Rivals for the grand duchy contended with varying fortunes, and the occupant of the throne at Vladimir changed frequently; the Tatars, who had a deciding voice, had an interest in fomenting conflict, and coalitions within the 'Big Nest' were constantly changing. The princes, who became more and more numerous as the dynasty multiplied, maintained direct or indirect relations with the Tatars and changed sides without scruple according to who best defended their personal interests. Daniil, in his external relations between 1283 and 1303, was no exception to this.

Daniil's period of independent rule coincided with the long struggle for the throne of Vladimir between his elder brothers Dmitry and Andrei. Except at the outset, the prince of Moscow firmly took Dmitry's side—a course which brought him much success, though not quickly or easily.

Andrei's last attempt to oust Dmitry from Vladimir was successful. In 1293 great Tatar hordes devastated the principality, into which

Andrei had led them. One of the cities conquered and sacked was Moscow. Dmitry saved himself by fleeing to Pskov. Conscious of his difficult situation, he offered an amicable settlement to his ambitious brother. Andrei, who after the Tatars' departure was not too certain of his own position, though some of the princes supported him, also showed a conciliatory attitude, and the two reached an agreement. Its main terms were that Dmitry, although the elder brother, renounced his claim to the title of grand duke and in return received from Andrei their father's inheritance of Pereyasavl'. Dmitry's death in 1294 strengthened Andrei's position at Vladimir, which he held until his own death in 1304.

An especially important part was played in that decade by the principality of Pereyasavl'. This region was in a key geographical situation,<sup>78</sup> as the Varangian Rus' had been well aware in the first half of the 10th century;<sup>79</sup> it was full of natural wealth<sup>80</sup> and, in consequence, thickly populated.<sup>81</sup> Early in the 12th century there were numerous Merya settlements<sup>82</sup> around the lake, on the north-eastern shore of which Pereyasavl' was situated. Both the lake and the town were originally called Kleshchino. In the middle of the 12th century Dolgoruky 'transferred' the old town to a new site<sup>83</sup> and founded a new one at the mouth of the Trubezh, the strength<sup>84</sup> and size of which were unprecedented<sup>85</sup> except for Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma. Together with the new city Dolgoruky erected a magnificent cathedral dedicated to the Saviour, of great artistic value and full of precious objects.<sup>86</sup> All this shows that Dolgoruky and his successors assigned to Pereyasavl' a role of the first importance in their plans for the future. This is confirmed by the events of the 13th century: both the territorial extension of the separate principality of Pereyasavl' and the fact that the grand dukes appointed their eldest sons to rule it. Yaroslav gave it as a hereditary possession to Aleksandr Nevsky, and Nevsky to Dmitry: the latter, who met with a chequered fate as ruler of Vladimir, bequeathed Pereyasavl' to his son Ivan after the agreement with Andrei, mentioned above.

We do not know the exact terms of the agreement but can only infer them from later events, which show that Dmitry's rights to Pereyasavl' were not precisely defined. Andrei gave Pereyasavl' to Dmitry during his lifetime, after which it was to revert to the overlord at Vladimir, but Dmitry thought he had received it on a hereditary basis. Immediately after his death his

son Ivan began to rule in his stead, which aroused Andrei's opposition and led to bad blood between the kinsmen. Pereyaslavl' was too important a prize to give up lightly, and he could use it as a bait to obtain aid from other princes who were his supporters.<sup>87</sup>

The quarrel took on major dimensions. Ivan, like his father, was supported by Daniil of Moscow and Mikhail of Tver', son of Yaroslav.<sup>88</sup> But Andrei also enlisted strong supporters.<sup>89</sup> A stormy congress between the opposing groups of princes was held at Vladimir, and nearly led to an open fight. The result was a compromise, or rather the postponement of a solution. Ivan kept Pereyaslavl', but as he was childless the question of the succession remained open after his death.

Andrei was dissatisfied with the concession thus extracted from him. When, after the congress, Ivan went to the Tatars to seek their approval of his hereditary right to Pereyaslavl', Andrei tried to take the city by force. However, Ivan's possession was defended by the troops of Tver' and Moscow, which compelled Andrei to retreat and, at least formally, to accept the status quo. Later events showed that his renunciation was insincere, but that he would resort to other than military means.

Hostile relations between the kinsfolk continued and must have reached a threatening pitch, as a fresh congress was held at Dmitrov in 1301 (actually 1300). If Ivan sought the recognition of his hereditary right to Pereyaslavl', but himself had no children, it meant that he intended to dispose of the patrimony as he pleased. Whoever he might designate as his successor would, it seemed to him, be a natural ally if, as was possible, Andrei tried again to oust him by force from Pereyaslavl'.

The chronicles only record one detail of the congress at Dmitrov, but an extremely important one; after a stormy discussion the princes managed to compose their relationships except for a dispute between Ivan and Mikhail.<sup>90</sup> This is surprising, as it was only a few years since, in 1297, Ivan had appointed none other than Mikhail to guard and defend his interests at Pereyaslavl' while he himself went to the Horde. It seems certain that the prince of Tver' was already then assured of succeeding to Ivan at Pereyaslavl',<sup>91</sup> since he acted so vigorously as to thwart Andrei's armed intervention.

We do not know what the quarrel at Dmitrov was about, and there are too many gaps in the sources for us to reconstruct the proceedings in detail. It seems certain, however, that the conflict must have been deep-seated,<sup>92</sup> as it brought about an understanding and co-operation between Mikhail and Andrei,<sup>93</sup> and hence a fundamental change in the balance of forces among the feuding princes. The bone of contention must have been the still open question of the succession to Pereyasavl'.

In my opinion the political initiative in this matter was taken by Andrei. Having so far been thwarted in his designs on Pereyasavl' by the closely-knit group of his opponents,<sup>94</sup> he decided to break up the dangerous alliance by negotiation. The first step was to drive a wedge between Mikhail and Ivan. Andrei was in a position to make a tempting offer to his kinsman at Tver': as grand prince he could recognize Mikhail's claim to the succession of Pereyasavl'.<sup>95</sup> It might seem that by accepting this offer Mikhail would feel doubly sure of his territorial ambitions, having received promises from both Ivan and Andrei. Moreover, he could not play the role of an arbiter between two notorious rivals, who would be obliged to compete for his favour. It is not surprising that Mikhail became the chief advocate and defender of the plan.

The negotiations between Andrei and Mikhail must have taken place after 1297 but before the congress at Dmitrov, where, as I take it, the new agreement was debated. During the negotiations a sharp dispute arose between Ivan and Mikhail. Ivan's main objective was that the kinsman to whom he had promised the succession should actively help him to keep his hold on Pereyasavl', which was constantly threatened by Andrei. The two other parties to the congress tried, at least ostensibly, to remain in the background, though they wished to prevent a resumption of hostilities. It was in the grand duke's interest for Ivan's resentment to be directed chiefly against Mikhail, while Daniil's interest was to support Ivan and await events. It appeared from the course of the dispute that the prince of Pereyasavl' would very soon appoint Daniil as his successor, and in fact he did so. The result of the Dmitrov congress was thus to give Moscow a claim to Pereyasavl'.

The negotiations at Dmitrov might have assuaged the quarrel among the princes over Pereyasavl' for a considerable time if Ivan and Andrei had abided by their decisions. Each of them



would, in his own opinion, have vindicated his right to decide the fate of the disputed city, since they had both supported Mikhail's claim. The transference of the Pereyasavl' succession to Daniil was a challenge to the wishes and authority of the grand duke. It was bound to provoke Andrei's intervention at the first opportunity, which occurred unexpectedly soon.

Ivan died childless in 1302, whereupon Andrei at once seized the land of Pereyasavl' and installed his own governors there. The latter, however, promptly fled as the Muscovite troops advanced. Daniil appropriated the succession and appointed his own eldest son Yury to govern Pereyasavl'. This was the less difficult because the population showed themselves decidedly favourable to Daniil and Yury, as they previously had to Ivan. After Daniil's seizure of Pereyasavl' Andrei went to the Horde, no doubt hoping to eject the Muscovite forces from the disputed territory with Tatar help. However, there was a rapid succession of unexpected events.

In February 1303 Andrei's only son Boris died suddenly at the age of barely 8 or 9. Andrei was thus childless, which altered his political plans and bound him even more closely to Mikhail of Tver', whom he henceforth wished to succeed him on the throne of Vladimir.

Daniil died in March 1303. In the autumn of that year Andrei returned from the Horde, and soon afterwards another congress of the contending princes was held at Pereyasavl' itself. The Tatars held the deciding voice. Evidently Andrei did not get the khan completely on his side, as Yury remained in possession of Pereyasavl'.

Andrei died in 1304. On the broader political stage there were now unexpectedly two ambitious rivals in the prime of life:<sup>96</sup> Mikhail of Tver' and Yury of Moscow. Thus there began the famous contention between Moscow and Tver' for the throne of Vladimir and the grand duchy—a struggle carried on with the utmost ruthlessness, at the cost of every sacrifice, and involving the use of all available internal and external resources. The adversaries were evenly matched, and the contest therefore lasted all the longer.

The question arises: how was it that Moscow, which until Daniil's time is scarcely mentioned in the chronicles, suddenly rose to

such a prominent position in the course of a mere 20 years? This question has always fascinated historians of eastern Europe, as is shown by the copious literature on the subject. Year after year fresh studies are published, while the sources remain, as they have always been, few in number and meagre in content.

Historians dazzled by the role of Moscow in later times have tried to date back as far as possible the glorious past of the city and its immediate surroundings. Apart from this, many writers hold the view that historical phenomena are solely determined by social and economic factors, settlement and colonization etc. Since all these elements, which are certainly of the first importance, are not attested in contemporary sources, these writers fill in the gaps by conjectures of their own in support of their preconceived opinions.

To sum up the conclusions of scholars up to the present time, it is often held that the Tatar invasion brought about profound changes in the distribution of population in Vladimir Rus'. Large numbers of people, it is argued, left their former homes and migrated to the neighbourhood of Moscow and Tver'. Muscovy was especially attractive on account of its natural wealth and favourable geographical position (the Moskva river was an ancient trade-route), and above all because it was comparatively safe from invasion by the khan's forces. Mass immigration fostered the economic life of the principality, and Daniil was thus able to raise strong military forces in support of his political ambitions.

Every detail of this theory, however, gives rise to serious doubts and reservations. To begin with a general observation: no one doubts that natural conditions affect human life, but in themselves they are not the direct causes of historical phenomena, although indirectly they modify these by making the fulfillment of human purposes easier or more difficult.<sup>97</sup> It may thus be said that Moscow's geographical position made it easier for the city to play the role it eventually did, but it was not geography that brought Moscow to the forefront of Rus'ian political life.

Many cities were situated on convenient river routes yet did not become particularly important politically. The Moskva basin, as we have pointed out, was covered with dense forest, bogs and marshes; its soil was sandy and infertile, its rivers comparatively poor in fish; it lacked salt lakes and other natural wealth,<sup>98</sup> and altogether could not have been particularly attractive to settlers.

The soil of the Tver' principality was even less fertile than that of Moscow. We are thus left with the second argument for the colonization theory: that masses of people, terrified by the Tatar atrocities, instinctively fled towards Moscow and Tver' in the hope of saving, if not their property, at least their lives.

Those who believe in this large-scale change in the distribution of population in the grand duchy put forward both arguments at once: on the one hand they expatiate on the economic advantages enjoyed by settlers on their new lands, yet on the other they represent these lands as a semi-wilderness, inaccessible and protected from the Tatars by nature itself. It is hard to deny that there is a considerable measure of contradiction in this combination of arguments.

The chroniclers frequently mention the panic caused by the Tatar raids in the various Rus'ian lands. The population fled blindly in every direction, 'themselves not knowing whither',<sup>99</sup> and hid from the invaders in forests or marshy country, but when the Tatars withdrew they returned to their ruined homesteads.<sup>100</sup> There is nothing in contemporary sources to indicate that the unfortunate fugitives made for the territory of Moscow, still less that there was migration on such a scale as to transform the economy and population of an area supposedly safe from molestation by the Tatars.<sup>101</sup>

The idea that Moscow's geographical position made it specially safe from the dreaded invaders is clearly contradicted by the sources. The Tatars knew all about the dense forests and numerous waterways in Vladimir Rus' and therefore conducted their campaigns in winter, when the rivers and lakes were frozen over. During the great invasion of 1237-8, after Batu's forces had conquered Ryazan' they were at the gates of Moscow within a few days, or at most two or three weeks.

In 1238 Muscovy, like other lands of the grand dukedom, was defeated and ravaged; so the population of other territories cannot have had any illusions about its special safety from the aggressor. They could only have formed such a belief if the Tatars had tried to invade Muscovy and not succeeded, but this never happened.

In 1252 Aleksandr Nevsky persuaded the Tatars to invade Vladimir Rus' once again to expel his brother Andrei (see chapter 6). The operation was successful, and the grand duchy was laid

waste, but once again there is no reason to suppose that Moscow was better off than any other lands.<sup>102</sup> There is more basis for the theory in 1281 and afterwards, when Nevsky's sons Dmitry and Andrei were contending for the throne of Vladimir. At that time the Tatars, called in by the warring brothers, plundered and laid waste many towns and lands—Vladimir, Yur'ev, Suzdal', Pereyaslavl', Rostov, Tver' etc.—but the chronicler does not mention Moscow. According to the accepted theory it would seem that the general belief that Muscovy was protected by nature from outside aggression might have arisen after 1281, though not earlier. But in 1293 Moscow, like other parts of the duchy of Vladimir, was again ravaged by the Tatars: so the belief, if it ever existed, was very soon disproved. It is hard to imagine that people of that time did not know what was going on and had so little sense of reality as to think themselves safe on the Moskva. It is even more unlikely that a period of ten years or less would have been long enough for a belief in the special safety of Moscow to gain ground and develop to such an extent as to bring about mass immigration into Muscovy by the end of the 13th century.

The Tatar raids on Vladimir Rus' generally took place either in response to appeals from one or other of the feuding princes or on the Tatars' own initiative, in revenge for the murder of the khan's emissaries in Rus'ian cities. Moscow was not involved in either of these situations. When the Tatars were after booty they aimed for the richer lands. Muscovy did not interest them much. The land was naturally poor, and the small size of the capital suggests that it was thinly populated. Voronin compares Moscow with Pereyaslavl', a town founded at about the same time. While the earthworks of Pereyaslavl' were about 2.5 kilometres in circumference and 10-16 metres high, the circumference of the Moscow ramparts was not more than 500 metres. Compared to the mighty Pereyaslavl', 12th-century Moscow was a settlement (*usad'ba*) of small importance,<sup>103</sup> and there was little change in the 13th century until Daniil's time.

Nevsky endowed Daniil with Muscovy on a hereditary basis. When a prince drew up his testament he took much account of the order of seniority among his sons. To his eldest son Dmitry Aleksandr bequeathed Pereyaslavl', while his second son Andrei received another important stronghold, Gorodets on the Volga;<sup>104</sup> Daniil, then an infant, received only Moscow, which shows how

Aleksandr rated its political prospects. A similar view was taken by Aleksandr's brother Yaroslav of Tver', who succeeded him as grand duke and for several years acted as Daniil's guardian. If Moscow had then been as strong in terms of economy and population as is contended nowadays, and had already been such a threat to Tver' as it afterwards became, Yaroslav would never have supported Daniil, but would rather have taken advantage of his nephew being under age to curb the development of Moscow as a danger to the other lands of the grand duchy. One thing appears certain: none of the princes in the 13th century saw Moscow as a dangerous rival for the future, or realized how important it was to become within the next hundred years.

We are left with the fact that under Daniil's rule the position of Moscow within the 'Big Nest' became significantly stronger, as a result of the prince's qualities and of favouring external circumstances. Daniil came of age and assumed the reins of government in 1274 or 1275. For the next eight years he is not mentioned in the sources and we can say nothing specific about his career. He is first referred to in 1283, when he was aged 22. He then took an active part in major political events, but we do not know whether he did so of his own volition or was drawn into the conflict between his two elder brothers. Initially, and for a considerable time, while supporting Dmitry in the protracted quarrel he did not involve himself too deeply but preferred to remain in the background; at least there is no sign of any bold initiative on his part.

Daniil's policy gradually changed after his brother Dmitry, who was more than ten years older than he, died in 1294, bequeathing Pereyasavl' to his son Ivan. On the one hand Dmitry's death strengthened Andrei's position on the throne of Vladimir, but on the other it automatically brought Daniil to the foreground as the grand duke's equal, genealogically speaking, and as a possible counter-candidate and rival. True, Daniil was younger than Andrei, but he was entitled to disregard this, as Andrei had ignored Dmitry's seniority when taking up arms against him.

In 1296-7 Novgorod was in a state of acute conflict with the grand duke Andrei; it expelled his lieutenants and invited Daniil to rule over it. Assured of support from Mikhail of Tver' and Ivan of Pereyasavl', Daniil did not decline the invitation; but he did not himself go to Novgorod, being aware of the difficulty of

maintaining his power in the northern city. Daniil's rule at Novgorod was a brief and inconsequential episode: in 1299 Andrei installed his son Boris as its ruler.<sup>105</sup>

Events took a similar course at Pereyasavl'. Daniil did not support Andrei's cause: he was out of sympathy with the latter's excessive ambition and aggressive plans, which brought great misfortune on the whole country. Daniil favoured his elder brother Dmitry and, after the latter's death, Dmitry's son Ivan: he intervened to the extent that Ivan, though constantly threatened by Andrei managed to keep his hold on Pereyasavl', but did not go beyond that defensive line. When, apparently, the childless Ivan designated Mikhail of Tver' as his successor, in return for help against the grand duke, Daniil did not oppose this solution, which rather suited his interests, since it made it harder for Andrei to gain possession of Pereyasavl' and inevitably cast the whole burden of the eventual struggle on the prince of Tver'.

The situation changed radically when, around 1298-9, Andrei succeeded in getting Mikhail on to his side. As the course of events shows, he must have undertaken to oust Ivan as soon as possible from Pereyasavl' for Mikhail's benefit, which was a better bargain than Mikhail had got from Ivan himself.<sup>106</sup> The new agreement placed Ivan in a very awkward position, obliging him to seek a new defender at the cost of the future succession. The obvious choice was his 'beloved' uncle Daniil.<sup>107</sup> It was probably Ivan, as the most threatened party at that time, who took the initiative of conferring the Pereyasavl' succession on Muscovy.

The chance of acquiring Pereyasavl' opened up broad prospects and was too inviting an opportunity for Moscow to decline lightly. No one, of course, knew when and in what circumstances the contest for Pereyasavl' would again break out. Daniil had to allow for the possibility that it would be after his own death. He therefore brought into the field his eldest son Yury, a youth of great energy and ambition, on whom he laid the responsibility of defending Moscow's claim to Pereyasavl'. On the other hand, it is equally likely that Yury himself induced his father to throw in his lot firmly with Ivan. Irrespective of who was the prime mover, it is a fact that Daniil took an important though risky decision, at variance with his policy up to that time: viz. he

resolved, in case of need, to intervene actively in the Pereyasavl' territory.

Whereas the policies of many princes of Vladimir Rus' in the 13th century were stamped by ambition out of all proportion to actual possibilities, Daniil was distinguished by a sense of reality, balance and caution. He sought compromise solutions to dynastic disputes, avoided military adventures, showed discretion in advancing his own claims, and so on. This caution was prompted by the weakness of Moscow in his day. Around the year 1300 Daniil's political ambitions did not extend beyond the Pereyasavl' region, and the succession to that principality was by no means certain. Ivan indeed was childless, but he was a young man<sup>108</sup> and might still have a son; or, even if not, he might still outlive both Daniil and Yury.

Unforeseen circumstances, which always play a great part in human affairs, were especially important in determining the political pattern of the grand duchy in the first years of the 14th century, when the unexpected deaths of several members of the dynasty brought about far-reaching consequences. Ivan died in 1302, thus at once activating Moscow's claim to Pereyasavl'. Daniil died in 1303 and Andrei in 1304. If these two events had happened in reverse order—and Andrei was, after all, the elder brother—the youngest of Nevsky's sons could have laid claim to the throne of Vladimir. Andrei's only son Boris, aged barely 8 or 9, also died in 1303; had he lived and proved to be a strong and capable ruler, the whole power situation within the 'Big Nest' might have been basically altered, and the destinies of Moscow might have followed a different course.<sup>109</sup>

As soon as the news of Ivan's death was received, Andrei took possession of Pereyasavl' and installed his governors there; he sent no troops beforehand, as he believed that the long dispute over Pereyasavl' was at last ended. Knowing Daniil's aversion to risky enterprises, and underrating his strength, Andrei assumed that his younger brother would not take up arms. No doubt to his complete surprise, Daniil's armies took Pereyasavl' and drove out Andrei's officials.<sup>110</sup> This was Daniil's first aggressive operation in pursuance of direct Muscovite interests.

Daniil no doubt realized that Andrei was stronger militarily, but for the time being at any rate he possessed an advantage which largely counterbalanced this: the population of Pereyasavl',

which at that time played an important political role,<sup>111</sup> gave him unanimous and strong support. None the less, Daniil was uncertain of maintaining his hold on the new territory; he did not himself assume the government of Pereyaslavl'—a city far superior to Moscow in wealth and the extent of its fortifications—but appointed his son Yury to act as his lieutenant. How strongly the people of Pereyaslavl' were committed to Moscow is shown by the fact that when Daniil unexpectedly died in 1303 they refused to let Yury leave the city to attend his funeral; they feared that Andrei might send in troops at any moment.<sup>112</sup>

If Moscow wanted to keep Pereyaslavl', it must without delay look to its own strength. It could only become stronger by conquering neighbouring territories, thus enriching itself with booty and increasing the number of its subjects under arms.

The territorial expansion of the Moscow principality, which coincided in time with the development of Daniil's and Yury's policy concerning Pereyaslavl', concentrated for the most part on the Moskva basin, the area with which the principality was most closely connected. Among its conquests were Kolomna and Mozhaisk. The former city, on the lower Moskva near its confluence with the Oka, belonged to the land of Ryazan'. Daniil conducted a successful campaign against Ryazan' in 1301. Since Kolomna was afterwards part of Muscovy it is usually supposed that Daniil annexed it then together with the surrounding territory, but this is not certain. The chronicles give some details about the campaign of 1301 but do not say that the Kolomna region was annexed at that time. It could have been after Daniil's death, e.g. in 1306, but later accounts do not mention it either. The seizure of Kolomna and several districts on the left bank of the Oka, such as Lopasna and others,<sup>113</sup> increased the area and population of Muscovy by at least two-thirds,<sup>114</sup> if they did not actually double it. Mozhaisk lay at the other extremity of the Moskva river, near its source. Soon after Daniil's death Yury seized it from the duchy of Smolensk and incorporated it in Muscovy.<sup>115</sup>

From these events it can be seen how energetically Moscow was building up its strength for future conflicts, which were not to be confined to the region of Pereyaslavl'. The results of the in-fighting among the princes could not be foreseen in the first years of the 14th century. The situation was fluid and complicated; so many facts and circumstances, expected or otherwise, came



into play that no far-reaching conclusions could be drawn. Only one fact was beyond doubt: the centre of gravity of Vladimir Rus' was increasingly shifting from the eastern part of the principality to the west, towards Moscow and Tver'.

Historians who have studied the process whereby Moscow became pre-eminent over the other principalities are of the opinion that the political career of Daniil and his successors was decisively affected by profound changes in the economy and population of Vladimir Rus'. In their view the principality's strength increased by a succession of logically formulated stages.<sup>116</sup> These historians give the impression that from about the mid-13th century onwards Moscow was, so to speak, already destined to perform the role which actually fell to it. But nothing was predetermined at the period in question. Moscow might have risen in the historical firmament and quickly vanished again, as was the case with other cities of the grand duchy which suddenly came to prominence.

In my opinion the causes of the rise of Moscow and Tver' (not only Moscow) are chiefly to be sought in the balance of forces and relationships within the ruling dynasty. The dynasty, hallowed by tradition, was still the main factor linking together the different parts of the Vladimir state.<sup>117</sup> If the cities from time to time revolted against their princes, it was only to support one member of the dynasty against another. While the Tatars intervened in the country's internal affairs and decided the course of events by favouring candidates devoted to themselves, the khans' decisions never went beyond the bounds of the 'Big Nest'.

The dynasty at this period was in a state of dissolution and chaos. The legal rules of succession to the throne of Vladimir grew less effectual with each passing generation. The idea of seniority, associated with the right to rule on the Klyaz'ma, became more and more unreal, especially when a right based only on descent came into conflict with the candidates' actual strength. Vsevolod III himself broke the principle that the grand duke's sons should succeed their father in order of age. Later the succession to the dignity of grand duke was limited in practice to the sons and grandsons (but not all of them) of Vsevolod's son Yaroslav. As time went on the princes became more numerous and their frequent jealousies more acute. At the same time a

counter-process was at work: some princely lines died out, causing a change in the balance of forces within the dynasty, sometimes with important political results for the whole country.

After the death of Grand Duke Andrei in 1304 the importance of the eastern parts of the Vladimir state rapidly declined in favour of its western parts. Andrei may have wished to prevent this, but was foiled by unexpected events.<sup>118</sup>

In the east four patrimonial principalities came into being in the 13th century. Two of them played an important part, though only for a short time. Kostroma was linked with Vasily, the youngest son of Grand Duke Yaroslav,<sup>119</sup> and Gorodets with Andrei. Both these princes died without issue, and their lands, which are scarcely mentioned in later sources, disappeared from the political map, being annexed or disposed of by the elder princes at Vladimir. Two other principalities, Galich<sup>120</sup> and Starodub,<sup>121</sup> continued to be ruled by descendants of Vsevolod III, but these were weak and few and we know next to nothing of them.<sup>122</sup> None of them played any part in the incessant rivalry for the dignity of grand duke. Daniil of Moscow and Mikhail of Tver', on the other hand, had many sons, including some of great ability. But, confining our consideration to the sons of Aleksandr Nevsky, events might have taken an opposite course: Andrei might have left a numerous and active progeny and Daniil might have died childless. In that case Moscow, as had happened after Mikhail's death in 1248, might have shared the fate of Gorodets on the Volga, or that of Kostroma at an earlier date after the death of Vasily. Family relations within the dynasty, which are often neglected, played an important though not an exclusive part in determining the political situation of the country and bringing about the rise of Moscow as well as Tver'.

Tver', at the confluence of the Tvertsa with the Volga, is first mentioned by the sources in 1209.<sup>123</sup> It seems likely that it was founded in the last quarter of the 12th century,<sup>124</sup> so that its fortifications would be the work of Vsevolod III.<sup>125</sup>

The land of Tver' was one of the most difficult and infertile regions of the Vladimir state. Covered with almost unending forests, it was marshy, boggy and waterlogged; the soil was full of rocks, clay and sand, and very little of it was suitable for agriculture.<sup>126</sup> The population was concentrated in the more fertile parts, chiefly along the Volga where it is joined by its tributaries:

the Tvertsa, Medveditsa, Dubna, Nerl' etc. In a territory so ill favoured by nature the population was sparse.<sup>127</sup>

Tver' lay on the river routes linking Novgorod with the grand duchy of Vladimir and, beyond it, with the near and distant south-east. The Varangian Rus' well understood the importance of Tver' on this route as early as the 10th century.<sup>128</sup> Of the various waterways that linked Novgorod with the Volga, from about the 13th century onwards increasing use was made of the river Msta, which flows into Lake Ilmen'<sup>129</sup> and was connected by portages (*voloki*) with the Tvertsa and Medveditsa, tributaries of the Volga.<sup>130</sup>

Waterways had a considerable effect on the military-political situation of the Tver' principality and the development of its trade with other lands.<sup>131</sup> Tver' was fortified chiefly to protect the state of Vladimir against aggression by the Novgorodians, or to serve as a base for hostilities against them. From the time of Vsevolod III and earlier, the grand duchy strove to extend its frontiers in all directions, and the task of realizing its ambitions fell to the most important fortress towns and their territories. Rostov expanded in a northerly direction and Suzdal' to the east, while Pereyasavl' directed its energies to the west. Tver' constituted the western borderland of the grand principality, and there was no lack of opportunity for conflict on its frontier with the extensive territory of Novgorod.<sup>132</sup>

Tver' was detached from Pereyasavl' and made into a separate principality<sup>133</sup> by Vsevolod's son Yaroslav, who inherited Pereyasavl' from his father and became grand duke in 1238 when his elder brother Yury was killed fighting the Tatars on the Sit'. He appears to have bequeathed the new territory to his son, also called Yaroslav, who was the first prince of Tver'. We do not know when he acquired it, but probably in 1246-7, when Grand Duke Svyatoslav granted patrimonies to his nephews in accordance with his dead brother's will (see chapter 6).<sup>134</sup> We can thus speak of Tver' having a policy of its own from about the mid-13th century. After Yaroslav's death in 1271 this policy was carried on by his sons, first Svyatoslav, who died at an early age before 1285, and afterwards Mikhail. The latter became the chief rival of Daniil of Moscow and his son Yury, in the famous struggle between the two principalities.

This struggle was remarkably fierce considering that relations between Moscow and Tver' had been more or less friendly up to the end of the 13th century; one can even speak of a common interest in view of the threat from Lithuania.<sup>135</sup> A rift developed, however, when the succession to Pereyaslavl' finally became a live issue in 1302, as both Moscow and Tver' laid claim to it. The conflict soon broadened: after Andrei's son Boris died in 1303 the grand duke, who was now childless and himself died in the following year, apparently bequeathed to Mikhail the throne of Vladimir together with the lands of the grand principality and his own patrimony.<sup>136</sup> The prince of Tver' thus suddenly beheld the possibility of acquiring huge territories, a dazzling prospect in contrast to the poverty of Tver' itself.

Many historians take the view that the prince of Tver' must have had great resources to embark on a task of this magnitude, and they ascribe the increase of the city's strength to a mass influx of population from various lands on the upper Volga and the Tvertsa in the second half of the 13th century.<sup>137</sup> The only foundation for this view is to be found in the chronicler's account of the Tatar raid on Vladimir Rus' in 1293, when people from other principalities fled for protection to the city of Tver' which, unlike other towns, had resolved to offer resistance.<sup>138</sup> Apparently Tver' was generally regarded as a difficult fortress to subdue, but its strength should not be exaggerated: soon afterwards the Tatars invaded once more and dealt heavy blows to the population of the Tver' principality.<sup>139</sup>

Interpretations of the chronicler's account of 1293 go further than is justified by the text. We do not know how many people from other lands took refuge in Tver', or whether they returned to their homes after the Tatars had withdrawn. Even if they stayed in Tver' it seems certain that, while their presence was initially useful in helping to defend the city, it must have caused no little difficulty in the ensuing years. Instead of a more or less orderly settlement there was an influx of unarmed refugees with no property, fleeing for their lives in desperation. It is hard to believe that this population brought about an economic transformation of the Tver' territory or increased its strength to a major extent in so short a time as the decade between 1293 and 1304.

On the other hand, Tver' 's political ambitions are perceptible earlier than Moscow's. There were various reasons for this. Tver' was independent before Daniil became prince of Moscow, and its first princes were certainly men of outstanding character. Yaroslav Yaroslavich did much to enhance its importance in the 25 years of his reign, especially in his later years (1263-71) when he was also grand duke and had many opportunities to achieve his purposes. The establishment of a bishopric at Tver' was an important event politically as well as for the church. In the first quarter of the 14th century the kremlin (palace, citadel) at Tver' was larger and richer than that of Moscow; and Tver' had stone buildings 40 years earlier than its rival. The chief of these was the cathedral of the Transfiguration (Spaso-Preobrazhenskii sobor).<sup>140</sup> Clearly Mikhail continued his father's work with energy and on a grand scale, as Yuri did that of Daniil.

The rivalry between the two princes was the more acute as they were both ambitious, in the prime of life and full of pride in their respective fathers' achievements. To begin with they concentrated on the Pereyasavl' succession, but from 1304 the quarrel took on wider territorial dimensions. On Andrei's death both Mikhail and Yuri attempted unsuccessfully to occupy lands belonging to the grand duchy: Yuri failed to make himself master of Kostroma, where he sent his brother Boris, and Mikhail's forces were defeated in the attempt to seize Pereyasavl'. Moreover, the Tverite forces were defeated before that city. The Novgorodians rightly assessed the situation, refraining from taking sides either way. In any case all depended on the khan's decision; the rivals knew this, and both made their way to the Horde. The decision did not make any essential change: Mikhail, who brought more lavish gifts, was confirmed as grand duke, but Yuri did not give up Pereyasavl'. It was in the Tatar's interest to keep the conflict alive.

Khan Tokhta's decision<sup>141</sup> brought about a temporary calm in the internal relations of Vladimir Rus'. Mikhail's right of seniority was unassailed, and there seemed no point in resisting it further. The people of Great Novgorod well understood this: they promptly made contact with Mikhail and acknowledged his supremacy over them. Several treaties concluded with the grand duke at this time reflect the Novgorodians' anxiety to preserve the integrity of their territory and remain as independent as possible. The

various appanage princes also adopted a submissive attitude. To judge from the annals they took only an ineffectual part in the conflict, and Moscow continued to be Mikhail's chief adversary.

It is hard to ascertain the exact nature of relations in those years between Mikhail and Yuri: the source accounts are scanty and often contradictory. There is no doubt, however, that their hostility was unabated. There were even open clashes, but these were episodes of no lasting consequences. In any case, Yuri did not reconcile himself to the status quo and made preparations for a fresh attempt on the Vladimir throne. Against Mikhail's endeavors to uphold the strength of the grand duke's position, Yuri found support in various quarters. Of particular importance was an agreement with Great Novgorod, which undertook to supply rich gifts for the khan and his dignitaries—the best way to assure him of the Tatars' favour.

Tokhta died in 1312 and was succeeded by Uzbek. In the following year, according to custom, Mikhail paid a visit to the new khan and stayed for a long time at Sarai. During his absence Yuri and his brothers did their best to consolidate their influence at Novgorod and elsewhere. Mikhail, however, found favour with Uzbek, who provided him with armed support on his return to Rus'. The only city that resisted him was Great Novgorod, but after a bloody battle at Torzhok it was obliged to surrender. However, despite Mikhail's undoubted successes his position in Vladimir Rus' was not strong, especially as Yuri still nursed ambitious designs. Summoned by the Tatars to Sarai in the early months of 1315, he remained there for nearly two years and managed to ingratiate himself with Uzbek: he married the khan's sister, received the *yarlyk* (patent) as grand duke and was given military aid against Mikhail. The latter, however, did not give up easily. A battle took place in which Yuri was defeated, but this did not alter the political situation. It was impossible to go on resisting the Tatars. Both Mikhail and Yuri went to the Horde to seek judgment from the khan's court. This journey by the two claimants to the rank of grand prince, full of hatred for each other and servility to the Tatars, is a vivid illustration of the political collapse of Vladimir Rus' and the strength of the Tatar overlordship. In November 1318 Uzbek gave his decision; it was a tragic one for Mikhail, who died a martyr's death at the Horde.

Yury, on his return to Rus', endeavoured to consolidate his supremacy in the grand duchy and Novgorod and to assure himself of continued Tatar support. Having achieved his aim he saw no reason to continue the quarrel and tried to reach an understanding with Mikhail's sons. He also needed peace with Tver' for the sake of his relations with the Tatars, which were not so close as they appeared. Barely a year later, for unknown reasons, the Tatars sacked Vladimir while the grand duke was residing there. This may have been the cause of Yuri's youngest brother Ivan setting off at once for the Horde, or it may be that Mikhail's eldest son Dmitry sought to exploit the situation. Relations between Moscow and Tver' were still strained, though not yet actively hostile. Mikhail's sons, who were fairly young<sup>142</sup> at the time of their father's sudden death, were not in a position to retaliate at once. Dmitry was obliged to accede to Yuri's demands, paying him tribute for the Tatars and promising not to take any steps to persuade the Horde to make him grand duke. We may infer from this either that he had already made tentative moves in that direction or, more probably, that Yuri was afraid of his doing so and wished to prevent it. Events showed that his fears were justified; but the grand duke himself began playing into the hands of his opponents.

Instead of forwarding to the Tatars the tribute collected in Rus', Yuri took it to Great Novgorod. Discovering this, Dmitry at once went to the Horde and informed Uzbek, who appointed him grand duke in 1322. At the same time, in collusion with Dmitry, his younger brother Aleksandr suddenly attacked Yuri on his way back from Novgorod and obliged him to flee to Pskov. This was a definite though short-lived success for the princes of Tver'. The two adversaries were more or less equal in strength, which is why their fortunes alternated so often. The final verdict lay with Uzbek, but events also depended to some extent on the qualities or defects of the respective princes: personal energy, courage, ruthlessness, guile, treachery and so forth.

Yuri returned from Pskov to Novgorod, where he probably received substantial financial help; he then went to Sarai to recover his position with the Horde and buy back the khan's favour. Faced with this threat Dmitry also repaired to the Horde, and the two rivals again confronted each other there. In November 1325, in the hope of victory and to avenge his father's death,

Dmitry murdered Yury, for which he was put to death in the following year on the khan's orders; Uzbek then conferred the grand duchy on Dmitry's brother Aleksandr.

The Rus'ian chronicles relate that the khan was 'angered' by the incessant quarrel between Moscow and Tver' for the throne of Vladimir, but if so there must have been some hypocrisy in his attitude. The Tatars themselves had fomented the quarrel and done their best to produce chaos and disorder throughout Rus'. In this way they were able to intervene directly in the affairs of Vladimir Rus' and plunder to their hearts' content. The chronicles frequently relate how this or that city or territory was plundered without explanation or apparent purpose; at first sight these actions appear planless and chaotic, but in fact they were deliberate and purposeful. Clearly the more oppressive the 'Tatar yoke' (*tatarskoe igo*) became, the stronger reactions it provoked on the Rus'ian side. Often the population, driven to despair or fury, themselves took up arms and offered resistance which might be successful at the moment though not in the long term. The grand dukes so submissive during their visits to the Horde, were also capable of acts of resistance, trivial though they might be. Yury, for instance, did not conform to the custom of welcoming the Tatar envoys or riding out to meet them, and he tried to appropriate to his own use the tribute collected for the khan. In the same way the new grand duke, Aleksandr, had no intention of being a mere tool of the Tatars, though he realized that there was no hope of effective resistance.

The extent to which the Tatars had ceased to respect the grand duke's authority is shown by the despotic behaviour of Uzbek's kinsman and envoy Shchelkan or Shevkal (Chol-Khan),<sup>143</sup> whose acts of violence and rapine drove the inhabitants of Tver' to the limit of their endurance and patience. Their anger and despair led to the famous uprising of 1327, although the immediate occasion of this was a trivial matter: the Tatars stole a young mare which was about to be watered in the Volga. The revolt at once spread throughout the city, and Shchelkan and his followers were killed.<sup>144</sup> Uzbek in anger sent a punitive expedition which ravaged the land,<sup>145</sup> while Grand Duke Aleksandr saved his life by fleeing to Pskov.

The tragedy of Tver' was at once exploited by its hereditary enemy Ivan, Daniil's youngest son. Up to now Ivan, while taking



an active part in events, had remained more or less in the background. He was now to come into the forefront of the political life of Vladimir Rus' and make his contribution to the glorious future of his descendants and of their patrimony, Moscow.<sup>146</sup>

## Notes to Chapter 7

1. M. Rabinovich, *Ob etnicheskom sostave pervonachal'nogo naseleniya Moskvyy*, SE, 1962 (2), pp. 59–71, and others.

2. '... radimichi bo i vyatichi ot lyakhov': *Povest'* I, p. 14. Then and later the terms *lyakhy*, *lyakhove* were always used in the Rus'ian east as a collective name for all the Polish tribes.

3. The Radimichians were settled on the Sozh, a left-bank tributary of the Dnepr. The chronicle gives the impression that the Vyatichians and Radimichians migrated eastward at about the same time.

4. We do not know whether the Vyatichian invasion of the Oka region took the form of conquest or peaceful infiltration. There are advocates of both hypotheses. E.g. A. Smirnov in: *Ocherki drevnei i srednevekovoi istorii narodov srednego Povolzh'ya i Prikam'ya*, MIA, XXVIII, 1952, p. 142, argues for peaceful infiltration, while T. Stroganova in: *K izucheniyu govorov mezhdurech'ya Oki-Klyaz'my*, TIY, VII, 1957, p. 90, argues for military action.

5. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin of Russia*, pp. 365–80.

6. *Povest'* I, pp. 11–14.

7. 'Letopisets . . . protivopostavlyayet vyatichiei i radimichei vsem ostal'nym iskonnyym vostochnym slovenam . . .': N. Milonov—V. Frolov, *Novye dannye o vyatichakh i radimichakh*, UZRGPI, XXXVI, 1965, p. 131.

8. The literature on eastern Europe at this period abounds in hypotheses of 'colonization' in respect of Slav settlements, especially in Finno-Ugrian territory; these conjectures are not supported by the sources. At the same time, the eager advocates of these numerous but unlikely hypotheses firmly reject the text which speaks clearly of the Vyatichians and Radimichians migrating to the Oka and Sozh.

9. The passage in the *Povest'* reads: 'Polyanom zhe . . . , sushchim ot roda sloven'ska, i narekoshasya polyane, a derevlyane ot sloven zhe, i narekoshasya drevlyane, radimichi bo i vyatichi ot lyakhov': *Povest'* I, p. 14. Given the first phrase 'sushchim ot roda sloven'ska', it is clear that the subsequent ones 'ot sloven zhe' and 'ot lyakhov' are to be read as meaning 'sushchim ot roda sloven' and 'sushchim ot roda lyakhov'. The stock expression 'ot roda' used by the chronicler to denote origin is not a geographical one and does not refer to the location of particular

tribal territories or the fact that one of them bordered on another (the Radimichians and Vyatichians as neighbours of the Poles). Two further arguments can be advanced in support of the above: (1) The writer speaks of the Drevlyane in the same way as the Radimichians and Vyatichians: 'a derevlyane ot sloven zhe'. It would thus follow that the Drevlyane were not 'Slavs' (i.e. East Slavs) but only their neighbours, which is absurd. (2) Elsewhere the *Povest'* speaks of the Polish origin of the Radimichians in a way that excludes all doubt: 'Bysha zhe radimichi ot roda lyakhov' (*Povest'* I, p. 59). The same must apply to the Vyatichians, who were ethnically related to them. It is not impossible that the latter's name (Vyatichi—Ventichi) was of West Slav (Polish) origin: cf. V. Vilinbakhov, *Baltiiskie Slavyane i Rus'*, *SOc*, XXII, 1962, pp. 258–9.

10. N. Milonov—V. Frolov, *Novye dannye*, pp. 130–5; G. Solovyeva, *K voprosu o prikhode radimichei na Rus'*, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, pp. 352–6.

11. M. Fekhner, *Raskopki v Kostrome*, *KSDPI*, XLVII, 1952.

12. G. Solov'eva and V. Kropotkin, *K voprosu o proizvodstve, rasprostraneni i datirovke steklyannykh brasletov v drevnei Rusi*, *KSDPI*, XLIX, 1953.

13. M. Rabinovich, *O drevnei Moskve*, 1964, pp. 126–7.

14. Various crafts, including that of jewellery, were in an advanced state among the Vyatichians at that time: T. Nikol'skaya, *Kuznetsy zhelezu, medi i serebru ot vyatich'*, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, pp. 122–32.

15. Archaeological finds suggest that some cities were becoming important centres of craftsmanship at this time and traded in such articles to a greater or lesser extent. M. Rabinovich in: *Ob etnicheskom sostave . . .*, pp. 70–1, points out that products of this kind are found both in Great Novgorod and among the Vyatichians and Radimichians, or again in Kiev and among the Tivertsians—the latter lived on the lower Dnestr and their settlements reached as far as the Danube. Further examples could be quoted. If lively trade relations prevailed among widely separated countries, they must have developed even more readily in neighbouring areas such as the Oka and Moskva basins, where contact was a great deal easier.

16. Cf. G. Mel'nichenko, *K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave russkogo naseleniya na territorii vladimiro-suzdal'skogo knyazhestva XII—nachala XIII v. (Na materiale sovremennykh govorov)*, *VY*, 1970 (5), pp. 15–41.

17. No one questions that the first settlers in the Moskva basin may well have learnt the Slav language from the neighbouring Vyatichians, with whom they were linked by everyday needs and contacts: not only trade but personal acquaintance, mixed marriages etc. But great caution must be used in estimating the extent and importance of such contacts.

18. A. Yanovsky is wrong in stating (*Yury Dolgoruky*, 1955, p. 122) that the written sources confirm the fact of Vyatician colonization of the Moskva basin.

19. G. Latysheva—M. Rabinovich, *Moskva v dalekom proshlom*, 1966, pp. 55–6.

20. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii Velikorusskoi narodnosti*, 1929, p. 38. A. Potulov, *Retrospektivnaya karta zalesennosti territorii . . . Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi* (map), *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956; id., *Pochvennaya karta territorii nakhodok pakhotnykh orudii*, *ibid.* (map).

21. As Yu. Kizilov rightly says in: *Geograficheskii faktor v istorii srednevekovoi Rusi*, Vol. 1973, p. 55: 'Advancing along the basins of rivers and their tributaries, people settled on "fields" that appeared best suited to cultivation. Between these "fields" there were large stretches of thinly populated lands.'

22. Cf. A. Potulov, *Pochvennaya karta*; V. Drobizhev, I. Koval'chenko and A. Murav'ev, *Istoricheskaya geografiya SSSR*, 1973, p. 69; V. Klyuchevsky, *Skazaniya inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve*, 1918, p. 180; M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 129–30.

23. Cf. Appendix: Slav colonization on Merya territory.

24. A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, map: *Poseleniya i kurgannye mogil'niki . . . Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi X—pervoi poloviny XIII vv.*, *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956; E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya*, *MIA*, XCIV, 1961, map N 4.

25. A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya drevnei Rusi in: Ocherki po istorii russkoi derevni X-XIII vv.*, *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956, pp. 14–15.

26. There is a wealth of archaeological literature on Moscow and the surrounding country. Titles are listed in my previous works (*The Origin of Russia, The Making of the Russian Nation*). Among later publications are: D. Belenskaya—A. Dubynin—A. Yushko, *Raboty v Moskve i Podmoskov'e*, *AO*, 1965 g. (1966), pp. 36–9; R. Rozenfel'dt, *Arkheologicheskie razvedki v Podmoskov'e*, *ibid.*, pp. 139–40; id., *Grigorovskie kurgany XII-XIII vv.*, *KSIA*, CX, (1967), pp. 106–9; A. Yushko, *Raskopki kurgana XI-XIII vv. u s. Pokrov, Moskovskoi oblasti*, *ibid.*, pp. 48–53; R. Rozenfel'dt, *Razvedki i raskopki vyaticheskikh kurganov v Podmoskov'e*, *AO*, 1967 g. (1968), pp. 52–3; A. Veksler, *Semiverkhie kurgany vyatichiei v Odintsove pod Moskvoy*, *MIA*, CLXXVI, 1970; A. Dubynin—R. Rozenfel'dt—K. Smirnov—A. Yushko, *Rezul'taty rabot Moskovskoi ekspeditsii*, *AO*, 1970 g. (1971), pp. 45–6; A. Veksler, *Raskopki gorodishch v Moskve i Podmoskov'e*, *AO*, 1970 g. (1971), pp. 90–1; A. Veksler and A. Mel'nikova, *Moskovskie klady*, 1973 (unavailable to me), and others.

27. M. Fekhner, *Vazhneishie torgovye puti . . . Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi X-XIII vekov* (map), *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956.

28. A. Potulov, *Retrospektivnaya karta*.

29. Some writers (e.g. V. Sedov, *Rannie kurgany vyatichiei*, KSIA, CXXXV, 1973, p. 16) believe that the oldest Vyatichian barrows of the 8th-10th centuries were concentrated in the basin of the upper Oka. According to T. Nikol'skaya (*Raskopki Serenskogo gorodishcha v 1969 g.*, KSIA, CXXXV, 1973, pp. 80-5; *Voennoe delo v gorodakh zemli vyatichiei*, ibid. 139, 1974, pp. 34-42) the Vyatichians did not appear on the upper Oka till around 1100. In view of the difficulties of terrain and the distance between the sources of the Moskva and the Oka, it seems unlikely that the Vyatichi initially settled along the upper course of the Moskva, as contended by P. Tret'yakov. (*Vostochno-slavyanskie plemena*, 1953, p. 238) and many others.

30. A. Mongait, *Ryazanskaya zemlya*, p. 236.

31. A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya'*, pp. 205-6.

32. 'The 12th century remains a firm archaeological date for Vyatichian antiquities in the Moscow region. To this period belong the oldest Vyatichian burial sites in the Moscow area, as shown by Artsikhovskiy in *Kurgany vyatichiei*, 1930': E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 212.

33. If we suppose that the Vyatichians colonized not only the extensive lands along the Oka but also the Moskva basin so intensively as to stamp it with their own ethnic character, it must be admitted that they were a tribe of extraordinary vigour and biological strength. The tribe was still an independent one in the second half of the 11th century, as pointed out by V. Kuchkin in: *Rostovo-Suzdal'skaya zemlya v X—pervoi treti XIII vekov* (Tsentry i granitsy), *ISSSR*, 1969 (2), p. 67. M. Rabinovich (*Ob etnicheskom sostave*, p. 64) opposes Kuchkin's view, maintaining that the Vyatichians as a tribe or group of tribes ceased to exist around the end of the 11th century or beginning of the 12th. If Rabinovich's view is to be reconciled with Goryunova's opinion, quoted above, that the oldest Vyatichian burial-places in the Moscow area date from the 12th century, it would follow that the Moskva basin was taken possession of by Rus'ian princes conquering Vyatichian lands. This would chiefly mean the princes of Ryazan', but, as later events show, although they extended the borders of their appanage in various directions they did not make efforts to acquire lands on the Moskva, supposedly populated by Vyatichians. The idea of colonizing activity by the princes conflicts with the opinion of many writers that the colonization of the Moskva basin was undertaken by the Vyatichians on their own initiative.

34. *Poves'* I, pp. 18, 20, 21.

35. The *Poves'* entry for 984 concerning the Radimichians refers to the river Pishchana, a tributary of the Sozh, indicating that they were already settled on the Sozh. Unfortunately the chronicler's statements about the Vyatichians in the 9th-10th centuries do not contain any such

clear territorial indication. From the description of the military exploits of Svyatoslav of Kiev in 964–6 (*Povest' I*, pp. 46–7) A. Mongait (Iz istorii naseleniya basseina srednego techeniya Oki v I tysyacheletii n.e., *SAr*, XVIII, 1953, p. 181) infers that the Vyatichians were then still living on the upper Don: this is held to follow from the route of Svyatoslav's march against the Khazars. It is contradicted, however, by the rather vague statement in the *Povest'* about Svyatoslav's march to the Oka and the Volga, where he found the Vyatichians ('I ide na Oku reku i na Volgu, i naleze vyatichi', pp. 46–7).

36. M. Rabinovich, *O drevnei Moskve*, p. 319.

37. As Ryazan' and Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma were separated by dense forest, communication between them was by roundabout river routes, either via Murom or Kolomna, i.e. the Moskva rivers: A. Nasonov, *'Russkaya zemlya'*, p. 208. The Mer'skaya may have played an important part here, as its head waters are close to the right-bank tributaries of the Klyaz'ma.

38. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 10.

39. It might seem that the etymology of the name of the Moskva river would give a clue to the ethnic character of the population settled on its banks. There is an abundant literature on this subject (V. Abaev, L. Berg, P. Chernykh, E. Dickenmann, F. Filin, F. Gordoev, G. Il'insky, V. Nikonov, A. Preobrazhensky, V. Sedov, N. Shishkin, M. Vasmer, A. Veksler, V. Zhuchkevich, and many others), but the conclusions are so divergent that the question must be left in suspense. One school of thought holds that 'Moskva' is a Slav name, presumably due to colonization by the Vyatichians; the other, that it is Finnic (Meryan).

40. *Povest' I*, p. 13.

41. A. Artsikhovskiy, *Osnovnye voprosy arkheologii Moskvy*, *MIA*, VII, 1947, p. 8; V. Kachanova, *Topografiya kladov Moskvy i ee okrestnostei*, in: *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki Moskvy i Podmoskov'ya*, 1954, pp. 134–6; M. Rabinovich, *O drevnei Moskve*, pp. 127–33, and others.

42. A. Mongait, *Iz istorii naseleniya basseina srednego techeniya Oki v I tysyacheletii n.e.*, *SAr*, XVIII, 1953, pp. 151–89; id., *Staraya Ryazan'*, *MIA*, XLIX, 1955, pp. 5–25; id., *Ryazanskaya zemlya*, 1961, passim; B. Widera, *Zur Kolonisation der Ostslaven in der Zeit bis zum Mongolen-einfall in die Rus'*, *ZS*, IX, (1) 1964, pp. 106–7; C. Goehrke, *Wüstungsperioden des frühen und hohen Mittelalters in Osteuropa*, *JGO*, XVI, (1) 1968, pp. 24–5; I. Rozenfel'dt, *Raskopki na severnom mysu Staror-ryarskogo gorodishcha*, *AO*, 1967 g. (1968), pp. 58–9, and others.

43. See *PSRL* (Ermolinskaya letopis', L'vovskaya letopis', Tverskaya letopis').

44. A. Mongait, *Ryazanskaya zemlya*, pp. 235–44.

45. The fortress town of Koltesk on the Oka belonged to the principality of Chernigov. It appears in the Rus'ian chronicles from the

middle of the 12th century, but probably existed earlier. A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', pp. 65, 225, 226. Cf. T. Nikol'skaya, *K istoricheskoi geografii zemli vyatichiei*, *SAr*, 1972 (4), pp. 158–70. The boundary between Ryazan' and Chernigov ran in a southerly direction between Rostislavl' and Koltesk: A. Mongait, *Staraya Ryazan'*, p. 25. Some authors (A. Nasonov, op. cit., pp. 66, 230; V. Kuchkin, *Rostovo-Suzdal'skaya zemlya v X—pervoi treti XIII vekov*, *ISSSR*, 1969 (2), p. 78) suppose that the Chernigov territory extended beyond the Oka in this sector and reached the lower Moskva; but this theory rests only on a localization of the town of Svirel'sk which has not yet been substantiated.

46. Rostislavl' was founded by Rostislav of Ryazan', son of Yaroslav, in the 12th century, most probably in its second quarter. Kolomna dates back to the first half of the 12th century.

47. Kolomna is near the confluence of the Moskva with the Oka. The territory of Ryazan' extended over less than twenty kilometres of the lower Moskva. The marshy terrain, with overflowing rivers etc., made it a suitable place for a fortress: M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, p. 420.

48. *Povest'* I, p. 34.

49. These Rus'ians, as the place-names show, received lands between the upper Volga and the Oka—not only large self-contained areas, but also smaller districts scattered about the country.

50. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 11, 14.

51. ' . . . Igor' . . . ustavi . . . Meryam' dayati Varyagom . . . ': *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis'*, p. 107. Cf. A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 174.

52. Cf. V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Lingvisticheskii analiz gidronimov Verkhnego Podneprov'ya*, 1962, p. 248; V. Sedov, *Baltskaya gidronimika Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya*, *MIA*, CLXXXIV, 1971, pp. 100, 104. These authors agree with Vasmer that the river-name 'Istra' is of Baltic origin. It is possible that Ister was a Balt, for there were Balts among Igor's envoys, e.g. Yavtyag (Yatvyag) Gunarev.

53. *Povest'* I, p. 34.

54. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 50. *Stan* denotes a rural unit of territory and administration.

55. In later centuries the *klekovskii stan* was administratively linked with the city of Vladimir.

56. It is generally stated that the initiative for the falsification of the early history of the city of Vladimir came directly or indirectly from Andrei Bogolyubsky, grandson of Monomakh. Many authors believe that to support his ambitious church policy he needed arguments such as the existence of an ancient Christian tradition in Rostov-Suzdal' and the building of Vladimir associated with that tradition. Since (in these authors'

view) he had no proofs, he was obliged to fabricate them. But it is no less likely that he came upon real facts, which it would be surprising if he had not used. Bogolyubsky knew his grandfather, who died when the boy was about 14. It seems rather unlikely that he would have robbed him of deserved credit for the foundation of Vladimir and attributed it to a remote ancestor.

57. Vladimir the Great founded a powerful fortress on the western border of his state and named it after himself: Vladimir in Volhynia. On this analogy he might well have done the same thing in the north-east, especially as Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma was also a frontier city. Authors who reject the possibility that the city on the Klyaz'ma was founded by Vladimir the Great nevertheless accept that Yaroslav I on the Volga was founded by Yaroslav the Wise, even during his father's lifetime. Cf. M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, 1956, p. 416; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XV vekov*, 1, 1961, p. 24. The son might thus have been following in his father Vladimir's footsteps.

58. The trade routes are marked by hoards of Cufic coins which bear witness to lively contact between the Arab world and eastern Europe. One of the routes, probably the most important, ran via the lower Oka and the Klyaz'ma into the area between the Volga and the Oka. The trade contacts thus developed in the 9th and 10th centuries break off at about the time of Vladimir the Great's death in 1015. N. Voronin, in: 'Sotsial'naya topografiya Vladimira v XII-XIII vv. i "chertezh" 1715 g.', *SAr*, VIII, 1946, p. 166, takes the view that in the 9th-10th centuries there was already a centre of traders and craftsmen at what became the site of Vladimir.

59. A. Nasonov, ('*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 195), M. Rabinovich—G. Latysheva (*Iz zhizni drevnei Moskvy*, p. 58) and others believe, though without proof, that Dolgoruky was the first to conquer the Moskva basin. It is often supposed that the territory remained isolated from the outside world in the 10th-11th century, a kind of no man's land in which nobody was interested. Large groups of Vyatichian settlers would have had no difficulty in penetrating into a territory regarded in this way, on the lines of the colonization theory discussed above. The possessions of Ister indicate that economic and political conditions on the banks of the Moskva had entered a phase of crystallization and stabilization by the first half of the 10th century.

60. '... Moskva rekshe Kuchkovo'. In later times (14th-15th century there was still a 'Kuchkovo pole' near Moscow.

61. E.g. his son-in-law Petr.

62. M. Salmina, *Povesti o nachale Moskvy*, 1964, p. 3, with a list of texts and literature (L. Pushkarev, S. Shambinago, M. Skripil', M. Tikhomirov etc.). Later illustrative material related to these tales of course

has no historical value. Cf. L. Sidorova, *Lubochnye povesti o nachale Moskvy i ikh istoricheskie istochniki* in: *Drevnerusskaya literatura i ee svyazi s novym vremenem*, 1967, pp. 260–87.

63. V. Toporov—O. Trubachev, *Lingvisticheskii analiz gidronimov Verkhnego Podneprov'ya*, 1962, p. 248.

64. M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnyaya Moskva*, 1947, p. 14.

65. A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', p. 187; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi*, p. 114.

66. P. Rappoport, *Drevnie russkie kreposti*, 1965, p. 6.

67. M. Rabinovich, *O vozraste i pervonachal'noi territorii Moskvy*, in: *Novoe o proshlom nashei strany*, 1967, pp. 21–32 (and other studies by the same author); A. Veksler, *K voprosu o drevneishei date Moskovskogo Kremlya*, SA, 1963 (1), pp. 110–15.

68. R. Rozenfel'dt, *K voprosu o nachale Moskvy*, SA, 1957 (4), pp. 93–8.

69. T. Ravdina, *Eshche raz o datirovke drevnego slova Moskvy*, SA, 1963 (1), pp. 98–109.

70. 'Togo zhe leta knyaz' velikii Yurii Volodimerich' zalozhi grad Mosk'vu, na ustnizhe Neglinny, vyshe reky Auzy': PSRL, XV, under the year 1156. Cf. M. Tikhomirov, *Srednevekovaya Moskva v XIV-XV vekakh* (1957), pp. 6–7.

71. Thus e.g. S. Platonov, *O nachale Moskvy*, in: *Stat'i po russkoi istorii*, 1912, pp. 76–83, questions the date 1156 and argues that the first fortification of Moscow must date from the 1170s.

72. The reference to 1156 comes from a late source (*Tverskii sbornik*, 16th century), but none the less seems highly probable: cf. Yu. Limonov, *Letopisanie Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi Rusi*, 1967, p. 29. The chief argument for it is that Dolgoruky built several other fortresses in the middle of the 12th century: Ksnyatin, Yur'ev, Pereyasavl', Dmitrov etc.: L. Tverskoy, *Russkoe gradostroitel'stvo do kontsa XVII veka*, 1953, p. 27. It appears from this that the fortification of Moscow was only part of a deliberate policy of strengthening the country's borders against invasion. Cf. M. Tikhomirov, *Osnovanie Moskvy i Yury Dolgoruky*, IAN, V (2), p. 145.

73. N. Voronin, in: *Moskovskii Kreml' (1156–1367 gg.)*, MIA, LXXVII, 1958, p. 55, discusses the question of the area of the Kremlin in the second half of the 12th century.

74. *Lavr. let.*

75. M. Rabinovich, *O drevnei Moskve*, p. 141.

76. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, p. 117.

77. Soon after Vsevolod III died in 1212 one of his youngest sons, Vladimir, remained in Moscow for some months but was soon removed by his elder brother Yuri and transferred to Southern Pereyasavl'. During Batu's great invasion in 1237–8 the Tatars captured Vladimir, son of



Grand Duke, Yuriy, in Moskow, but this does not mean he was ruling there. Mikhail, a son of Grand Duke Yaroslav (who died in 1246), is supposed to have received the principality of Moscow under his father's will, but this is not certain. Cf. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, p. 117; V. Kuchkin, *Rol' Moskvy v politicheskom razvitii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi kontsa XIII v.*, in: *Novoe o proshlom nashei strany*, 1967, pp. 57–8. Mikhail was killed fighting the Lithuanians in 1248 (see Chapter 6), so if he ruled in Moscow it was only for a year or so.

78. Two rivers, both called Nerl', almost flow together in the vicinity of Pereyasavl'. One is a left-bank tributary of the Klyaz'ma, the other a right-bank tributary of the Volga. Pereyasavl' lay at the intersection of important land and river routes. Of special importance was the convenient link between the Klyaz'ma and the upper Volga, leading further northwards and also south towards the Oka.

79. In Igor's treaty of 944/5 with the Greeks the name Karsh (Karash) appears in the list of the grand duke's entourage: *Povest' I*, p. 34 (' . . . Karshev Turdov'). Karsh was presented by Igor' with large estates in the basin of the Nerl', tributary of the Klyaz'ma (Karash-volost' (district), Lake Karash). Cf. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii Velikorusskoi narodnosti*, 1929, pp. 12, 113.

80. The natural wealth of Pereyasavl' was due to many factors: rich soil (*opol'e*), plenty of high-quality fish, salt (which was then tremendously prized) etc.: M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, 1956, pp. 394, 413, 414; A. Sakharov, *Goroda Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XIV-XV vekov*, 1959, pp. 34, 35. It is true that the sources first mention salt at Pereyasavl' in the 15th century, but it seems highly probable that it was produced there in much earlier times.

81. Pereyasavl' was densely populated not only in later times (M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 43–6) but also at the dawn of history: N. Voronin, *Pereyasavl' Zalessky* 1948, pp. 5–6; id., *Raskopki v Pereyaslavle-Zalesskom*, MIA, XI, 1949, pp. 193–202; id., *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XV vv.*, 1, 1961, p. 56.

82. The Kiev chronicler, describing the situation in his own day (the verbs are in the present tense), states that the Merya people were largely concentrated around Lake Rostov and Lake Pereyasavl': *Povest' I*, p. 13. This account is often 'corrected' and, without justification, placed two or three centuries further back.

83. PSRL, XXIV, under the year 1152. Cf. A. Nasonov, *Maloissledovannye voprosy Rostovo-Suzdal'skogo letopisaniya XII veka*, PI, X, 1962, p. 357. Despite the 'transfer' the old city continued to exist, alongside Pereyasavl', for a surprisingly long time (14th–15th centuries) under its old name of Kleshchin: *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov*, p. 477.

84. The building of a powerful fortress shows that the prince's important decision was guided by military reasons, although the chosen site was in flat, open country. River communications also played a part. For the layout of Pereyasavl' see L. Tverskoy, *Russkoe gradostroitel'stvo do kontsa XVII veka*, 1953, pp. 31, 33, 102; P. Rappoport, *Kruglye i polukruglye gorodishcha Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi*, *SAr*, 1959 (1), p. 121.

85. N. Voronin, *Pereyasavl' Zalessky*, p. 14.

86. For details see N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo*, pp. 101–11. One of the treasures that has survived is a fine silver chalice with a Slavonic inscription. Cf. B. Rybakov, *Russkie datirovannye nadpisi XI–XIV vekov*, 1964, p. 32 (Plate XXX).

87. An important part in appealing to the Tatars against Dmitry was played by Fedor of Yaroslavl', son of Rostislav. Andrei had evidently promised to grant him Pereyasavl' beforehand, as he did so immediately Dmitry was ejected.

88. Yaroslav of Tver' became grand duke at Vladimir after his elder brother Aleksandr Nevsky, and ruled there till his death in 1271. The principality of Tver' was then inherited by his eldest son Svyatoslav and, on the latter's death in 1282, by Yaroslav's next son, Mikhail.

89. Fedor of Yaroslavl', Konstantin of Rostov, etc.

90. ' . . . i vzyasha mir mezhyu soboyu . . . a Mikhailo s Ivanom ne okonchal mezhi soboyu . . . ': *PSRL*, I, under the year 1301.

91. Tver' belonged to Pereyasavl' before it became a separate political entity; this may have been the legal basis of Mikhail's claim to Pereyasavl'.

92. This does not necessarily exclude other, minor causes of dispute such as Dmitrov itself.

93. When, after the Dmitrov congress, Andrei involved himself in fighting the Livonian Order in defence of Great Novgorod, Mikhail, though belatedly, came to the grand duke's help.

94. In considering the political situation at Pereyasavl' we must not neglect the role of the population of the city, which had much effect on the course of events around 1300. The people suffered from the consequences of the inter-princely feuds and were forced to take action to defend their direct interests. They had reason to favour Ivan, and his father Dmitry before him. Andrei, together with Fedor of Yaroslavl', had persuaded the Tatars to invade Vladimir Rus' in 1293 with tragic results for Pereyasavl'. In 1294 Fedor, deprived of the city, had burnt and destroyed it. It is hard to believe that the people of Pereyasavl' would have forgotten these and similar facts.

95. It is not impossible that in return for this Mikhail undertook to support in future the claim of Andrei's son Boris to the grand-ducal throne.

96. Mikhail was 33 in 1304, and Yury was about ten years younger.

97. N. Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniya* 2 (1), 1901, p. 6.

98. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 38.

99. 'Togdy zhe be popolokh zol po vsei zemli i sami ne vedyakhu i gde kto bezhit': PSRL, I, under the year 1239.

100. Many accounts of the Tatar raids on Vladimir Rus' constantly repeat two apparently contradictory facts: on the one hand they say that the whole population of the cities was murdered or led into captivity, but on the other we find large numbers of people in those cities, not only a few years later but even within months of the Tatars' departure. Both statements are correct, however. The townsfolk who stayed in the towns were killed or taken prisoner, but others saved their lives by hiding in inaccessible terrain which they knew better than the enemy did. As the raids continued, the population became more adept at hiding and escaping from enemy atrocities.

101. If we suppose that the 13th century population left their homes *en masse* to escape the Tatars, they should have gone northwards to the Volga, where it was certainly safer. Hence the Vladimir state in the 13th-14th centuries should have expanded on a large scale in a northerly direction; but this was not the case. Cf. Yu. Kizilov, *Geograficheskii faktor v istorii srednevekovoi Rusi*, Vol. I, 1973 (3), pp. 62-3.

102. It appears from the chronicles that Tatar military action was then chiefly concentrated in the Pereyaslavl' region. After Andrei fled: 'Tatarove zhe rossunushasya po zemli . . . i lyudi beshchisla povedosha da kon' i skota i mnogo zla stvorshe otidosha': PSRL, I, under the year 1252. In view of the general character of this and similar accounts there are two possibilities: (1) The ravages of the Tatars were limited to the Pereyaslavl' region. Most of the lands of the grand duchy, including Moscow, escaped; hence there was no reason why Moscow should have come to be thought especially safe. (2) The Tatars plundered over a wide area, which may have included Moscow (as the chroniclers do not specify the regions affected). The first hypothesis seems the more likely.

103. N. Voronin, *Pereyaslavl' Zalessky*, p. 14.

104. Gorodets, on the left bank of the middle Volga, first appears in the sources s.a. 1172. On its geographical position see A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', pp. 190-1. It was founded in the 1150s or 1160s as a strong base for aggressive and defensive warfare by Vladimir Rus' against the Volga Bulgars. However, as archaeological finds have shown, it was not only a fortress but an important centre of trade and craftsmanship. The town extended for more than 2000 metres along the Volga. Cf. A. Medvedev, *Osnovanie i oboronitel'nye sooruzheniya Gorodtsa na Volge*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 158-67; id., *Pervye raskopki v Gorodtse na Volge*, KSIIMK, CX, 1967, pp. 73-85.

105. List of source material on Moscow-Novgorod relations at this period in V. Kuchkin, *Rol' Moskvy*, pp. 54–64.

106. Under the previous agreement Mikhail was not to obtain Pereyaslavl' until Ivan's death.

107. ' . . . knyaz' Ivan Dmitrievich' . . . beyashe chad ne imeya, i blagoslovi v svoje mesto knyazyza Danila Moskovskago v Pereyaslavli knyazhiti; togo bo lyubyashe pache inekh': *Troitskaya letopis'*, s.a. 1303.

108. A. Ekzemplyarsky, in *Velikie i udel'nye knyaz'ya*, gives Ivan's date of birth as 1286; N. Baumgarten, in *Généalogies des branches* . . . , as c. 1280.

109. All these princes died a natural death; there is no reason to suspect foul play.

110. ' . . . a namestnitsy knyazyza velikago Andreyashe sbezhali': *Troitsk. let.*, p. 350.

111. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 88–90.

112. Voskr. let., PSRL, VII, p. 183.

113. The dates at which these districts were acquired can only be guessed; cf. V. Kuchkin, *Rostovo-Suzdal'skaya zemlya*, pp. 91–2.

114. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 40.

115. Mozhaishk, on the right bank of the Moskva, was probably founded in the first half of the 13th century: cf. A. Uspenskaya—M. Fekhnér, *Poseleniya drevnei Rusi*, p. 145. On the basis of later source data M. Lyubavsky in: *Obrazovanie*, pp. 46–7, calculates the area of the Mozhaishk region including subordinate districts.

116. The argument runs as follows. In the first place, as already mentioned, there was a mass influx of population into the Moskva basin from many parts of the grand duchy (1st stage). This provided a strong stimulus to the economy (2nd stage), and the resulting wealth enabled Moscow to maintain powerful armed forces (3rd stage). Material resources and military strength enabled Daniil and his descendants to embark on long-term, premeditated political plans (4th stage). This account of the matter, although maintained with great confidence (the assurance of these historians is there strongest argument) is not supported by contemporary sources.

117. It is sometimes argued that the strength of Vladimir lay not so much in the dynasty as in the sense of national solidarity among its inhabitants. But it is hard to speak of a highly developed national sense at this period of history, and in the present case it is especially unlikely if only because the great bulk of the population of the grand duchy were Merya.

118. Andrei's only son Boris, a minor, died at Kostroma in 1303. It seems quite likely that his father, apart from intending to place him on the throne of Vladimir, gave him Kostroma as a hereditary fief. Since

he also bequeathed to his son Gorodets on the Volga, Boris's territory in the east was considerable enough to give him a chance of obtaining the grand-duchy throne. In view of this it seems difficult to speak of a basic shift of the centre of gravity of Vladimir Rus' before 1303 or 1304.

119. Kostroma, named after the Kostroma river, was situated on the left bank of the Volga. It first appears in the sources at the beginning of the 13th century (1213), though it existed in the 12th: M. Fekhner, *Raskopki v Kostrome* (K voprosu o vremeni vznikeniya Kostromy i ee pervonachal'nom polozenii, *KSIIMK*, XLVII, 1952, pp. 101–8. In the 11th–13th centuries the district was quite densely, though unevenly populated: A. Uspenskaya—M. Fekhner, *Poseleniya drevnei Rusi*, p. 14; E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 232. It possessed much fertile land (M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 49) and mineral wealth (salt). The Volga was full of excellent fish. The principality of Kostroma was in many ways fitted to play a much more important part in the economic and also the political life of Vladimir Rus' than it actually did. Its ethnic character was not a bar to prominence. The population of the district, like that of Muscovy, was Merya, as the place-names show: *Mersky stan*, the river Mera etc. The political role of Kostroma in the 13th century is wholly bound up with the personality of the grand duke Vasily Yaroslavich, whose patrimony it was; he died in 1276.

120. Galich, north-east of Kostroma, on the south-eastern shore of the lake of the same name, first appears in the sources in 1238. Grand Duke Yaroslav (d. 1246) gave it and the surrounding district as an appanage to his son Konstantin, showing that Galich must have been founded before Yaroslav's. It is rightly supposed that it was built and fortified by Dolgoruky about the middle of the 12th century: P. Rappoport, *Kruglye i polukruglye gorodishcha Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi*, *SAr*, 1959 (1), p. 119; id., *Oboronitel'nye sooruzheniya Galicha Mer'skogo*, *KSIIMK*, LXXVII, 1959, pp. 3–9. The Galich principality was unevenly populated: most sparsely in the basins of the Unzha and its tributaries and the Vetluga, covered with huge forests, and most thickly in the west, around Lakes Galich and Chukhloma, and along the upper waters of the Kostroma (M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 62–3). It contained areas of fertile land and salt deposits: the name 'Galich' is connected with these and with the salt industry (A. Popov, *Geograficheskie nazvaniya (Vvedenie v toponimiku)*, 1965, pp. 69–74). The occupations of the people were determined by natural conditions: salt-extraction and trading in salt, hides and furs from the animals that abounded in the many forests, agriculture etc. The population were Merya, as the name of the town (Galich Mersky) shows. (All theories as to the Slav character of the territory are extremely improbable and have no foundation in the sources).

121. Starodub (Klyaz'men'sky gorodok) was on the right bank of the lower Klyaz'ma, north-east of Vladimir. It first appears in the chronicles

in 1218, but there is no doubt that it existed in the 12th century, since at the beginning of the 13th it became the capital of an independent principality. Vsevolod III (d. 1212) bequeathed it to his son Ivan, for whom see R. Rybakov, *Russkie datirovannye nadpisi XI-XIV vekov*, 1964, pp. 40–1. Its importance should not be exaggerated, however: Ivan was Vsevolod's youngest son and did not receive an important patrimony. Cf. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 66–7.

122. We have only fragmentary information about these princes. Grand Duke Yaroslav (d. 1246) gave Galich as an appanage to his son Konstantin (d. 1255). His son David, who also held Dmitrov, reigned in Galich after him and was succeeded in 1280 by his brother Vasily, who died c. 1310. The patrimony of Starodub was held by Ivan, youngest son of Vsevolod III, and after him by his son Mikhail and grandson Ivan, but even this genealogy is not quite certain.

123. A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 193; M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, p. 42. True, A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhnner (*Poseleniya drevnei Rusi*, p. 149) consider that Tver' existed in 1134–5; but the 12th-century document of Vsevolod Mstislavich of Great Novgorod, on which they rely, is extant only in late copies with considerable variations and may even be of 14th-century origin. Cf. G. Kochin, *Pamyatniki istorii Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova*, 1935, p. 40; A. Zimin, *Pamyatniki russkogo prava* 2, 1953, p. 174.

124. M. Tikhomirov (*Drevnerusskie goroda*, p. 115) points out that even in the early 13th century the sources do not mention Tver' but only the river Tvertsa (Tver', T'khver'), from which it takes its name.

125. N. Voronin, Kul'tura Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi zemli XI-XIII vekov, *IsZ*, 1944 (4), p. 36; id., *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XV vekov*, 1, 1961, p. 350.

126. V. Borzakovsky, *Istoriya Tverskogo knyazhestva*, 1876, pp. 8–10; D. Anuchin, *Ozera oblasti istokov Volgi i verkhov'ev Zapadnoi Dviny*, in his *Izbrannye geograficheskie raboty*, 1949, pp. 325–60; M. Bocharov, *Priroda kalininskoi oblasti*, 1951 (unavailable to me); M. Tikhomirov, *Rossiya v XVI stoletii*, 1962, pp. 179–81; A. Bogdanovich, *Yazyk zemli. Naselenie verkhnego povolzh'ya, Oki i Kamy*, 1966, p. 63; Yu. Kizilov, *Geograficheskii faktor v istorii srednevekovoi Rusi*, *Vol*, 1973 (3), pp. 64–5.

127. A. Nasonov, '*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 89.

128. In the treaty of 944/5 between the Rus' and the Greeks Ivor appears as the chief envoy of Grand Duke Igor': *Povest' vremennykh let* I, p. 34. He was granted large estates in what was later the principality of Tver', extending from the left bank of the upper Volga and along the Shostka (the *Ivorovskaya volost'*). M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 117, 120.

129. The older riverway, known as the *Seligersky put'*, which was used more than the Msta in earlier times, ran from Novgorod via the upper Volga along the Lovat'; and its right-bank tributary the Pola to Lake Seliger and on to the Volga.

130. The Medveditsa flows into the Volga near the influx of the Nerl', and by way of the Nerl' it was possible to reach Pereyslavl' and the whole interior of the grand duchy.

131. E. Rikman (*Goroda Tverskogo knyazhestva i sukhoputnye dorogi*, in *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 228–32) gives a conspectus of the source data on land communications in the Tver' principality, chiefly from later centuries. For earlier times we have only a few indications of a very general character. Land routes existed, but were not often used owing to the difficulties of terrain.

132. M. Tikhomirov in *Starorusskie goroda*, p. 62, points out the analogy at this period between the situation at the mouth of the Tvertsa and at the mouth of the Oka, both tributaries of the Volga. In both places towns were founded chiefly for military, not economic reasons; but, on account of their excellent geographical situation, both Tver' and Nizhny Novgorod soon became important centres of international trade. In Tikhomirov's opinion the late date at which they were founded indicates that trade was not the original reason for their existence.

133. The early history of Tver' is discussed in A. Vershinsky, *Vozniknovenie feodal'noi Tveri*, *PIDO*, 1935 (9–10), pp. 109–25.

134. V. Kuchkin in: *Rol' Moskvy*, p. 55, dates the emergence of Tver' as a separate political entity from the late thirties or early forties of the 13th century.

135. H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa I* (1), 1933, pp. 189–90.

136. Owing to the scantiness of the sources this is a hypothesis based on the course of events at the time.

137. Here are two examples of opinions that are often met with. 'By the end of the second half of the 13th century it had become the strongest principality in north-eastern Rus'. The rise of Tver' was aided by . . . mass migration and the flight of rural and urban population to the land of Tver' from the eastern outskirts of Vladimir-Suzdal' . . . By the end of the 13th century the Tver' principality had become the most densely populated [region of the Vladimir state]: V. Mavrodin, *Obrazovanie edinogo russkogo gosudarstva*, 1951, p. 42. 'Situated in the north-eastern part of Rus', in the area furthest away from Tatar incursions, during the second half of the 13th century Tver' became a centre of attraction for large masses of people. The town grew swiftly . . . and acquired [great] importance by the end of the 13th century . . .': A. Sakharov, *Goroda Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XIV-XV vekov*, 1959, p. 108. A more circumspect approach is that of M. Tikhomirov in: *Srednevekovaya Rossiya na mezh-*

*dunarodnykh putyakh*, 1966, p. 30: 'Natural conditions cannot explain why exactly the land of Tver' became independent for so long and occupied a prominent place among the Rus'ian principalities. One reason may have been the absence of collateral lines and hence the extreme centralization of power in the hands of the Tver' princes.'

138. ' . . . i Tferichi tselovasha krest, boyare k chernym lyudem, takozhe i chernyya lyudi k boyarom, chto stati s edinago, bitisya s Tatory; byashe bo sya umnozhibo lyudei i pribeglykh v Tferi iz ynykh knyazheni i volostei pered rat'yu': M. Priselkov, *Troitskaya letopis'*, s.a. 1293. This raid represented the last phase of the long conflict between Nevsky's eldest sons Dmitry and Andrei for the title of grand duke. Andrei persuaded the Tatars to invade, thus devastating the country but ensuring his own accession to the throne of Vladimir.

139. 'I toe zhe zimy tsar' tatarskii pride na Tfer' . . . i veliku tyagost' uchinil lyudem, ovekh poseche, a ovekh v polon povede': *Troitskaya letopis'*, *ibid.*

140. N. Voronin, *Tverskoe zodchestvo XIII-XV vv.*, *IAN*, VII (2), 1945, pp. 380-94; *id.*, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XV vv.*, 2, 1962, pp. 135-48.

141. Tokhta, son of Tudan Menke, was khan from 1291 to 1312.

142. At Mikhail's death his eldest sons Dmitry and Aleksandr were 19 and 17 respectively.

143. The Rus'ian chroniclers undoubtedly exaggerate Shchelkan's designs: according to them he planned to murder all the Rus'ian princes, transfer all power in Rus' to the khan's emissaries, wipe out Christianity etc.

144. The chroniclers differ considerably as to the details of the Tver' rising. The source material is listed and analysed in L. Cherepnin, *Istochniki po istorii antimongol'skogo vosstaniya v Tveri v 1327 g.*, *AE*, (1958), 1960, pp. 37-53; J. Fennell, *The Tver' Uprising of 1327: a Study of the Sources*, *JGO*, XV, (2), 1967. See also L. Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vekakh*, 1960, pp. 475-81; J. Fennell, *The Emergence of Moscow 1304-1359* (1968), pp. 105-9. The most accurate narrative would seem to be the almost contemporary one contained in the chronicles (*Rogozhskii letopisets*, *Tverskoi sbornik*, *Predislovie letopistsa knyazheniya tverskago*) which preserved the oldest Tver' accounts: PSRL, XV, pp. 42-4, 415-16, 465-6. The Tver' uprising of 1327 was reflected in oral tradition and literary works, songs and historical tales: N. Voronin, ' "Pesnya o Shchelkane" i tverskoe vosstanie 1327 g.', *IsZ*, 1944 (9), pp. 75-82; V. Adrianova-Peretts, *Istoricheskaya literatura XI—nachala XV v. i narodnaya poeziya*, *TODRL*, VIII, 1951, pp. 124-8; L. Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 481-97; B. Putilov—B. Dobrovolskiy (ed.), *Istoricheskie pesni XIII-XVI vv. Pa-*



*myatniki russkogo fol'klora*, 1960; A. Zimin, *Pesnya o Shchelkane i voz-niknovenie zhanra istoricheskoi pesni*, *ISSSR*, 1963 (3), pp. 98-110.

145. Later chroniclers undoubtedly exaggerate this devastation when they say that 'the whole land of Tver' was laid waste and became nothing but forests and an impenetrable wilderness': *PSRL*, X, p. 195.

146. The first part of the 14th century, down to 1327, has been dealt with here in only the broadest outline for two reasons. In the first place, a detailed account together with source material is given in my previous work *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*, pp. 285-305. Secondly, the years 1304-27 were essentially a period of transition, with no events of special importance for the future of Vladimir Rus'. Political conditions remained fluid and were constantly changing; the actors on the historical scene were not of outstanding ability, and their tragic fate can only arouse sympathy. Especially at the end of the period, everything was in a state of dissolution and uncertainty.

## Ivan Kalita

Recording the assumption of the grand-ducal dignity by Ivan Danilovich, nicknamed Kalita ('Money-bag'), the chroniclers state that 'There was a great quiet (*tishina*) for forty years, and the heathen ceased to make war upon the land of Rus' and to murder Christians, and the Christians breathed freely and rested from their great trials and the many oppressions and duress of the Tatars . . .'.<sup>1</sup> This is true, though not entirely so. During Ivan's reign there was a lessening of armed clashes within the dynasty and Tatar raids on Rus', which had both inflicted grievous suffering on the country. Pacification was an urgent need of the whole population, both urban and rural. The period of sustained peace encouraged economic life and especially trade. Ivan had inherited his father's caution and consistency; his policy was marked by a deep sense of realism, in sharp contrast to the adventurism of earlier aspirants to the grand-ducal throne. The new occupant of the throne of Vladimir was a man of mature years,<sup>2</sup> trained to politics from his youth onwards.<sup>3</sup> He showed this especially by his skill in exploiting all opportunities, even those that arose independently of his own volition: the case of Tver' is a good example.

There is no reason to suppose that Kalita, either directly or indirectly, inspired or fomented the revolt of Tver' against the Tatars in 1327—a spontaneous and suicidal act whereby Tver' brought about its own downfall and assisted the rise of Moscow.

Ivan took part in the Tatar expedition mounted against Tver' in retaliation for the murder of Shchelkan and his servants. He took up arms of his own accord as well as by Uzbek's order. Moscow, at least for a time, had the chance to eliminate a formidable rival to its political aspirations. After the events of 1327 Aleksandr of Tver' was of course stripped of the grand-ducal dignity by the khan; in addition, Uzbek ordered Kalita to

capture him alive and deliver him to the Horde. Ivan did his best to carry out this order, though unsuccessfully.<sup>4</sup>

The main thing from Ivan's point of view was that the Vladimir throne was vacant. He awaited Uzbek's decision, hoping no doubt—though he could not be sure—that 1328 would launch him on a triumphant political career. The decision, when it came, was only partially favourable to his ambition. The khan, by an unusual measure,<sup>5</sup> divided the state of Vladimir and appointed two grand dukes of equal rank: Ivan was given Great Novgorod and Kostroma, while Aleksandr of Suzdal'<sup>6</sup>—who, like Ivan, had taken an active part in the campaign against Tver'—received Vladimir, the capital, and extensive lands on the middle Volga (the Povolzh'e<sup>7</sup>), especially Gorodets and Nizhny Novgorod,<sup>8</sup> the latter situated at the junction of the Volga and the Oka.

This preferment of the prince of Suzdal' is surprising, as his principality had not played much of a role around the turn of the century. The sources do not indicate whether Aleksandr's promotion was due to his efforts at the Horde or whether, as is more likely, the khan wished for his own purposes to win over the princes of Suzdal' and use their enlarged patrimony to fill the political gap created by the fall of Tver'.

The condominium between Ivan and Aleksandr soon came to an end with the latter's death in 1331. Events might have taken the opposite course, with Ivan dying first and Aleksandr stepping into his shoes. Doubtless Ivan was well aware of the precariousness of the situation.

With Aleksandr's death the grand-ducal dignity was vested entirely in Ivan. With it went the obligation to collect all kinds of taxes and tribute from the whole of Vladimir Rus' and deliver them to the Khan.<sup>9</sup> In the previous century, it will be recalled, the collection of taxes and other duties were performed by Tatar dignitaries—*baskaki*—specially sent to Rus' for the purpose, who also supervised the census on which taxation was based. The task of collection was transferred to the grand duke before Ivan's time, not later than the beginning of Uzbek's reign, i.e. soon after 1313. When the fierce conflict broke out between Mikhail of Tver' and Yuri of Moscow for the throne of Vladimir, the Muscovites informed Uzbek that Grand Duke Mikhail was keeping for his own use the tribute money collected for the khan.<sup>10</sup> This brought about Mikhail's downfall in 1318 and opened the way

for Yury to ascend the grand-ducal throne. Yury in his turn failed to deliver the sums collected in Rus' to the Horde, and instead took them with him to Great Novgorod.<sup>11</sup> When Dmitry, whose father Mikhail had been murdered by the Tatars, learnt of this he at once went to Uzbek, informed him of the fact and was himself made grand duke in 1322. For our present purposes the main point is that during the time when the internecine feuds in Rus' were at their most acute, the system became firmly implanted whereby the grand duke was obliged to collect all forms of tribute from the whole state of Vladimir for the khan's benefit.

On whose initiative was this system instituted? It is hard to imagine that the Rus'ian princes could have done so: they would have had to wield powerful influence at the Horde, and there is no evidence for this in the sources. It seems much more likely that it was Uzbek himself, if not Tokhta, who took the decision to transfer the functions of the *baskaki* to the grand duke of Vladimir.

Two further facts should be noted. In the first place, the Tatars' intelligence service was well-developed for those days and they showed a good knowledge of internal conditions in Rus'. Uzbek cannot have doubted for a moment that the grand dukes of Vladimir would defraud him in carrying out their new duties. Secondly, the Tatars were rapacious in demanding tribute from conquered peoples and paid great attention to the amount received. Uzbek was no exception to this as far as Rus' was concerned.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these apparently contradictory facts. The transference of the tax-collecting function to the grand dukes was not intended to diminish but rather to increase the revenues of the Horde. Uzbek did not basically object to the grand dukes cheating in fiscal matters if they did so not at his expense but at that of Great Novgorod, Rostov, Suzdal' etc. When it was reported to him that they were keeping back the sums due to the Horde he reacted with typical Tatar hypocrisy, displaying anger and indignation and removing the guilty from the grand-ducal throne. A change in the occupancy of the throne was a convenient opportunity for the khan to extract additional revenue. In my opinion the transference of fiscal responsibility from the *baskaki* to the grand dukes was intended to strengthen Tatar domination over Rus'. The possibility, despite formal

prohibition, of taking a 'cut' from the tribute money collected for the Horde was a factor encouraging the princes in their rivalry for the throne of Vladimir; it inflamed their mutual jealousies and kept them in a state of servile competition for the khan's favour. The only danger of Uzbek's policy towards Rus' was that the grand dukes might unduly enrich themselves in carrying out their fiscal obligations; but this was not a serious risk for the present, owing to the frequent changes on the grand-ducal throne.<sup>12</sup>

Although relations between the Tatars and Rus' remained formally unchanged when Kalita became grand duke, in reality they underwent far-reaching changes. The name 'Money-bag' shows that people had long been well aware of his speciality. In my opinion, though the point is disputed, the large-scale economic growth of Moscow dates from no earlier than Kalita's times and was a consequence of his occupancy of the throne of Vladimir, during which the power of the grand duke was considerably increased at the expense of the other members of the dynasty. Evidently the khan allowed Ivan, to some extent anyway, a free hand in his dealing with the whole of Vladimir Rus' and Novgorod.

What led the Tatars, crafty and suspicious as they were, to allow Kalita to act the part of an autocrat *vis à vis* the other Rus'ian principalities? One thing is certain: the Horde's approval of Ivan's conduct as grand duke was not intended to lessen his servile dependence on Uzbek or to diminish the khan's revenues. Kalita's intention was to make all the principalities bear the brunt of his own Tatar policy, while seeing to it that Moscow suffered least. His main argument with Uzbek was that Rus' as a whole would contribute far larger sums to the khan's coffers, thus demonstrating Ivan's devotion and loyalty.

Kalita's proposal may have attracted the Tatars. Vladimir Rus' had long been in a state of political chaos and increasing material distress, which must have had an adverse effect on Uzbek's revenues (regardless of the fact that that chaos was largely brought about by himself). If internal conditions could be regularized and the economy of the grand principality revived, the Tatars might hope for a steady increase in the amount of tribute. In the long term it was difficult to run the state exclusively on murder and rapine, as they had done hitherto. There had to be something to plunder; while as for the Tatar atrocities, they provoked the

population to incalculable outbreaks of despair which were basically harmful to Rus'ians and Tatars alike. The problem of security for the khan's emissaries to the grand duchy became more acute after the events of 1327 in Tver', especially as similar disturbances probably broke out elsewhere, though on a lesser scale. Kalita's appointed task was to keep the country in a state of peace and order. It may be that Uzbek intended this pacification to make it easier for the Tatars to resume direct rule at some unspecified time in the future, which would have involved doing away with all the Rus'ian princes. This, at any rate, was thought of in Rus' as a possible eventuality.<sup>13</sup>

Ivan's rule as grand duke wears a double aspect. On the one hand he grovelled at the khan's feet, while on the other he showed great self-confidence and arrogance towards the other Rus'ian princes and Great Novgorod. Time and again throughout his reign he summoned his closer and more distant relatives to take an active part in military expeditions ordered by the khan,<sup>14</sup> and he showed unprecedented zeal in collecting contributions for the Horde. In particular the wealth of Novgorod excited his greed; this led to sharp conflicts in which Kalita displayed his 'anger' and took military action to compel obedience. He was no less ruthless with the individual princes of Vladimir Rus'. As events in the land of Rostov illustrate, the collection of tribute from them was accompanied by open plunder and violence (*nasilovanie mnogo*).<sup>15</sup> There was little to choose in the way of terrorism between Ivan's government and that of the Tatars. Perhaps fewer people were murdered than before, but brutal force and duress (*velikaya nuzha*) put the whole population of the country, not only Rostov, in great fear (*strakh velik*).<sup>16</sup> When the chroniclers speak of Ivan's great merit in giving the land rest (*otdokhnusha*) from Tatar violence, we may judge from these events how much 'rest' there really was.

Ivan took care that none of the subordinate princes should be in a position to challenge his military or political power. The supremacy of the grand duke of Vladimir over the rest of the dynasty had so far been largely formal, but now became much more of a reality.

This development was favoured by changes that took place in 1330-5 on several of the princely thrones: Starodub,<sup>17</sup> Rostov,<sup>18</sup> Suzdal',<sup>19</sup> Dmitrov,<sup>20</sup> and Galich<sup>21</sup>), which led to a considerable

regrouping of forces within the dynasty. The deaths of these rulers are recorded by the sources, for the most part briefly and tersely. There is no evidence that they fell victim to Ivan's machinations, but it cannot escape notice that their deaths mostly rebounded to his advantage.

In order to impose his supremacy on all the lands of the grand principality Ivan used not only physical force but also peaceful and amicable means, which varied according to circumstances in different areas. He exaggerated his influence and importance to the Horde in order to intimidate his recalcitrant kinsmen; he sometimes threatened them with his military superiority; he fomented and then exploited jealousies among the lesser princes, and (as we shall see) used the Church as an aid to his ambitions; he created factions of his own among the boyars of the other patrimonies so as to undermine the authority of their princes; he continued the shrewd marriage policy of his elder brother Yury, and so on. Marriages within the extensive dynasty were often an expression of political *rapprochement* among the princes; in Kalita's case they were meant to strengthen his influence in the lands whose rulers married Moscow princesses, especially such important patrimonies as Tver'<sup>22</sup> and Rostov.<sup>23</sup>

When Aleksandr of Tver' fled to Pskov after the events of 1327 his younger brother Konstantin, who was married to Ivan's niece Sofia, took refuge at Ladoga in the north. Soon, however, he returned on Ivan's orders and assumed the government of Tver'. He proved an obedient servant of the grand duke, accompanying him on military expeditions and journeys to the Horde. After the frightful recent devastation of Tver' his aim was to keep the land at peace for as long as possible so that it could recover from its downfall.<sup>24</sup> His policy was justified by practical necessity; it was unobtrusive and threatened no one in the immediate future, and thus won Kalita's approbation.

The co-operation between Uzbek and Ivan in the first phase of the latter's reign as grand duke brought unquestionable advantages to both parties,<sup>25</sup> but obtained the germs of inevitable future conflict. Kalita, as the weaker partner, did all he could to induce the Horde to continue the policy of collaboration. Undeterred by setbacks, he was prepared to pay any price to ingratiate himself with the khan, to exclude others from the Tatars' favour and, above all, to keep the grand-ducal title for his own progeny. It

was at this point that the interests of the two parties were opposed.

Uzbek accepted the loyal service of his vassal, whome he needed though he did not trust him. It is hard to suppose that he did not see through Ivan's ambitious plans, just as Ivan understood the khan's intentions only too well. Fearing lest Kalita should become too strong and influential, Uzbek would have liked to see other, non-Muscovite candidates for the dignity of grand duke. Initially (1328-31) he favoured Suzdal', while from 1335 he transferred his support to Tver'. The question of Tver' was linked with the fate of Aleksandr, who had fled to Pskov after Shchelkan's murder in 1327. Threatened with military action by the Tatars, Moscow and others, the Pskovians were obliged to humble themselves and sever contact with the exiled prince. Aleksandr thereupon took refuge in Lithuania, but returned to Pskov after eighteen months; he was received in a friendly manner, but his prospects and those of his children seemed hopeless. Realizing this, he formed the idea of returning home in order to appease Uzbek and perhaps recover his principality. He was unexpectedly successful, as the khan restored him to favour and entrusted him with the government of Tver' (of which more later). He brought his family with him from Pskov, showing that he felt safe for the time being at least, but this was an illusion.

Kalita no doubt knew all about Aleksandr's moves and followed them closely. The return of his hated rival to Tver' in 1338 weakened Ivan's authority throughout the grand duchy. The prince of Tver', whether he wished it or not, inevitably became the head of the opposition and symbol of the anti-Muscovite feelings of the princes and others in Vladimir Rus'. This animosity grew in strength as Kalita's high-handed rule continued. The chronicles indirectly suggest that Aleksandr, by his extreme obsequiousness towards the khan, revealed his aspirations to regain the dignity of grand duke, which were justified by the situation before 1327. This was a threat to Ivan's closest interests. The deciding voice belonged to Uzbek, but the khan's decisions were often changeable and apparently capricious (though this 'caprice' was generally a matter of cold calculation). Kalita was kept in constant suspense and uncertainty. With his usual energy he tried, by an act which he well knew to be extremely risky, to put an end to the danger as quickly as possible. Before embarking



on a journey to the Horde, from which he was doubtful of returning alive, he drew up his will, in which he remarked that only God knew what his fate was to be.<sup>26</sup>

Kalita's will is the first of the grand-ducal written testaments. His predecessors on the throne of Vladimir no doubt expressed their wishes or decisions before death, but not in writing, or at any rate no such document has come down to us. We therefore cannot compare Kalita's dispositions with the relationships that previously existed between Rus' and the Tatars or among the Rus'ian princes. Although Kalita enjoyed great authority in Muscovy and his descendants invoked the provisions of his will, the chroniclers know nothing of its existence, although in several details their accounts facilitate the analysis of Ivan's testaments.

Two such documents have survived.<sup>27</sup> The differences are not important, and it does not matter greatly whether we speak of two wills or two versions of a single one. Arguments for regarding them as two wills are that they both bore the grand-ducal seal,<sup>28</sup> that they are not certainly of the same date, and that one of them, but not the other, contains a notable list of villages purchased by Ivan outside the borders of Muscovy. This longer document also bore the Tatar seal.<sup>29</sup>

In Cherepnin's opinion both documents were drawn up at the same time in Vladimir Rus', though they are not in the same hand.<sup>30</sup> Kalita, he thinks, took them with him to the Horde, keeping the shorter document in reserve in case the Tatars refused to recognize his acquisitions outside Muscovy. Uzbek, however, gave his approval to these and endorsed the longer version of the will.<sup>31</sup>

Cherepnin believes that Ivan took to the Horde drafts of both versions; the sealed document, on the other hand, is a fully valid instrument. The question remains, however, why the version which is more modest in its territorial claims and less in accordance with Muscovite interests was not destroyed, but sealed with Kalita's seal and kept in the archives of the grand duchy.

The passage concerning the villages purchased by the grand duke outside Muscovy occurs in a curious place. As Cherepnin points out, it does not belong organically where it is, but is a 'manifest insertion' (*yavnaya vstavka*). There is no doubt that it ought to appear in a different part of the document. In Cherepnin's

opinion the mention of Ivan's acquisitions outside Moscow was included 'more or less accidentally'. It is hard to accept this, however. The question of the Moscow princes' possessions outside their own patrimony was too important to be left to chance. Cherepnin himself recognizes this when he suggests that these acquisitions were the cause of Ivan drawing up two versions of the will.

If we are to remain in the field of conjecture—and the suggestions of Cherepnin and others are largely conjectural—it seems to me more plausible to suppose that before Kalita left for the Horde, being uncertain whether Uzbek would allow him to keep the villages purchased outside Muscovy, he drew up a will enumerating the Muscovite towns and settlements that belonged to him, sealed it and entrusted it to his immediate successors. This document was largely meant for use within the family. I assume (since it is impossible to be more certain) that Ivan took to the Horde a slightly altered transcript of the first will, leaving a blank at the end which he intended to fill in after the khan had confirmed his extra-Muscovite acquisitions. In other words, the concluding part of Ivan's second will would have been written in at Sarai.<sup>32</sup> Had it been done at Vladimir Rus', the document would have been drafted in a different and more careful fashion.

This hypothesis would explain three difficulties: why there were two wills, both bearing Ivan's seal; why the passage about his acquisitions outside Muscovy is in the wrong place from the drafting point of view; and why the clerk, as Cherepnin noticed, wrote in smaller letters and crowded them together more in the final passage of the document, since he could not foresee the length of the insertion.

The time and circumstances are important. Neither will is dated, and the historian must do his best to fill the gap. We only know that both documents were drawn up before Ivan went to the Horde.<sup>33</sup> But he made several journeys to Uzbek, and the question is which one. The earliest possible date is 1328, when Ivan became grand duke<sup>34</sup> (or rather one of the two grand dukes); the latest is before February 1340, more probably 1339.<sup>35</sup> Attempts to be more precise than this have led to varying conclusions.

In an old collection of documents both wills appear under the year 1328.<sup>36</sup> Zimin referred them to 1327–8, with a preference for the former year,<sup>37</sup> though this hypothesis arouses doubts from

the outset.<sup>38</sup> Zimin attached importance to the mention by name of Ivan's wife Elena, and thought the wills must date from before her death in 1331. However, analysis of the source material shows that they were drawn up after her death,<sup>39</sup> and hence not before 1334.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the period between 1328 and 1339, mentioned above, can be narrowed to 1334–9, and we can be more precise even than this. The grand duke's will suggests a situation of political tension, dangerous to Kalita and even threatening his life. Such a situation prevailed in 1338, when Aleksandr returned to Tver' after his long exile at Pskov. According to the chronicle Kalita, no doubt alarmed by the turn of events, went to the khan in 1339, and I believe that the wills must have been drawn up in that year. This view, which is highly probable though not certain, now clearly predominates among scholars.

Ivan's will reflects the profound anxiety of a husband and father for the material well-being of his immediate family, their endowment and income. Both variants are chiefly devoted to this question, showing how deeply it concerned him. To his son Semen he bequeathed Mozhaïsk and Kolomna, situated at the source and the mouth of the Moskva—two fortresses of great importance to Muscovite policy, whether for defence or expansion. In addition Semen received a number of rural districts and villages, chiefly situated on the Moskva and its tributaries, from Moscow to Kolomna. Ivan, the second son, received Zvenigorod, Ruza and lesser settlements chiefly in the western part of the principality, while Andrei, the youngest, got Serpukhov and a zone of southern lands along the Oka. Kalita's widow received Radonezh and some northern districts. Such in broad lines<sup>41</sup> was the settlement on Ivan's immediate family. Taking all these lands together we obtain a picture of the territory owned by him at the end of his life, with frontiers unchanged as he had inherited them from his father and brother.

In my opinion Kalita's will does not reflect all the details of the understanding reached between the Tatars and Moscow in 1339. Historians often underrate the strength of the antagonism between Moscow and Tver'. Apart from personal jealousies, the conflicts of interest between them were too serious to be resolved without bloodshed. In return for recognizing the Horde's supremacy over Vladimir Rus' and for supporting it to the full, Kalita obtained Uzbek's promise that Aleksandr of Tver' would be destroyed.

This promise was a logical outcome of events. If we regard it as, in modern terminology, a 'secret clause' in the understanding between the Tatars and Moscow, it serves to offset the overwhelming balance of advantage in the khan's favour *vis à vis* the grand duke, as we find it in Ivan's testaments.

Cherepnin supposes that Ivan made a third will, now lost,<sup>42</sup> reflecting the increased strength and importance of Muscovy in its relations with the Horde and all the princes of Vladimir Rus'. There may be a measure of truth in this, but in general I think we should guard against artificially increasing the number of documents drawn up by Ivan. In my opinion he probably expressed his last wishes to his sons orally, and the fact that he did not write them down, and that the trace of them was concealed from the outside world, testifies to their anti-Tatar character as well as their sincerity. In the conditions of the time it was vitally important to maintain the utmost secrecy. The chronicles often mention acts by Kalita which are hard to reconcile with his written testaments. The Horde was suspicious enough without its vigilance being carelessly aroused.

Ivan's bequests to his sons and his wife show political concern as well as family feeling. The will enumerates Muscovite towns, rural areas and villages bestowed on each of the sons, as well as the villages purchased by Kalita in various principalities outside Moscow. The salient feature of these bequests is their more or less equal size. Even in the case of the non-Muscovite settlements, each heir received an equal share (two or three villages). The city of Moscow was bequeathed to them jointly.<sup>43</sup> Kalita's object in his last will was to create conditions and an atmosphere in which his sons could work together and in harmony, thus helping to fill the gap between the small size of Muscovy and the grandeur of its ambitions.

The analysis of Ivan's written testament makes it possible to overcome some of the difficulties of reconstructing and assessing the events of the grand duke's reign as a whole. Special importance attaches to its last years, with which his testament is most closely connected. The main difficulty is the state of the sources,<sup>44</sup> thanks to which particular episodes in Ivan's life are differently represented by scholars.<sup>45</sup> In the same way, though all writers use the same sources they differ in their judgment of Ivan's place in history.

There are two main opinions of Kalita as a man and a ruler. According to one view his behaviour evinced 'a crude opportunism dictated by circumstances' which made him 'an ideal servant' of the Tatars. He won the khan's full confidence at the outset of his rule as grand duke, and kept it to the end. The two collaborated in a harmonious manner and took decisions in full accord with each other. However, while Moscow gained much from these friendly relations with the Horde, 'events were influenced not so much by the determination of the grand duke as by the decisions of the khan.'<sup>46</sup>

According to the second view, Kalita achieved considerable success in his political aims. While showing great submissiveness to the Horde and not hesitating even to act as 'a kind of agent for Uzbek', he none the less assumed the initiative in all important decisions concerning Vladimir Rus', while the khan's role was reduced 'if not to supporting those decisions, at least to [passively] accepting them'.<sup>47</sup> In my opinion neither of these views is correct; although opposed to each other, they both assume that one side gave way completely to the other, which is not justified by the evidence.

We are concerned here with a great trial of strength between two powerful characters, Uzbek and Kalita: a contest to which both sides applied all their mental energy while concealing their motives with a veil of hypocrisy, making it difficult for historians to interpret certain facts. The khan, regarding Ivan with suspicion and secret contempt, showed 'love' (*lyubov'*) towards him and his sons, as the chroniclers assure us in connection with the events of 1339. Kalita felt similar 'love' towards Uzbek, whom he hated with all his soul, and he trusted his overlord so profoundly that before setting out to visit him—he made his will.

No one denies that 1339 marked the beginning of a *rapprochement* and closer collaboration between the Tatars and Moscow. This represented an important switch in Uzbek's policy towards Rus', though not such a complete one as it may seem. The khan, on the one hand, allowed Kalita to remain as grand duke (none of the other princes could raise such revenues for the Horde), but, on the other, he kept in reserve a counter-candidate for the Vladimir throne whom he could use at any time if Ivan were in any way fractious. As we know, the khan in these tactical manoeuvres played first the Suzdalian card<sup>48</sup> and, soon afterwards,

that of Tver';<sup>49</sup> all he did in 1339 was to throw away the latter and put his money on a substitute in the shape of Moscow.

The fortunes of Tver' were bound up with Aleksandr, who was for long an exile at Pskov. As we have seen, he finally resolved to attempt to regain his patrimony. According to the chroniclers, he was moved by homesickness and the desire to gain for his children a share in the heritage of Tver'. Without denying these motives, we may also suppose that he had received some confidential sign from the Horde promising forgiveness for the events of 1327 and a renewal of the khan's favour. If this was not so, it would appear that he was a shrewd judge of relations between the Tatars and Muscovy, realizing that Kalita's elevation to the grand-ducal dignity was a favourable omen for his own designs.

Aleksandr proceeded cautiously: in 1335, or perhaps 1334, he sent to the Horde his eldest son Fedor. Instead of having Fedor executed, Uzbek received him graciously and allowed him to return not only to Pskov but, be it noted, to Tver' itself, where he remained for at least a year. This was a clear hint to Aleksandr that he himself might safely return home. Alarmed by Fedor's journey and its consequences, Ivan himself went to the Horde in 1336 (returning in the winter of 1336/7<sup>50</sup>), but, as events showed, achieved no positive results. At the same time Aleksandr took a further step: in that winter he returned from Pskov to Tver',<sup>51</sup> presumably to take counsel with Fedor and his own brother Konstantin, to sound out conditions in the principality etc. His stay was apparently short but quite successful; returning to Pskov he took with him Fedor, his chief helper and confident. They both went to the Horde in 1337, and were rewarded by the favour of the khan, who allowed Aleksandr to resume the government of Tver' in 1338.

The khan's Rus'ian policy in 1335-8 was distinctly favourable to Tver' and, by implication, anti-Muscovite. This was eloquently illustrated by three facts. In the first place, the Horde had generally allowed Kalita a free hand in regulating questions of succession within the dynasty. It was a breach of this practice to reinstate Aleksandr as prince of Tver' without informing Ivan or taking any notice of his views. Secondly, Aleksandr was solemnly installed on the throne of Tver' by two special emissaries from Uzbek—a clear warning against interference by Moscow.<sup>52</sup> Thirdly,

on Aleksandr's return and while the Tatars were still there, pro-Moscow elements began to be expelled from the Tver' principality.<sup>53</sup> These facts must be borne in mind in analysing the memorable events of 1339.<sup>54</sup>

In that year a political change, unexpected in view of the khan's pro-Tverite attitude, took place as a result of negotiations carried on while Ivan was at the Horde early in 1339. It seems certain that the initiative for these was taken by Moscow,<sup>55</sup> which felt gravely threatened by the installation of Aleksandr at Tver', his aspiration to the throne of Vladimir,<sup>56</sup> the support he enjoyed from other princes etc.

Kalita wished at all costs to put a speedy end to the collaboration between Tver' and the Tatars, and to do away with Aleksandr as the only means of making sure that it did not revive.<sup>57</sup> He also tried to get rid of other princes who opposed his policy, though they were less dangerous to him than the Horde's support of Aleksandr. If he could achieve both these ends, the way would be clear for his sons and grandsons to ascend the grand-ducal throne. Ivan was well aware of this, but so was Uzbek.

Another point is worth notice: in the early months of 1339 Kalita advised the khan to summon not only Aleksandr of Tver' but also other princes of Vladimir Rus'. The chronicles say that all the princes were summoned, and they mention by name Vasily Davidovich of Yaroslavl' and Roman Mikhailovich of Beloozero,<sup>58</sup> both of whom were Kalita's enemies and supporters of Aleksandr. In the absence of source information it is hard to say why Ivan persuaded the khan to hold a congress of the princes at Sarai, but some reasons may be suggested.

The congress—it is not known how many attended—was probably held in the autumn of 1339. Aleksandr of Tver' was among those 'invited'. He was put to death on the 28th or 29th of October<sup>59</sup> and had then been at the Horde for a month,<sup>60</sup> so he must have arrived there in September. At that time all Kalita's three sons were at Sarai or on the way there by their father's command,<sup>61</sup> presumably to swell the number of princes assembled at the khan's court.

Two facts throw light on the character and purpose of the congress. Firstly, while Vasily of Yaroslavl' was on his way to the Horde, Kalita sent a detachment of 500 men to capture him. Vasily no doubt expected something of the kind, as his retinue

were strong enough to beat off the attack.<sup>62</sup> It is worth noting that when Aleksandr of Tver' made his first journey to the Horde from exile at Pskov he took a roundabout route avoiding the duchy of Vladimir: like the other princes, he was well acquainted with Ivan's methods.

The second noteworthy point is that Ivan himself did not choose to be present at the congress, although it was he who had persuaded Uzbek to call it. He wished to avoid responsibility for whatever might happen there, so that the whole opprobrium would fall on the Tatars as far as the Church and Rus'ian public opinion were concerned.<sup>63</sup> Aleksandr and his son Fedor were duly put to death, but it is an open question whether Ivan did not also intend the khan to execute other troublesome princes. It seems quite likely that he exerted pressure in this sense; but, unlike the case of Aleksandr, he could not be sure that Uzbek would take such a decision. (He tried to give help and encouragement in this direction by planning to kidnap and secretly murder Vasily of Yaroslavl'). In any case, it was entirely in Moscow's interest for the more stubborn princes to be liquidated and the weaker ones terrorized into submission; but was this also in the interests of the Horde?

Uzbek's Rus'ian policy depended on playing off the princes against one another, and it could therefore be predicted that the khan would not tip the balance further towards Moscow. As far as we know, except for the Tver' princes, all those summoned to the Horde on this occasion returned home safe and sound.

By placing Aleksandr on the throne of Tver' in 1338 Uzbek had struck at the most sensitive point of Kalita's political aspirations. Independently of Aleksandr's intentions, events might raise him to the Vladimir throne or bring about his downfall. Everything depended on Ivan's reaction to the khan's decision. He had two alternatives, either to resist or to give in completely to Uzbek's wishes. Taking a sober view of the situation, he preferred the latter. The more complete Ivan's capitulation, the bleaker were the prospects for Aleksandr. His fate was sealed not by his collaboration with Lithuania,<sup>64</sup> which did not amount to much, but by his role as a pawn in the game between Uzbek and Kalita.

If the khan allowed himself to be persuaded to discard Aleksandr, who was such a convenient element in his game, he certainly did not do so without compensation. Uzbek had two aims in



view: to make Moscow more dependent on the Horde and to extract more tribute from Vladimir Rus'. The Tatars well knew that the fall of Tver' would strengthen the grand-ducal authority of Ivan (and his sons). The khan imposed a limit on the growth of Moscow's power by preventing it from acquiring territory at the expense of its neighbours. He also had other means at his disposal: he could at any moment incite the anti-Muscovite princes to revolt; in the last resort he could summon Ivan and his sons to the Horde and murder them all. The fate of Aleksandr of Tver' and his son Fedor, so recently favourites of the khan, must have played a prominent part in Ivan's calculations and acted as a dire warning.<sup>65</sup>

When acceding to Kalita's intrigue against the Tverites Uzbek put forward a new demand typical of Tatar greed: he doubled the tribute due to the Horde from the grand principality, 'which has not been done since the beginning of the world'. In obedience to the khan's orders Ivan applied to rich Novgorod for additional sums, but met with a violent protest.<sup>66</sup> It may be assumed that the reaction was the same throughout Vladimir Rus'. In this way Uzbek increased his own revenues and at the same time exacerbated anti-Muscovite feeling in many lands of the grand duchy.

The Tatar-Muscovite agreement of 1339 must also be considered from the point of view of what Kalita got out of it. The answer is, both much and little. The agreement was really no more than a return to the state of affairs before 1337-8 (the period of Aleksandr of Tver' 's exile). It did not seem to confer much on Ivan, but he was none the less anxious to secure it.

Kalita had no illusions: Aleksandr's return from exile was a first step towards the recovery of the Vladimir throne by the princes of Tver'. If, as Ivan's testaments show, it was not yet possible to put Moscow's privileged position beyond doubt for the future, he must play for time while preserving the status quo. In my opinion Kalita's policy in 1339 was a success in that it secured a postponement of the issue though not a solution of it. No more could have been achieved in the circumstances; and the status quo was not to be sneezed at, especially from the financial point of view.

Economic progress cannot be hurried. Moscow's rise to predominance, on the other hand, took place in an unusually short time. Great as were Kalita's energy and industry, his reign

was too short a period in which to complete the immense task that lay before him.<sup>67</sup> Thus the causes of Moscow's economic and financial growth, and consequently its political consolidation also, must be sought above all in Ivan's headship of the dynasty. One of the duties of the grand duke was to collect tribute of various kinds for the Horde from all the lands of Vladimir Rus' and Great Novgorod. Kalita diverted a considerable part of these sums to his own use, for the benefit of his immediate patrimony of Moscow.

It was well known in the principality of Rostov, and not only there, that all payments for the khan were collected not by the Vladimirians but by the Muscovites.<sup>68</sup> Soon after the execution of Aleksandr of Tver' Ivan robbed his hated rival of the great bell in the Cathedral of the Saviour which used to proclaim the glory of Tver'; he removed it not to Vladimir, but to Moscow.<sup>69</sup> This symbolic act cast a shadow over the future not only of Tver' but of Rostov, Suzdal' and all the other principalities of Vladimir Rus'.

Kalita's financial wealth was shown by his large-scale building activity in Moscow: churches, the palaces of the grand duke and the metropolitan, etc. We can only speculate about these buildings, which were of wood and have not survived: the city was much damaged in later times by enemy raids and frequent fires. The Cathedral of the Assumption or Dormition (*Uspensky sobor*) is noteworthy as Moscow's first building in stone.<sup>70</sup>

Prosperity was reflected in the prince's court, as is shown by the valuable gifts Kalita bequeathed to his immediate family. Apart from elaborate dresses, mantles, pelisses etc., these comprised rings, necklaces, chains, belts, vases, bowls, goblets, dishes and other vessels—all of gold or silver, studded with pearls and precious stones, and other costly ornaments.<sup>71</sup> Some of these valuables Kalita inherited from his predecessors or received as part of his wives' dowries, others he bought, and others still were looted from other principalities.

Ivan's wealth, no doubt helped to give an impetus to economic life and bring about social change in Muscovy, though on this we have very little information.<sup>72</sup> It was also a trump card in his further dealings with Uzbek. Tatars visiting Moscow could see the Kremlin fortifications erected by Ivan towards the end of his life.<sup>73</sup> They made the city much better able to defend itself

against attack, and it was not hard for the Tatars to imagine whose attacks the grand duke had chiefly in mind.

The events of 1339 show that Uzbek and Kalita continued their policy of co-operation until the grand duke's death. This was also shown in the winter of 1339/40, when the Muscovites and Tatars jointly made war on their common enemy Smolensk.<sup>74</sup> This military co-operation did not prevent rivalry between the parties in areas where Tatar and Muscovite interests clearly conflicted. Ivan had to allow for the possibility that the khan might revert to his policy of 1328-31 and support Suzdalian aspirations to Nizhny Novgorod (and to the Vladimir throne). This seemed to be especially on the cards after the execution of Aleksandr and the political weakening of Tver'. To guard against such dangerous intentions, which may have been forming just then in the khan's mind, Kalita sent his eldest son Semen to Nizhny Novgorod to protect his own interests on the middle Volga (see Chapter 9).

If the khan and the grand duke, despite their evidently conflicting interests, were both disposed to maintain the agreement of 1339, the reason was that it was to the advantage of either side, though unequally and only in the short term. The understanding was designedly left imprecise; each side drew different conclusions from it and cherished opposite hopes for the future. The rest of the game was never played out between them, however, as both died almost immediately: Kalita in 1340 and Uzbek in 1341.

Ivan Kalita also acquired the sobriquet of 'gatherer of the Rus'ian land' (*sobiratel' russkoi zemli*), and is supposed to have rendered his country unique services in this respect. The sources afford us more information on his external policy than on the internal affairs of Muscovy, but here too there are many gaps which historians have to fill with their own hypotheses.

It is not a question of the grand duke's intentions and aims, which are clear and undisputed, but of the real effects of his Rus'ian policy, i.e. relations with other principalities: since the various lands he sought to acquire were the patrimonies of different branches of the ruling dynasty.

Ivan's reign should, I believe, be treated from two points of view, according to whether we regard him as the overlord of Vladimir or the hereditary ruler of Muscovy. There is no doubt

that he wished to unite these two functions as closely as possible with himself and, moreover, with each other. This was far from being in the Horde's interest, but in view of the agreement of 1339 Ivan might have expected to obtain Uzbek's consent to at least an incidental mention in his testament which would have given expression to his political ambitions.

Kalita's testaments are significant for what they did not contain as well as what they did. They make no mention of anything to do with the grand duchy; the occupancy of the throne of Vladimir, the lands belonging to it, the sphere of authority of the grand duke etc. Decisions concerning Vladimir Rus' remained exclusively in Uzbek's hands, not only formally but in practice.<sup>75</sup> After Ivan's death (March 1340) his sons could only beg humbly for the khan's support of their aspiration to the Vladimir throne. Up to then there were no promises or engagements by the Tatars in Moscow's favour: in this respect Uzbek made no concessions.<sup>76</sup>

A study of the source material shows that Kalita as grand duke was an industrious 'gatherer' or accumulator not only of power, i.e. supremacy over all the princes of Vladimir Rus' and Great Novgorod (Presnyakov's thesis) but also of lands (as emphasized by Lyubavsky). The territories which belonged directly to the grand duke increased steadily in area, owing chiefly to the dying-out of minor princely families and the escheating of 'orphaned' lands to the head of the dynasty at Vladimir. Kalita's aim was to keep these possessions together and enlarge them as far as possible, as they gave him a preponderance of strength over the rest of the dynasty. Uzbek on the whole did not oppose this more and more evident preponderance, which was a guarantee of ruthlessness in collecting tribute for the Horde; but he was concerned that it should not lead to an excessive growth in Moscow's power.

Muscovy itself occupied a central and highly controversial place in the grand duke's negotiations with Uzbek in 1339, and it is twice mentioned in Ivan's will. In one passage he enjoined his sons to redistribute the districts bequeathed to them if any should be taken away by the Tatars.<sup>77</sup> This provision, which occurs in both versions of the testament, recognized the khan's right to reduce Kalita's patrimony to such limits as he might decree. If new appanages were carved out of Muscovy, there might be little left for the grand duke's sons to divide among themselves.

Did Ivan agree to this under pressure from Uzbek, or was he acting on his own initiative? In my opinion the first alternative can be ruled out. The khan, worshipped as ruler of the world, looked down contemptuously on the Rus'ian vassals who bowed at his feet. The ceremonies performed when Rus'ian princes visited the Horde were a reflection of the true state of affairs. The khan still had power of life and death over the Rus'ian princes, disposing absolutely over the lands and peoples they ruled. Given the balance of forces at that time, it is unthinkable that Uzbek should have voluntarily abandoned his sovereign rights and asked Ivan to consent to a reduction of the area of the Moscow principality. The provisions in the will can only have been introduced by Kalita himself.

At first sight this conclusion may seem highly improbable, conflicting as it does with all Ivan's efforts to secure for Moscow a dominant position in Vladimir Rus'. Uzbek well knew of these efforts, and Ivan knew that he knew. To allay the khan's fears he entrusted him with the protection of the territorial integrity of Muscovy, thus as it were guaranteeing that Moscow's power would never increase more than was acceptable to the Tatars.

In return for this proof of extreme submissiveness Ivan obtained a second advantage from Uzbek (besides the promise to destroy Aleksandr of Tver'), viz. the approval of his purchases of settlements outside Muscovy: all the villages are mentioned by name, though not all are easy to identify.<sup>78</sup> Kalita was at pains to secure this approval, which shows that he attached great importance to the villages. In view of their small size it is unlikely that he had only economic advantage in mind. In my opinion his object was to establish a valuable precedent by getting the khan's approval for the possession and enlargement of such lands outside Muscovy as might be purchased by Ivan's successors. This was a first step—modest perhaps, but of real importance in view of Ivan's material resources—in his policy of 'gathering in' the Rus'ian land under Moscow's aegis.<sup>79</sup> Given the inequality of strength between Ivan and the khan in 1339 it cannot be said that he scored any great success in the negotiations, but what he did achieve was not entirely negligible.

Kalita's political moves were seemingly inconsistent. On the one hand he showed a lack of firmness in maintaining the territorial integrity of Muscovy, agreeing in advance that its area

might be reduced, as though inviting the Tatars to help themselves; while on the other he busied himself in acquiring land for Moscow in other principalities. These apparent contradictions were a consequence of the awkward position in which he found himself.

Uzbek's suspicions were the chief obstacle to his designs. In order to allay them he had to proceed with extreme caution and obsequiousness. The purchase of lands by Rus'ian princes and princesses was a normal practice that had gone on since long before Kalita's time.<sup>80</sup> Generally such acquisitions did not involve more than individual villages and had no political character. This explaining why Uzbek consented to Ivan's wish. It does not mean, however, that he trusted him or abandoned the right, which he exercised, to confirm individual purchases or withhold his approval.

Half the villages bought by Kalita were in territory belonging directly to the grand duchy: the districts of Vladimir, Pereyaslav' and Kostroma. Although Ivan was the grand duke, he had to obtain permission from the Horde for each one of these purchases. This fact throws light on the remarkable extent of Ivan's dependence on the Horde, and on Uzbek's care that Ivan should not unite too many lands of Vladimir Rus' to Moscow by way of purchase. Indirectly, it provides evidence that the khan's plans for the future did not involve restricting the office of grand duke to the house of Muscovy.

The question of Ivan's territorial possessions is linked to the second testament of Dmitry Donskoy (1389), which states that that prince inherited from Kalita Beloozero, Galich, Uglich and all the lands belonging to those appanages. In view of this statement from such a notable source, and of the fact that after Ivan the throne of Vladimir was occupied by Muscovite princes almost without interruption, historians have concluded that (1) the policy of 'gathering' Rus'ian lands around Moscow involved large areas at that time, and (2) thanks to the possession of those areas and the strength they conferred, Ivan could persuade or compel the Horde to acknowledge the right of his Muscovite successors to the office of grand duke. Clearly these conclusions are sharply at variance with the analysis of Kalita's last will put forward by the present author.

As Donskoy refers to his grandfather's acquisitions in fairly general terms (Beloozero, Galich, Uglich), historians have tried

to fill in the gaps in his testament with supplementary detail of their own. Authors are constantly suggesting fresh hypotheses, showing that they are not convinced by the many conjectures of their predecessors.

Kalita's three important acquisitions mentioned by Donskoy raise several questions. In what capacity did he acquire the territories, as grand duke of Vladimir or as ruler of Moscow? From whom did he acquire them; what type of law and administration prevailed there; how did the other princes react, especially those who had till then been hereditary owners of the lands in question? and so on. Historians give different answers to all these questions; the extensive bibliography of the subject has been listed several times and need not be analysed here.<sup>81</sup>

Authors have concentrated on the most important problem, viz. whether Donskoy's testament is correct in ascribing to Kalita such a great enlargement of Moscow's territory. A clear majority of scholars answer this question in the affirmative. Among them is Kuchkin, though he admits that the hypotheses so far advanced concerning the acquisition of Galich by Kalita 'have not solved the mystery'; the solution, he believes, 'is unattainable without further data', i.e. source material.<sup>82</sup> Since the acquisition of Beloozero and Uglich, on close examination, also constitutes a 'mystery', we may apply Kuchkin's remark to all three territories.

Fresh source material is very much to be desired, but this is largely a utopian wish: it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find trustworthy new material concerning such remote times.

As to the manner in which Ivan acquired the three territories in question, Donskoy's testament uses the term *kuplya*.<sup>83</sup> This word, which usually means 'purchase', is generally used of the acquisition of territory, together with its verb *kupit'* and the derivatives *prikup*, *prikupit'*, signifying an addition to one's purchases.<sup>84</sup> The source material of most concern to us in the present connection is that of the 14th century, especially from Kalita's time up to and including that of Donskoy. The historian is fortunate in that princely documents of the period use the terms *kuplya* and *prikup* repeatedly, and always in connection with the purchase of land. The words are used in this sense by Kalita,<sup>85</sup> Semen<sup>86</sup> and Donskoy<sup>87</sup> himself—in the latter's case even in his second testament, in connection with Galich, Uglich and Beloozero.<sup>88</sup>

Historians have for the most part treated these documents somewhat cavalierly and attached more importance to other, less common uses of *kuplya*, usually in the sense of 'joining together' (*soedinenie*) or 'agreement' (*dogovor*).<sup>89</sup> Arguing on this basis they have sought to ascertain the nature of Kalita's agreements with the other princes concerned, which are thought to have brought about a new relation of dependence on their part *vis à vis* Ivan. Thus the historians concerned have concentrated on identifying the difference in status according to whether a prince was *kuplenny* or *nekuplenny*, i.e. in such a relationship or not. Their efforts do not go beyond individual hypotheses and have, if anything, still further widened the gaps between their views, although all these authors see Ivan's *kupli*<sup>90</sup> as a great success for Muscovite policy.

In my opinion, we should keep as close as possible to the sources. It appears from Donskoy's testament that the *kupli* were economic transactions consisting in the purchase of land. No one doubts that the change of ownership of the three principalities had important political consequences; it may have been brought about by force, but Dmitry's testament does not present the matter in this way. Again, we must be careful in using 15th-century sources as a key to events in the reign of Kalita. It may at times be necessary to adopt this dangerous method owing to the scarcity of 14th-century material, but this is only justified occasionally and by way of exception. In my opinion many authors go too far in applying 15th-century terms and conditions to earlier times, which is liable to give a false picture of the events we are concerned with.

In any case, the purchase of these three principalities involved Moscow, the Horde, and the princes of Beloozero, Galich and Uglich. How did each of the parties assert their interests? This question need really only be asked as regards the Tatars and the local princes, since it is quite clear what Moscow got out of the negotiations and treaties. It will help to elucidate this controversial question if we examine the cases and circumstances in which the word *kuplya* was used, especially in the period of special concern to us, and also study Kalita's testament more closely.

There is a huge discrepancy between Ivan's consent to a possible diminution of strictly Muscovite territory as the price of Uzbek's favour and, on the other hand, the expansion of that territory by the addition of vast faraway lands belonging to no fewer than



three other princes. The khan's approval, as Kalita's testament shows, extended only to the purchase of single villages outside Muscovy. In my opinion there is not the least plausibility in hypotheses, based on preconceived assumptions, to the effect that Uzbek supported the large-scale expansion of Moscow.<sup>91</sup>

There is, of course, the alternative possibility that Ivan bought the three territories in his capacity as grand duke. But this presents a difficulty of another kind: would Kalita have spent the money on such purchases when he was not certain that his sons and grandsons would succeed him on the Vladimir throne (his testament does not suggest any hope of this kind)? Would he not have been making a present of the territories to his potential rivals of Tver' or Nizhny Novgorod? S. Solov'ev, in his famous *History of Russia*, examined the alternative theory and decided that it was unlikely. In my opinion Ivan's *kupli* can only have been effected by bilateral agreements with the princes concerned, to which the Tatars were not a party.<sup>92</sup>

I do not deny that this view also presents great difficulties. The transactions in question might have aroused the khan's fury, with grave consequences of the kind that Ivan was most at pains to avoid. Moreover, would the three princes have voluntarily agreed to the curtailment of their rights to their own territories? We do not know what new kind of dependent relationship the purchases established as between them and Kalita; but, knowing Ivan's character, we may suppose that they were placed in a state of thoroughgoing subordination.

If we accept the unlikely view that the princes made these unprecedented concessions of their own free will, it would be natural to search the sources for indications of a *rapprochement* with Moscow and hence of the possible date of their agreements with Kalita. Unfortunately the sources provide no definite indications of this kind, and rather point to a state of hostility towards Ivan on the part of his weaker kinsmen. This, at any rate, is clear in the case of Beloozero.

The prince of Beloozero, Roman Mikhailovich, had taken an active part in the dispute between Moscow and Tver' in 1339, when he visited the Horde and, as we have seen, was a firm supporter of Aleksandr against Kalita. After that year the sources cease to mention him. It seems probable that he returned safely from the Horde<sup>93</sup> and continued to rule his own land, but we

do not know for how long. The opinion of most writers, with which I agree, is that Ivan could not have purchased Beloozero before 1339,<sup>94</sup> which means that he could only have done so in the last year or two of his life. Historians connect this with a switch of policy on Roman's part in favour of Moscow, evidenced by the marriage of his son Fedor to Ivan's daughter.

Kopanev has shown that Ivan's daughter Fedos'ya and Fedor's wife Fedos'ya were the same person:<sup>95</sup> the evidence for this rests on sources previously known and used, and others to which Kopanev himself drew attention.<sup>96</sup> In his view the marriage was concluded 'after 1339' but 'probably in Kalita's lifetime'.<sup>97</sup> Fennell likewise places it 'probably soon after the crisis of 1339'.<sup>98</sup> Kopanev further believes that the purchase of Beloozero took place at the same time as the marriage. This is less certain: it is a long way from a marriage that may be regarded as a sign of political *rapprochement*, to the purchase of a whole territory.<sup>99</sup> In any case, the dating of the above events requires closer examination. It is undisputed that the change in Beloozero's policy towards Moscow took place after the execution of Aleksandr of Tver', which was at the end of October 1339. November and December would not have allowed time for so many important events,<sup>100</sup> and Kopanev therefore rightly places the marriage 'after 1339'; but it is an open question whether his further statement ('probably in Kalita's lifetime') can be sustained.

Kalita died on 31 March 1340. Before his death he assumed the monastic habit and took the name Ananias. The chronicles are here supplemented by the *Laudation of Prince Ivan Kalita*, a source that has long been known<sup>101</sup> and is preserved in the MS of the *Siiskoe evangelie*.<sup>102</sup> The date of 1339, previously accepted for the *Laudation*,<sup>103</sup> has been corrected by Meshchersky, who convincingly ascribes it to 25 February 1340.<sup>104</sup> In the *Laudation* Ivan is twice referred to by his religious name of Ananias, showing that his withdrawal from public life cannot have been later than February 1340.<sup>105</sup> Despite this fact historians represent Kalita as engaging in vigorous activity in the last months of his life, including the *kuplya* of the three principalities which was, so to speak, the crowing achievement of his reign.<sup>106</sup> As far as dating is concerned, their statements take as a basis Fedor's marriage to Fedos'ya. This event was certainly a success for Moscow's policy, but the credit belongs not to Ivan but to his son Semen.<sup>107</sup>

Thus the marriage was not connected with the purchase of Beloozero. The question then arises whether events in Uglich and Galich afford more evidence of the date of Ivan's *kupli* than the insufficient data we have concerning Beloozero.

Unfortunately we know nothing whatever of the affairs of Uglich at this period, so that we can neither confirm nor deny that the principality was acquired by Ivan.<sup>108</sup> In the case of Galich there is more source material, but it does not get us much further.

As Kuchkin first pointed out, in 1345 Kalita's youngest son Andrei married Maria, daughter of Ivan Fedorovich, prince of Galich.<sup>109</sup> From this it would seem that after purchasing the principality Ivan Kalita allowed the then prince to continue ruling it. It is hard to say who that prince was, as our knowledge of Galich in the first half of the 14th century is extremely scanty: all we really know is that Fedor died in 1335<sup>110</sup> and Maria, as mentioned above, was married to Andrei. If the purchase of Galich took place before 1335 it was in the reign of Fedor;<sup>111</sup> if after 1335, it was in that of his son Ivan. The latter seems more probable, as historians are inclined to date the *kupli* to the latter part of Ivan Kalita's reign.

Unfortunately we know virtually nothing of Ivan Fedorovich except that he died some time after 1345. We do not know his date of birth or whether he had any children other than Maria, or what his attitude was towards the events of Kalita's reign. On this basis we cannot form any conclusions as to the date of the purchase of Galich, or whether it took place at all. Any discussions of these matters can only be hypothetical.<sup>112</sup>

Dmitry Donskoy's second testament is undated but was certainly drawn up in April or May 1389.<sup>113</sup> On this basis we may put the question: what data concerning the purchase of the three principalities have survived from before or after that year respectively? Neither Kalita's testament, nor his sons, nor Donskoy before 1389, make any mention of these annexations by Ivan. This is a point of basic, perhaps decisive importance. After 1389, on the other hand, new details come to light concerning these achievements. In fact, strange to say, the further away we get from the events, the more people know about them. As our argument has already shown, the whole story of the three purchases is full of unusual features, which we will sum up in order to present the picture as a whole.

As we know from Kalita's testament, he sought the Horde's approval for the purchase of certain villages outside Muscovy, which he enumerated by name, yet there is no sign that he sought permission to buy three principalities, which were far more important than the villages. Then, despite the ambitious nature of his designs, he allowed the local princes to go on ruling their lands. Considering the centralism which usually marked Moscow's policy, we would have expected him to do all he could to wipe out any signs of the separate identity of the three principalities and to absorb them as completely as possible into his own domain. Instead we find the opposite: the territories were long allowed to remain as separate entities with unchanged frontiers. We are surprised, moreover, at the princes of Beloozero, Galich and Uglich consenting of their own accord to the diminution of their rights and the increased subordination of their lands to Kalita. Besides these unusual features, the list of which could easily be prolonged, we are struck by the complete silence of the sources on the most important aspects of the purchase: e.g. we do not know whether Ivan acquired the three principalities in his capacity as grand duke or as ruler of Muscovy. This is of great importance for the political situation at the time. We do not know to what extent the subordination of the purchased principalities to Moscow was made to exceed that of the unpurchased ones. The sources afford no evidence as to the date or dates of the transactions and do not confirm their existence in any way. For all these reasons I am convinced that what Donskoy says about his grandfather's purchases does not correspond to the state of affairs in Kalita's time, though it gives us valuable information on Dmitry's own reign. This view is not a new one: similar opinions have been expressed by other authors such as Sergeevich,<sup>114</sup> Nasonov,<sup>115</sup> and especially Vodoff.<sup>116</sup>

If the territory of Muscovy before Ivan's time is compared with that principality as he bequeathed it, we find that it was unchanged except for the addition of the dozen or so villages mentioned in Kalita's will. These are too narrow a basis on which to speak of an already developed process of 'gathering in the Rus'ian land'. The purchase of three principalities would indeed justify the credit given to Ivan in this respect, but Donskoy's statement about it cannot be accepted.

It is often maintained that Kalita consolidated the grand duchy from a political point of view thanks to the predominance he acquired over the other princes; but this view should be treated with caution.

If Ivan's son Semen was surnamed 'the Proud' (*Gordy*), he undoubtedly inherited this trait from his father. Ivan looked down on his relatives, whether close or distant; he showed cruelty and ruthlessness in extorting tribute from their lands, and compelled them to various servile obligations. He stood aloof from them in every way: it was not they who had raised him to where he was, and the fate of the grand duchy did not depend on them. Kalita, in his own estimation, ruled by the grace of two supreme authorities: God in heaven and the khan on earth (*pozhalovan Bogom i tsarem*).<sup>117</sup>

Ivan's exalted position must have provoked reaction and resistance on the part of the other princes, especially the stronger ones. If one can speak of the political consolidation of Vladimir Rus' in Ivan's time, the events of 1339-42 and somewhat later show that it is rather a case of the most important principalities (Tver', Suzdal', Rostov,<sup>118</sup> Yaroslavl',<sup>119</sup> Beloozero) being knitted together by hostility to Moscow.

Ivan's testament shows him in an unexpectedly weak position both as grand duke, concerned to secure the succession for his descendants, and as ruler of Muscovy, concerned, despite appearances, to preserve its territorial integrity. He did not enlarge his patrimony of Moscow to any appreciable extent, and he was far from being able to keep the other princes in a subservient position. The short period of his rule as grand duke (1332-40) might, like that of many of his predecessors on the Vladimir throne, have been only a passing episode of no special importance. Much was to depend on the wisdom of his successors, and much on the gravity of the Tatars' mistakes.

If Ivan's role in history were to be assessed from his testaments alone, the picture would be distinctly one-sided. His achievements should not be underrated; they were considerable, but more financial than political. The symbolic sackful of coin, extracted from the whole state for the khan's benefit, was to be the foundation of all Moscow's further progress.

Ivan's ambitions looked far into the future. He certainly hoped that his grandsons, if not his sons, would throw off the 'Tatar

yoke' and unite all Vladimir Rus' and Great Novgorod under their own sway. For the time being this was not practical politics. Any serious attempt to resist the Horde would have meant an armed clash with the Tatars, and Kalita was clearly too weak to challenge the khan. It might have been possible, though extremely risky, to contemplate such action if all the Rus'ian principalities and Great Novgorod had ranged themselves firmly behind Moscow. But the situation within the dynasty gave no ground for such hopes, as Ivan knew only too well. As it was hopeless to resist the khan, he had to be subservient. In his testament he went to the extreme limit of servility by agreeing in advance to the diminution of his own territory, as the best way of keeping the other princes in a helpless condition.

Ivan needed to be an outstanding politician to achieve the aims and tasks he had set himself for the future. His situation called for the greatest circumspection, a keen sense of reality, consistency in action and a masterly command of hypocrisy and falsehood. His policy rested on two bases: constant deceitfulness towards the khan (keeping for himself a proportion of the tribute collected for the Tatars) and violence, not excluding murder, in his relations with unruly princes. He played a dangerous game, the final results of which were hard to foresee. It is a far cry from this reality to the assertions of some historians that by the time he died the triumph of Moscow was a foregone conclusion.

One point in Semen's testament is of particular interest. The grand duke was concerned above all that posterity should not forget his father, 'that the candle may not go out'.<sup>120</sup> I do not think this was a mere empty phrase.<sup>121</sup> Ivan's son compared his achievements to a lighted candle, dispelling darkness all over the country. Kalita's testaments do not themselves afford any ground for giving him the credit of preparing a brighter future for Moscow: they rather suggest a candle that has gone out already. I believe, however, that in making his comparison Semen was lifting a corner of the veil that concealed Ivan's unwritten testament to his sons. To indicate to his younger brothers the meaning and purpose of their future government, Semen had no choice but to clothe his thoughts in vagueness and metaphor.<sup>122</sup>

He did not, be it noted, called on his brothers to make the candle burn brighter or illuminate the whole of the grand duchy. He took a more cautious view of the situation, expressing anxiety

lest Kalita's candle should be extinguished, and well aware that this might happen at any moment. A single unexpected invasion by the Tatars would suffice to raze Moscow to the ground and ruin the country once and for all. Or, more easily still, the khan could have summoned Ivan and his three sons to the Horde and put them all to death.<sup>123</sup> One way or another, the candle was still easy to blow out.

## Notes to Chapter 8

1. *TL*, p. 359; *PSRL*, XV, p. 417, and others.
2. Ivan was born in the 1280s, probably the second half of the decade. In 1327 he was about 40.
3. Cf. V. Kuchkin, *Rol' Moskvy v politicheskom razvitii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi kontsa XIII v.*, in: *Novoe o proshlom nashei strany*, 1967, pp. 61-2.
4. Aleksandr, it will be recalled, saved his life by fleeing to Pskov.
5. Seeking a precedent for this decision by Uzbek, historians generally refer to the situation which arose soon after the death of Grand Duke Yaroslav in 1246, when his eldest son Aleksandr (Nevsky) received 'Kiev and the whole land of Rus'' while the second son, Andrei, was given Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma (in the broad sense). This is a far from exact parallel, since in the middle of the 13th century there was as yet no firm tradition whereby the Tatars appointed the grand duke, and moreover Aleksandr was not coequal with Andrei but his overlord, at least in theory.
6. The appanage of Suzdal' was given to Andrei, Nevsky's rival and the son of Grand Duke Yaroslav (see Chapter 6). His sons Yury and Mikhail ruled at Suzdal' after him. Mikhail's son was Vasily, father of Aleksandr who now became grand duke.
7. '... i Ozybyak podelil knyazhenie im: knyazyu Ivanu Danilovichu Novgorod i Kostromu, polovina knyazheniya; a Suzhdal'skomu knyazyu Aleksandru Vasil'evichu dal Volodimer i Povolozh'e i knyazhi poltret'ya godu': *NPL*, p. 469. The Rus'ian chroniclers for the most part say that Ivan became grand duke of the whole of Vladimir Rus' in 1328. They either do not know of, or do not choose to mention, the division effected by Uzbek, as to which see A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 138-40; J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, pp. 111-14.
8. The early history of both these towns and their political role has recently been discussed by V. Kuchkin, *Nizhny Novgorod i Nizhegorodskoe knyazhestvo v XIII-XIV vv.*, in *Pol'sha i Rus'*, 1974, pp. 234-9.

9. On the payments and tribute extracted from Rus' by the Tatars see B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 316–20, 332–42 etc.

10. '... nachasha vaditi na velikogo knyazya Mikhaila bezakonnomu tsaru, Ozbyaku, glagolyushche: knyaz' Mikhailo, sbrav po gradom mnogoy dani, khoshchet iti v Nemtsi a (k) tobe emu ne byvati': *PSRL*, XV, pp. 410–11, 38. 'I pokladakhu mnogoy gramoty so mnogym zamysleniem na knyazya Mikhaila, glagolyushche: mnogoy dani poimal esi na gorodekh nashikh, tsaryu zhe ne dal esi . . . ; iznosyashche emu nepravednoe osuzhenie: tsesarevy dani ne dal esi . . .': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 163.

11. '... knyaz' Yuri, poimav srebro ou Mikhailovichy vykhodnoe po dokonchaniyu, ne shel protivu tsareva posla n[o] stupil s srebrom v Novgorod Velikiy': *PSRL*, XV, pp. 41, 414.

12. Between 1313 and 1328 six princes held the office of grand duke, counting both Kalita and Aleksandr of Suzdal' who were appointed by the khan in 1328.

13. 'Togo zhe leta [1327] priide iz Ordy posol silen na Tfer' imenem Shcholkan so mnozhtvom Tatar, i nachasha nasilie veliko tvoriti, a knyazya Aleksandra Mikhailovicha i ego bratiyu khotyashe pobiti, a sam sest' khotyashe vo Tferi na knyazhen'i, a inykhn knyazei svoikh khotyashe posazhati po inym gorodom Russkim . . .': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 168. Similarly, though in different words: *PSRL*, XV, p. 415.

14. Expedition against Tver' in 1327 'po povelenu tsarevu', *TL*, p. 358; against Smolensk in 1339 'po tsarevu povelenu', *ibid.*, p. 363.

15. '... i nasta nasilovanie mnogo . . . , uvy, uvy! togda gradu Rostovu, pache zhe i knyazem ikh, yako otyasya ot nikh vlast' i knyazhenie, i imenie, i chest' i slava, i vsya prochaya, i potyagnu k Moskvu. Egda izyde povelenie velikogo knyazya Ivana Danilovichya, i poslav byst' ot Moskvu na Rostov, aki nekii voyevoda, edin ot velmozh, imenem Vasilei, prozvivshchem Kocheva, i s nim Mina, i egda vridosta vo grad Rostov, togda vozlozhista veliku nuzhu na grad, da i na vsya zhivushchaya v nem, i gonenie mnogo umnozhisya . . . I byst' strakh velik na vsekh slyshashchikh i vidyashchikh sia . . .': *PSRL*, XI, pp. 128–9.

16. We are not concerned here to ascertain whether the acts of violence at Rostov were paralleled in all the lands of the grand duchy. The sources neither confirm nor deny this. It may be that the population of a small principality, out of fright and despair, would have made over all their possessions to Kalita without his having to use force in all cases. The account of events in Rostov is important as showing the methods to which Ivan resorted without hesitation whenever he encountered resistance.

17. The chronicler mentions s.a. 1330 that 'Fedor of Starodub was killed at the Horde': *PSRL*, XV, p. 45. He could scarcely have been more



laconic. We do not know why and in what circumstances this Fedor was put to death. Starodub, on the Klyaz'ma, was not important politically, and we know very little of its princes in the 14th century. Cf. V. Kuchkin, *Iz istorii genealogicheskikh i politicheskikh svyazei moskovsko-knyazheskogo doma v XIV v., IZ, XCIV, 1974, pp. 368-9.*

18. Fedor Vasil'evich, prince of Rostov, died in 1331, a convenient event for Kalita. His brother and successor Konstantin was married to Kalita's daughter, so that the latter was able to influence the affairs of the principality through his son-in-law.

19. Aleksandr of Suzdal', who had shared the grand-ducal office with Kalita, died in 1331, leaving Ivan as supreme ruler of all Vladimir Rus'—another success for Moscow. We do not know what their mutual relations were like. During their brief period of joint rule they acted in concert, obediently performing the khan's wishes.

20. The chronicler states s.a. 1334 that Kalita left the Horde safely, while Boris, prince of Dmitrov, died there (' . . . vyide knyaz' velikii Ivan izo Ordy, a knyaz' Boris Dmitrov'skyi v Orde mertv': *PSRL, XV, col. 47*). This cryptic statement suggests that there was some connection between the two events, but it is difficult to say what.

21. Fedor of Galich, brother of the Boris mentioned above, died in 1335.

22. Daniil's eldest son Yuri married his daughter Sofia to Konstantin Mikhailovich of Tver' in 1320, hoping that this would be to his advantage in the strained state of relations between Tver' and Moscow. Kalita followed his brother's line and treated Konstantin more favourably than the other Tverite princes, a policy made easier by Konstantin's subservience to the grand duke.

23. In 1328 Kalita married his daughter to Konstantin Vasil'evich of Rostov. The chronicles do not give her name ('Togo zhe leta zhenisya knyaz' Kostyantyn Vasil'evich Rostovsky u velikovo knyazya Ivana Danilovicha': *PSRL, XXV, p. 169; ULS, p. 50, etc.*). Most writers suppose that it was Maria, but this is impossible, as Maria is mentioned in Kalita's will as one of his younger children (' . . . dal menshim detem svoim, M(a)r'i . . .': *DDG, N 1, p. 8, N 2, p. 10*), i.e. those by his second marriage in 1332. The error is due to the fact that the chronicle speaks s.a. 1365 of the death of Konstantin's wife Maria (*PSRL, I, p. 231*). What must have happened is that Kalita's daughter died before 1365 and the widowed Konstantin married a princess Maria of whom nothing else is known.

24. ' . . . knyaz' Kostantin . . . nacha knyazhiti togdy tikho i mirno': *PSRL, XV, p. 417.*

25. No one was more cruel and ruthless than Kalita in extracting tribute for the khan from the grand duchy, and no one in so doing secured a greater share of the Horde's revenue for Moscow.

26. 'Azhe B(og) chto rozgadaet' o moem' zhivote . . .'

27. Both documents were published in *DDG*, 1950: N 1, pp. 7-9 and N 2, pp. 9-11; previous editions are listed *ibid.*, p. 11. They have been reprinted many times. Useful especially to readers who do not know Russian is Robert C. Howes, *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow*, 1967, where the texts are also given in English with a commentary (pp. 180-7).

28. On Kalita's seals see L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy XIV-XV vekov*, 1, 1948, p. 15.

29. A. Oreshnikov, *Materialy k russkoi sfragistike, TMNO*, III (1), 1903, pp. 119-21.

30. L. Cherepnin, *loc. cit.*, states that the documents were written by two different persons, though the hands are fairly similar. The shorter one gives the clerk's name as Kostroma; the writer of the longer document is not named.

31. L. Cherepnin, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

32. Even if we accept that the whole of the grand duke's second testament was written by the same hand, this does not invalidate the suggestion in the text. Kalita might have taken with him to the Horde a clerk who had drawn up the main part of the will at Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma or Moscow.

33. Both documents state this in the same words: ' . . . pishu d(u)sh(e)vnuyu gramotu, ida v Vordu . . .'

34. 'A gramotu [sc. Kalita's first will] p(i)sal d'yak knyazya velikogo . . .'

35. The statement of later chroniclers that Kalita went to the Horde in 1340 is untrustworthy (cf. L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 14), if only because of the state of his health at the time (cf. below).

36. *SGGD*, I, NN 21-2, pp. 31-5.

37. A. Zimin, *O khronologii dukhovnykh i dogovornykh gramot velikikh i udel'nykh knyazei XIV-XV vv.*, *PI*, VI, 1958, pp. 276-9.

38. In his second will, as we know, Kalita listed several villages which he had bought outside the frontiers of Muscovy. It is hard to suppose that he could have concluded all these purchases by 1327-8; it seems more likely that they went on during the whole of his reign as grand duke.

39. Ivan was twice married. After the death of his first wife Elena, referred to above, he married again in 1332. In his will he repeatedly mentions his wife and makes various bequests to her. As she is not named in either version of the will, whereas Elena is mentioned by name, Zimin assumes that the references to Ivan's living consort relate to Elena also. If there had been a second wife, he argues, Ivan would have mentioned her by name, if only to distinguish her from Elena.

Both versions of the will mention Elena once only and in a specific context: Ivan bequeaths to Fetin'ya, his daughter by his first marriage, the valuables that belonged to her mother Elena, while he leaves the rest of the 'gold' to his wife and her small children. 'A chto zoloto knyagini moee Olenino, a to esm' dal dcheri svoei Fetin'i, 14 obruchi i ozherel'e m(a)t(e)ri ee . . . A chto esm' pridobyl zolota . . . , a to esm' dal knyagini svoei s menshimi detmi.' It seems to me clear from this that Elena was no longer alive and that the latter part of the passage refers to Ivan's second wife and his children by her.

Doubt is removed, in any case, by the testament of Kalita's son Ivan, who knew the terms of his father's will and, referring to them, assured Ul'yana (here we learn for the first time the name of Ivan's second wife) of the continued possession of the estates bequeathed to her by Kalita. ('A knyagini Oul'yana, po o(t)sa m(oego, knyazyia) velikogo, gramote po d(u)sh(e)vnoi, vedaet' volosti, i osmnich'e i sel(a) . . .': DDG N 4, pp. 16, 18). If we accepted Zimin's view that the bequests in the known testaments of Ivan were to Elena, then in view of the entirely trustworthy testimony of Ivan Ivanovich we should have to suppose that Kalita made yet another will in favour of Ul'yana, which is highly unlikely.

In making his bequests Kalita thought and spoke of his second wife. He might name her or not as he pleased, but it was a customary mark of respect for the prince's widow not to name her, as being a person in any case generally known. Kalita's sons naturally mention their own wives in their respective wills: Semen does not give his wife's name (DDG, N3, pp. 13-14), while Ivan does (ibid. N4, pp. 15-19). The latter's son Dmitry, who assigned an important political role to his wife, does not mention her by name (ibid. N8, pp. 24-5; N 12, pp. 33-7). Whether named or not, the consorts are always referred to in the wills as 'my princess' (*knyagini moya*).

40. Kalita refers several times in his will to his 'children' (plural) by his second wife ('A se dayu knyagini svoei s menshimi detmi . . .'; . . . a to esm' dal knyagini svoei s menshimi detmi'; 'A prikazyvayu tobe, s(y)nu svoemu Semenu, brat'yu tvoyu molodshuyu i knyag(i)nyu svoyu s menshimi detmi . . .'). There must therefore have been at least two daughters (a son would have received far more important bequests). This is confirmed by the passage in the will referring to 'my younger children, Maria and Feodos'ya' (' . . . a to esm' dal menshim detem svoim, M(a)r'i (zhe) Fedos'i, ozherel'em.').

41. Details in V. Debol'sky, *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty moskovskikh knyazei kak istoriko-geograficheskii istochnik* 1, 1901; M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii Velikorusskoi narodnosti*, 1929; S. Veselovsky, V. Snegirev and N. Korobkov, *Podmoskov'e*, 1955; and others.

42. L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 18.
43. 'Prikazyvayu s(y)nom svoim och(i)nu svoyu Moskvu': DDG, pp. 7, 9.
44. The chronicles often record facts in an extremely laconic fashion and without any indication of the connection between them. Events of a given year are not always recorded in the order in which they took place; the month and day are not given, and it is difficult to establish their correct sequence and interrelation. Information from contemporaries was not preserved in its original form but incorporated into later compilations (*letopisnye svody*) and distorted in the process. The oldest original texts were 'amended' for the most part in accordance with the interests of Moscow, which predominated in the 15th and 16th centuries. Naturally the records of Tver' were most liable to alteration, and today it requires no small effort to reconstruct them. Cf. A. Nasonov, *Letopisnye pamyatniki Tverskogo knyazhestva. Opyt rekonstruktsii Tverskogo letopisaniya s XIII do kontsa XV v.*, IAN, 1930 N 9, pp. 709–38; N 10, pp. 739–72. The chroniclers sometimes give different accounts of the same events, showing indirectly that they interpreted facts subjectively according to their predisposition in favour of Moscow, Tver' or Novgorod. In short, while the source material we are concerned with is fairly plentiful for some matters, for others it is scanty and full of gaps which different authors try, not always successfully, to fill with their own hypotheses.
45. To take one of many examples, A. Zimin (*O khronologii*, p. 277) thinks that Ivan went twice to the Horde in 1332–9, while J. Fennell (*The Emergence*, p. 120) speaks of at least four journeys. The trips are of importance, as they throw light on the extent of Rus'ian dependence on the Tatars and the grand duke's co-operation with the khan.
46. J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, pp. 120, 121, 195 etc.
47. L. Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vekakh*, 1960, p. 512.
48. I.e. the appointment of Ivan and Aleksandr of Suzdal' as coequal grand dukes in 1328–31.
49. Aleksandr of Suzdal' died in 1331. Ivan became sole grand duke of Vladimir Rus' in 1332, and Fedor, son of the exiled Aleksandr of Tver', began his successful intrigue with the Horde as early as 1335 or even 1334. Uzbek's anti-Moscow policy was interrupted for only a very short time.
50. N. Berezhkov, *Khronologiya russkogo letopisaniya*, p. 295.
51. Aleksandr's return to Tver' was no doubt kept secret from Moscow (and Ivan was in any case still on his way back from the Horde). It is possible that Fedor, with Uzbek's encouragement, persuaded his father to return.
52. 'Na tu zhe zimou priide knyaz' velikii [!] Aleksandr iz Ordy vo Tfer', a s nim posly silny Kindyak i Avdul . . .': PSRL, XV, col. 48.

53. After mentioning Aleksandr's return to Tver' and the presence of Uzbek's envoys the chronicler adds: ' . . . i mnogo stvorishet'sya tyagosti khristianom. A boyare mnozi otekha na Moskvu k velikomu knyazyu Ivanu' (ibid.). If 'Christians' is to be taken literally and not as a conventional euphemism for supporters of the Muscovite interest, then the persecution must have been carried on by the Tatars, not Aleksandr, who was of course a Christian himself. In connection with the persecutions a large group of boyars left Tver' for Moscow. This indicates that when Kalita became grand duke he 'planted' some boyars of his own in Tver' or, as was his habit, bribed some of the local ones. Uzbek's envoys were sent in order to eliminate Ivan's partisans from the Tver' principality.

54. J. Fennell (*The Emergence*, p. 169) states that 'both [Ivan] and the khan had long decided to destroy' Aleksandr of Tver'. This raises many questions that Fennell does not answer. Why was Uzbek so anxious for the death of Aleksandr, who presented no danger as long as he remained in exile either in Lithuania or in Rus'? Why was Aleksandr not put to death as soon as he appeared at the Horde from Pskov? Why was he sent back to Tver' and solemnly installed as ruler there? Why was he given Tatar aid in expelling pro-Muscovite elements from Tver'? and so forth. It remains a fact that when Aleksandr went to the Horde he avoided travelling through any part of Rus' (' . . . obishedshi vsyu zemlyu Rousskuyu': *PSRL*, XV, col. 48), i.e. the grand duchy of Vladimir, for fear that Kalita might have him kidnapped and slain. In other words, he perceived a difference between the attitudes of Moscow and the Horde towards himself: he saw some chance of regaining the khan's favour, but was certain that Ivan would murder him if he could.

55. The dates show that it was Ivan, alarmed at the course of events, who initiated fresh negotiations with Uzbek. Aleksandr arrived in Tver' in autumn 1338, and Kalita went to the Horde that winter. Cf. J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, pp. 163, 164.

56. There is no clear proof that Aleksandr, after his return, aspired to the office of grand duke, but there are several indirect indications. He had been grand duke at the time of his flight in 1327, and might naturally have hoped to restore the status quo. The fierceness of the hostility between Moscow and Tver' suggests that something more important was at stake than Aleksandr's recovery of Tver'. L. Cherepnin suggests in *Obrazovanie*, p. 506—though this is open to doubt—that Uzbek did appoint Aleksandr grand prince in 1338: *PSRL*, XV, col. 48. Aleksandr did not have regular relations with Kalita at that time (' . . . knyaz' Aleksandr Mikhailovich' Tfer'skii poide v Ordu, a ne ukonchiv so knyazem s velikim s Yvanom s Danilovichem': *TL*, p. 362), and there is no sign that he wished to, since any negotiation would have had to start by recognizing Ivan as grand duke. When the prince of Tver' was

summoned by Uzbek to Sarai the Tatars told him, shortly before his death, that he would either be made grand duke or executed ('... inii glagolakhu: knyazhenie ti daet velikoe tsar'; a inii glagolakhu: ubitu ti byti': *PSRL*, XV, col. 419). So apparently the first possibility was considered at the Horde, though it was very unlikely to have been put into effect.

57. The events connected with Aleksandr's summons to the Horde and his death are described in many chronicles in very vague terms. One attributes his misfortune to 'the evil counsel of the devil' (*PSRL*, XV, col. 48). Some persons unknown blackened his name at the Horde with slanderous charges (unspecified): 'vo Orde tsaryu Azbyaku mnogo klevetasha netsii na knyazya Aleksandra' (*PSRL*, X, p. 208). All the records agree in implying that his tragic fate was decided by the Tatars alone: the later editors of old texts were determined to erase any suggestion of Kalita's complicity in the crime. Only one or two accounts come closer to reality by stating that it was Kalita who persuaded Uzbek to summon Aleksandr ('Knyaz' velikii Ivan Danilovich' khodi vo Ordu . . . Ego zhe dumoyu posla tsar' Ozbyak na Rus' po knyazya Aleksandra . . .': *PSRL* XXV, p. 172. Similarly *NPL*, p. 349). The summons was ostensibly friendly, as the chroniclers keep emphasizing, but was in fact a trap: Aleksandr's fate was sealed before he arrived at the Horde. Kalita's thirst for his rival's destruction is illustrated by the fact that he invaded Tver' and plundered it mercilessly, either before or immediately after Aleksandr's burial.

58. 'Khodi knyaz' velikyi Ivan v Ordu; ego zhe dumoyu prislavshe Tatarove, pozvasha Aleksandra i Vasil'ya Davydovitsa Yaroslav'skago i vsekh knyazii v Ordu': *NPL*, p. 349; similarly *PSRL*, XXV, p. 172. 'Togo zhe leta poidosha v Ordu knyaz' Aleksandr Mikhailovich' Tferskii . . . ; takozhe poshli v Ordu knyaz' Vasilei Davydovich' Yaroslavskiy, knyaz' Romanchyuk Belozerskiy': *TL*, pp. 362-3.

59. N. Berezhkov, *Khronologiya*, p. 296.

60. 'I prebyst' edin mesyats' v Orde . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 58.

61. 'Toe zhe oseni knyaz' Ivan Danilovich' otpusti vo Ordu syny svoya, Semena i Ioana i Andreyas': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 172.

62. '... poide v Ordu . . . Vasilii Yaroslav'skiy, na n' posla Ivan knyaz' . . . v 5 sot pereimat', n' otbisya ikh': *NPL*, p. 350.

63. From the chroniclers' accounts, especially those of Tver' (*PSRL*, XV, pp. 50-1, 420-1), it appears that Aleksandr's martyrdom caused a great stir in Vladimir Rus'. The highest church dignitaries—the metropolitan and many bishops—attended his funeral, a fact of political as well as religious importance. Kalita had to reckon with the Church's attitude, as he constantly needed its aid in his political designs.

64. It is generally supposed that Aleksandr's links with Lithuania were the cause of his downfall. It is true that he spent about eighteen

months there during the first phase of his long exile, when obliged for a time to leave Pskov. But the khan knew all about this stay when he restored Aleksandr to favour and installed him at Tver'. The Lithuanians took no political or military action in support of Tverite interests.

In 1333 Kalita married his son Semten to a Lithuanian princess, probably the granddaughter of Gedyminas, grand duke of Lithuania: cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*, 1, p. 345. This marriage had clear political overtones, emphasized by the tender age of the parties. At that time Ivan was seeking closer relations and co-operation with Lithuania. The marriage was more likely to be compromising in Uzbek's eyes than Aleksandr's stay in Lithuania at a time when he was driven by circumstances and had no strength of his own.

65. The Tatars had much experience and skill in liquidating Rus'ian princes who visited the khans: they either poisoned them so that they died on the homeward journey (this happened more often in the 13th century) or murdered them in the Horde itself (more often in the 14th). Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa* 1, pp. 184, 201, 214, 216, 291, 297, 301, 350 etc.; id., *The Origin of Russia*, 1954 (repr. 1969), pp. 309, 319.

66. 'Ko knyazyu zhe Ivanu poslasha (novgorodtsi) Selivestra Voloshevicha i Fedora Ovramova s vykhodom. Knyaz' zhe prisla posly svoi, prosya drugogo vykhoda: a eshche daite mi zapros tsesarev; chogo u mene tesar' zaproschal; i oni rkosha: togo (u nas) ne byvalo ot nachala miru, a ty tseloval krest k Novogorodu po staroi poshline novgorodchko i po Yaroslavlim gramotam': NPL, p. 350. Similarly PSRL, XXV, p. 172.

67. It should be remembered that Kalita reigned only 11 years as grand duke and only 8 years over the whole of Vladimir Rus', from 1332 to 1339; he died in March 1340. It is often maintained that in those years he carried out a large-scale settlement programme, bringing large numbers of people from other principalities to Muscovy, founding new villages and greatly increasing his revenue as a result. The sources in no way confirm that such colonization took place. If it did at all, which is highly speculative, the process cannot have been either rapid or on a large scale. The settlers attracted by Ivan would at best have come in small groups (the other princes would no doubt have hindered them); they would chiefly have been allotted waste land and would have needed time and help in cultivating it. It is hard to believe that these new settlers would have become an important source of revenue in barely ten years.

68. 'I ne malo ikh ot Rostovets' moskovichem imeniya svoya s nuzheyu otdavakhu . . .': PSRL, XI, p. 128.

69. 'A knyaz' velikii Ivan v Tferi ot svyatago Spasa vzyal kolokol na Moskvou': PSRL, XV, p. 52. Tver' was an important fortress city, and

the residence of its princes was larger and richer than that of Moscow: M. Tikhomirov, *Srednevekovaya Rossiya na mezhdunarodnykh putyakh*, 1966, p. 30. We may suppose that Kalita did not confine himself to carrying off the bell, but looted a great many other things also.

70. There is a vast literature on Kalita's building programme and works of architecture, painting, sculpture, etc. in Moscow at this period. The authors include M. Alpatov, N. Brunov, G. Latysheva, V. Lazarev, P. Maksimov, A. Nasonov, O. Podobedova, M. Rabinovich, V. Snegirev, A. Stoletov, M. Tikhomirov, A. Vasnetsov, N. Voronin, and many others.

71. 'A pri svoem' zhivote dal esm' s(y)nu svoemu Semenu: 4 chepi zoloty, 3 poyasy zoloty, 2 chashi zoloty s zhenchugi, blyudtse zoloto s zhenchugom' s kamen'em'. A k tomu eshche dal esm' emu 2 chuma zolota bolshaya. A is soudov is serebr'nykh dal esm' emu 3 blyuda ser'br'na': DDG, N 1, pp. 7, 9. He made similar bequests to his other sons and his wife (and daughters). Cf. A. Svirin, *Yuvelirnoe iskusstvo Drevnei Rusi XI-XVII vekov*, 1972 (unavailable to me).

72. J. Fennell (*The Emergence*, p. 287) rightly observes: 'The extant sources give practically no information on social and economic conditions within the principality; we know nothing of land-ownership, of agrarian conditions, of tax-collection, of legal administration.'

73. 'Toe zhe zimy novyabrya 25 [1339] zalozhen byst' grad Moskva, da i srublén byst' toe zhe zimy v velikoe govenie': PSRL, XXV, p. 172. TL, p. 363: '... a kon'chasha toe zhe zimy na vesnu, v velikoe govenie': PSRL, XV, p. 52. Cf. V. Kostochkin, *Russkoe oboronnoe zodchestvo kontsa XIII—nachala XV vv.*, 1962, pp. 191–2; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII-XV vv.* 2, 1962, p. 165; M. Rabinovich, *O drevnei Moskve*, 1964, pp. 33–5, and others.

74. PSRL, XV, col. 52; XXV, p. 172; TL, p. 363, etc.

75. It must be borne in mind that these decisions, which were particularly important when it was a question of placing a candidate on the throne of Vladimir, were not of a permanent character. The grand-ducal office was not hereditary and was not necessarily held for life. The Tatars might at any moment depose the grand duke and remove him from Vladimir.

76. This shows how unlikely are hypotheses which suggest that Uzbek was particularly amenable to Kalita's persuasions in 1339.

77. 'A po moim grekhom, tsi imut' iskati tatarove kotorykh volosti, a otoimut'sya vam, s(y)n(o)m moim, i knyagini moei podeliti vy sya opyat' tymi volostmi na to mesto': DDG, N 1, pp. 8, 10.

78. 'A proch' Moskov'skikh sel, dayu s(y)nu svoemu Semenu sela svoya kuplenaya . . .': DDG, N 1, p. 10.

79. The purchase of villages outside one's own patrimony had a degree of political significance. It was fairly easy for any prince to evict



small land-holders in his own appanage, but a much more difficult matter, if not impossible, to lay hands on the property of the Moscow rulers, who held the grand-ducal office and enjoyed the Tatars' favour. The ownership of even a single village enabled the Moscow princes in practice to interfere in the internal affairs of the principality in question, and as their villages were scattered through various lands, by this means Moscow could take the first steps towards establishing its influence from within in a number of areas.

80. The grand duke's testament also confirms this: 'A chto selo Pavlovskoe, baby nashei kuplya . . .': *ibid.*, p. 10.

81. A. Kopanev, 'O "kuplyakh" Ivana Kality', *IZ*, XX, 1946, p. 25; *id.*, *Istoriya zemlevladieniya Belozerskogo kraya XV-XVI vv.* 1951, pp. 22-4; L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, pp. 17-20; J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, pp. 181-5; V. Kuchkin, *Iz istorii genealogicheskikh i politicheskikh svyazei moskovskogo knyazheskogo doma v XIV v.*, *IZ*, XCIV, 1974, pp. 373-6; W. Vodoff, 'A propos des "achats" (kupli) d'Ivan Ier de Moscou', *JS*, 1974(2), pp. 97-101, and others.

82. V. Kuchkin, *Iz istorii*, p. 376.

83. 'A s(y)n a svoego bl(a)g(o)s(lo)v(l)yayu, knyazya Yur'ya, svoego deda kupleyu, Galichem . . . A s(y)n a svoego, knyazya An'dreya, bl(a)g(o)s(lo)v(l)yayu kupleyu zhe deda svoego, Belymozerom . . . A s(y)n a svoego, knyazya Petra, bl(a)g(o)s(lo)v(l)yayu kupleyu zhe svoego deda, Ouglechim polem . . .': *DDG*, N 12, p. 34.

84. *Kuplya* is correctly defined in S. Pushkarev, *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, 1970, p. 50, as 'A purchase and the property so acquired, esp. a purchased landed estate. Also, a trading operation in general.' R. Howes, in *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow*, 1967, p. 212, gives a precise translation of the above-quoted passages from Dmitry's testament: 'And my son, Prince Yury, I bless with my grandfather's purchase, Galich . . . And I bless my son, Prince Andrei, with yet (another) purchase of my grandfather, Beloozero . . . And my son, Prince Petr, I bless with yet (another) purchase of my grandfather, Ugleche Plain . . .'

85. Ivan's testament, 'A proch' Moskov'skikh sel, dayu s(y)nu svoemu Semenu sela svoya kuplenaya . . . A chto esm' kupil selo Petrovskoe . . . A chto esm' kupil selo Varvar'skoe . . . A chto selo Pavlovskoe, baby nashee kuplya, i Novoe seltse, chto esm' kupil, i Oleksandr s(vya)tyi, chto esm' kupil na Kostrome . . . A chto esm' kupil selo v Rostove . . . A chto esm' prikupil seltse na Kerzhachi . . .': *DDG*, p. 10.

86. Semen's agreement with his brothers: ' . . . chto esm' prikupil Zaberegi . . . kuplyu . . . ; . . . tobe, knyazyu velikomu . . . nashikh oudelekh ne kupiti . . .': *ibid.*, p. 12. Semen's testament: ' . . . a v Per'yaslavle kuplya moya sel(o) Samarov'skoe . . . ; . . . sel(o) Semen-

ov'skoe Volodimer'skoe volosti, chto esm' kupil u Ovtsi ou Ivana; . . . sel(o) v Dmitrove, chto esm' kupil ou Ivana u Dryuts'skogo, i Zabereg, chto esm' kupil ou Semena ou Novosil'skog(o), ili bud(e) chego zabyl napisati svoee kupli i ouchastka . . .': *ibid.*, p. 14. Note also the document of Oleg of Ryazan' (1382): 'A chto kuplya kn(ya)zya velikog(o) Meshchera . . .': *DDG*, p. 29. Cf. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 74, 90.

87. Agreement between Donskoy and Vladimir Andreevich, prince of Serpukhov and Borovsk: 'A tobe . . . v moem oudele sel ti ne kupiti . . . Tako zhe i mne v tvoem oudele sel ne kupiti . . .': *DDG*, p. 20. Another agreement between the same: 'A chislenykh lyudii blyusti ny s odinog(o), a zeml' ikh ne kupiti. A kotoryi slugi k dvor'skomu, a chernyi lyudi k stanovshchiku, tykh v' sluzhbu ne priimati . . . a zeml' ikh ne kupiti . . . A sel ti ne kupiti v moem' oudele . . . A khto budet pokupil zemli . . . Tak zhe i mne . . . sel ne kupiti v tvoem' oudel(e) . . .': *ibid.*, pp. 31–2. Donskoy's first testament: 'A chto bud(e) prikupil (sel) . . . ili kotoraya bud(u)t' sela o(t)sa moego velikom knyazhen'e kuplya, ili moya sela kuplenaya . . .': *ibid.*, p. 25.

88. Donskoy's second testament: 'A iz Yur'evskikh sel dayu s(y)nu svoemu, Knyazyu Vasil'yu svoego prikupa Krasnoe selo . . . A iz Yur'evskikh sel emu (synu Yur'yu) prikupa moego selo Kuzmydemyan'skoe . . . A iz Yur'evskikh sel emu (synu Petru) prikupa moego selo Bogorodits'skoe . . . ; i chto knyagini moee prikup . . . , to moei knyagine . . . A chto knyagini moee kuplya Lokhno, to ee i est' . . . A chto ee selo Repen'skoe i prikup, to ee i est' . . . A iz Yur'evskikh sel dayu ei kuplyu svoyu Petrovskoe selo . . .': *DDG*, pp. 33–5.

89. On the various meanings of *kuplya* see I. Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlya slovary drevnerusskogo yazyka*, 1, 1893, pp. 1370–1; S. Platonov, *Proshloe russkogo severa*, 1924, pp. 28, 36 etc.

90. *Kupli* is the plural of *kuplya*.

91. The Rus'ian princes received from the khans *yarlyki*, i.e. charters or patents, mostly for the purpose of confirming them in their patrimonies. V. Kuchkin in *Iz istorii*, pp. 377–8, expresses the view that Kalita bought three *yarlyki* from the Horde in respect of the three principalities and that Donskoy called these transactions *kupli*. The local prince would also have been a party to each deal, but 'the khan played the decisive part . . .': in other words, Uzbek actively encouraged Kalita's acquisitions of territory. This is an unlikely supposition, and one argument against it is that *kuplya* is used in Donskoy's second testament in its usual sense of the purchase of villages. One would have to assume that the grand duke used the same word in the same document with different meanings. Kuchkin takes issue with Lyubavsky's conjecture (*Obrazovanie*, p. 54) that Kalita considerably increased his suzerain rights over the three princes in return for releasing them from the obligation to pay tribute

for the Horde. As Kuchkin rightly says, '14th-century Rus'ian history knows of no such agreements [between the grand duke and local princes]'. But the same applies to his own hypothesis: 14th-century Rus'ian history knows no instance of the grand duke buying *yarlyki* from the Horde in respect of individual principalities of Vladimir Rus'.

92. L. Cherepnin in *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 18, suggests that there was a third written version of Kalita's will which has been lost, and in which the grand duke asked the khan to endorse the purchase of the three principalities, but that Uzbek refused to do so 'because the local princes signified objections [to the Horde]'. Without going into the question whether there was a third will, which I regard as very doubtful, it is noteworthy that Cherepnin represents both the Tatars and the princes concerned, especially the latter, as opposed to the *kupli* by Moscow.

93. The dispute between Moscow and Tver' was concluded for the time being by Aleksandr's tragic death (at the end of October 1339). Roman may have been murdered by the Tatars at the same time, but the chroniclers do not say so, though they record that Aleksandr's son Fedor was murdered with him.

94. If by 'purchase' (corresponding to 'sale') is understood an ordinary commercial transaction, in this case for the acquisition of land, this would postulate a peaceful and friendly relationship between the prince of Beloozero and the grand duke, which is ruled out by Roman's anti-Muscovite policy. There is another possibility, viz. that Kalita used his military predominance to compel Roman's obedience and that Donskoy diplomatically used the term *kuplya* for what was in fact duress. But if so, Roman could not have pursued an independent and markedly pro-Tverite policy as he did in 1339.

95. A. Kopanev, 'O "kuplyakh" Ivana Kality', pp. 33-7; id., *Istoriya zemlevladieniya*, pp. 25, 32-7.

96. Kopanev made use of the genealogical book of the Monastirev princes, which had long been known (A. Vostokov, *Opisanie russkikh i slovenskikh rukopisei Rumyantsevskogo muzeuma*, 1842, pp. 488-9) but not sufficiently taken into account. It is a late (16th century) work, containing some plausible details together with much fantasy.

97. A. Kopanev, 'O "kuplyakh" Kality', pp. 36-7; id., *Istoriya zemlevladieniya*, pp. 36-7.

98. J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, p. 180. This author considers (p. 245) that Fedor did not desist from his hostility towards the grand duke at the end of 1339, but that Roman did. His argument, however, based on the fact that Roman did not join the other princes in their anti-Muscovite moves after the death of Aleksandr of Tver', is unconvincing: for it is also the case that Roman did not take part, along with other

princes, in the military actions undertaken by Ivan and Semen against Smolensk and Torzhok. In my opinion there are only two possibilities worth considering: either Roman was murdered at the Horde with Aleksandr of Tver', or, more likely, he returned to Beloozero and died very soon after.

99. 'A. Kopanev regards as a "purchase" by Kalita . . . the fact that the prince of Beloozero married the daughter of Ivan Danilovich, as a result of which that principality became, as it were, subordinate to Moscow. The artificiality of this argument seems to require no comment.' V. Kuchkin, *Iz istorii*, p. 376.

100. Assuming that the purchase of Beloozero was not an act of coercion *vis à vis* Roman (for which the sources afford no evidence) but took place by mutual agreement, the course of events would have had to be as follows. Some time would have to elapse for the personal animosity between Ivan and Roman to die down; then there would be long and difficult negotiations, since there was no precedent for a prince 'selling' his patrimony; then the purchase agreement would be finalized, and the transaction crowned by Fedor's marriage to Fedos'ya. In addition there would have to have been Rus'ian embassies to the Horde, as some authors maintain that Kalita's *kupli* received the assent of Uzbek. All this could not have happened in two or even four months.

101. I. Sreznevsky, *Svedeniya i zametki o maloizvestnykh i neizvestnykh pamyatnikakh*, 1879, N 86, pp. 145-8.

102. Palaeographic description of the *Siiskoe evangelie* in E. Smorgunova, *Drevneishii moskovskii rukopisnyi pamyatnik* (Paleograficheskoe opisanie i vopros ob originale rukopisi 1339 g. Biblioteka Akad. Nauk SSSR, No. 338) in *Istochnikovedenie i istoriya russkogo yazyka*, 1964, pp. 119-41.

103. M. Tikhomirov, *Srednevekovaya Moskva v XIV-XV vekakh* (1957), p. 241; E. Smorgunova, *op. cit.*, p. 119, and many others.

104. V. Meshchersky, 'K datirovke "Pokhvaly Ivanu Kalite"', *VLU*, 1967 2(1), pp. 137-9.

105. It would appear from this that Ivan's deteriorating health may have prevented him from personally taking part in the expedition against Smolensk in the winter of 1339/40, though he was not too ill to express his displeasure with the Novgorodians.

106. Historians speak as if the three principalities were all purchased at the same time, but Donskoy's testament affords no ground for this.

107. From the fact that Ivan, the son of Fedor's marriage to Fedos'ya, was active against Donskoy at the Horde in 1363, Kopanev concludes that he was 'a grown man' at that time. He suggests indirectly, though not explicitly, that Ivan was aged 22-3 in 1363, so that he was born about 1340-1. Kopanev uses this to support his argument that Fedor

and Fedos'ya were married in the early months of 1340. But the idea of 'a grown man' is very imprecise: Ivan might equally have been aged about 18 in 1363. What is of basic importance for the date of the marriage is the age of Fedos'ya of Moscow. She is mentioned in both versions of Kalita's will as the younger of his daughters by his second marriage, which took place in 1332. Hence she cannot have been born before 1333-4, and it is highly improbable that she was married to Fedor in 1339 or 1340. When Kalita's will was drawn up both his daughters by his second wife were children under their mother's care ('... a to esm' dal knyagini svoei s menshimi detmi.'). Kopanév's argument would require her to have given birth to a son, Ivan Fedorovich, shortly after her marriage, which is impossible as she would have been still a child.

108. It is generally supposed, though there is no clear evidence, that Uglich was annexed to Rostov at an unknown date; in the 13th century it had its own princes. According to an uncertain later tradition Kalita invaded and plundered the land of Rostov (PSRL, XI, p. 128), and as part of his depredations he may have seized Uglich from Rostov and annexed it to Moscow. But the sources give no support to conjectures of this kind.

109. PSRL, XV, col. 56. V. Kuchkin, *Iz istorii*, pp. 365-70.

110. PSRL, XV, col. 47.

111. There is no hard information about Fedor's reign, or any sale of Galich by him to Kalita.

112. In defence of the theory that Kalita purchased Galich, Kuchkin (op. cit., p. 376) cites an annotation that has long been known and is preserved on a copy of the Gospel made at Galich in 1357 'in the reign of Grand Duke Ivan, son of Ivan (Kalita)'. In my opinion this is not connected with any purchase of Galich in 1340 or earlier, but it is important for a reconstruction of the political situation in 1357, of which more later.

113. L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 59.

114. V. Sergeevich, *Drevnosti russkogo prava* 1, 1909, pp. 59-60.

115. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, 1940, pp. 105-6.

116. W. Vodoff, 'A propos des "achats" (kupli) d'Ivan Ier de Moscou', *JS*, 1974(2), pp. 95-127. S. Kashtanov, in 'Eshche raz o "kuplyakh" Ivana Kality', *VI*, 1976(7), pp. 189-91, advances such unconvincing objections to Vodoff's thesis that they tend indirectly to confirm the latter.

117. *TL*, p. 362.

118. For the anti-Muscovite attitude at this time of the three Konstantins—of Tver', Rostov and Suzdal'—see Chapter 9.

119. Vasily, prince of Yaroslavl', whom we have already mentioned, was in 1339, together with Roman of Beloozero, a staunch opponent

of Kalita's policy. Historians are concerned to show that Ivan scored important successes at the end of his life, which would make the purchase of Beloozero, Galich and Uglich more plausible. These successes, it is argued, were signalized by Roman and Vasily transferring their support to Moscow, the latter marrying Kalita's daughter. This argument does not seem convincing.

A. Kopanev, in 'O "kuplyakh"', pp. 27-31, citing the genealogical book of the Monastyrev princes, states that Nastas'ya (Anastasia), the sister of Grand Duke Semen, married Vasily of Yaroslavl'. The Novgorodian chronicle, under the year 1339, refers to Kalita as this Vasily's father-in-law (*NPL*, p. 350). It might seem at first sight that the two statements complement each other and that, some time before 1339, the grand duke married Nastas'ya, his daughter by his first wife, to Vasily of Yaroslavl'. This is reasonable as far as the date is concerned (another daughter of Kalita's married Konstantin of Rostov in 1328), but is unacceptable on several grounds. The chronicles record the death of Vasily's wife Evdokiya (Ovdot'ya) under the year 1342 (*TL*, p. 366; *PSRL*, X, p. 215; XVIII, p. 94, etc.), but they do not say she was Kalita's daughter. Ivan, as far as his testament shows, had no daughter named Nastas'ya or Evdokiya. Rejecting the possibility of a marriage between Vasily and Kalita's daughter, Kopanev put forward the hypothesis that Ivan had a daughter by his second marriage, Nastas'ya, who married not the above-mentioned Vasily (whom we may call the Elder) but his son of the same name (the Younger). In Kopanev's view this marriage might have been concluded in Kalita's lifetime, around 1339 or the beginning of 1340. On p. 31 he writes: 'If Nastas'ya married Vasily [the Younger] of Yaroslavl' in the last year of Ivan Kalita's life, she was Kalita's youngest daughter and therefore might not have been mentioned in his will.' This whole argument is extremely artificial. As Ivan mentioned in his will two daughters of his second marriage it is hard to believe he forgot about the third or, for instance, wished to disinherit her. It is still more unlikely that Nastas'ya's marriage was connected with hopes on Moscow's part that it would secure the goodwill of the princes of Yaroslavl'. Kalita's second marriage was in 1332, and Nastas'ya is supposed to have been the third daughter of that marriage, so that she could not have been born before 1334. How then could she have married Vasily the Younger in 1339-40?

Kopanev's reconstruction of the policy of Vasily the Elder towards Moscow in 1339-42 presents him as extremely inconsistent. Up to autumn 1339 he firmly supports Aleksandr of Tver'; then he swings sharply over to Ivan's side, but soon after the latter's death moves back into the anti-Muscovite camp. It is hard to suppose that Vasily the Elder behaved so inconsequently. The events of 1375 show that Vasily the

Younger was then a faithful servant of Moscow, and Kopanev infers from this that the attitude of both Vasilys was similar in 1339-40. But the distance of 35 years is a long one, and the political situation in Vladimir Rus' was constantly changing. In my opinion the sources do not give sufficient ground for the view that the principality of Yaroslavl' was on Moscow's side at the time of Kalita's death.

120. 'A pishu vam se slovo togo delya, chtoby ne perestala pamyat' rodi(te)li nashikh . . . i svecha by ne ougasla': *DDG*, N 3, p. 14. For the sake of filial love Semen mentioned both his parents, but it was his father who counted. We know nothing of the political role of his mother Elena; in any case she probably died before Ivan became sole grand duke of Vladimir Rus'.

121. R. Howes makes a similar conjecture in *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow*, p. 192: 'It is . . . possible that a deeper meaning is hidden in this phrase. It may be that Semen, just before his death, was calling upon his brothers to keep alive the hope of eventual liberation from the Tartar yoke.'

122. In any case he did not need to be explicit: Kalita's younger sons knew their father's intentions well enough.

123. This would have been analogous to the tragic fate of Aleksandr of Tver' and his son Fedor at the Horde in 1339. Whether the Tatars murdered two or four princes was to them a trifle of no importance.

## Semen Ivanovich and Ivan II

Kalita's death brought to the fore the question of succession to the grand-ducal throne at Vladimir. All members of the dynasty were acutely interested in the succession, which depended entirely on the khan's decision.

Owing to the poverty of source material it is difficult to reconstruct the relationship at this time between Moscow and the other princes of Vladimir Rus', and among those princes themselves. Our chief evidence consists in the chroniclers' accounts of events during the last months of Kalita's life and the first years of Semen's rule. Individual princes other than those of Muscovy are mentioned fairly often, though fragmentarily, in these records, showing that they played a certain political role which, however, is hard to define precisely. In view of the centralizing tendency which Moscow showed so clearly under Ivan's rule, it was in the Tatars' interest to support the second-class princes in whatever manner circumstances might dictate.

Three events are of especial importance to our study: the murder of Aleksandr of Tver' at the Horde at the end of October 1339, the Tatar-Rus'ian campaign against Smolensk in the winter of 1339/40, and the visit of Rus'ian princes to the Horde in the spring of 1340, soon after Kalita's death. These events were separated by periods of only a few months. As to the first, Aleksandr had been supported in his firm stand against Ivan by at least two princes, Vasily of Yaroslavl' and Roman of Beloozero (see Chapter 8).

The Tatar-Rus'ian expedition against Smolensk took place soon after Aleksandr's death. We have the names of the princes who took part in it,<sup>1</sup> and they throw some light on relations within the dynasty during the last months of Kalita's life. Not all the princes of Vladimir Rus' took part in the campaign. Of the more important ones the list includes only two—Rostov<sup>2</sup> and Suzdal'<sup>3</sup>—



or three if we count the prince of Yur'ev, who was less prominent than the others. There are two possibilities: either Ivan did not summon all the princes to join in, or he did so but some of them disregarded his order. The latter seems more probable. Ivan no doubt wanted to assemble as large a force as possible to ensure the success of the campaign. The opportunity was also a convenient one for him: sheltering behind Uzbek's order, he could compel refractory princes to obey him or, if they would not do so, their refusal would discredit them in the eyes of the khan.

The princes connected with Aleksandr of Tver'—Vasily of Yaroslavl', Roman of Beloozero and Konstantin of Tver'—ignored Kalita's command to join the Smolensk expedition. They all well knew who bore the moral responsibility for instigating the murder of Aleksandr and his son Fedor at the Horde. The princes' remains had just been solemnly brought back to Tver' (the chroniclers describe the funeral ceremonies at length) and the whole country was deeply moved, more so perhaps than Ivan expected.

Konstantin, who had governed the principality of Tver' during the long exile of his elder brother Aleksandr, had at that time shown great submissiveness to Ivan. After Aleksandr's death, however, his apparently pro-Muscovite attitude gave place to one of coolness and marked reserve. This was shown not only by his failure to take part in the Smolensk expedition but also by later events.

Soon after Kalita's death Semen, his brothers and the other princes of Vladimir Rus' repaired to the Horde. The chroniclers state that all the non-Muscovite princes presented themselves, though they mention by name only three: Vasily of Yaroslavl', Konstantin of Tver' and Konstantin of Suzdal'.<sup>4</sup> From the chronicles it would seem that these princes made their way to Uzbek independently of Ivan's sons and separately from them,<sup>5</sup> as was also to happen in 1342. If so, we may infer that they were agreed in opposing Semen's ambition to be appointed grand duke, though it is hard to say whether each one was out for himself or whether they all supported another candidate.

The Muscovite and the other princes assembled at the Horde to receive the khan's decision. Uzbek, not without inducement,<sup>6</sup> decided in favour of Semen. The chronicler, writing in Moscow, records with pride that all the Rus'ian princes submitted to the

authority of their new overlord.<sup>7</sup> At the end of October Semen was solemnly installed on the Vladimir throne. At the beginning of 1341, when it was still winter, he summoned a congress of the subordinate princes at Moscow (NB not Vladimir), after which they set out a campaign to put down rebellious Torzhok.<sup>8</sup> Those named as taking part are Semen and his brother Ivan, Konstantin of Suzdal', Konstantin of Rostov, Vasily of Yaroslavl', and 'all the princes with them'. As later events were to show, the participation of these princes was not so much a sign of compliance towards Semen as of obedience to the khan.<sup>9</sup>

It is generally claimed as an important achievement by Ivan Kalita that he created a pro-Muscovite group among the princes of Vladimir Rus', including the two Konstantins of Suzdal' and Rostov. However, the fact that these princes joined in Ivan's campaign against Smolensk in 1339 and Semen's against Torzhok in 1341 does not justify such a far-reaching conclusion.

The political position of individual princes at the time in question is illuminated by their visits to the Horde. Uzbek died in the autumn or winter of 1341.<sup>10</sup> After a sanguinary dispute in his immediate family the succession fell to his son Chanibek (this is the form of his name used in the Rus'ian chronicles). Bound by duty and custom, Semen and the other princes hastened to the Horde to do homage to the new khan and ask to be confirmed in the possession of their lands. The crucial question was whether Chanibek would uphold Semen as grand duke or would reverse his father's appointment, as he was perfectly free to do.

We know that he left matters as they were (which must have cost Semen a high price), but another detail of these events is worth attention. Under the year 1342 the chroniclers mention four princes who, they say, arrived at the Horde before Semen,<sup>11</sup> and did so together (*v kupe*):<sup>12</sup> namely the three Konstantins of Suzdal', Tver' and Rostov, and Vasily of Yaroslavl'. In my opinion there is no doubt that they intended to persuade the Tatars to deprive Semen of the office of grand duke. Otherwise they would have travelled with Semen and would naturally have formed part of his entourage.

This supposition is supported by the composition of the group of princes. Konstantin of Tver', after the tragic death of his brother Aleksandr, and Vasily of Yaroslavl' were hostile towards Kalita, though submissive to the Horde. Konstantin of Rostov and

Konstantin of Suzdal' joined forces with the two others immediately after Kalita's death, an event which affected both their attitudes. Konstantin of Rostov was Ivan's son-in-law and took account of his wishes while he was alive, but is unlikely to have felt the same respect for Semen.<sup>13</sup> One might support or oppose Kalita, but his experience and rank could not be lightly set aside. Semen, who was only 24 when he assumed the office of grand duke, did not possess the same personal authority. His surname *Gordy* ('the Proud', 'the Haughty') indicates his character and behaviour towards the other princes. Such a man could not have been over-popular with them, especially those older than he.

To weaken the anti-Moscow feeling that prevailed in many regions Semen endeavoured to gain new adherents and link them firmly to himself by the bonds of marriage. Using well-tryed political means, he would incite brother against brother or uncle against nephew so as to exacerbate divisions within particular branches of the dynasty and ensure his own domination over the whole country. This is seen especially clearly in the case of Tver'.

The princely family of Tver' was fairly numerous, which facilitated Moscow's designs. Aleksandr, murdered by the Tatars in 1339, had generally lived in harmony with his two brothers, Konstantin and Vasily. After his return from exile in 1338 he took over the government from Konstantin without the slightest resistance on the latter's part.<sup>14</sup> The brothers' solidarity is also shown by the fact that after Aleksandr was murdered at the Horde at Kalita's instigation, Konstantin took up a markedly hostile attitude towards Moscow. Consequently Semen, in order to strengthen his own authority as grand duke, wished if possible to overthrow Konstantin and expel him from Tver'.<sup>15</sup>

Aleksandr's immediate family afforded an opportunity to further these plans: Semen secured the support of Aleksandr's widow Anastasia and her son Vsevolod,<sup>16</sup> who were driven into Moscow's embraces by personal ambition despite the recent death of their husband and father. Semen promised Vsevolod that he would become prince of Tver' after the deposition of his uncle Konstantin—a great advance on Vsevolod's then appanage of Kholm.<sup>17</sup>

The sources do not reveal much about the dissension in the Tverite princely family. Most of the relevant material is in the late (16th-century) Nikon Chronicle,<sup>18</sup> a tendentious and therefore

unreliable source although it sometimes contains noteworthy details that do not appear in earlier records. According to this Chronicle the dispute was due to the two uncles, Konstantin and afterwards Vasily, who cruelly oppressed Vsevolod and the population of Kholm, levied unlawful tribute and so on;<sup>19</sup> the innocent Vsevolod accordingly sought justice and aid from outside the Tver' principality. One would suppose from this that Vsevolod's aim was to obtain some lightening of his burdens, but the chronicle goes on to tell us that the unhappy victim of his uncles' persecution was installed by his protectors as ruler of the city of Tver' and lord of the whole district.

There is no doubt that the dispute between the Tverite princes was Semen's doing. There were various reasons why it did not break out till 1346. It may be that in the first few years after 1340 Semen tried to induce Konstantin, then governing at Tver', to adopt a submissive line towards Moscow as he had in Kalita's day, during Aleksandr's exile. If so he was clearly unsuccessful, as shown by Konstantin's decided attitude, and Semen accordingly resolved to use Vsevolod to rid himself of his dangerous rival by force.

But Vsevolod for his part needed time to come to an understanding with Semen, in view of his age<sup>20</sup> and, above all, his tragic memories of the death of his father and brother, which was undoubtedly Moscow's doing. This would explain the period of quiet in relations between the Tver' princes from 1340 to 1345. In 1346, however, Vsevolod openly came out against Konstantin, making his way first to Moscow and then to the khan in search of support.<sup>21</sup> Konstantin, alarmed at his nephew's intrigues, also went to the Horde and unexpectedly died there.<sup>22</sup> He was only 40, and given the unusual circumstances it is hard to believe he died a natural death; it seems highly probable that the Tatars killed him<sup>23</sup> at Semen's instigation.<sup>24</sup> Relations between the Tatars and Moscow were quite close at the time, as both were threatened by the expansion of Lithuania into eastern Rus'. Semen, as his frequent visits to the Horde show,<sup>25</sup> was at pains to maintain those relations and obtain the khan's favour for his political designs. Chanibek showed no special interest of his own in Tverite affairs and, in general, supported the grand duke's actions.

Vsevolod had much to thank Semen for, and naturally had to show his gratitude by submissiveness towards Moscow. To fortify

this state of affairs Semen in 1347 married Vsevolod's sister Maria.<sup>26</sup> Although he was only 31, it was his third marriage.<sup>27</sup> However, it did not fulfill the hopes he had placed in it, and led to many complications.

Semen had annulled his own second marriage by sending the bride home to her father. This aroused the strong disapproval of the Church, which might have been a threat to the position of his sons by Maria. At the outset the metropolitan Feognost opposed the new marriage in a demonstrative fashion, going so far as to close the churches.<sup>28</sup> Semen, however, had no intention of abandoning Maria, to whom he looked for male progeny.<sup>29</sup> Clearly the dilemma could only be resolved by negotiation between the grand duke and the metropolitan. The chronicler mentions one meeting between them,<sup>30</sup> but there must in fact have been several; the results appear from facts which are generally known.

Feognost, a skilled politician (he was not a Greek for nothing), withdrew his uncompromising objection to Semen's third marriage, and it was agreed to refer the matter to the Patriarch for decision. Feognost's support for Semen,<sup>31</sup> and a large sum of money contributed by the latter to repair the church of St Sophia at Constantinople,<sup>32</sup> produced the desired effect: the Patriarch granted his blessing for Semen's marriage to Maria.

The metropolitan's support in this matter soon led to far-reaching changes in Moscow's policy towards Tver'. The grand duke had to yield to Feognost's persuasions (especially as he needed his aid against Lithuania) and withdrew his support for Vsevolod's ambitions in Tver'. Consequently Semen's marriage to Maria soon lost its political significance.

Konstantin was succeeded as ruler of Tver' by his younger brother, Vasily of Kashin;<sup>33</sup> this was in accordance with customary law, but Vasily omitted to secure the approval of Moscow or the Horde. Vsevolod took advantage of this to challenge the second of his uncles. Supported by the same protectors as before, he expelled Vasily from Tver' by force of arms and became master of the capital. His success was short-lived, however, as he met with decided opposition from the metropolitan and from the latter's appointee Fedor, bishop of Tver'.<sup>34</sup> Semen's deference to the church authorities was decisive, and Vasily resumed the government of Tver'.

The chronicler rightly states that the agreement reached between Vasily and his nephew was the work of Bishop Fedor; but he is less convincing when he states that relations between the two were henceforth full of love, sincerity, solidarity and so on.<sup>35</sup> As the next few years were to show, the truth was quite different.

Semen, abandoning Vsevolod, went over entirely to Vasily's side. The new situation was symbolized by the marriage, in 1350, of Semen's daughter<sup>36</sup> to Vasily's son Mikhail. The grand duke probably interceded with the Horde in defence of Vasily's rights to Tver', and after a time, in 1352, his efforts were successful.

Vsevolod, relegated to his appanage of Kholm, was in a very difficult position, as Vasily was supported by the metropolitan and the grand duke, as well as the khan under the latter's influence. None the less, he reacted with surprising energy to Moscow's volte-face. Clearly he had not given up his far-reaching ambitions, although his chances had become so much more remote. The marriage of his sister Maria to Semen in 1347 having lost its political effect, he now played a second 'trump' in the shape of his younger sister Juliana (Ul'yana), who in 1349 or 1350 was married to Algirdas (Ol'gerd, Olgierd), grand duke of Lithuania.

Under the year 1349 the chronicles speak of a solemn embassy from Algirdas to Semen, asking for Juliana's hand. The grand duke informed Feognost<sup>37</sup> and, when the latter agreed, gave his consent to the marriage.<sup>38</sup>

Relations between Lithuania and Muscovy were unfriendly owing to their conflicting interests.<sup>39</sup> In 1348 Algirdas sent envoys to the Horde seeking help and co-operation against Semen:<sup>40</sup> to show its importance the embassy was headed by his brother Karijotas (Kor'yad, Koriat).<sup>41</sup> This move shows that the Lithuanians well understood the nature of Tatar-Muscovite antagonism, although, as events proved, they greatly exaggerated its importance at that time. Chanibek rejected the proposal and handed over the Lithuanian envoys to Moscow.

Semen soon found out about the Lithuanian approach to the Tatars and at once took effective counter-measures.<sup>42</sup> When he consented in 1349 to Algirdas marrying Juliana of Tver', he knew very well that the marriage was a sign of co-operation between Vsevolod and Lithuania against himself. As the sources clearly show, Semen tried to postpone the outbreak of open war with

Lithuania, realizing how uncertain the outcome would be and what huge territories were at stake. Algirdas to some extent shared these fears and pursued a similar line.<sup>43</sup> Thus in the years in question we find the two manifesting courtesies to each other, with manifest hypocrisy. When the Lithuanian envoys whom the khan had turned over to Semen were held captive in Moscow, Algirdas in 1349 requested the grand duke to let them return home; Semen at once agreed, and his complaisance was soon repaid by the Lithuanians. In the same year 1349, two marriages were on the tapis: that of Algirdas to Juliana of Tver', and that of Algirdas's brother Liubartas (Lyubart, Lubart) to Agatha (Agafa) of Rostov. Both brothers sent special envoys to Semen to seek his consent to the marriages, though they were not bound to do so: at that time Lithuanian princes often married Rus'ian princesses without seeking permission from the grand duke at Vladimir, or at any rate the chronicles say nothing of such permission. In 1352 Semen launched an expedition against Smolensk, a territory in which Lithuanian interests were involved, but he withdrew as soon as Algirdas sent an embassy with peace proposals.<sup>44</sup>

The grand duke realized that large-scale conflicts with Lithuania, even if successful militarily, must be a considerable drain on Moscow's strength and hence increase the Tatars' power. He could only hope to subdue the Lithuanians if he received the firm support of all the subordinate princes, and he was far from being certain of this: especially towards the end of his life, he was convinced that if a conflict broke out the most prominent members of the dynasty would side with Lithuania against him.

In 1352 the dispute between Vasily of Kashin and Vsevolod of Kholm flared up again,<sup>45</sup> with the result that Tver' largely ceased to play an important part in the balance of forces in Vladimir Rus', while Suzdal' came to the fore among principalities following an anti-Moscow policy.

Semen was at Nizhny Novgorod at the time of Kalita's death (March 1340) and could not go to his father's funeral.<sup>46</sup> We do not know whether he was on a journey or, as is more probable, had been sent by Ivan to watch over Muscovite interests in the Povolzh'e (the middle course of the Volga).<sup>47</sup> His father may even have entrusted him with the government of Nizhny Novgorod: this would indicate how much significance Kalita attached to that

extensive<sup>48</sup> territory, under-populated but lying in a key geographical position, given the importance of the Volga as a trade route. In my opinion Kalita was chiefly influenced by the fear that, once he himself was dead, Uzbek might revert to the idea of having two grand dukes as in 1328–31, when Aleksandr of Suzdal' was placed on an equal footing with Ivan and had the Povolzh'e as his allotted territory.

This fear proved to be justified. Soon after Kalita's death, in 1341, Konstantin of Suzdal' (the younger brother of Aleksandr, who had died in 1331) took possession of the Povolzh'e. The chronicler states that he 'sat on the grand ducal throne of Novgorod and Gorodets':<sup>49</sup> this marks a return by the Tatars, at least in some degree, to their policy of 1328–31. In each case the decision was taken by Uzbek himself, that of 1341 being shortly before he died.<sup>50</sup>

Konstantin took the offensive of his own accord and, more important, with the khan's approval and encouragement. Semen went to the Horde and protested,<sup>51</sup> but he did not dare expel Konstantin of Suzdal' from the disputed territory by force, knowing that the Tatars were behind him. Sure enough, the Horde ruled in Konstantin's favour.<sup>52</sup> Semen was accompanied on his journey to the Horde by pro-Moscow boyars from Nizny Novgorod and Gorodets: evidently Kalita had managed to form a party of his own in the Povolzh'e, as Semen himself had not been grand duke long enough to win over and assemble forces of this kind.<sup>53</sup> These defectors call to mind the boyars of Tver' who left that principality for Moscow after Aleksandr returned from exile and recovered his patrimony by the khan's favour in 1338.<sup>54</sup> Both at Tver' and in the Povolzh'e, and doubtless elsewhere too, Ivan had managed to create boyar factions devoted to himself, either by 'planting' his own men from Muscovy or, more often, by bribing the local nobility. It is noteworthy that the Tatars took a hostile attitude towards these pro-Muscovite elements: the boyars from Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets who arrived at the Horde with Semen were handed over by them to Konstantin for condign punishment.<sup>55</sup> Evidently the Tatars were opposed to Moscow's centralizing tendencies and did not want to see the other princes of Vladimir Rus' unduly weakened.

These princes maintained direct relations with the Tatars and visited the Horde independently of Ivan and Semen. They were



received with genuine or apparent friendliness and appreciation of their resistance to Moscow, which does not mean that the Tatars supported their aspirations to the grand-ducal dignity. Moscow, on the other hand, despite its efforts, was unable to persuade the Horde to confirm it in the office of grand duke. Kalita's testaments show that Moscow had no influence when it came to matters affecting the grand-ducal office or, in particular, the occupancy of the throne of Vladimir. Tatar policy consisted of incessantly playing off the feuding elements of Vladimir Rus' against one another, and the district of the middle Volga was no exception.

Konstantin was remembered by posterity chiefly as the ruler of the Povolzh'e. When recording his death in 1355 the chroniclers call him Konstantin of Suzdal', but also give the length of his reign as 15 years:<sup>56</sup> they count it from his seizure of Nizhny Novgorod and not from 1331, when he inherited Suzdal' from his brother Aleksandr.

Konstantin's ambitions and efforts were directed towards maintaining and developing the restored grand duchy on the middle Volga. Symbolically he was buried, no doubt by his own wish, not at Suzdal' but at Nizhny Novgorod, in the cathedral of the Saviour (*Spaso-Preobrazhenskii sobor*)<sup>57</sup> which he had built or rebuilt on the site of an old church dating from the 1220s.<sup>58</sup> He had a large bell<sup>59</sup> cast for the cathedral, which he also adorned with a specially venerated icon of the Saviour, brought from Suzdal'.<sup>60</sup>

We know next to nothing of Konstantin's rule in the Povolzh'e. Stories based on later local tradition, e.g. about his colonizing activities,<sup>61</sup> are hard to verify and in some cases are clearly fanciful. Historians are thus reduced to more or less probable speculation. A suggestion frequently met with is that in 1350 Konstantin transferred his capital from Suzdal' to Nizhny Novgorod. This idea is usually put forward on Presnyakov's authority, but the latter advanced it in a very cautious manner and with all reserve.<sup>62</sup> The process whereby Nizhny Novgorod wrested the pre-eminence from Suzdal' can hardly be narrowed to a single year; it continued from 1341 to 1350, and there is not enough evidence to show where the grand duke and his dignitaries mostly resided during those years. If there was a formal transfer of the capital it may have taken place at the end of that gradual process,

which was viewed with great disfavour by Moscow. An argument for 1350 may be the fact that in that year both the grand dukes, Semen (with his brothers) and Konstantin went to the Horde, of course independently. The chroniclers do not say what their purpose was or what they achieved,<sup>63</sup> but there is no doubt that the khan had an important voice in the relations between Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod.

A bishopric was created at Suzdal' in 1347.<sup>64</sup> It is generally supposed, and is very probable, that it was intended to have jurisdiction over all Konstantin's lands including Povolzh'e. Konstantin would have had to ask the metropolitan to create the new see, and would no doubt rather have had it at Nizhny Novgorod. Feognost apparently adopted a compromise reflecting not only church interests but also Moscow's distrust of Konstantin's ambitions on the middle Volga.

The links between Suzdal' and Povolzh'e were not a transient phenomenon, but continued for many years to affect the political situation in Vladimir Rus'. This was largely due to Tatar support, but due weight must be given to Konstantin's efforts to develop Povolzh'e both politically and economically.<sup>65</sup> We do not know much about his internal regime, but from the results he achieved it is clear that his efforts were on no mean scale.

The chronicler, despite his pro-Muscovite bias, rightly states that Konstantin was energetic in defending his lands against 'mighty princes and the Tatars'.<sup>66</sup> There is no doubt that the chief of the 'mighty princes' was Semen. In the nature of things Konstantin's policy was bound to have an anti-Muscovite slant. Moreover, although Konstantin was of necessity submissive towards the khan, he was far from being merely a passive instrument in his hands. The fact that he succeeded, at least for a time, in gaining the support of both Tatars and Lithuanians for his policy of independence *vis-à-vis* Moscow bears witness to his talent and experience as a politician.

Konstantin sought closer relations with Lithuania, to which he looked for help in the still uncertain situation, and he also endeavored to obtain the co-operation of other princes of Vladimir Rus' against Semen. A clear political significance attached to the marriage of two of his children more or less simultaneously in the autumn of 1352. His daughter Evdokiya (Eudoxia) married Mikhail of Tver', who, with his elder brother Vsevolod and his

sister Juliana (the wife of Algirdas), belonged to the group of anti-Moscow princes; while Konstantin's son Boris was married to Algirdas's daughter Agrafena (Agrippina).<sup>67</sup>

Another, earlier marriage was also of some political significance. In 1350 Konstantin married his daughter Antonida to Andrei Fedorovich, prince of Rostov.<sup>68</sup> Although we know little of Andrei's politics, it may well be that Konstantin hoped to induce the youthful bridegroom to join the group opposed to Semen. It is relevant that, in the previous year, Liubartas (Lyubart) of Volhynia, Algirdas's younger brother, had at the latter's instance married the daughter of Andrei's uncle, Konstantin of Rostov.<sup>69</sup> It thus looks as if Lithuania and Nizhny Novgorod were taking concerted action at practically the same time to create and foster anti-Muscovite feeling in the principality of Rostov.

Semen died suddenly during an outbreak of plague in 1353,<sup>70</sup> and the occupancy of the Vladimir throne again became an issue. Given the balance of forces within the dynasty, only two candidates came into question: Semen's brother Ivan, and Konstantin of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal'. The conflict between them soon became acute.<sup>71</sup>

Considerable as the risks were, Konstantin had a fair prospect of success. He was supported by Lithuania, whose direct and indirect influence was an important factor in Vladimir Rus'. Great Novgorod was also firmly in his favour.<sup>72</sup> Rostov was on his side,<sup>73</sup> and so were some of the other principalities, though these were in general divided internally into two groups, pro- and anti-Muscovite: this was the case, for instance, with Tver'<sup>74</sup> and Yaroslavl'.<sup>75</sup> Together with the territory directly under Konstantin's rule (Povolzh'e and Suzdal') this added up to a considerable force that was not to be underrated.

If Konstantin's ambitions had been realized, the history of north-eastern Rus' might have taken a different turn. Under Kalita and Semen the grand duchy had continued formally to be based on Vladimir, but its spirit and substance were Muscovite. If Konstantin had become grand duke, Vladimir would no doubt have retained its symbolic status but the Rus'ian polity would have been increasingly centred on Nizhny Novgorod, with greater emphasis on expansion beyond the Volga, to the east and north-east. This would have been much to the interest of Lithuania,

enabling it to strengthen its hold on western Rus'; which goes far to explain Algirdas's support for Konstantin.

The testaments of Kalita and Semen contain nothing to show that the Muscovite princes were in any way assured of a privileged position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the dynasty. The Vladimir throne was the key to the situation, and it was entirely in the khan's gift. When Semen died his brother Ivan was in no stronger a position in this respect than Semen himself had been in 1340.

The chroniclers tell us that after Semen's death all the princes<sup>76</sup> went to the Horde to receive the khan's orders. After, apparently, some hesitation<sup>77</sup> Chanibek conferred the office of grand duke on Ivan. For various reasons that will be considered later in this chapter, the Tatars were unlikely to decide otherwise; but they were far from intending thereby to determine Moscow's fate in the more distant future.

The situation in 1353 was unusual and unexpected. None could have foreseen the violent epidemic which carried off Semen and his two surviving sons, who were barely 1 or 2 years old. Kalita's youngest son, Andrei of Serpukhov, also died of the plague, so that Ivan was left as the sole representative and defender of Moscow's interests.

For all Kalita's sons—Semen, Ivan and Andrei—their father had been the supreme authority, and there is no reason to think that any of them were opposed to his wishes. The disagreements that arose among the brothers after his death were not of a major kind. As he showed in his testament by dividing the inheritance equally, his basic intention was that they should preserve unity and solidarity among themselves, and this they had done.<sup>78</sup> The death of both Semen and Andrei in the same year (1353) simplified Ivan's task.

Apart from the territorial bequests, which were specified in detail, Kalita's testament contained provisions that are obscure and difficult to explain. The first problem is why he did not name Semen as his successor, i.e. senior prince of Muscovy, instead of leaving the question of seniority open and artificially placing his two younger sons on a level with Semen. In 1340 Semen was aged 24, Ivan 14 and Andrei 13. We can hardly suppose that Kalita's disposition was due to chance or oversight, and must assume that it was a deliberate act on his part.<sup>79</sup>

In his testament Ivan merely appointed Semen 'guardian' (*pechal'nik*) of his two younger brothers (and of Ivan's second wife with her two daughters).<sup>80</sup> The term 'guardian' had no precise legal meaning. The wardship was in any case due to expire at a foreseeable time; the period involved in this case was very short, and Kalita's testament did not look beyond it. It was a matter of urgent practical necessity to regulate the relationship between the three fatherless brothers, and they were obliged to do so by mutual agreement.

The text of an agreement concluded between the three princes has survived; unfortunately this important document is undated. Some scholars believe that it dates from immediately after Kalita's death, while others place it in the last years of Semen's rule. The matter thus requires more detailed examination.

In my opinion it was Semen who took the initiative towards regulating relations among the three brothers. He wished to reach agreement with Ivan and Andrei so as to clarify and stabilize the politico-legal situation in Muscovy.<sup>81</sup> For an understanding to be permanent and ensure cooperation among the brothers it must safeguard the interests of both the senior and the two junior ones. The lands bequeathed by Kalita to the respective princes were an important factor in ensuring concord between them. For the sake of mutual confidence each of the brothers required an assurance from the other two that they would not seek to annex the lands bequeathed to him but would respect his hereditary right to them.<sup>82</sup> In return for this assurance Semen's brothers recognized his seniority<sup>83</sup> and consented to the political,<sup>84</sup> military<sup>85</sup> and financial<sup>86</sup> advantages that it conferred on him.

The agreement was concluded and sealed at Kalita's tomb.<sup>87</sup> Semen intended by this solemnity to make up for the deficiency of his father's will: the brothers' oath is referred to twice in the agreement itself and again in Semen's own testament. Semen evidently took credit for the idea of consecrating the agreement in this way, and rightly thought it a successful move on his part.

Another point that suggests itself as regards the date is that in asserting rights of seniority and therefore suzerainty over his brothers, it would have been easier for Semen to do so on favourable terms when Ivan and Andrei were boys rather than after they had grown up. It thus seems unlikely that the agreement was concluded towards the end of Semen's life, when the other

two had long been old enough to govern their lands independently. No doubt they were anxious to start ruling the areas bequeathed to them as soon as possible. In order to preserve peace and harmony in the family I suggest that Semen allowed them to do so at the same time as the agreement was concluded, when they would have reached an appropriate age.<sup>88</sup> Semen's guardianship of the brothers under their father's will could not last long: all three sons of Kalita, for different reasons, were interested in bringing it to a speedy end.

It seems certain therefore that the three brothers came to an agreement soon after Kalita's death; but it is a further question whether the agreement that has survived is the same one. It may be that what we have is a later agreement and that the text of the original one has been lost. This hypothesis would obviate much of the argument that surrounds the subject.

Answers to these questions must be sought in the sole available source material concerning relations among Kalita's sons, viz. the above-mentioned agreement and Semen's will.

Both documents are undated, but we can assign approximate dates to them. In my opinion Semen's will was drawn up a few days before 26 April 1353.<sup>89</sup> There are indications that the date of the agreement was close to that of the will. The agreement refers to some subversive activity against the grand duke, of which we have no details, by a boyar named Aleksei Petrovich. Ivan and Andrei apparently took part in this, and in the agreement with Semen they promise to break off all contact with Aleksei Petrovich and 'not to receive him'.<sup>90</sup> Semen in his will admonishes Ivan and Andrei not to listen in future to the counsels of 'evil men':<sup>91</sup> the sources suggest that this must have referred to Aleksei Petrovich and those about him. There is a causal connection between the grand duke's anger and the disgrace of Aleksei, and Semen's warning to his brothers; this suggests that the two events were fairly close together in time.<sup>92</sup>

It is also noteworthy that the extant agreement speaks in the past, not the present tense, of the establishment of concord among the brothers, indicating that there must have been a previous agreement to which they were now appealing.<sup>93</sup>

Another point bearing on the date of the extant agreement is that it refers to the eventuality of one of the princes dying and the others looking after his widow and children. This is hard to

relate to the situation in 1340–1, immediately after Kalita's death, when all three brothers were childless. Andrei was still a bachelor; so probably was Ivan, or else he had only just married.<sup>94</sup> Semen's second son, Konstantin, was born in 1341, but lived only for a day.<sup>95</sup> Ivan and Andrei at this time were at an age when they would have been more likely to think of their future career than of death and its political consequences. Hence I think it probable that the first agreement between the brothers was couched in general terms, leaving some details open. The main points may of course have been carried over from one agreement to the other, but as we only have the text of the second we cannot compare them.

The details covered by the second agreement indicate that it dates from after 1345<sup>96</sup> or, more precisely, after 1347,<sup>97</sup> while it must have been concluded before Semen's death in the spring of 1353. We can, however, narrow this down a good deal further, in the light of the passage concerning the death of one of the brothers and the guardianship of his widow and children.<sup>98</sup> This must date from a time when Kalita's sons in fact had wives and children; and from the dates of birth and death of their children, in particular, it can be deduced that the agreement was concluded not before the latter part of 1350, more probably in 1351 or even perhaps in 1352.<sup>99</sup> This accords with our previous conclusion that the agreement dates from about the same time as Semen's will.

The conclusion of the extant agreement was necessary for two main reasons. In the first place, Ivan and Andrei had taken part in the conspiracy with Aleksei Petrovich. This, to say the least, must have caused some discord among the brothers, and matters had to be put right by a fresh agreement. With remarkable restraint, Semen confined himself to a mild admonition to Ivan and Andrei not to heed evil counsellors in future. This shows how much he took to heart their father's command to preserve brotherly unity. He used Kalita's authority to keep his younger brothers from willful acts, and by the same authority he found it easy to persuade them to repeat their vows at their father's tomb.<sup>100</sup>

A second reason for the agreement was that about ten years had elapsed since the previous one. Events had made it necessary not so much to alter as to supplement and define more closely

the rather general terms of the first agreement: a particular reason for this was the birth of Kalita's grandchildren and the need to provide for their future. Since in my view the second agreement was not basically different from the first but was rather an expansion of it, we may speak of a single agreement in two versions.

Semen's will was in effect a single great bequest of land, valuables and many revenues, exclusively to his widow. This munificence contrasts with the fact that he left practically nothing to his brothers. From this point of view the will makes a chilly impression. As far as Ivan and Andrei are concerned, Semen does not go beyond their father's will<sup>101</sup> and his own agreement with them.

The grand duke's decision has been much discussed and blamed by historians. The reasons for their adverse criticism are clear: Semen's wife Maria was a princess of Tver', daughter of Aleksandr who was put to death by the Tatars at Kalita's instigation in 1339. Her sister (Ul'yana or Juliana, wife of the Lithuanian grand duke Algirdas) and her brothers (Vsevolod of Kholm, Mikhail of Mikulin) were decidedly hostile to Moscow. It is hard to agree with Sergeevich in regarding Semen's will as proof that 'the principality of Moscow had lost all idea of political unity', as the document itself recalls Kalita's injunction to the brothers. None the less it is certainly surprising and unusual for a husband to bequeath everything to his wife and not indicate what is to happen to the property after her death. No doubt Semen's feelings of love and confidence in Maria played a part, but this cannot be the whole story.

Some light may be thrown by a suggestion which I advance although it is not supported by the sources. This is that Maria was pregnant when Semen made his will, and he hoped for a posthumous son.<sup>102</sup> He attached great importance to his own posterity and had already had four sons by Maria during a fairly short marriage, but all had died in infancy or early childhood.<sup>103</sup>

On this supposition<sup>104</sup> we can, I think, easily perceive the intention of Semen's will. Maria, the person closest to him and the confidante of all his ambitions, would watch over her newborn son (the seventh of Semen's male progeny), bring him up and train him to carry out his father's policy;<sup>105</sup> she would also bequeath to him the whole of the territory left to her by Semen.



The grand duke evidently thought that Maria's love for him and for their child would be a stronger influence than her Tverite origin; but, when all is said and done, we cannot help being surprised by his act in confiding such a vital role to a Tverite princess.

The end of Semen's life is marked by many other unusual facts. He had had six sons, yet he died childless; and he himself, while full of energy and ambition, was suddenly carried off by the plague. The most striking fact, however, is that all Semen's personal tragedies eventually redounded to the benefit of Moscow, as he would have wished. How differently the principality would have been situated if he had left six or seven sons, all quarrelling among themselves!<sup>106</sup>

The combination of unforeseeable circumstances makes it singularly difficult to assess the historical role of Grand Duke Semen. He had a high opinion of his own rule and achievements, and drew up his testament 'so that the memory of our parents and of us may not die';<sup>107</sup> but it is hard to see from the will itself what he did that was so remarkable. If he placed himself on a level with his father, it was because he continued the latter's political aspirations. Kalita's testament shows great reserve—he accomplished more than he wrote—and is thus a truer reflection of the facts than that of Semen, who wrote more than he accomplished. The surname *Gordy* ('proud, haughty') expressed his vanity, not his power. He styled himself grand duke 'of all Rus' ' (*vseya Rusi*), which may serve as an index of his hopes or ambitions but which did not correspond literally to the conditions of the time.<sup>108</sup> In the history of his rule there are many wise moves,<sup>109</sup> but also impulsive, unrealistic decisions that aroused gratuitous opposition. His weakness was that he too often mistook his desires for reality.

Historians, I believe, have overrated Semen by taking him at his own valuation. He is generally credited with having enlarged Muscovite territory by the annexation of Yur'ev; made Vladimir Rus' a good deal more independent of the Horde than it was in Kalita's day; and asserted the superior strength and authority of the grand duke over the rest of the dynasty.

The small principality of Yur'ev<sup>110</sup> was important economically thanks to its fertile soil and salt deposits.<sup>111</sup> Its last prince, Ivan Yaroslavich, is mentioned in the chronicles as having taken part

in the Tatar-Rus'ian campaign against Smolensk in the winter of 1339/40. It is generally thought that he died childless after 1340 and that Semen then laid hands on the 'orphaned' principality. All this may be true but is not certain. We do not know the date of Ivan's death, and he may easily have outlived Semen. The fact that he is not mentioned in the sources is not conclusive. There are many gaps in the chronicles regarding the minor principalities of Vladimir Rus', and some of them affect long periods of time. If we suppose that Ivan died soon after 1340, Yur'ev would have been annexed not to Muscovy but, of course, to the grand duchy,<sup>112</sup> so that it would not have been a success for Moscow's policy as such.<sup>113</sup> The territory of the grand duchy, i.e. the lands directly composing it, decreased markedly during Semen's reign. Yur'ev may perhaps be counted as a gain, but on the other hand we have definitely to record the loss of the whole Povolzh'e (the middle Volga basin) with Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets. No one charges Semen with light-heartedly giving away these lands; he expended all his efforts at the Horde to avert their loss. But there is no reason to credit him with gaining fresh territory, either as grand duke or as prince of Muscovy. This basic fact is not affected by his purchases of particular villages in various parts of Vladimir Rus'.

It might seem at first sight that Semen did much to weaken the Horde's supremacy over Vladimir Rus'. His testament, unlike Kalita's, says nothing about repartitioning Muscovite territory if any of it should be taken away by the Tatars. Nor does the testament bear a Tatar seal: it was not endorsed by Chanibek. I do not agree, however, with the inference that Semen refused to seek the khan's approval and succeeded in conducting a more or less anti-Tatar policy. The will was drawn up in exceptional circumstances, a few days before Semen's death, and consequently there was no time for him to seek Tatar consent.<sup>114</sup>

The third achievement with which Semen is credited is that of asserting the authority of the grand duke over the remainder of the dynasty. No one disputes that he was formally the suzerain over his host of kinsmen, but we are concerned here with actual supremacy and hence with the balance of power within the dynasty. It is hard to form an opinion owing to the poverty of sources and especially the lack of data from Semen's reign concerning such minor principalities as Galich, Starodub etc. As

a rule we simply know that they existed, and can only guess whether their political orientation was pro- or anti-Muscovite.

Of the major principalities Tver'—or, more strictly, the line of Kashin—was definitely on Semen's side. Thanks to Muscovite support this branch of the family was able to maintain itself in power in the principality's capital city. Mologa, detached from the land of Yaroslavl', was also among Semen's allies. One or two further principalities may be counted in, but altogether they do not amount to much.

First and foremost among his opponents was Suzdal'. Just as Tver' was the centre of hostility to Kalita's political ambitions, so now in Semen's reign Suzdal' became the focal point of anti-Moscow activity. The fact that Konstantin of Suzdal' seized the Povolzh'e in 1341 and continued to hold it was an important accretion to his strength and made it possible for him to block Semens' aspirations. Among Konstantin's adherents were Rostov, Great Novgorod, the Tverite princes of Kholm and Mikulin, and other members of the dynasty. There is therefore no ground for saying that Semen consolidated the grand-ducal authority and achieved actual supremacy over the whole of Vladimir Rus', though that was undoubtedly his aim. This assessment is fully confirmed by the difficulty of Ivan's situation *vis-à-vis* many of the princes after his brother's death.

Ivan was 27 at the time of Semen's death, and was thus fully mature politically. As his later decisions show, he was far from agreeing with his elder brother on all points, but up to 1353 he concealed his critical attitude under a mask of obedience. The relationship between the brothers was constrained by the customary law of seniority and by Semen's position as grand duke. The extant agreement between Kalita's sons speaks of joint action and mutual understanding in their relations with neighbours near and far,<sup>115</sup> but in practice the younger brothers did not have much say. Until 1353 Ivan and Andrei remained in the background and were confined to the role of auxiliaries to the grand duke.

After Semen's death Ivan was able to come out into the open. In the extant agreement he had promised his brother not to receive the disgraced boyar Aleksei Petrovich. He now welcomed him with open arms and appointed him to the high military office of chiliarch (*tysyatskii*). In the agreement the brothers had

also sworn not to violate the territorial status of the lands inherited from Kalita; but Ivan took away from Semens' widow Maria the districts of Kolomna and Mozhaisk,<sup>116</sup> which her husband had bequeathed to her, although Semen had charged him to look after Maria and respect her territorial rights.

Relations between Ivan and Semen were typical of those prevailing at this period between younger and elder brothers in many Rus'ian lands. There was an age gap of ten years, and differences of talent and character were reflected in the surnames given them in later years. Ivan's title of *Krotky* (the Meek, the Gentle) shows him to have enjoyed a popularity which Semen was unable or did not care to acquire. Ivan's critical attitude towards Semen's rule also had deeper political roots. The main reason why he conspired against his brother was that he realized only too well the effect of Semen's 'pride' on the other princes of Vladimir Rus', especially the stronger ones.

In my opinion Ivan was far superior to Semen in his sense of reality and sober estimate of his own strength and possibilities. It was evident that the constant disputes among the princes could only benefit the Tatars. To put an end to them he adopted a conciliatory attitude towards his princely kinsmen, especially those who most firmly opposed his candidature as grand duke. In his view the internal pacification and consolidation of Vladimir Rus' was an imperative political necessity.

The chroniclers agree in stating that the main opposition to Ivan's ambition to succeed Semen as grand duke came from Konstantin of Suzdal' and Povolzh'e, who himself aspired to the Vladimir throne and was supported by other princes and by Great Novgorod. Ivan, after his return from the Horde, was at pains to disarm the opposition of the two Novgorods and regularize relations with Moscow's former antagonists.

This was not an easy task: it called for restraint and perseverance, and could not be hurried. Ivan did not come to terms with Great Novgorod until a year and a half later, in the autumn of 1355.<sup>117</sup> Meanwhile there was neither war nor peace between them, but the Novgorodians did not suffer from this state of affairs.<sup>118</sup> Ivan's tactics, as this fact shows, were not to offend the other side by arbitrary acts or by harming its interests, but gradually to create an atmosphere favourable to closer relations. No doubt he pursued a similar policy towards Konstantin, with whom he also concluded

an agreement, although the latter had been firmly hostile to Moscow throughout Semen's reign and at the beginning of Ivan's.

The laconic statement in the chronicle suggests that the initiative for the agreement came from Ivan.<sup>119</sup> Unfortunately we have no details of the negotiations that led to it. The chief object of contention between Moscow and Suzdal' was the Povolzh'e. This disputed area was not a subject of negotiation in 1355: in the resulting agreement, Konstantin kept both Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets. Ivan renounced the extensive territorial claims he had inherited from his father and brother, knowing that to put them forward even in the most tentative way would arouse violent opposition and make agreement impossible. In any case it was unrealistic for Moscow and Suzdal' to argue about the Povolzh'e, if only because the decision about its fate lay with the khan. Ivan could only assure Konstantin that he would not take any steps at the Horde, either openly or in secret, to have him evicted from the territory. In this way he might hope to dispel Konstantin's fears and gain his confidence.

We do not know the exact date of the agreement, which was concluded before Konstantin's death in November 1355. We likewise have no information as to the beginning and duration of the negotiations. The agreement was a considerable achievement, bearing in mind that the issue was not only the Povolzh'e but the elaboration of a programme of political collaboration between two principalities which were more or less equal as far as real power was concerned. All that can be said is that the negotiations took place in 1355—it is less probable that they began in 1354—and must have been kept a secret from the Tatars.

The Tatars' policy towards Rus' at that time was extremely purposeful despite apparent contradictions. The Moscow princes' aspirations to the Vladimir throne were gratified in return for their zeal in collecting tribute for the khan: after Kalita's death both his sons, Semen and Ivan, held the office of grand prince. They had to pay for the favour of Uzbek and Chanibek, however, by forfeiting the Povolzh'e to Suzdal' and, subsequently, Lopasna to Ryazan'.

The district of Lopasna<sup>120</sup> had long been in dispute between Ryazan' and Moscow. In a victorious conflict with Ryazan' in 1301 Daniil, son of Aleksandr Nevsky, conquered and annexed

to Muscovy Kolomna and, apparently, Lopasna as well. In 1353, at the time with which we are now concerned, Prince Oleg of Ryazan' in a retaliatory campaign recovered Lopasna on 22 June.<sup>121</sup>

Lopasna was one of the districts bequeathed by Kalita to his youngest son, Andrei of Serpukhov.<sup>122</sup> The date of its capture by Oleg should be compared with three other dates: Semen died on 26 April 1353, Andrei on 6 June, while Ivan, Kalita's only surviving son, became grand duke only in March 1354. Thus Oleg's coup was facilitated by the fact that it took place during the 'interregnum' at Moscow.

The question is whether Oleg recovered Lopasna on his own initiative or was instigated by the Tatars. The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive. In my opinion the action was due on the one hand to the impetuosity of the very young prince,<sup>123</sup> his warlike spirit and unbridled ambition, and, on the other, to cold calculation on the part of Chanibek.

There seems to be no doubt that the Tatars' designs concerning Lopasna began to be put into effect very soon after Semen's death.<sup>124</sup> Ivan went to the Horde to seek approval of his appointment as grand duke in succession to his brother: we do not know exactly when, but it is unlikely that he would have lost time in view of the rival ambitions of Konstantin, prince of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal'. It can safely be guessed that the seizure of Lopasna by Oleg of Ryazan' took place while Ivan was absent from Rus'.

The chronicles state that all the Rus'ian princes went to the Horde<sup>125</sup> soon after Semen's death (i.e. not before May 1353). They returned to their lands in the winter of 1353/4. The proceedings at the Horde must have been stormy. The subject of 'discussion', or rather petitions to the khan,<sup>126</sup> was, naturally, the question who should occupy the throne of Vladimir. The princes were clearly at odds on this point.<sup>127</sup> After hearing their pleas Chanibek decided that Ivan should succeed Semen as grand duke, but he was obliged in return to allow Ryazan' to keep Lopasna<sup>128</sup> and probably had once more to renounce Moscow's claim to the Povolzh'e.<sup>129</sup> Konstantin's possession of Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets was not called in question. These details show that Chanibek's intention was to offset the grant of the grand-ducal dignity of Moscow by checking Muscovite expansion either southward, along the Oka, or eastward (the middle Volga).

The khan assumed that Konstantin and Oleg would be increasingly hostile to Moscow and that it was in the Tatars' interest to foment this state of things. At the same time, as we know from other evidence, the Horde's intention was to divert Ivan's strength and ambition westward, against Lithuania.

Despite Ivan's apparent deference to the Horde, his policy was far from being one of complete submissiveness. As we know, he aimed to assuage dissensions and conflicts of interest within Rus', as shown by his achievements of 1355: agreements with Konstantin and Great Novgorod, and perhaps others with minor principalities of which we know nothing in this period. To Ivan, and also to Chanibek, Konstantin's attitude was of great importance not only by reason of his own strength but because of his influence in other Rus'ian lands.

Konstantin represented what we may call a third line of policy, as far as possible independent of the Horde and also of Moscow. It involved skillful manoeuvring between the two stronger forces and exploiting their conflicts of interest. The chronicler, summing up Konstantin's career up to his death, rightly states that he 'worthily and fiercely defended his patrimony against mighty princes [sc. Moscow] and the Tatars.'<sup>130</sup> It cannot be denied that Konstantin was ambitious, especially as he tried to secure the Vladimir throne for himself from the Tatars after Semen's death. It is another question whether such a policy could have been sustained in the long run.

Chanibek's attitude towards Konstantin was cold and distant; he did not weaken his position on the Volga, but refused to make him grand duke. Konstantin's ambitions went beyond what Chanibek had planned for him. The Horde was proverbially suspicious; it distrusted Konstantin, and was quite right to do so. He showed clear leanings towards Lithuania, whence he expected help in carrying out his plans for the future.<sup>131</sup> The Tatars must have been well aware of this, as they began gradually and cautiously to take counter-measure.

Konstantin certainly hoped to exploit Tatar-Lithuania antagonism for his own ends. This bore witness to his political adroitness, but it was a policy fraught with many dangers, as the prince was well aware. To play off three rival powers (the Horde, Lithuania and Moscow) against one another was in fact beyond his strength; and when, in 1355, Ivan approached him with

conciliatory proposals, he grasped them with alacrity. He chose the weakest of the other three powers, with whom he had many common interests despite personal antagonism (which latter applied more to Semen than to Ivan).

The co-operation between Konstantin and the youthful Ivan<sup>132</sup> was based on solid foundations. Both were interested in obtaining Lithuanian support to offset Chanibek's undue influence in Rus'. When Konstantin died shortly afterwards, in 1355, Ivan continued a similar policy with his son Andrei. In 1356 two important events took place: a meeting between Ivan and Andrei at Pereyaslavl',<sup>133</sup> and the marriage of Ivan's daughter to a Lithuanian prince, Algirdas's nephew.<sup>134</sup>

It is not easy to reconstruct these events in detail. Although there are quite numerous references in the chronicles, they are for the most part extremely brief: facts are given baldly in a disjointed manner and without indication of the month and day, so that it is difficult to determine their sequence and interrelation. Historians have thus been largely reduced to conjecture as regards the political situation in those years.

The death of the boyar Aleksei Petrovich, of whom we have already spoken, must have been regarded as a major event, since the chroniclers, who are generally laconic even in relating important facts, give a good deal of attention to it, though they do not elucidate all the details. Aleksei, who with the rank of *tysyatskii* was an important figure at the court of Grand Duke Ivan, was murdered in mysterious circumstances. In my opinion this was a consequence of Tatar reaction to the agreement reached between Ivan and Andrei at Pereyaslavl', as the order of events also suggests. The agreement probably dated from the summer or autumn of 1356;<sup>135</sup> Aleksei was killed at the beginning of February 1357, so that the murder must have been plotted around the end of 1356.

The understanding reached at Pereyaslavl' between the two strongest princes of Vladimir Rus', which might be expected to extend to some of the minor princes also, was completely contrary to the basis of Chanibek's Rus'ian policy as we have described it. Accordingly it provoked swift and decided counteraction by the khan; this was directed first and foremost against Aleksei, which shows indirectly that the latter was an advocate of the Pereyaslavl' agreement.



Chanibek was an experienced ruler with a thorough knowledge of Rus'ian internal affairs. He allowed the local princes a certain freedom of action *vis-à-vis* their closer and more distant neighbours, which gave them a sense of relative independence, but only within certain limits. When these were overstepped, the khan generally used Rus'ian forces to remedy the situation; only in the last resort, if these failed, did he send in troops of his own. This was a sign of political wisdom, since armed intervention, with its accompanying slaughter and devastation, would have diminished the revenues that the Horde obtained from conquered Rus'.<sup>136</sup>

Since at the time in question Ivan had no brother whom Chanibek might have used for his own ends, the Tatars instead chose as their instruments the senior boyars whom Ivan had passed over when appointing the chief officers of his court. Among these were the leaders of the conspiracy against Aleksei Petrovich's life.<sup>137</sup>

Aleksei's corpse was discovered 'in the square' (presumably in the Kremlin) at daybreak on 3 February 1357. The deed caused general amazement: no one knew who had killed the *tysyatskii* and why. All were indignant at the murder—the chronicler ascribes it to the prompting of the devil—which indicates that the conspiracy did not affect wide circles of the population but was the work of a small group.<sup>138</sup> The murder was supposed to have been decided on at a council of the boyars. It is hard to say whether this means a full council, or whether only some boyars were involved. The latter seems more probable, in view of the risk of punishment and the difficulty of keeping a large conspiracy secret. Although the chroniclers got their information about the plot at second hand,<sup>139</sup> they were not deceived as to its motives. In their opinion it was due to personal enmity: the murderers hated and were jealous of Aleksei. Apart from envy (*zavist'*) the action was one of disobedience (*nepokor'stvo*) and protest against the grand duke's appointment of Aleksei to the office of *tysyatskii*. This is supported by the fact that the chief organizers of the plot, with their families,<sup>140</sup> hastily fled from Muscovite territory. At this time Ivan was definitely on the side of Aleksei.

Most authors are agreed that a widespread revolt (*myatezh' velii*) broke out in Moscow in connection with Aleksei Petrovich's death. Tikhomirov, Cherepnin and many others believe that

masses of the common people (*chernye lyudi*) among the city's inhabitants rebelled, as well as some of the better-off and especially merchants.<sup>141</sup> The riots are said to have been a protest against excessive taxes and other burdens constantly imposed by the Horde; and they were directed in the first instance against the boyars who fled after Aleksei's murder, and who were thought to be zealous defenders of Tatar interests.

All the suggested explanations of the riot are suspect at first sight. They exaggerate in an artificial way the role and importance of the boyar conspirators, who had been for some years excluded from key government posts. If they were so excluded, how could they have oppressed the population of Moscow in the Horde's interests? and how was it that the leaders of the rebellion allowed these hated boyars to flee the country? Why did these leaders provoke disturbances on such a scale, since their opponents had disappeared? What was the grand duke's attitude towards the revolt? These questions, and many more which could be asked, are not answered in anything like a convincing manner in the relevant literature. We must therefore examine more closely what the sources tell us about this anti-Tatar revolt.

The scholars who have written about the Moscow riot base themselves on the account in the Patriarch Nikon Chronicle. This work dates from the 16th century and contains abundant source material; it sometimes quotes important facts from earlier sources that have been lost, but it also often contains fanciful and tendentious information. It therefore requires to be used with great care. The account it gives of the revolt of 1357<sup>142</sup> suggests two observations. The chronicler refers to the outbreak in very general terms, without any specific details. The authors who accept that a revolt took place and eke out the story with their own conjectures cannot adduce any source in support of their assertions except the Nikon Chronicle: not surprisingly, for no other sources exist. The chronicles earlier than that of Nikon are precise in their account of Aleksey's death, in describing the conspiracy they say that they are not certain of their facts, which are based on hearsay (*netsii zhe rekosha*). This is not extraordinary, as the conspiracy was a secret one. But it is unthinkable that every one of the early chroniclers should have been unaware of a major revolt in Moscow and passed it over in silence.

Historians who accept the account in the Nikon Chronicle without reserve—even though it can easily be refuted by the testimony of another 16-century source<sup>143</sup>—take the view, as we have seen, that the revolt was not against the grand duke but against the Tatars, in revenge for their oppression and violence towards the Rus'ian people. This hypothesis is contrary to the statement in the Nikon Chronicle itself that Chanibek was a good khan who mitigated the hard lot of Rus'.<sup>144</sup> Since, then, the revolt was neither against the grand duke nor against the Tatars,<sup>145</sup> we are at a loss to understand its political background. In addition we do not know what course it took, what its results were, what sections of the population took part in it and so on. In short we know nothing—and in my opinion the explanation of this is that the revolt never took place, but represents an erroneous inference on the chronicler's part.

Many accounts of Aleksei's death, prior to the Nikon Chronicle, draw a comparison between the conspiracy against him and that against Andrei Bogolyubsky in 1174:<sup>146</sup> in both cases the crime was plotted in secret and the murderers escaped unscathed. Under the influence of these accounts the Nikon Chronicle also connects the two events, but in its own way: to underline the similarity even more, the annalist transfers to Aleksei's time the events which took place after Bogolyubsky's death. Since on that occasion there was indeed a mass uprising with murder and pillage, the chronicler thought that a similar revolt must have broken out after the murder of Aleksei Petrovich, though he had no concrete details of it.

In my opinion Presnyakov is closest to the truth when he confines the story of events in Moscow in 1357 to the conspiracy and murder of Aleksei, discounting the alleged revolt.<sup>147</sup> It is, I think, only by analysing the conspiracy that we can form an idea of the political situation in the grand duchy at the time. It remains a fact that its leaders were men of experience and acquainted with the internal situation of their country.<sup>148</sup> They well knew that the *tysyatskii* enjoyed the full support and confidence of the grand duke. When deciding on their dangerous enterprise they must have taken into account two eventualities: either the conspiracy would fail and they would incur savage punishment, or Aleksei would be killed and Ivan's reaction would be still more ferocious. In either case they would have to flee

the country. They must have made preparations to do so at the same time as the coup itself, since they were able to take their families with them.

It might appear at first sight that the conspirators were animated only by envy of Aleksei and that, in a fit of excitement, they committed an unpremeditated act which, in the circumstances, was suicidal as well. This would be a valid inference if they had acted of their own accord, independently of the general political situation; but this is highly improbable. There remains the alternative possibility that they had a protector who incited them to action by playing on their personal jealousies and ambitions. He would have to have been a powerful protector, unafraid of the wrath and vengeance of the grand duke. From the pattern of forces and interests it may be seen that the instigator of the events in Moscow in 1357 can only have been Chanibek. This is also confirmed by what took place subsequently.

It is significant that the leaders of the conspiracy who fled from Ivan's vengeance took refuge in Ryazan',<sup>149</sup> a territory especially dependent on the Tatars. Oleg of Ryazan', having taken Lopasna, continued to adopt an anti-Muscovite stand, faithfully obeying the khan's wishes. In autumn 1357 Chanibek died and was succeeded by his son Berdibek. As was customary when a new khan came to the throne, Ivan and the other Rus'ian princes went to the Horde<sup>150</sup> with gifts to do homage to Berdibek and seek confirmation of their hereditary lands. Two of the conspirators against Aleksei Petrovich<sup>151</sup> were summoned from Ryazan' on this occasion and were received in a friendly manner by Ivan at the Horde.<sup>152</sup> There is no need to wonder who summoned them<sup>153</sup> and commanded Ivan to take them into his service. The fate of Aleksei Petrovich was to be a warning to the grand duke himself.

The new khan, in accordance with his father's wishes, allowed Ivan to continue as grand duke, but also gave his protection and support to the conspirators of 1357. Berdibek's rule was very brief: he died in 1359. On 13 November of the same year there also died Grand Duke Ivan, the last of Kalita's sons.

Ivan's testament, which is undated, is of much importance in reconstructing the last period of his reign. It is witnessed by Ignaty, bishop of Rostov,<sup>154</sup> who assumed that office in 1356,<sup>155</sup>

so that the will is thought to have been made between 1356 and 1359. This period of nearly four years is considerably narrowed by a fact which historians have strangely overlooked. Kalita's youngest son, Andrei of Serpukhov, had two sons: Ivan (date of birth unknown, but probably 1350–2) and Vladimir, born in 1353. Ivan II's will expresses concern for the future of his nephew Vladimir and mentions him several times,<sup>156</sup> showing that the elder child Ivan was no longer alive. We know in fact that this Ivan died in 1358,<sup>157</sup> which proves that the grand duke's testament cannot have been drawn up before that year.<sup>158</sup> In other words, it must date from 1358 to 1359. This period of nearly two years could be still further shortened if we knew the month and day of little Ivan's death, but unfortunately the chronicles give only the year, and further precision must be a matter of conjecture.

It might seem from the grand duke's testament that negotiations, of which we have no other knowledge, had been going on between Moscow and Ryazan' for the settlement of frontier disputes by means of an exchange of territory.<sup>159</sup> Under this 'agreement' Moscow acquired lands on the Protva and Luzha, while Ryazan' gained Lopasna and a surrounding area which is hard to define exactly. The testament also seems to indicate that the agreement was not affected by force of arms but by the mutual goodwill of Ivan and Oleg.

The question arises whether this was intended to be a final settlement of their territorial disputes or only a first stage, to be followed by other frontier changes.<sup>160</sup> The latter is suggested by a passage in the will where Ivan charges his heirs, should any part of the inherited lands be lost, to repartition the remainder by mutual agreement. Among the lands which he envisages as being possibly taken away are Kolomna, localities in the Lopasna basin, and areas acquired by exchange and previously belonging to Ryazan'.<sup>161</sup>

From extant sources it appears clearly who initiated the 'agreement' between Moscow and Ryazan', i.e. who persuaded or rather ordered them to exchange territories: namely the Tatar khan. There is plenty of evidence for this. Ivan in his will envisages that the Tatars may lay claim to Kolomna and the other places mentioned.<sup>162</sup> They would probably have done so in order to attach them to Ryazan'; Ivan, however, does not mention that principality by name, showing how little he cared for Oleg's

territorial claims and his entire role in the frontier dispute. The annals of Ryazan' record a fact, not mentioned in the Rus'ian chronicles, that in 1353 an envoy came to Ryazan' from the Horde to delimit the frontier between Ryazan' and Muscovy.<sup>163</sup> In 1358 Berdibek sent his son Mamat Khozha to Rus' for the same purpose.<sup>164</sup> It appears from these accounts that the Horde took an active part in determining the frontiers between feuding neighbours. The will of the khan—first Chanibek, then Berdibek—was decisive for the whole question; neither Ivan nor Oleg could confront the Horde on equal terms.

The sources quoted enable us to reconstruct the Tatars' course of action. The khans gave express instructions to their envoys and sent them to Rus' to delimit the new frontiers in detail. We may doubt whether the interested Rus'ian parties were allowed much say in the matter. We do not know whether the delimitation was confirmed in writing, or whether the word-of-mouth orders of the khan's envoy sufficed. In any case we have no written version of the Moscow-Ryazan' agreement—which would also have had to bear the khan's seal—and it is uncertain, or rather improbable, that it existed at all in written form.<sup>165</sup> Ivan's will speaks of the lands acquired from Ryazan', but it refers to them in very general terms and does not say how they were acquired.<sup>166</sup> On the other hand it mentions a very important fact in the present context, viz. that the delimitation of disputed lands actually occurred.<sup>167</sup> The fact therefore is beyond doubt, but there is room for controversy on a number of details, especially the question when and in what circumstances the redrawing of frontiers took place.

The old quarrel between Moscow and Ryazan' became considerably acuter and in fact entered a new phase when Oleg took Lopasna in 1353. This appears indirectly from Ivan's testament. The frontier revision must therefore have taken place between 1353 and 1359. This may be narrowed to a particular year, but only on a conjectural basis. Importance attaches here to the above-mentioned accounts of Tatar embassies to the banks of the Oka from Chanibek (1353) and Berdibek (1358) respectively.

In my opinion Chanibek was the initiator and effective agent of the settlement on the Oka in the 1350s. Berdibek, aided by his father's chief counsellors, merely continued his policy. This is suggested by the length of Chanibek's reign (1342–57), his

outstanding ability, broad political horizons and thorough knowledge of Rus'ian affairs, exemplified in the Moscow-Ryazan' frontier question as in other matters. It seems very unlikely that the new settlement on the Oka would have been effected during Berdibek's short reign (1358-9). The new khan showed himself from the beginning unfavourable, if not hostile, towards Moscow. If the settlement had been made in his time it would have been much more adverse to Moscow than that reflected in Ivan's testament. Moreover the latter indicates indirectly that the delimitation did not occur at the time when the will itself was drawn up but previously, that is to say before 1358.

We can also rule out 1357 as the date of the delimitation—a year of tense relations between the Tatars and Moscow, when the *tysyatskii* Aleksei Petrovich was murdered at the Horde's instigation by men who enjoyed the confidence and support of Chanibek. On the other hand, as to earlier years, 1353 also seems unlikely. Semen died in April of that year, and Ivan and the other Rus'ian princes went to the Horde in late spring or summer, returning to their lands in the winter of 1353/4. Ivan became grand duke in March 1354, and I surmise that the new frontiers became valid soon after that. It would have taken some months to delimit them on the ground, and it seems very reasonable to suppose that Chanibek's envoy was sent to the Oka in the autumn or winter of 1353. In my opinion, even if we did not have Kuz'min's statement about the Tatar embassy, 1354 would be the most probable date for the frontier settlement. The change was necessitated by Oleg's seizure of Lopasna in June 1353, and the Horde would have had to act quickly so as to forestall any retaliatory action by Ivan and ensure that the district remained for the time being in the possession of Ryazan'.<sup>168</sup>

From this reasoning it appears that Chanibek allowed Ivan to succeed Semen as grand duke on condition that he agreed to the frontier changes with Ryazan'. Not being yet certain of Ivan's loyalty, the khan in 1353 imposed another condition, viz. Ivan's 'consent' in advance to the possible detachment from his patrimony of Kolomna and the Lopasna basin (which, it would seem, involved a wide zone of Muscovite territory on the left bank of the Oka, from Kolomna to Lopasna).

Chanibek's demands illustrate his style of government. His policy was to achieve his wishes not by force but by the 'voluntary'

agreement of the Rus'ian princes. In theory Ivan might have refused Chanibek's requests, but the khan could then have exercised his 'right' to transfer the Vladimir throne to Konstantin of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal', who was doing his utmost to obtain it.

Kalita in his will also envisaged the possible loss of some of his lands, but did not name them specifically. Ivan II, on the other hand, had a much better idea of which territories the Tatars might take away from him, or indeed Chanibek may have been quite open with him on the subject. This was a severe threat hanging over Moscow in case its prince might take too independent a line, contrary to the Horde's interests.

But Ivan also knew that the Horde needed Muscovy as its chief bulwark against the increasingly expansive tendencies of Lithuania, and that the khan was therefore not likely to weaken Moscow by curtailing its territory unduly. The exchange that actually took place between Moscow and Ryazan' was very different from the threats used by Chanibek to intimidate Ivan.<sup>169</sup> Moscow's territory was not diminished and may even have been enlarged; it was, on the other hand, shifted more to the west, which the khan hoped would increase the antagonism between Moscow and Lithuania.

Ivan accepted with feigned humility the conditions imposed by Chanibek in return for granting him the grand-ducal dignity, but from the outset he was far from being a loyal executant of the khan's orders. Several of his actions after March 1354 show that he intended, with the aid of 'new' men devoted to himself,<sup>170</sup> to weaken the oppressive Tatar hegemony over Rus'. For this purpose he endeavoured to bring about lasting peace within the grand duchy and to consolidate Rus'ian forces.<sup>171</sup> Closer relations with Lithuania would, he expected, help him in this difficult task.<sup>172</sup>

News of Ivan's fairly bold actions in 1355-6 promptly reached Chanibek, perhaps in an exaggerated form;<sup>173</sup> he reacted violently by ordering the murder of Aleksei Petrovich. It is hard to suppose that Ivan failed to perceive the motives and purpose of the conspiracy, as the boyars in question fled to Ryazan' where they were under the khan's protection. Owing to the scantiness of source material it is difficult to assess the results of Aleksei's death or its effect on Ivan's policy; but all the more interest



attaches to relations between Moscow and Tver' in 1357-8, which throw at least some light on the tense situation in eastern Rus'.

The principality of Tver' had for several years been torn by a fierce dispute between Vasily of Kashin, who was exercising the princely power, and his nephew Vsevolod of Kholm. During Semen's reign as grand duke Vasily had leant towards Moscow and, through it, the Horde, while Vsevolod was closer to Lithuania, whose grand duke Algirdas was his brother-in-law. The dispute passed through several phases. In 1357 Vsevolod appealed to the metropolitan Aleksei for mediation or help against the grievous injuries he was suffering from his uncle.<sup>174</sup> The metropolitan refused: he was then pursuing a decidedly anti-Lithuanian policy, for which he had good reason (see Chapter 10). The quarrel between the Tverite princes, which might have seemed a purely local affair, took on wider dimensions. In the same year 1357, at the metropolitan's instance, Vasily reached a closer understanding with Grand Duke Ivan.<sup>175</sup> It appears from this that such an understanding did not exist between them before; on the other hand Ivan had not shown any unfriendly feelings towards Vsevolod. As later events confirm, there is no reason to think that the grand duke was unduly influenced by the metropolitan in his *rapprochement* with Vasily. He was governed by his own interest, which required him at that time to take up a firmly anti-Lithuanian attitude: for Tatar suspicions of intrigue between Moscow and Lithuania were growing in strength and had led to fearful consequences (the murder of Aleksei Petrovich).

After February 1357 the grand duke was in an extremely difficult position, and Chanibek's death at the beginning of winter in that year<sup>176</sup> still further complicated the tense relationship between the Horde and Moscow. In that winter (1357/8)<sup>177</sup> the Rus'ian princes went to the Horde to do homage to the new khan Berdibek,<sup>178</sup> returning home in the spring of 1358.<sup>179</sup> Vsevolod of Kholm, 'compromised' by his close relations with Lithuania, did not accompany his uncle Vasily but set out for the Horde by himself, independently of the other princes. On his way through Pereyaslavl' he was turned back by the grand duke's governors,<sup>180</sup> so that he only made his way to the Horde much later, by a roundabout route through Lithuania. We may presume that he complained to the khan in 1358 of the wrongs he was suffering at his uncle's hands, in the same way as he had

complained to the metropolitan in the previous year. Berdibek, however, turned a deaf ear and promptly sent Vsevolod back to Vasily for severe punishment.<sup>181</sup> The khan's decision showed that Vasily of Tver' enjoyed his full confidence; the grand duke must have known this when entering into closer relations with Vasily in 1357. By refusing to allow Vsevolod to cross his territory, Ivan showed extreme loyalty towards the Tatars, but he did not gain their confidence thereby.

Light is thrown on Berdibek's relations with Moscow by the fact that when in 1358 he sent his own son Mamat Khozha to the Oka to effect the frontier settlement between Ryazan' and Moscow, the grand duke—an extraordinary occurrence for those times—refused to allow the khan's envoy to enter Muscovite territory.<sup>182</sup>

In my opinion it cannot be the case that Ivan's reference in his will to the new Moscow-Ryazan' frontiers related to those fixed by Mamat Khozha. Apart from the loss of Lopasna those frontiers were on the whole quite favourable to Moscow, and there is no reason why Ivan should have reacted so violently and insulted the khan in the person of his son. It would be different if we suppose that there was to be a further delimitation of the areas in question in 1358. The grand duke in his testament named the lands that he thought Moscow might have to forfeit to the Tatars, or through them to Ryazan'. Berdibek knew Chanibek's intentions and decided now to give effect to the possibility reserved by him. This would be the Horde's second act of retaliation (the first being the murder of Aleksei Petrovich) against the policy pursued by Ivan in 1355–6. The distance of time also makes it improbable that the only delimitation of the Moscow-Ryazan' frontier took place in 1358–9. The insult to the Tatar envoy cannot, it would seem, have taken place earlier than the summer of 1358,<sup>183</sup> and it must, to say the least, have greatly strained relations between the Horde and Moscow for a considerable time. This must have affected the frontier settlement in Ivan's disfavour. Both Berdibek and Ivan died in 1359; there is no evidence as to whether the situation created in the second half of 1358 had changed before their deaths.<sup>184</sup>

The grand duke well knew that he had taken an extremely risky step by refusing to admit Berdibek's son to his territory. Although in good health and aged only 32 or 33, he made a

will expressing uncertainty as to his fate and life.<sup>185</sup> He was saved by circumstances at the Horde which he had no part in bringing about but which worked to his benefit: Berdibek was on bad terms with Mamat Khozha,<sup>186</sup> and the former's position at the Horde was itself insecure. Berdibek had attained power through the murder of several of his brothers, which had its effect on his closest relatives; with good reason he felt constantly endangered by plots and intrigue, and appears to have died of poison.<sup>187</sup> He was prevented from undertaking any large-scale activity in Rus' by the complex situation at the Horde, evidenced by events shortly after his death.

Ivan could not foresee all these circumstances. He knew Berdibek's high-handed, ruthless and cruel disposition, and had every reason to expect the worst at the time of making his will. This document, which appears to have been drawn up with unusual haste,<sup>188</sup> resembles that of Kalita in one notable respect. Both father and son made their wills while in good health, not smitten by disease but well aware that the khan might have them done to death at any time. This shows that over a period of nearly twenty years there had been no basic change in the dependence of the grand duchy on the Horde, although both Kalita's sons did what they could to lessen it.

The situation in Moscow at Ivan's death was no better than that in which Semen had left it. Ivan had not, like Semen, died childless, but in other respects the position was no less complex and unpredictable. Historians, although working on the same source material, differ in their opinions as to the course of events in Ivan's reign and their assessment of it. The principal views are represented on the one hand by Cherepnin and by Fennell, who largely agrees with him, and on the other by Rüß. In summing up my own views I shall at the same time indicate my position—generally a middle one—*vis-à-vis* these authors.

One of the main problems raised by this Chapter is that of relations between Kalita's sons, their agreement or differences in both home and external affairs. While Cherepnin and Fennell see considerable divergences in the actions of Semen and Ivan respectively, Rüß quotes evidence to the contrary: e.g. Semen went to the Horde several times with his younger brothers, he consulted them before sending an embassy to the khan in 1348,

he campaigned with them against Smolensk in 1352, and so on. Rüß concludes that the brothers co-operated closely in all external matters;<sup>189</sup> and he observes that there is no direct indication in any source of the policy differences postulated by Cherepnin and Fennell.<sup>190</sup>

Rüß is right in drawing attention to the many examples of joint action by the brothers in external affairs; but co-operation is not the same as identity of views. Joint action by two parties may be due to the superior strength of one of them, so that their solidarity is more or less the effect of coercion.<sup>191</sup> In the present case there is a special factor inasmuch as Kalita bequeathed the city of Moscow, capital of the principality, not to Semen alone but to all three of his sons jointly,<sup>192</sup> so that they had to consult together and act in concert. Their father intended each of them to have an equal voice (Semen being his brothers' guardian for only as long as they were under age), though in practice probably things were different.

Rüß argues that there is direct evidence supporting the view that the brothers agreed in foreign policy matters. Two reservations should be made here. No one disputes the value of direct evidence, but indirect should not be neglected either, provided it is not far-fetched but emerges clearly from the sources. Secondly, too sharp a distinction should not be drawn between internal and external affairs. In practice they were often interconnected, as is shown by relations between the Tatars and Rus'. These were a matter of foreign policy, but the Horde governed the conquered territory (usually by indirect means) and in practice often determined, in one way or another, the political balance within Rus'. Another example: Semen, after consulting his brothers and supposedly with their approval, sent an embassy to the Patriarch at Constantinople to ask that Aleksei should be appointed metropolitan in succession to Feognost. Rüß quotes this as an instance of agreement in foreign policy between Semen and his brothers, Ivan and Andrei. This is true, but the choice of a metropolitan was a question of the first importance to the whole internal life of Rus'. Examples can be adduced to show that Kalita's sons from time to time took joint decisions in home affairs also: e.g. when in 1345 they all married at about the same time, doubtless not by chance, or when they combined to present churches with newly-cast bells etc. In my opinion, to get a correct view of

relations between the brothers one must treat all their concerns, internal and external, as part of a single whole, just as they were in day-to-day life. Another point which should be borne in mind is that we should not exaggerate either the princes' solidarity or such disputes as they may have had, as both were restricted by definite limits.

The difference of views expressed by historians is no doubt partly due to the state of the sources. Although the chronicles indicate that Semen's relations with Ivan and Andrei were in general harmonious, this is not the impression given by extant documents such as the agreement between the brothers and Semen's testament.<sup>193</sup> In my opinion we can trust both groups of sources if we assume that each of them reveals only part of the truth. All three brothers were, I believe, conscious of what Kalita had willed concerning their mutual relations; when they referred to his intention<sup>194</sup> it was not merely a pious phrase but something they wished to express and emphasize.

There is no doubt that documents emanating directly from the parties concerned have more weight than chroniclers' accounts. But the two documents mentioned are not easy to interpret, being expressed in veiled language corresponding to the delicacy of the situation. If Semen and his younger brothers had openly voiced their claims or grievances and had firmly defended their respective courses of action, relations between them would soon have taken a turn for the worse; and this, mindful of their father's will, they desired to avoid.

The grand duke treated his brothers' conspiracy with extreme leniency.<sup>195</sup> They for their part took up a very conciliatory, if not humble, attitude. There was never an open conflict among Kalita's sons, but that does not mean that their relations were placed on a completely sound footing by the agreement between them or by Semen's will. Ivan was not wholly loyal and sincere in his agreement with Semen;<sup>196</sup> Semen, though he came to an understanding with his brothers, did not trust Ivan.<sup>197</sup> Such was the real state of affairs. The quarrel, I believe, was something more than a mere family dispute; there were domestic differences, but they were secondary to the main issue.

No one doubts that both Semen and Ivan wanted to keep the grand-ducal succession for Moscow. Both wanted to weaken and eventually overthrow the Tatar overlordship and to unite Rus'

under Muscovite rule. But in the 1350s both these aims were a long way off, and many difficulties stood in the way. At this point, my summing-up of the views expressed in this Chapter is that the brothers differed considerably in the choice of means towards their two supreme objectives.

Semen saw as his chief aim the political unification of the grand duchy with Moscow as its centre. He was not called 'the Proud' for nothing; he behaved haughtily towards all other members of the dynasty, using every means and every opportunity to weaken them and compel them to submission. Chanibek supported him in this ambitious policy, while at the same time inciting to resistance the minor princes whose position and importance was threatened by Semen. The khan, enjoying perfect freedom of manoeuvre, could control the situation within Rus' and assure the continuance of his own power.

Realizing that Semen's method of conducting relations had brought deplorable results, Ivan set about concluding free agreements with individual princes in order to check the growth of anti-Muscovite feeling which Chanibek had fostered in many parts of Rus'. Restraining his own ambition and renouncing excessive territorial claims (e.g. the Povolzh'e), he strove to create an atmosphere of confidence as a basis for the political consolidation of Rus'. In so doing he could appeal to the common interest of all the princes in resisting the Tatar menace. Thanks to these efforts Ivan made himself popular throughout the grand duchy, as is confirmed by favourable references in the chronicles.

Ivan's policy, if successful, was bound considerably to weaken Tatar supremacy in Rus'. Chanibek soon perceived his intentions and reacted sharply, ordering the murder by his agents of the *tysyatskii* Aleksei Petrovich, one of the chief assistants of Ivan's political designs.<sup>198</sup> Aleksei's death was a grim warning to Ivan, whose immediate reaction to the khan's anger was to adopt an obedient and submissive attitude towards the Horde.

In my opinion many authors exaggerate the independence displayed by Kalita's sons in their pro- or anti-Tatar activities. The only independent agent in eastern Rus' was the Horde, as Lithuania was in the west. Moscow was as yet too weak to do anything but manoeuvre, within very narrow limits, between the Tatars and Lithuania. Everything depended on the degree of pressure exerted by the khan. Noting that Chanibek did not

directly oppose Semen's ambition to assert the authority of the grand duke over all the Rus'ian princes, Cherepnin ascribes this to an 'alliance' between Moscow and the Tatars.<sup>199</sup> But an alliance implies some measure of equality between the partners, which is out of the question here. Fennell is closer to the truth when he emphasizes the servitude of both Semen and Ivan towards the Horde.<sup>200</sup> On the other hand, he restricts this attitude on Ivan's part to the period 1357-9. 'From all the available information it would appear that the great change in Ivan's policy took place in 1357':<sup>201</sup> i.e. Ivan in that year switched sharply from a pro-Lithuanian to a pro-Tatar policy. In my opinion this view must be treated with great reserve.

For lack of sources we know little of Moscow-Tatar relations in 1359, but we have more information on 1358. In that year, as we have seen, Ivan departed from his previous deference to the Horde by refusing to admit the Tatar envoy, Berdibek's own son, to his territory.<sup>202</sup> This fact throws light on Ivan's true attitude towards the khan, stripped of its hypocritical concealment. I agree with Rüss that there was no basic change in that attitude towards the end of Ivan's reign.<sup>203</sup>

Some changes occurred, but they were brought about by the Horde. Ivan's efforts to consolidate the grand duchy from the politico-military point of view, so that the Tatars could not exploit jealousies among the princes, met with a sharp reaction on the part of Chanibek (1357) and Berdibek after him. Ivan's policy was more dangerous to the Horde than Semen's had been. Realizing the consequences of the khan's anger, conscious of the threat to him as grand duke and perhaps even to his life, Ivan elected to advertise his submissiveness to the Horde and disclaim any association with Lithuania. In my opinion this was a purely tactical and short-term decision.

Ivan's rule was marked by a keen sense of reality and, consequently, extreme caution. In 1353-7 he maintained correct relations with the khan and confined himself to the role of a formally (but only formally) obedient vassal. He observed similar caution towards Lithuania, seeking friendly relations<sup>204</sup> while avoiding too close engagement.

Ivan's rule lasted barely six years, too short a time to determine the future of Moscow; but all his actions were in the right direction as far as that future was concerned. In the difficult situation

inherited from his father and brother, he made efforts that should not be underrated. Despite those who belittle the importance of his reign<sup>205</sup> I believe that he was an outstanding political figure,<sup>206</sup> though in the conditions of the time he could not expect to achieve much.

## Notes to Chapter 9

1. ' . . . a knyaz' velikii Ivan Danilovich' poslal zhe svoyu rat' s Tovlub'em k Smolensku po tsarevu povelen'yu, a otpustil knyazya Konstantina Suzhdal'skago, knyazya Konstantina Rostovskago, knyazya Ivana Yaroslavichya Yur'evskago, knyazya Ivana Kryutskago, Fedora Fominskago . . .': *TL*, p. 363; similarly *PSRL*, XV, col. 52, and XXV, p. 172. This would appear to be a complete list of those who took part in the expedition: it does not end with a general reference to 'other princes', as the chroniclers do on many other occasions. The mention of minor princes from the borders of Smolensk, such as those of Drutsk (a fortress on the Drut', a right-bank tributary of the Dnepr) and Fominskoe (near the junction of the Vazuza and the Volga), makes it hardly probable that any better-known and more important ones have been omitted.

2. The participation of Konstantin of Rostov was largely due to family reasons: he was married to Kalita's daughter.

3. Although Konstantin of Suzdal' obeyed Kalita's summons, he cannot be reckoned as a member of the pro-Muscovite camp: see later in this Chapter.

4. *NPL*, p. 351; *PSRL*, XXV, p. 172.

5. 'Toe zhe vesny mesyatsya maya v 2 den' . . . poshel v Ordou knyaz' Semen Ivanovich, a s nim bratia ego knyaz' Ivan i Andrei, i vsi knyazi togda v Orde byli': *PSRL*, XV, col. 53; *TL*, p. 364. The text does not read: 'poshel v Ordou knyaz' Semen Ivanovich', a s nim bratia ego . . . Ivan i Andrei, i vsi knyazi s nimi—the usual formula when they all went together. Presumably the non-Muscovite princes also made the homeward journey separately from Kalita's sons: this, in any case, was true of Konstantin of Tver'. 'A knyaz' Kostyantyn priide iz Ordy v Tfer': *PSRL*, XV, col. 53.

6. It seems certain that Semen and his brothers 'persuaded' the khan by means of hard cash (the symbolic money-bag bequeathed by Kalita to his sons), an argument to which Uzbek was especially amenable.

7. 'Toe zhe oseni vyide iz Ordy na velikoe knyazhen'e knyaz' Semen Ivanovich', a s nim brat'ya ego, Ivan i Andrei, i vse knyazi Ruskie pod rutse ego dany, i sede na stole v Volodimeri mesyatsa oktyabrya v 30': *PSRL*, XXV, pp. 172–3.



8. The population of Tŏrzhok resisted the excessive taxes which Semen zealously collected for the Horde; their resistance was supported by Great Novgorod.

9. 'Toe zhe zimy byst' velik s'ézd na Moskve vsem knyazem russkym, i poide rat'yu k Torzh'ku i vzya na nikh chernyi bor Knyaz' velikii Semen', a s nim brat' ego knyaz' Ivan Ivanovich', knyaz' Kostyantín' Suzhdal'skyi, knyaz' Kostyantín Rostov'skyi, knyaz' Vasilei Yaroslav'skyi, i vsi knyazi s nimi . . .': *TL*, pp. 364–5; *PSRL*, XV, p. 53. It appears from this account that the princes of Vladimir Rus' accepted Uzbek's decision appointing Semen grand duke with complete submissiveness. There is nothing surprising in this. The non-Muscovite princes did not engage in anti-Tatar politics, but confined themselves to intrigue and rivalry within the dynasty.

10. N. Berezhevskii, *Khronologiya russkogo letopisaniya*, p. 297; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 98.

11. ' . . . knyaz' velikii Semen Ivanovich' poide v Ordu. Knyaz' Kostyantín Suzhdal'skyi, knyaz' Kostyantín Tfer'skyi, knyaz' Kostyantín Rostov'skyi, knyaz' Vasilei Yaroslav'skyi te vo Ordu zhe poshli perezhe': *PSRL*, XV, col. 54; *TL*, p. 365.

12. *PSRL*, X, p. 215.

13. The cooling of relations between Konstantín and Semen may have had an additional cause, if Konstantín's wife (Kalita's daughter; we do not know her name) had died at this time.

14. At least the chronicles say nothing of his having objected.

15. After Aleksandr's death Konstantín, in accordance with custom, resumed the government of Tver'. '[1340] A knyaz' Kostyantín priide iz Ordy v Tfer'': *PSRL*, XV, col. 53.

16. Aleksandr left four sons: Vsevolod, Mikhail, Vladimir and Andrei (the eldest, Fedor, was put to death with his father at the Horde), and two daughters, Maria and Juliana. Nothing is known for certain of the origin of his wife, Anastasia.

17. The district around the fortress of Kholm, in the south-western part of the Tver' principality, in the basin of the Derzha, a right-bank tributary of the Volga.

18. Patriarshaya ili Nikonovskaya letopis', *PSRL*, X, 1965 (repr.). Cf. A. Kuz'min, *K voprosu o vremeni sozdaniya i redaktsiyakh Nikonovskoi letopisi*, *AE*, (1962) 1963, pp. 111–20.

19. 'Togo zhe leta [1346] knyazyu Konstyantínu Mikhailovichyu Tverskomu byst' nelyubie s knyagineyu s Nastas'eyu i so knyazem so Vsevolodom Aleksandrovichem, i nachya imati boyare ikh i slugi v serebre za volosti chrez lyudtskuyu silu, i byst' nad nimi skorb' velika; knyaz' zhe Vsevolod Aleksandrovich, togo ne mogli trpeti . . .': *PSRL*, X, p. 217. As regards the tribute levied by Vasily: 'Togo zhe leta [1346]

knyaz' Vasilei Mikhailovich' . . . prisla danshchikov svoikh vo udel knyazya Vsevoloda Aleksandrovichya v Kholm, i vzyasha dan' na lyudekh v Kholmu . . . Slyshav zhe knyaz' Vsevolod Kholmskii, yako dyadya ego . . . vzya dan' na votchine ego na Kholmu, i oskorbisya . . .': *ibid.*, p. 218.

20. Vsevolod's date of birth is not known, but it was probably 1328 or 1329. Cf. A. Ekzemplyarsky, *Velikie i udel'nye knyaz'ya Severnoi Rusi* 2, 1891, pp. 539–40 and note 1724; N. Baumgarten, *Généalogies des branches régnautes des Rurikides*, pp. 46, 49. Thus when Vsevolod took up the quarrel with his uncle he would have been 17 or 18.

21. ' . . . knyaz' . . . Vsevolod . . . ide izo Tveri k velikomu knyazyu Semenu Ivanovichyu na Moskvu . . . Togo zhe leta [1346] knyaz' Vsevolod Aleksandrovich' poide vo Ordu zhe s Moskvu': *PSRL*, X, p. 217.

22. The chronicles mention Konstantin's death very briefly and without comment: 'Togo zhe leta [1346] prestavisya knyaz' Tferskii Kostyantyn Mikhailovich': *TL*, p. 368. Similary *PSRL*, XV, col. 57; xxv, p. 75. The Nikon Chronicle adds that the death took place at the Horde ('Togo zhe leta prestavisya vo Orde knyaz' . . . Kostyantyn . . .': *PSRL*, X, p. 217) and that Chanibek made Vsevolod prince of Tver' (' . . . i dade emu tsar' Tverskoe knyazhenie': *ibid.*, p. 218).

23. This seems very probable, looking at the matter in a longer time-perspective. When Kalita persuaded Uzbek to murder Aleksandr and Fedor, he gave the khan's sons an example to follow. Konstantin followed in the footsteps of his father Mikhail and his brothers Dmitry and Aleksandr, and it was natural that, like them, he should suffer a martyr's death at the Horde.

24. Vsevolod, if only by reason of his youth, was not influential enough at the Horde to have persuaded Chanibek to put his uncle to death.

25. H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa* 1, p. 387; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 103–4.

26. Maria's date of birth is not known. She was probably much younger than Semen, as she died only in 1397.

27. Semen's first wife, Anastasiya (Aigusta) of Lithuania, died in 1345. Both children of the marriage (Vasily and Konstantin) died in infancy. Soon after Anastasiya's death Semen married Evpraksiya, daughter of Fedor Svyatoslavich, apparently a princeling from the border area between Smolensk and Moscow (Dorogobuzh-Vyaz'ma). He soon sent her back to her father (1346) on the ground that she showed reluctance to perform her wifely duties. This may have been true, but we are entitled to be sceptical, as the sources, revised in Moscow, are constantly at pains to clear Semen of all blame at the expense of others concerned.

The grand duke's marriages had a markedly political flavour, and the match with Maria of Tver' was expected to bring Moscow much greater advantages than the previous one, so recently concluded. It would seem therefore that Semen's close relations with Vsevolod began only in 1346, as otherwise he would not have married Evpraksiya.

28. 'A zhenilsya knyaz' velikii Semen, outaivsysa mitropolita Fegnasta, mitropolit zhe ne blagoslovi ego i tserkvi zatvori . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 57.

29. Semen married Maria in the spring of 1347. Their son Daniil was born in December, and a second son, Mikhail, in 1348.

30. 'Togo zhe leta [1347] . . . Feognast mitropolit . . . posovetova nechto dukhovne s synom svoim . . . Semenom Ivanovichem . . .': *PSRL*, X, p. 218.

31. 'Togo zhe leta [1347] knyaz' velikii Semen i Feognost mitropolit poslasha vo Tsar'gorod o blagosloven'i: *TL*, p. 369. ' . . . i tako poslasha [Semen and Feognost] v Tsar'grad k patriarkhu o blagoslavenii': *PSRL*, X, p. 218. Similarly *PSRL*, XV, col. 57.

32. This is attested by the Byzantine historian Nicephorus Gregoras. See J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, p. 231.

33. Vasily's appanage comprised the northern part of the Tver' principality.

34. It is hard to be certain as to the motives of Feognost and Fedor, but respect for customary law no doubt played an important part. There may also have been personal reasons: Fedor came to the bishopric of Tver' from Kashin (*PSRL*, XV, col. 55). Both clerics, moreover, were concerned at the suffering caused to the population at large by the inter-princely feuds. The chronicler records the joy of the masses at the reconciliation between Vasily and Vsevolod. 'I poidosha k nim lyudie otvsyudu vo grady ikh, i vo vlasti i vo vsyu zemlyu Tver'skuyu, i umnozhashasya lyudie i vzradovashesya radostiyu velikoyu': *PSRL*, X, p. 221.

35. ' . . . Fedor, vladyka Tferskii, vvede v mir i v lyubov' knyazya Vasilia . . . s . . . Vsevolodom . . . , i plakashesya mezhi soboyu v lyubvi i v mire . . . , i ukrepishssya mezhi sobya krestnym tselovaniem vo edinomyslii, i v sovete, i v edin'stve zhiti. I priekha vo Tver' knyaz' . . . Vasilei . . . , i nachya zhiti z bratanichem svoim so knyazem Vsevolodom Aleksandrovichem Kholmskim tikho, i krotko, i mirno i v lyubvi mnoze': *PSRL*, X, p. 221.

36. The chroniclers recording this marriage do not give the name of Semen's daughter; in view of her age she must have been the child of his first wife. *PSRL*, XV, col. 60; *ibid.*, XXV, p. 178; *TL*, p. 371. They mention the death in 1368 of Vasilisa, wife of Mikhail of Kashin, but do not say that she was Semen's daughter: *PSRL*, XI, p. 12. There are

two possibilities: either Semen had a daughter Vasilisa who married Mikhail, or the daughter who married him died soon afterwards and Mikhail took a second wife named Vasilisa of whom nothing else is known.

37. The metropolitan's consent was necessary because Algirdas was a pagan and did not intend to be baptized on the occasion of the marriage.

38. 'Togo zhe leta knyaz' Litovskiy Olgord prislal svoi posly k knyazyu velikomu Semenu Ivanovich(yu) biti chelom i prositi za sebe svesti knyazhi Semenovy knyazhny Ul'yanu . . . I knyaz' velikii . . . dolozha Fegnasta mitropolita, i vyda svoyu svest' za Olgorda . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 59; *TL*, p. 370. Many details are missing from this account. We do not know when the marriage took place, but to judge from the age of the eldest offspring (cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *O genezie i wartosci Krewa*, pp. 335–8) it was probably towards the end of 1349 or in 1350. There is no doubt that Algirdas reached an understanding with Juliana and Vsevolod before sending his envoys to Moscow. The discussions must have taken place in 1349 or 1348, in any case before Semen went over to supporting Vasily. It is hard to be certain which side took the initiative: equally probable arguments can be advanced for either.

39. For details see Chapter 10.

40. ' . . . Knyaz' veliki Litovsky Olgerd posla v Ordu k tsaryu Chzhanibeku brata svoego Koriyada prositi sebe pomoshchi na velikogo knyazya Semena': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 177. See also *PSRL*, XV, col. 58; *TL*, p. 369, and others.

41. Although Algirdas was a pagan his brother Karijotas was a Christian, bearing the name Mikhail. In the oldest text, no longer extant, he must have been referred to by both names; later chroniclers, misunderstanding this, speak of two different princes, Karijotas and Mikhail. ' . . . i vydasť tsar' . . . brat'yu Olgerdovu knyazei Litovskiykh, Kor'yada da Mikhaila . . .': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 177. Similarly *PSRL*, XV, col. 58; *TL*, p. 369.

42. 'I to slyshav [sc. that Lithuanian envoys were at the Horde] knyaz' velikii Semen, pogadav s svoeyu brat'ieyu s knyazem Ivanom i Andreom i s boyary, i posla v Ordu Fedora Glebovicha da Aminya da Feodora Shubacheeva k tsaryu zhalovatisya na Olgerda': *PSRL*, XV, col. 58; XXV, p. 177; *TL*, p. 369, etc.

43. Family connections cannot be completely left out of account. Semen's first wife, who died in 1345, was a Lithuanian, Algirdas's sister.

44. *PSRL*, XV, cols. 60–1; XXV, p. 178; *TL*, p. 372, etc.

45. *PSRL*, X, p. 223.

46. 'Syna zhe ego knyazya Semena ne byst' na provozhenii ottsa svoego, byashe bo byl v to vremya v Novegorode v Nizhnem': *PSRL*, XV, col. 53.

47. A minor, but significant detail: in the winter of 1339/40 Ivan ordered a number of princes, including Konstantin of Suzdal', to march against Smolensk, but did not send Semen with them. We may presume that he wanted Semen to go to Nizhny Novgorod as soon as possible after his return from the Horde.

48. V. Kuchkin (*Nizhnii Novgorod i Nizhegorodskoe knyazhestvo v XII-XIV vv.*, in: *Pol'sha i Rus'*, 1974, pp. 242-3) expresses the view that the southern frontier of the principality of Nizhny Novgorod ran along the Sura, a right-bank tributary of the Volga, while the other frontier was formed approximately by the P'yana, a left-bank tributary of the Sura, and another tributary of that river, the Para. No certainty is possible as to the exact frontier for lack of source material and above all because frontiers were not precisely delimited in those vast, thickly forested areas.

49. 'Togo zhe leta [1341] sede v Novegorode v Nizhnem' na Gorodtse na knyazhenii na velikom Kostyantín Vasil'evich Suzhdal'sky': *PSRL*, XV, col. 54. As grand duke of Povolzh'e Konstantin could not be subordinate to Semen. The chronicler does not say what his relationship was to Semen in respect of his holding of Suzdal', or indicate the nature of the link between that principality and Nizhny Novgorod. From a practical point of view it seems most likely that all Konstantin's lands were under the supremacy of the grand duke of Vladimir.

50. Immediately after recording Konstantin's acquisition of Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets, the chronicler mentions Uzbek's death and gives its date: autumn 1341. ('Toe zhe oseni umre tsar' Ozybyak': *PSRL*, XV, col. 54). Thus the prince of Suzdal' became lord of Povolzh'e before that date, i.e. in the spring or summer of 1341. This is indirectly supported by several other facts. In the winter of 1340/1 Semen called to Moscow the princes under his suzerainty, including Konstantin of Suzdal'. Immediately after the Moscow congress the princes undertook an expedition against Torzhok, in which Konstantin also took part. Hence he cannot have occupied the Povolzh'e until that expedition was over. Semen did not react to Konstantin's ambitious move until as late as 1343. Konstantin must have acted just before Uzbek's death, as there was no time for Semen to counter his activities at the Horde: the disputes which broke out in the khan's immediate family soon after his death for a time prevented the Tatars taking decisions on Rus'ian matters.

51. ' . . . knyaz' velikii Semen Ivanovich spersya s knyazem Kostyantínom Vasilievichem Suzhdal'skym o knyazhenii Novagoroda Nizhnyago i poidosha vo Ordu . . . ': *PSRL*, XV, col. 55.

52. 'I byst' im v Orde sud krepok i dostasya knyazhenie Novogorodskoe knyazyu Kostyantínu': *ibid.*

53. Semen could have done so if he was stationed at Nizhny Novgorod well before 1339, but in that case it would have been by his father's order: the policy was therefore basically Kalita's.

54. 'Na tu zhe zimou priide knyaz' velikii Aleksandr iz Ordy vo Tver' . . . A boyare mnozi otekha na Moskvu k velikomu knyazyu Ivanu': *PSRL*, XV, p. 48.

55. ' . . . i yashasya boyare Novgorodskiy i Gorodech'skiy za knyazya Semena Ivanovicha, da s nim i v Ordu poidosha . . . ; i vydasha emu [sc. Konstantin] boyar, i privedeni bysha v Novgorod v khomolstekh i imenie ikh vzya, a samekh povele kazniti po torgu voda': *ibid*.

56. 'Togo zhe leta [1355] . . . prestavisya knyaz' Kostyantyn Vasil'evich' Suzhdal'skiy mesyatsa noyab(rya) 21 . . . A knyazhil let 15 . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 64. Similarly other chronicles.

57. ' . . . i polozhen byst' v tserkvi svyatago Spasa v Novegorode v Nizhnem': *ibid*.

58. 'Togo zhe leta [1350] knyaz' Kostyantyn Vasilievich' porushal tserkov' kamenu staruyu i vetshanuyu svyatago Spasa, a novuyu zalozhil': *PSRL*, XV, col. 60.

59. 'Togo zhe leta [1347] knyaz' Kostyantyn Vasilievich' slil kolokol bolshi svyatomu Spasu': *PSRL*, XV, col. 58.

60. A. Sakharov, *Goroda Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XIV-XV vekov*, 1959, p. 66.

61. A. Gatsissky (ed.), *Nizhegorodskii letopisets*, 1886, pp. 2-3.

62. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva*, p. 263.

63. 'Toe zhe vesny [1350] poide v Ordu knyaz' velikii Semen Ivanovich, a s nim bratia ego knyaz' Ivan i Andrei. Togo zhe leta vyide iz Ordy na Rus' knyaz' velikii Semen s svoeyu bratieyu i s poshalovaniem': *PSRL*, XV, col. 59. Of Konstantin's journey the pro-Muscovite chronicler says laconically: 'Togo zhe leta [1350] knyaz' Konstantyn Suzhdalskii khodi vo Ordu': *PSRL*, X, p. 222. The fact that both journeys by the grand dukes are mentioned under the same year suggests that there was some connection between them, but it is hard to say what. Semen, we know for certain, went to the Horde in the spring of 1350; Konstantin appears to have gone there towards the end of the year. From the generally known course of events it would seem that Semen was unsuccessful in getting the Horde to thwart Konstantin's ambitions in Nizhny Novgorod: the latter's position showed no weakening after 1350.

64. 'Togo zhe leta [1347] postavlen byst' Nafanail episkopom Suzhdalyu': *PSRL*, XV, 57-8.

65. On the development of trade and artisanship at Nizhny Novgorod see A. Sakharov, *Goroda*, pp. 66-9; V. Kuchkin, *Nizhnii Novgorod i Nizhegorodskoe knyazhestvo v XIII-XIV vv.*, in: *Pol'sha i Rus'*, 1974, pp. 244-5.

66. ' . . . Konstantyn . . . chestno i grozno boronil otchinu svoyu ot silnykh knyazei i ot Tatar': *PSRL*, X, p. 228. Other chronicles do not mention the Tatars.

67. 'Toe zhe oseni [1352] ozhenisya knyaz' Mikhailo Aleksandrovich Tfer'skyi ou knyazya ou Kostyantina v Novegorode v Nizhnem'. Togdy zhe i knyazyu Borisu privedosha iz Litvy dcher' Olgordovu Ogrofenu i venchasya v Novegorode ou svyatago Spasa mesyatsa ok(tyabrya)': *PSRL*, XV, col. 61. Some chronicles' (e.g. *PSRL*, XXV, p. 180) date the marriage 1354, but this is much less likely.

68. 'Togo zhe leta [1350] knyaz' Kostyantyn Vasilievich dal dcher' svoyu Ontonidu za knyazya Andreyu Fedorovicha v Rostov': *PSRL*, XV, col. 60.

69. Konstantin of Rostov (who married Kalita's daughter in 1328) ceased to behave submissively towards Moscow after Semen became grand duke. He openly favoured the anti-Muscovite princes, and joined them in intriguing at the Horde in 1342 to have Semen deposed from the grand-ducal throne. After the failure of these attempts, while not altering his basic attitude he maintained cautiously correct relations with Semen. He obeyed Semen's orders, e.g. for the action against Great Novgorod in 1348 (*PSRL*, XV, col. 59; *TL*, p. 370), and when in 1349 he married his daughter to Liubartas (Lyubart) of Lithuania he took care to obtain Semen's formal approval, though the marriage was basically directed against Moscow. The chroniclers correctly describe this daughter of Konstantin's as Semen's niece (*sestrichna*): her mother was Kalita's daughter by his first marriage, of which we know little. Her name was certainly not Maria (see Chapter 8); she may have been the Fetiniya, Kalita refers in his testament as the only daughter of that marriage, or else another daughter of Kalita's by his first wife who died before he made his will and is therefore not mentioned in it.

70. Semen died in the prime of life: he was still under 40, having been born in 1316.

71. 'Togo zhe leta [1353] poidosha knyazi v Ordu, spersya o velikom knyazhen'i': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 179. 'Togo zhe leta [1353], spershysya, poshli v Ordu knyaz' Ivan Ivanovich' da knyaz' Kon'styan'tin suzdal'skii o velikom knyazhenii': *ULS*, p. 52.

72. 'Togo zhe leta [1353] poslasha novgorodtsi svoi posol Smena Sudokova ko tsesaryu v Ordu, prosya velikogo knyazheniya Kostyantynu knyazyu Suzdal'skomu': *NPL*, p. 363.

73. This is indicated by the marriages already mentioned: Liubartas of Lithuania in 1349 to the daughter of Konstantin of Rostov, and Andrei, nephew of that Konstantin, to Antonida in 1350.

74. Semen's activity in Tver' had brought him undoubted gains. Vasily of Kashin had remained on the throne thanks to Moscow's support, which he repaid by considerable subservience. But there was also a pro-Lithuanian faction in Tver', full of energy and initiative: viz. Vsevolod, Juliana and Mikhail, the children of Aleksandr who was murdered at the Horde in 1339.

75. David of Yaroslavl' left two sons: to the elder, Vasily, he bequeathed Yaroslavl' itself, while the younger, Mikhail, received Mologa (the lands on the river of that name, a left-bank tributary of the Volga). Vasily was firmly opposed to Moscow's grand-ducal ambitions. This is shown by the events of 1339–42, already mentioned: Vasily sided with Aleksandr in his conflict with Kalita, and after the latter's death he joined other princes at the Horde in efforts to have Semen removed from the grand-ducal throne. Mikhail of Mologa, on the other hand, was subservient to Semen, and governed Torzhok on his behalf at the beginning of his (Semen's) reign (*NPL*, p. 352; *PSRL*, XXV, p. 173, etc.), showing that he had by then entered the service of Moscow.

76. ' . . . i vsi knyazi Russkii byli togdy v Orde': *PSRL*, XV, col. 63.

77. Ivan's solemn enthronement at Vladimir took place only in March 1354, Semen having died in April of the previous year. Semen himself was enthroned six months after Kalita's death.

78. 'Byti ny zaodi(n do zhivota . . .)': *DDG*, N 2, p. 11. 'A po o(t)sa nashego bl(a)g(o)s(lo)v(e)n'yu, chto nam prikazal zhiti zaodin . . .': *DDG*, N 3, p. 14.

79. There is no doubt that before making his will Kalita gave much thought to the possibility of Semen becoming grand duke of Vladimir, and that he did all he could to secure the succession for his son. The Vladimir throne was entirely in the khan's gift, which is why there is no mention of it in the will. Ivan's relations with Uzbek were pervaded by hypocrisy and mutual distrust, so that Ivan had to allow for the possibility of either success or failure. In the first case, he may have reasoned to himself that once Semen was grand duke he could easily solve the problem of relations among the Muscovite princes; while in the second eventuality, the equal division of the inheritance among his sons, their equality of rank and consequent solidarity would constitute a foundation strong enough to make possible the fulfillment of Moscow's ambitions in the future. I have already suggested (see Chapter 8) that Ivan's testament did not contain the whole of his political programme, which was not meant for Tatar eyes, and that he supplemented it by confidential advice to his sons.

Another unknown factor, apart from the Vladimir succession, was the future of Povolzh'e. It seems likely that Kalita placed his eldest son at Nizhny Novgorod with orders to hold on to the middle Volga area; this would explain the fact that Semen was not given a specially strong position in Muscovy, having no privileges of seniority over his brothers. It was hard to lay down in advance the nature of Semen's authority over that distant territory, as it depended on several factors: whether he became grand duke of Vladimir, or, if he did not, whether the khan would agree to Povolzh'e being joined to Moscow instead of Suzdal',



and so on. Many issues of undoubted importance are ignored or touched on obscurely in Kalita's will. He could not foresee events, and did not wish to hamper his son by provisions that might turn out to be completely at variance with reality. This, in my opinion, is the explanation of the obvious gaps in Kalita's testament.

80. 'A prikazyvayu tobe s(y)nu svoemu Semenu, brat'yu tvoyu molodshuyu i knyaginyu svoyu s menshimi detmi, po B(o)ze ty im budesh' pechalnik': *DDG*, N 1, pp. 8, 10.

81. The fact that Semen stood very little chance of maintaining direct rule over Nizhny Novgorod was, I take it, a motive inclining him to strengthen as far as possible his position in his own patrimony.

82. The agreement among the princes formulated clearly for the first time the basic principles of the 'appanage system' (*udel'nyi poryadok*) which was long to govern inter-princely relations in Rus': cf. L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 24.

83. 'A brata svoego stareish'ego imeti ny i chtiti v ottsevo mesto': *DDG*, N 2, p. 11.

84. '(A kto bude)t' brat(u) nashemu stareishemu (nedrug, to i n)am nedrug. A kto bud(e)t' brat(u) nashemu sta)reishemu (drug, to i) nam drug. A tobe g(o)s(podi)ne, kn(ya)z' vel(ikii, bez nas) ne dokanchivati ni s kim. (A brat'e tvoe)i molodshe(i) bez tobe ne dokanchivti ni s (kim . . . )': *ibid.*

85. 'A gde mi budet vsemi na kon', vsemi vy so mnoyu. A gde mi bud(e)t' samomu ne vsemi, a bud(e)t mi vas poslati, vsemi vy na kon' bez oslushan'ya': *ibid.*, p. 13. Thus Ivan and Andrei promised their brother absolute obedience in military matters; Semen became in effect the supreme commander of all Muscovite forces.

86. 'A chto esmy sstupilisya tobe na starei(shinstvo) . . . pol-tamgi, da tobe sokolnichii put', i sadovnitsi, da konyushii put', i koni staviti . . .', etc.: *ibid.*, p. 11. In financial matters too, as appears from this, Semen maintained a privileged position *vis-à-vis* his brothers, who agreed to place at his disposal the greater part of the proceeds of taxation. Cf. G. Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, pp. 222-3, 361-2.

87. All three sons declare: 'tselovali esmy mezhi so(be) kr(e)st ou otnya groba': *DDG*, p. 11.

88. If we suppose, for instance, that the agreement was concluded in 1341, Ivan would have been fully of age according to the ideas of the time: at the beginning of that year he took part in the campaign against Torzhok, and in the same year he married. Andrei was only a year younger than Ivan.

89. The metropolitan Feognost died on 11 March 1353; Semen's sons, Ivan and Semen, died a week later. Semen's will does not mention his sons, showing that it was drawn up after their death. L. Cherepnin

(*Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 25) argues that it was made immediately after that event, because two bishops who took part in Feognost's funeral—Aleksii of Vladimir and Afanasei of Kolomna—also witnessed Semen's testament. This does not seem to me convincing, however, as the bishops may have stayed in Moscow for some time after the funeral, or may have been specially summoned by Semen to witness his will. The document refers to the grand duke by his name in religion, Sozont, indicating that, having been smitten by the plague, he had taken monastic vows at the time the will was drawn up. This places the date of the will just before April 26, on which day Semen died.

As the sources witness (*NPL*, pp. 362–3; *PSRL*, XV, pp. 76–7, etc.), epidemics in those days spread with devastating swiftness and claimed their victims in a matter of days. (Cherepnin's argument would require the grand duke to have been ill for some weeks.) Many authors have written about epidemics and other widespread diseases in Rus': F. Döbeck, V. Ekkerman, F. Mroziak, D. Rokhlin, V. Samarkin, K. Vasil'ev and others. I. Buchinsky, in: *O klimate proshlogo russkoi ravniny* (1957, chapters III and IV), has collected extensive source material on disease and other calamities (flood, famine, drought, fire etc.) afflicting the population of eastern Europe at that period.

90. 'A chto Olekse Petrovich vshel v koromolu (conspiracy, mutiny) k velikomu knyazyu, nam, knyazyu Ivanu i knyazyu Andreyu, k sobe ego ne priimati . . .': *DDG*, N 2, p. 13.

91. 'A likhikh by este kyudei ne slushal(i) . . .': *DDG*, N 3, p. 14.

92. A. Zimin points out in: *O khronologii dukhovnykh i dogovornykh gramot*, p. 280, that the names of two witnesses—the archimandrites Peter of Moscow and Filimon of Pereyasavl'—appear both on the extant agreement among the brothers and on Semen's will.

93. Cf. J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, p. 287: 'Only one compact between the three brothers has survived. That it was not the only treaty between them and that it was not the first is evident from a clause early in the agreement which talks of various fiscal and administrative privileges yielded previously to the grand duke by his two brothers'; with reference to *DDG*, p. 11: 'A chto esmy sstupilisya tobe na starei(shinstvo) . . . pol-tamgi . . .', etc.

94. Ivan married in the winter of 1341/2. His wife Fedos'ya, daughter of Dmitry of Bryansk, died in the winter of 1342/3.

95. Semen's first son, Vasily, was born in 1337 and died in the following year.

96. All three brothers, who at the time had no children, contracted marriage in 1345, so that the question of succession became not only a theoretical but an actual one.

97. When Semen married Maria of Tver' in 1347, two boyars were sent on a ceremonial mission to escort the bride to Moscow. One of

these was the Aleksei Petrovich mentioned in the text. Thus in that year he still enjoyed the grand duke's confidence and held an important position at court.

98. The extant agreement provides an equal guarantee to all three brothers that the interests of their wives and children would be protected. '... (ko)g(o) iz nas B(og) otvedet, pechalovati(sya knyagineyu ego i) detmi, kak pri zh(ivote, tak i po zhiv)ote ...': *DDG*, p. 12.

99. Later (after Konstantin's death in 1341) Semen had two sons: Daniil, b. 1347, and Mikhail, b. 1348. Nothing is known of them except their dates of birth; they evidently died in infancy. From these dates it might be supposed that the agreement was concluded in 1349, but this cannot be sustained. The eldest son of Semen's brother Ivan—Dmitry, later Donskoy—was born in October 1350, so the agreement must be subsequent to that date. If, as is probable, Semen's sons Daniil and Mikhail died before 1350, he may have had in mind his next two sons: Ivan, b. 1350 or 1351, and Semen, b. February 1352. The agreement may date from soon after Semen's birth. L. Cherepnin (*Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 22) places it in 1350 or 1351. It should be noted that the facts concerning the children of Kalita's youngest son Andrei do not provide clear evidence as to the date of the agreement.

100. It may also be that the passage about exchanging vows at Kalita's tomb was automatically carried over from one agreement to the other.

101. Semen to the end of his life remained faithful to Kalita's will: in his own testament he appealed to Ivan and Andrei to preserve brotherly concord. 'A po o(t)sa nashego bl(a)g(o)s(lo)v(e)n'yu, chto nam prikazal zhiti zaodin, tako zhe i yaz vam prikazyvayu, svoei brat'i, zhiti zaodin': *ibid.*, 14.

102. The spread of the plague tended to produce unusual family situations of this kind: e.g. Andrei of Serpukhov died in June 1353, and his son Vladimir was born in the following month.

103. The youngest, named Semen after his father, was born in February 1352, so that there was time for Maria to be pregnant again. Semen was barely 37 when he died; Maria was younger (she died towards the end of the century). If she was pregnant, I presume the child miscarried. The chroniclers say nothing of any posthumous offspring of Semen's, though they do mention the birth of Vladimir of Serpukhov. The miscarriage might have been caused by Maria's nervous shock and distress due to the plague and her husband's death.

104. This hypothesis may of course be attacked on the ground that it implies a lack of realism on Semen's part, in so far as he took for granted that his desire for a posthumous son would be fulfilled. This is true, but only to a certain extent. At the time of making his will Semen was in a tragic situation, and he grasped at what seemed the only hope of giving effect to his ambition for the future.

105. It seems certain that Semen expected Maria to be helped in her difficult task by the experienced boyars who had shown themselves loyal to him and whom, along with Maria, he now commended to his brothers.

106. The unexpected deaths of Semen and Andrei enabled the third brother, Ivan, to become the *de facto* ruler of all Muscovy. There were no rivals capable of threatening him. Semen's heir was a woman, and Andrei's a child (Ivan). The latter died in 1358. We do not know when he was born, but N. Baumgarten (*Généalogies des branches régnantes des Rurikides*, p. 13) believes it was about 1350.

107. 'A pishu vam se slovo togo delya, chtoby ne perestala pamyat' rodi(te)lii nashikh i nasha . . .': DDG, N 3, p. 14.

108. The expression 'of all Rus'' is discussed later in the present work.

109. E.g. the leniency with which he treated his younger brothers after they had conspired against him; his advice to Ivan and Andrei to obey the counsels of the newly consecrated bishop Aleksei of Vladimir, afterwards metropolitan (DDG, N 3, p. 14); and so on.

110. Yur'ev, the capital of the principality, was on the Koloksha, a left-bank tributary of the Klyaz'ma.

111. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 55-6.

112. Semen's will makes no mention of Yur'ev.

113. The appointment to the Vladimir throne was entirely a matter for the khan, and there was no certainty that his decision would conform to Moscow's wishes.

114. The fact that, owing to unusual circumstances, Semen's will was not endorsed by the khan was to prove a convenient precedent for his successors.

115. '(A kto bude)t' brat(u) nashemu stareishemu (nedrug, to i n)am nedrug. A kto bud(e)t' brat(u) nashemu sta)reishemu (drug, to i) nam drug. A tobe, g(o)s(podi)ne, kn(ya)z' vel(ikii, bez nas) ne dokanchivati ni s kim. (A brat'e tvoe)i molodshe(i bez) tobe ne dokanchivati ni s (kim)': DDG, N 2, p. 11.

116. DDG, pp. 15, 17.

117. Ivan became grand duke in March of that year.

118. 'I prebysha bez mira novgorodtsi s velikim knyazem poltora goda, n' zla ne byst' nikakogo zhe': NPL, p. 363.

119. 'Togo zhe leta [1355] knyaz' veliki Ivan Ivanovich vzya lyubov' so knyazem Konstantinom Vasil'evichem Suzdal'skim': PSRL, X, p. 228; *ibid.*, XXVII, pp. 241, 325 etc.

120. The Lopasna river is a left-bank tributary of the Oka. The town of that name is thought, correctly, to have been situated on the right bank of the Oka at its confluence with the Lopasna (A. Nasonov,

'*Russkaya zemlya*', pp. 227, 243). The Lopasna district comprised lands along the Lopasna river and on both banks of the Oka, near the confluence: M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 7.

121. PSRL, XV, col. 63; X, p. 227; TL, p. 374, etc.

122. Serpukhov is on the Nara, a left-bank tributary of the Oka, near the confluence of the two. The Lopasna and Nara basins were the principal territory in dispute between Ryazan' and Moscow.

123. ' . . . knyaz' Oleg eshche togdy molod byl, mladoumen, surov i sverep . . . ' This unflattering description indicates that the text is a later Moscow revision (for the treatment of Oleg in particular chronicles see A. Kuz'min, *Ryazanskoe letopisanie*, 1965, pp. 204-6). The statement about his age, which occurs in many chronicles, is no doubt correct. He died as late as 1402. N. Baumgarten (*Généalogies*, p. 84) supposes that he was born about 1336, so that he would have been about 17 in 1353.

124. Only about two weeks elapsed between the death of Andrei of Serpukhov and Oleg's occupation of Lopasna. This is too short a time to permit of a connection between Andrei's death and the military preparations and aggression by Ryazan', especially if it was concerted with the Tatars.

125. ' . . . vsi knyazi Russtii byli togdy v Orde . . . ': PSRL, XV, col. 63. It is hard to be certain whether they all went, but in any case many did.

126. 'Togo zhe leta [1353] poslasha novgorodtsi svoi posol Smena Sudokova ko tsesaryu v Ordu, prosya velikogo knyazhenia Kostyantinu knyazyu Suzdal'skomu . . . ': NPL, p. 363. The account makes clear that the role of the Rus'ian participants in the congress was confined to putting requests to the khan which he might or might not grant. In this case Chanibek rejected the Novgorodian request (' . . . i ne poslushaikh tesar' . . . ': *ibid.*, p. 363).

127. ' . . . spersya o velikom knyazhen'i . . . ': PSRL, XXV, p. 179. The rivalry, already mentioned, between Ivan and Konstantin played a part here.

128. Although Ivan had considerable military forces at his command after he became grand duke, he made no attempt to oust Oleg from Lopasna district. Ivan's testament, of which more below, indicates that he accepted the fait accompli.

129. The sources do not expressly mention this renunciation, but it follows from the logic of the situation. Semen had lost the Povolzh'e, and there was no course left for Ivan except formally to acknowledge or confirm this state of affairs.

130. ' . . . knyaz' Konstyantyn . . . chestno i grozno boronil otchinu svoyu ot silnykh knyazei i ot Tatar': PSRL, X, p. 228. Other chronicles do not mention the Tatars.

131. Two marriages concluded shortly before Semen's death reflect Konstantin's desire for closer relations with Lithuania. In the autumn of 1352 his daughter Evdokiya (Eudoxia) became the wife of Mikhail, one of the pro-Lithuanian princes of Tver', while his son Boris married Agrafena (Agrippina), daughter of the grand duke Algirdas himself.

132. Konstantin was a whole generation older than Ivan; even his sons, Andrei and Dmitry, were Ivan's seniors.

133. 'S' 'sezd byst' v Pereslavli velikomu knyazyu Ivanu Ivanovichyu s knyazem Andreem Kostyantynovichem: i dary mnogi i chest' veliku sotvori bratu svoemu molodshemu i otpusti ego s mirom': *PSRL*, V, p. 228; *ibid.*, XXVII, pp. 241, 326. The account suggests that the initiative for the meeting came from Ivan, who invited Andrei, received him with honours and showered him with gifts—in short, was at pains to gain his favour. The chroniclers describe Andrei as Ivan's younger brother. In my opinion this is a typical revision of an old text to suit later Muscovite ambitions. There is no ground for the assertion that Andrei at that time recognized Ivan's suzerainty and sought his consent for the retention of his territorial patrimony. Before the meeting with Ivan took place—the order of events is important—he had already been to the Horde and obtained the khan's agreement to his keeping the inheritance of both Suzdal' and Povolzh'e. 'Toe zhe zimy [1355/6] knyaz' Andrei Kostyantynovich' priide v Ordu k tsaryu Zhanibekou i vzyat knyazhenie ottsa svoego: Suzdal' i Novgorod Nizhnei i Gorodets'': *PSRL*, XXVII, pp. 241, 325–6.

134. 'Togo zhe leta knyaz' velikii Ivan Ivanovich' otdal za Kor'yadova syna v Litvou': *PSRL*, XV, col. 65. 'Knyaz' veliki Ivan Ivanovich' . . . otdal dshcher' svoyu v Litvu za Koriadova syna, vnuka Gedimanova': *PSRL*, X, p. 228. This prince, Dmitry by name (H. Paszkiewicz, *O genezie i wartosci Krewa*, p. 286), was the son of Algirdas's brother Karijotas (Koriat, Koryad). The latter gave active support to Algirdas and played an important part in framing Lithuanian policy towards the eastern and southern lands.

Ivan was first married, in the winter of 1341/2, to a princess of Bryansk who died after about a year, apparently childless (at least the chronicles say nothing of any children surviving her). Ivan's second marriage was in 1345. If we suppose that Maria was his eldest child by his second wife, she cannot have been more than ten when she married the Lithuanian Dmitry—a strong indication of the political character of the marriage.

135. Konstantin died on 21 November 1355. During that winter Andrei went to Chanibek for confirmation of his right to the lands inherited from his father. Allowing time for the journey both ways, his stay at the Horde (usually fairly lengthy), and discussions with Moscow leading

up to the Pereyaslavl' meeting, it will be seen that the latter cannot have taken place before the spring of 1356; the summer or autumn is more probable.

136. Rus' paid various forms of tribute to the Horde, but we know little as to its amount during the period from the Tatar conquest in 1237 to Donskoy's death in 1389. Cf. M. Roublev, *The Periodicity of the Mongol Tribute as paid by the Russian Princes during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, *FOG*, XV, 1970, p. 8.

137. There is a study of the conspiracy by H. Rüß, *Der Kampf um das Moskauer Tysjackij-Amt im 14. Jahrhundert*, *JGO*, XXII, 1974, pp. 481-90.

138. 'Toe zhe zimy na Moskve vlozhishet' d'yavol mezhi boyar zavist' i nepokor'stvo, d'yavolim naoucheniem' i zavist'yu oub'en byst' Aleksii Petrovich' tysyat'skii mesyatsa fevralya v 3 den' . . . , v to vremya egda zaoutrenyuyu blagovestyat', oubienie zhe ego divno nekako i neznaemo, aki ni ot ko(go)zhe, nikim' zhe, tokmo obretesya lezha na ploshchadi': *PSRL*, XV, col. 65. Similarly other chronicles: *PSRL*, VIII, p. 10; X, pp. 228-9; XVIII, p. 99; XXV, p. 180; *TL*, p. 375, etc.

139. 'Netsii zhe rekosha, yako vtayu svet sotvorisha i kov kovasha nan' i tako vsekh obshcheyu doumoyu . . . [Aleksii] ot svoea drouzhiny postrada': *PSRL*, XV, col. 65. Similarly other chronicles.

140. 'Toe zhe zimy po posled'nemou pouti bolshii boyare Moskov'skye togo radi oubiistva otekhasha . . . s zhenami i z det'mi': *ibid*.

141. M. Tikhomirov, *Srednevekovaya Moskva v XIV-XV vekakh*, p. 222; L. Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 546-8, and others.

142. As regards the events we are concerned with, the chronicler generally follows his predecessors, but adds: ' . . . i byst' myatezh' velii na Moskve togo radi ubiistva': *PSRL*, X, p. 229.

143. The *Stepennaya kniga* praises Ivan for not waging wars and for protecting the country from internal revolt (' . . . mirno i nemyatezh' no derzhastvova . . . ': *PSRL*, XXI, p. 344.

144. 'Be zhe sei tsar' Chyanibek Azbyakovich' dobr zelo k khristian'stvu, i mnogu lgotu sotvori zemle Russtei': *PSRL*, X, p. 229.

145. Earlier chronicles than that of Nikon also speak well of Chanibek: ' . . . umre bo dobryi tsar' Chzhanibek': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 180.

146. ' . . . yako zhe Andrei Bogolyubyi ot Kuch'kovich', tako i sii [Aleksei] ot svoea drouzhiny postrada': *PSRL*, XV, p. 65; XXV, p. 180; *TL*, p. 375.

147. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 167-8.

148. The chroniclers speak of them as leading boyars (*bolshii boyare*: *PSRL*, XV, col. 65), which shows them to have been men of political training and experience.

149. ' . . . boyare Moskov'skye togo radi oubiistva otekhasha na Ryazan': *PSRL*, XV, col. 65. Similarly other chronicles.

150. ' . . . a knyaz' velikii Ivan i vsi knyazi Rous'skyi . . . poidosha v Ordou': *ibid.*, col. 66.

151. These are named by the chronicler as Mikhail and his *zyat'* (daughter's or sister's husband) Vasily Vasilevich (' . . . Mikhailo, zyat' ego Vasilei Vasil'evich . . .': *ibid.*, col. 66). Among the witnesses to the extant agreement between Semen and his brothers are the *tysyatskii* Vasily and Mikhail Aleksandrovich: *DDG*, N 2, p. 3. It is very likely, though not certain, that this is the same Mikhail as the conspirator. In any case the Mikhail who witnessed the agreement must be the same as the Mikhail (with the same patronymic, Aleksandrovich) who unsuccessfully defended Lopasna against Oleg of Ryazan' in 1353 (' . . . Ryazantsi . . . Lopasnu vzyasha, a namestnika izymasha Mikhaila Aleksandrovicha i povedosha ego na Ryazan' . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 63). We do not know to what boyar family Mikhail belonged. More important is the origin and subsequent role of Vasily, who belonged to the eminent boyar family of the Vel'yaminovs. Cf. 'Toe zhe oseni [1374] . . . prestavisya na Moskve . . . tysyats'skyi Vasilii Vasiliev syn Veliaminovicha . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 108; *TL*, p. 397. Several writers (Cherepnin, Fennell, Howles, Kuchkin, Rüß, Tikhomirov and others) devote much attention to the Vel'yaminovs and their family connections in the 14th century. These authors' conclusions are mainly hypothetical, but they have clarified some details on the basis of information from later years.

152. The relevant portion of the original chronicle says merely: 'priide [1358] knyaz' veliki Ivan Ivanovich iz Ordy, a shto boyare byli na Ryazani Mikhailo, zyat' ego Vasilei Vasil'evich, a tekhn v Orde prinyal': *PSRL*, XV, col. 66. This is garbled by the later Nikon Chronicle, which says that Ivan, after returning from the Horde, summoned the conspirators in question [from Ryazan' to Moscow] [and restored them to favour]: 'knyaz' veliki Ivan Ivanovich' . . . pride izo Ordy, i perezva k sebe paki [*paki* = 'again', 'later'] dvu boyarinov svoikh, izhe otekhalo byli ot nego na Ryazan', Mikhailo i zyat' ego Vasilei Vasil'evich': *PSRL*, X, p. 230. The purpose of this fantasy is clear: the chronicler, who constantly bends the facts in Moscow's favour, wished to emphasize that Ivan's decision to summon Mikhail and Vasily was not dictated by the Tatars. Historians as a rule follow the Nikon Chronicle, for which they are to be criticized, since the *Rogozhskii letopisets* (*PSRL*, XV) is an earlier and much more reliable source.

153. It is not impossible that the Tatars, when planning and directing the conspiracy against Aleksei Petrovich, instructed the murderers to flee to Ryazan' for safety as soon as they had done the deed. The Tatars wanted these boyars kept alive so that they might once again enjoy high office and look after the Horde's interests in the grand duchy. It seems doubtful whether Mikhail would have taken refuge at Ryazan'



of his own accord, since it was barely four years since he had been captured after the fall of Lopasna and so mistreated that he was half-dead when ransomed. (' . . . a namestnika izymasha Mikhaila Aleksandrovicha i povedosha ego na Ryazan' i blisha ego i mnogy pakosti emu stvorisha i potom edva vykupilil ego': PSRL, XV, col. 63).

154. 'A na syu gramotu poslusi i o(te)ts' moi, vl(a)d(y)ka rostov'skii Ignatii . . .': DDG, N 4, pp. 17, 19.

155. [1356] 'Prestavisya Ioan episkop Rostovsky i postavljen byst' Ignatei episkopom Rostovu': PSRL, XXV, p. 180; XV, col. 64; TL, p. 374.

156. ' . . . dayu ryad svoim s(y)nom . . . i svoemu brat(a)nichu, knyaz(yu) Volodimeru . . .': 'Prekazyvayu otch(i)nu svoyu Moskvu synom svoim . . . (A bratanichu) moemu, knyaz(yu) Volodimeru, na Moskve v namestnichtve tret' . . .': 'A brat(a)nich' (moi), knyaz' Volodimer, vedaet' ouezd o(t)tsa svoego,' etc.: DDG, pp. 15-18.

157. [1358] 'Prestavisya knyaz' Ivan Ondreevich': PSRL, XXV, p. 18; X, p. 230.

158. I cannot accept A. Zimin's view (O khronologii dukhovnykh i dogovornykh gramot velikikh i udel'nykh knyazei XIV-XV vv., PI, VI, 1958, p. 281) that Ivan's will was drawn up in about 1356. The author cites T. Yaskovicheva, *Dukhovnye knyazei velikikh i udel'nykh kak istochnik po istorii obrazovaniya Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva*, 1950 (unavailable to me) and refers to the following passage of the will: 'A kogo mi dast' B(og) zyat'yu, po chepi im zol(o)te da po poyasu po zol(o)tu'—i.e. Ivan bequeathed a gold chain and a gold belt to any who might in the future marry a daughter of his. Zimin comments: 'Since in 1356 one of Ivan's daughters was married to a Lithuanian prince, it follows that the will was not made subsequently to that year, since it refers to the possibility of other daughters marrying.' This presumably refers to other daughters of the grand duke. According to Zimin the passage in the will referred chiefly to the Lithuanian marriage of 1356, and Ivan regarded the marriages of his other daughters as secondary. In my opinion it is quite the reverse: the will says nothing about the grand duke's Lithuanian son-in-law because Ivan had already conferred gifts on him at the time of the wedding, but he commanded his heirs to keep the gold belts and chains in reserve as presents from himself to his future sons-in-law, whoever they might be. In other words, the passage on which Zimin relies has no bearing on the date of the will. It is of importance, however, as showing that besides the Lithuanian Dmitry's bride Ivan had other daughters, of whom the sources tell us nothing.

159. 'A cht(o) sya mne) dostali me(sta Ryazan')skaya na sei storone Oki, is tykh mest dal esm' knyaz(yu) Volodi(meru), v Lopastny mesta, Novyi gorodok na oust' Porotli, a inaya mesta R(yazan'sk)aya otmen' naya

s(y)nom moim, knyaz(yu) Dmitr'yu (i knyazyu) Ivanu, pode(lyatsya nap)oly, bez obidy': DDG, pp. 15, 18. Ivan in his will does not describe in detail the new Moscow-Ryazan' frontier, though he mentions it repeatedly. Especially curious is the passage already quoted in which he speaks in very general terms of the lands acquired from Ryazan' which he bequeaths to his sons Dmitry and Ivan. Historians (e.g. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 57-9; J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, pp. 222-4, and others) have tried to fill in the gaps in Ivan's will by reading the facts of the 1380s into the 1350s. This, however, is purely hypothetical: in such a long period there may have been other frontier changes of which we know nothing.

160. It is not a question of what actually happened, but of the parties' plans and intentions for the future.

161. 'A tsi po grekhom, imut' . . . iskati Kolomny, ili Lopasten'skikh mest, ili otmen'nykh mest Ryazan'skikh, a tsi po grekhom otoimetsya kotoroe mesto, deti moi, knyaz' Dmitrii, i knyaz' Ivan, i knyaz' Volodimer, v to mesto, i knyagini podelyatsya bezpen'nymi mesty': DDG, pp. 15, 16, 18. This indicates that in Ivan's view the territory of Muscovy comprised lands that belonged to it permanently and absolutely (*bezpen'nyi*—'uncontested') and, besides these, the Ryazan' border districts, possession of which was much more doubtful.

162. 'A tsi po grekhom, imut' iskati iz Ordy Kolomny . . .': DDG, N 4, pp. 15, 18.

163. [1353] 'posol iz Ordy prikhodil na Ryazan' uchinit' mezhu moskovskim knyazyam': A. Kuz'min, *Ryazanskoe letopisanie*, 1965, p. 206.

164. More of this later.

165. This is why I used inverted commas, above, in referring to the 'agreement'.

166. 'A chto sya mne dostali mesta Ryazan'skaya . . .': DDG, N 4, pp. 15, 18.

167. The grand duke divided the lands acquired from Ryazan' among his heirs: ' . . . is tykh mest dal esm' knyaz(yu) Volodimeru, v Lopastny mesta, Novyi gorod(o)k na oust' Porot(li), a inaya mesta Ryazan'skaya otmen'naya s(y)nu moemu, knyaz(yu) Dmitriyu i (knyazyu) Ivanu, podelyatsya napoly, bez obidy': DDG, pp. 15, 18.

168. Hence 1354 is a more likely date for the delimitation of the new frontiers than 1355. In the second half of 1355 and in 1356 Ivan moved distinctly closer to Nizhny Novgorod and Lithuania, which provoked a reaction from Chanibek.

169. Moscow, as appears from Ivan's will, was threatened with the loss not only of Kolomna and the Lopasna basin but also of the lands in the south acquired by exchange from Ryazan'.

170. In my opinion Ivan made changes in the governing team as soon as he became grand duke. Unfortunately we know nothing of them

except the important fact that Aleksei Petrovich was made *tysyatskii*. This could not have happened earlier, as Ivan did not know whom the khan would appoint to the grand-ducal office. When he went to the Horde in spring or summer 1353 he left Semen's men in their previous posts: e.g. the governor of Lopasna, Mikhail Aleksandrovich.

171. This is shown by facts already discussed, e.g.: the understanding reached in 1355 with Konstantin of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal', who was gravitating towards Lithuania; the reconciliation with Great Novgorod in autumn 1355; the meeting at Pereyaslav' in 1356 with Konstantin's son Andrei after the former's death; and so on.

172. Ivan's daughter married Algirdas's nephew in 1356.

173. It seems certain that the boyars Mikhail Aleksandrovich and Vasily Vasil'evich, who murdered the *tysyatskii* Aleksei Petrovich and were subsequently protected by the Tatars, remained in close contact with the Horde after 1354, when they were dismissed from their posts; and that even earlier than 1357 they kept the khan informed of Ivan's political moves, probably exaggerating their anti-Tatar aspect.

174. *PSRL*, XV, pp. 65–6; *ibid.* X, p. 229, etc.

175. 'A knyaz' Vasilii vozma lyubov' so knyazem s Yvanom po mitropolichyu slovu': *PSRL*, XV, p. 66.

176. 'Toe zhe zimy [1357] umre tsar' Zhanibek': *PSRL*, XXVII, pp. 241, 326. B. Spuler in *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 108, places Chanibek's death in autumn of that year.

177. These events can only be approximately dated. In summer 1357 the metropolitan Aleksei was summoned to attend the khan's (probably Chanibek's) wife Taidula, who was ill. He set out for the Horde on 18 August and returned in due course, though he nearly lost his life during the violent struggles which broke out among Chanibek's successors as soon as the khan was dead. 'I v to zhe vremya [during these disturbances] byst' v Orde Aleksei mitropolit, i mnogu istomu priim ot poganykh Tatar, milostiyu Bozhieyu . . . tsel i zdrav ot nasiliya poganykh vyde na Rous': *PSRL*, XXVII, pp. 241, 326. 'I paki vskore otpushchen byst' s velikoyu chest'yu, a v Orde togda zamyatnya byst' velika, umre bo . . . tsar' Chzhanibek . . .': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 180. It is hard to say how long the dissensions lasted; probably a fairly short time, in view of their violence and of the fact that the Russian princes attended on the new khan, Berdibek, towards the end of the same year.

178. 'Na tou zimy [1357] prishli v Ordu knyazi rustii k novomu tsaryu Berdibekou: knyaz' velikii Ivan Ivanovich', knyaz' Andrei Kostantinovich i s nimi vsi knyazi rustii': *PSRL*, XXVII, pp. 241, 326; *ibid.* XV, col. 66, etc.

179. Vasily of Tver' reached home on 7 April 1358, ten days after the death of his son Aleksandr on 28 March. We do not know the dates

for the other princes, but they were probably around the same time.

180. ' . . . knyaz' Vsevolod . . . poide v Ordou na Pereyaslavl', i knyazya velikogo namestnitsi ne dali emou pouti i on poekha v Litvou': *PSRL*, XV, col. 66 (s.a. 1357). 'A knyaz' Vsevolod' poide v Ordou iz Litvy': *ibid.*, 67 (1358).

181. 'Togo zhe leta [1358] knyaz' Vasiliï poslal Grigor'chyuka da Koreeva v Ordu na Vsevoloda, a tamo bez souda tsar' i tsaritsa vydali knyaz(ya) Vsevoloda i misyur' prive ego vo Tfer' v tyagot(e) i vydal knyazyu Vasil'yu. I byshet ot knyazya Vasil'ya knyazyu Vsevolodu tomlenie veliko i boyarom i slougam prodazha dannaya velika, tako zhe i chernym lyudem': *ibid.*, col. 67.

182. 'Togo zhe leta [1358] vyide posol iz Ordy tsarev syn imenem Mamat Khozha na Ryazan'skouyu zem'lyu . . . i k velikomu knyazyu Ivanu Ivanovichyu prisylal o roz'ezde zemlya Ryazan'skyya. Knyaz' zhe velikii ne vpousti ego vo svoyu ochinu v Rous'skouyu zem'lyu': *PSRL*, XV, col. 67; *ibid.* XXV, p. 180; *TL*, p. 376, etc.

183. The grand duke's decision was taken after his return from the Horde, which probably took place in the spring of 1358.

184. The chroniclers do not say whether, after Mamat Khozha's failure, any other Tatar envoy was sent to regulate the disputed frontiers.

185. ' . . . pishu d(u)sh(e)vnuyu gramotu, nichim zhe ne nuzhen, tselym svoim oumom, vo svoem' zdorov'e. Azhe chto B(og) rozmyslit' o moem' zhivote, dayu ryad svoim s(y)nom . . .': *DDG*, N 4, pp. 15, 17.

186. Mamat Khozha had on many occasions disobeyed his father's wishes, and the enraged Berdibek had given orders to have his son executed. It is hard to say whether Ivan knew of this family dissension, but even if he did, there is no reason to think that he expected it to work to his own advantage. The Rus'ian chroniclers say that when Mamat Khozha came to the Oka he inflicted much injury on the Ryazan' population (' . . . vyide . . . iz Ordy . . . Mamat Khozha na ryazn'skouyu zem'lyu i mnogo v nikh zla sotvori . . .'). This was contrary to the policy of Chanibek and Berdibek, since Oleg of Ryazan' had been loyal and obedient towards the Horde. It seems probable that Mamat Khozha deliberately ignored his father's orders to show his independence: he took no interest in the complicated internal politics of Rus' but was only concerned with plunder and violence. In this respect Berdibek's son was not much different from other Tatar envoys in Rus', who generally robbed the country unmercifully when collecting tribute for the khan.

Rus'ian chronicles (*PSRL*, XV, pp. 65, 66; XXV, p. 180; XXVII, pp. 241, 326; X, pp. 228–9, etc.) speak of the unusual number of envoys from the Horde in 1357. However, they mostly give only their names, and the information is too fragmentary and laconic to provide a picture of Tatar policy towards Rus' at that time.

187. B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 109.

188. Ivan's testament has survived in two copies made at the same time from a single draft. They were written by the same hand (the scribe is named as Nazarko) and bear the same seal of the grand duke; the witnesses are also the same. (L. Cherepnin, *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, pp. 28–9). They differ chiefly in the arrangement of the material. The most notable fact, however, is that the testament contains internal contradictions, the most glaring of which is that in certain cases the same lands are bequeathed to different people. For details see L. Cherepnin, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–30; R. Howes, *The Testaments*, pp. 195–202. See also A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 170–1; J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, pp. 222–4, and others. There is no doubt that the will was drawn up hastily and carelessly, embodying as it does various conflicting wishes of the grand prince which have not been properly thought out. To explain these contradictions Cherepnin (*op. cit.*, pp. 30–1) suggests that there may have been an earlier will made shortly after Ivan became grand duke, i.e. in about 1354. But at that time Ivan's relations with Chanibek were correct (as evidenced by the frontier settlement between Moscow and Ryazan', which was quite favourable to the former), so that there was no need for him, young as he was, to begin his reign by making his will. Cherepnin does not explain why there should have been such an earlier will, and his hypothesis does not really explain anything.

189. H. Rüss, *Der Kampf um das Moskauer Tysjackij-Amt im 14. Jahrhundert*, *JGO*, XXII, 1974, p. 486.

190. 'Die genannten Forscher gehen von einem aussenpolitischen Gegensatz zwischen dem Grossfürsten Semen und seinem Bruder Ivan aus. Hierfür gibt es allerdings in keiner Quelle einen direkten Hinweis': *op. cit.*, pp. 485–6.

191. Semen, as grand duke, was far stronger militarily than Ivan or Andrei. His authority was enhanced by age (he was ten years older than Ivan); he was personally ambitious and had a much stronger position at the Horde than his brothers.

192. 'Prikazyvayu s(y)n(o)m svoim och(i)nu svoyu Moskvu': *DDG*, N 1, pp. 7, 9.

193. Semen's will may to some extent be regarded as a second agreement between the brothers. In it the grand duke laid various obligations on Ivan and Andrei, who signified agreement by attaching their seals. It is another question whether their agreement was sincere.

194. Semen in his will reminded the brothers of Kalita's charge: 'A po o(t)sa nashego bl(a)g(o)s(lo)v(e)n'yu, chto nam prikazal zhiti zaodin . . .': *DDG*, N 3, p. 14. In the agreement all three brothers state: 'Byti ny zaodi(n do zhivota)': *DDG*, N 2, p. 11.

195. There is no doubt that Aleksei Petrovich was an outstanding individual of great energy and ambition. But we do not know the purpose of the intrigue against Semen: whether the intention was to murder him (which I think less likely) or merely to compel him to take more heed of Ivan's views. Semen, if he had chosen, could easily have magnified the gravity of the revolt (*kramola*) to justify his own wrath and vengeance. It is not impossible that the three brothers—Ivan and Andrei acting under persuasion or pressure from Semen—agreed to make Aleksei Petrovich a scapegoat in order to preserve harmony among themselves. Aleksei would thus deserve severe punishment as the ringleader and head of the conspiracy, while Ivan and Andrei would be regarded as innocent or almost so.

196. This is sufficiently proved by one generally known fact. In the agreement among the brothers Ivan condemned Aleksei Petrovich and promised to exclude him in future from any position of importance, but as soon as he himself became grand duke he appointed him to be *tysyatskii*.

197. In order to estrange Ivan from Aleksei Petrovich, Semen bequeathed to his brother part of the estates confiscated from the disgraced boyar. 'A mne, knyaz(yu) Ivanu, chto dal knyaz' velikii iz Olekseva zhivota, togo mi Oleksyu ne davati, ni ego zhene, ni ego detem, ni inym' nichim' ne podmagati ikh': DDG, N 2, p. 13. (*Zhivot* = 'estate, landed property': cf. I. Sreznevsky, *Materialy* 1, p. 869). Not long afterwards the grand duke, already stricken by his last illness, made Ivan and Andrei promise to obey his wishes as regards, in particular, the tenure by his widow, Maria of Tver', of the lands bequeathed to her. Events after 1353 showed that in both cases Semen's fears and mistrust were justified.

198. Rüß states (op. cit., pp. 485–90) that there were acute personal jealousies and rivalries among the Moscow boyars (Aleksei Petrovich, Vasily Vel'yaminov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich), and that these led to Aleksei's murder. He thus reduces the events surrounding the latter's death to a matter of internal contention without any wider political significance. No one doubts that there were such acute rivalries, but this does not mean that outside agents such as the Tatars did not incite the boyars against one another and foment their personal ambitions. The chroniclers' accounts show that the leaders of the conspiracy against Aleksei Petrovich were supported and protected by the Horde.

199. Cherepnin suggests that some boyars, including Aleksei Petrovich, showed their discontent with Semen's policy based on alliance with the Horde. '... vystuplenie chasti boyarstva (v tom chisle Alekseya Petrovicha Khvosta) s oppozitsiei velikomu knyazyu Semenu Ivanovichu bylo vyzvano nedovol'stvom orientatsiei poslednego na soyuz s Ordoi': Cherepnin,

*Obrazovanie*, p. 546. It must be said that the political programme of Aleksei Petrovich and his supporters, as reconstructed by Cherepnin, contains many obscurities, not to say contradictions. He argues that the opposition of the boyars in the question to the grand duke was caused by his lack of military success against Lithuania. '... boyare ... ukazывали na voennye neudachi velikogo knyazya ... v bor'be s Litvoi': *Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy* 1, p. 22. One would therefore expect them to have demanded more energetic and successful action against Algirdas; yet Cherepnin says that the same boyars were in favour of closer relations with Lithuania: '... boyare ... byli storonnikami litovskogo sblizheniya', *ibid.*, p. 22.

200. Semen, and Ivan II (at any rate in the latter part of his reign), remained the faithful and obedient servants of the khan, attempting no resistance to Tatar rule and prepared to carry out their master's commands uncomplainingly: J. Fennell, *The Emergence*, p. 196.

201. J. Fennell, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

202. Whatever his personal relations with his father at the time, Mamat Khozha was in Rus' as Berdibek's representative, and Ivan's refusal was a clear flouting of the khan's wishes.

203. '... die These, dass Ivan nach den Ereignissen um Chvost Aleksei Petrovich wiederum die alte, tatarenfreundliche Politik seiner Vorgänger aufgenommen habe, ist nicht haltbar': H. Rüss, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

204. An example of Ivan's desire for amicable relations was the marriage of his daughter Maria in 1356 to Algirdas's nephew Dmitry. This marriage may have increased Chanibek's mistrust and suspicion of Ivan, who in 1357 was obliged, under pressure from the Horde, to adopt a markedly anti-Lithuanian attitude.

205. M. Tikhomirov, for example, speaks thus of Ivan in *Srednevekovaya Moskva*, p. 198: 'Iz vsekh moskovskikh knyazei eto byla samaya bes-tsvetnaya figura. Letopisets nazyvaet Ivana krotkim, tikhim i milostivym, nagrazhdaya dobrodetelyami, podkhodyashchimi dlya obychnogo sem'yanina, no ne dlya moskovskogo knyazya.'

206. It is generally supposed that Ivan, with his apparently mild and conciliatory nature, was a weak, passive ruler governed by his boyar entourage. This view is based on the course of the conspiracy against Semen before 1353. It appears from the agreement between Kalita's sons that the initiator and leader of the plot was Aleksei Petrovich; it may be, however, that the latter was a tool of Ivan's but that the brothers agreed to place the whole blame on him so as to preserve their own unity.

Ivan showed after the death of Aleksei Petrovich, his supposed mentor, that he was capable of bold and independent decisions. In 1358, as we

saw, he forbade the khan's envoy to enter his territory, which was more than Kalita or Semen had ever done. Ivan chose then to make his will, showing that he realized what dire consequences might befall. Another point is worth noticing: when Chanibek died, Ivan went to the Horde to do homage to the new khan. Berdibek then enjoined him to restore to favour the pro-Tatar boyars Mikhail Aleksandrovich and Vasily Vel'yaminov, who had murdered Aleksei Petrovich. Ivan obediently took the two boyars into his service, but excluded them from any influence in government. If they had been members of the grand duke's council and had had a powerful voice there, Ivan would never have snubbed the khan's son and envoy, Mamat Khozha, as he did.



## Dmitry Donskoy

The death of Ivan II was followed by thirty years of crisis, with decisive results for the history of eastern Europe. The old order of things was breaking down. Inter-state relations entered a fluid and unstable phase. In this confused and disorganized situation, internal divisions made themselves felt not only among the Tatars but also in Rus' and Lithuania, and even in the Church. Out of the general dissolution emerged a new pattern of political affairs which was to affect the whole future of the countries with which we are concerned. The principal result of the changes that took place between 1360 and 1390 was the firm establishment of Moscow's power at the expense of the Horde, which had till then dominated the area.

The Tatars had shown skill and wisdom in overcoming the difficulties of ruling the vast expanses of eastern Europe. Their experience and organizing ability were accompanied by skillful exploitation of antagonisms and conflicts among the conquered princes, and when necessary by methods of ruthless cruelty. In the second half of the 14th century, however, their dominant position in Rus' was appreciably weakened. This was not so much due to the increased strength of Rus' as to the growing dissolution of the Horde itself. Rivals for the khanate fought one another constantly with great ruthlessness and ferocity, generally to the point of bloodshed. These quarrels, however, did not have unduly adverse consequences as far as external relations were concerned, provided the eventual victor in the struggle was a man of strong character and enjoyed a fairly long reign. This was exemplified by the rule of Uzbek (1313-41) and his son Chanibek (1342-57).

After Chanibek came a period of extremely frequent changes at the top, leading to a fairly incoherent Tatar policy towards dependent Rus'—the aspect which particularly concerns us.

Twenty-two rulers of the Golden Horde<sup>1</sup> succeeded one another in the two decades from 1357 to 1377: the average duration of their power was thus less than a year. The first, Chanibek's son Berdibek, murdered twelve of his brothers to gain the throne,<sup>2</sup> and ruled for two years. He died in obscure circumstances and was succeeded by his brother Kulpa, who ruled for barely 5 or 6 months<sup>3</sup> before he was overthrown and put to death by another brother, Navrus (Nevrus).

Berdibek and Ivan II died in 1359 within a short time of each other.<sup>4</sup> Both events made it necessary for the Rus'ian princes to present themselves at the Horde. They had to do homage to the new khan, bring him gifts and seek confirmation of their territorial rights; while Ivan's unexpected death at the fairly early age of 33 gave them an opportunity to make their petitions to the khan and express their wishes—which he might grant or deny—concerning the appointment to the throne of Vladimir.

Ivan left two young sons: Dmitry (later to be known as Donskoy), who was nine years old, and Ivan, an infant.<sup>5</sup> The only surviving child of Andrei of Serpukhov was Vladimir, aged six.

In discussing the last years of Ivan II's reign (1357–9) I expressed the view that his decisions in that period were essentially his own; at all events there is no sign that he had any influential counsellors. This view is confirmed by a comparison of Ivan's testament with those of his father and brother. When Kalita made his will in 1339 he thought it necessary to appoint Semen guardian of his younger brothers Ivan and Andrei although they were then 13 and 12 respectively (thus older than Ivan II's sons, Donskoy and Ivan, were in 1359). Semen in his own will commended his wife and faithful boyars to his brothers; although the latter had long reached manhood, he admonished them to follow the advice of Aleksei, later metropolitan, and the boyars of proven loyalty. Ivan II's will, on the other hand, says not a word about guardians or counsellors, which one might have thought essential in view of his sons' tender age. In this respect there is a yawning gap in Ivan's testament. He says nothing in it about his wife, who may have been of non-princely origin,<sup>6</sup> or the metropolitan Aleksei,<sup>7</sup> or his own devoted boyars.

The history of events after 1359 suggests that Dmitry Donskoy showed great independence and initiative at a remarkably early age. It may be so, or perhaps later hero-worshipping chroniclers

ascribed to him all kinds of virtues and abilities from childhood onwards.<sup>8</sup> In any case, the sources leave us in the dark as to who gave the young prince his first training in politics. One would suppose it to have been his parents. Of his mother Aleksandra we know very little, and there is no evidence that she played any part in politics, or wanted to do so, after her husband's death.<sup>9</sup> It seems probable that the chief influence on Dmitry was that of his father.

The Rus'ian princes, including Donskoy, went to the Horde in the winter of 1359/60,<sup>10</sup> perhaps to do homage to Kulpa. When they arrived they found Navrus already on the throne, so it was to him they declared their loyalty and obedience.<sup>11</sup> Navrus confirmed them in their patrimonial lands,<sup>12</sup> but his reign too was very short: in the spring of 1360 he was deposed and put to death by a khan named Khidyr' from a nomadic horde whose homeland was east of the lower Volga, beyond the river Yaik. Aided by Tatars hostile to Navrus, Khidyr' made himself master of the Volga Horde.<sup>13</sup> The khan appointed the new grand duke of Rus'; but we have to enquire which khan did so, and when and to whom he confided that important office.

We learn from chroniclers' accounts that when, after Kulpa's fall, the Rus'ian princes presented themselves to Navrus he conferred the throne of Vladimir on the sons of Konstantin of Suzdal':<sup>14</sup> first Andrei and afterwards his younger brother Dmitry, in whose favour Andrei resigned.<sup>15</sup> According to a different version it was not Navrus but Khidyr' who raised this Dmitry to the grand-ducal throne.<sup>16</sup> From these accounts it appears that Dmitry's candidature was supported by both the rival khans, independently of each other.<sup>17</sup> In each case the decision was taken in unusual circumstances. Navrus had only just ascended the throne; his position was still shaky and was threatened by hostile elements within the Horde who were intriguing with Khidyr'. He desperately needed help and support, including the financial aid provided by Rus'ian tribute to the Horde. Khidyr', in the general confusion at the outset of his reign,<sup>18</sup> appointed Dmitry grand duke without hesitation or reflection.<sup>19</sup> In the rush of events, neither khan was in a position to give proper thought to his Rus'ian policy. Both Navrus and Khidyr' were purely concerned with their own personal advantage and with short-term gains, but they wished to keep Rus' in subjection and for that purpose to maintain

correct relations with its princes. These unusual conditions gave greater weight to Rus'ian wishes concerning the appointment to the Vladimir throne.

If we add to the princes who were favourable to Dmitry<sup>20</sup> those who co-operated with him in 1360 and somewhat later, it must be said that the Suzdal' candidature was supported by considerably more princes than that of Moscow.<sup>21</sup> Among those who declared for Dmitry were his elder brother Andrei (who continued to govern Nizhny Novgorod, while Dmitry kept Suzdal'), Konstantin of Rostov, Mikhail of Yaroslavl', Ivan of Beloozero, Dmitry of Galich, and the Starodub princes, Andrei and Ivan.<sup>22</sup> On grounds of general probability this list could probably be extended. Another important fact is that Dmitry was recognized as grand duke by Great Novgorod.<sup>23</sup>

Dmitry's short tenure of the grand-ducal office was of great importance: after a lengthy interval the Vladimir throne was again occupied by a prince who was not a Muscovite. This fact gives us an insight into internal Rus'ian conditions at that time and the political tendencies that were gaining ground among members of the dynasty. Authors have a good deal to say about increased solidarity and the concentration of all forces in the grand duchy under Moscow's leadership; if we look at the sources they confirm that a process of consolidation was going on, but they show it to have been against Moscow.

The Rus'ian chronicles in their present form contain evident contradictions. On the one hand they note the above-quoted facts, derived from lost earlier chronicles, while on the other they distort these facts with additions and comments of their own, intended to buttress Muscovite policy in the 15th and 16th centuries by tracing back as far as possible Moscow's hereditary right to the grand-ducal dignity. A typical example: describing the events of 1360-2, the chroniclers blame Dmitry for occupying the Vladimir throne although he had no right to it by way of inheritance from his father or grandfather,<sup>24</sup> whereas Donskoy, according to them, did have such a right.<sup>25</sup> This argument, based on the past, is not very convincing in the circumstances. Certainly Donskoy's 'rights' were stronger in that they were more recent; but Dmitry of Suzdal' also had historical 'rights' that could not wholly be overlooked.<sup>26</sup> In any case neither Dmitry nor Donskoy had any actual right to the throne of Vladimir, since both in

theory and in practice it was entirely for the khan to say who should occupy it. On each occasion the reigning khan appointed a new grand duke without asking anyone's consent, and the Rus'ians humbly accepted that state of affairs.<sup>27</sup> Kalita's testament and those of his sons could not and did not say anything about any right of succession by the Moscow princes to the grand-ducal office. Later chroniclers, not content with fabricating such a right, required the Tatars to have acknowledged and respected it. According to them Khidyr' recognized Moscow's special position in principle, and if he departed from this principle at a particular time it was only because of Donskoy's youth.<sup>28</sup> In other words, if Donskoy had been older he would have been appointed grand duke automatically, without any objection on the Tatars' part. It is hard to believe that a highly artificial argument of this kind (Donskoy would in any case soon have been old enough to govern by himself)<sup>29</sup> could have been the basis of a decision of such importance as the displacement of the Muscovite line from the Vladimir throne.

It is not easy to fathom Khidyr's reasons for conferring the throne on the Suzdal' princes. I believe that throughout his reign the new khan took an unfriendly or even hostile attitude towards Moscow's political aspirations. The decisions he took in the same year 1360 concerning the future of Rostov and Galich were not in Moscow's interest either.<sup>30</sup> Later events seem to confirm this observation.

Donskoy did not reconcile himself to Dmitry's tenure of the Vladimir throne, but evidently pursued a policy of passive resistance. There is no trace of collaboration between the princes in the period after June 1360.<sup>31</sup> Moscow was in no hurry to abandon its far-reaching claims and ambitions. Time was on the side of Donskoy, who was fast growing up. Most importantly, the internal situation at the Horde was more and more fluid. There was hope that either a new khan would come to power at any moment, or that Khidyr' might change his mind if persuaded by additional funds from Moscow.

In 1361, probably in summer,<sup>32</sup> Donskoy went to the Horde to seek Khidyr's support for his political aims. He was evidently unsuccessful, as none of the chroniclers says a word about the results of his mission. But Grand Duke Dmitry could not be sure of that; alarmed by Donskoy's intrigues at the Horde he went

there himself, accompanied by his allies. While Dmitry and his friends were still at the Horde, but after Donskoy's departure, a new conspiracy broke out: Khidyr' was murdered by his son Temir' Khozha.<sup>33</sup> The latter, however, ruled for only a few weeks or less, and in turn paid for his ambition with his life.

Events at the Horde were more and more sudden and ferocious, and the chaos deepened. The source accounts, full of gaps, are often uncertain, falsified and contradictory, so that it is hard to make out even the basic facts. It is not our purpose here to analyse the internal situation at the Golden Horde at this period, but we are concerned with Tatar-Rus'ian relations during the years in question and their effect on the grand duchy.

The frequent changes on the throne at Sarai weakened the authority of the supreme power, and the presence of two or more khans disputing one another's rights brought about a *de facto* disintegration of the Horde. In these circumstances the real decisions were taken by 'Tatar princes', as the Rus'ian chroniclers call them, i.e. great officers of state, frequently of high lineage, and especially army commanders, who more than once removed khans they did not like and placed their own candidates on the throne. In this way Temir' Khozha was overthrown by the powerful Mamai, who seems to have already been an important figure at Berdibek's court. He led a nomadic horde in the vast steppe area west of the Volga, reaching to the southern frontier of the Ryazan' principality. Mamai had under his protection a descendant of Uzbek named Avdula whom he proclaimed as khan, although the throne at Sarai had been seized by one Kildibek, who declared himself to be a son of Chanibek. Kildibek was challenged by Murut (Amurat, Murat), who was supported by the princes of the Horde and claimed, truly or falsely, to be a son of Khidyr'. Kildibek lost his life in the contest with Murut, probably in summer or autumn 1362, and the rivalry between Murut and Avdula grew to the point where there were two hostile khanates, one based on Mamai's horde and the other on the 'princes' at Sarai. There were also 'princes' who took less part in these internal quarrels and, with large forces at their disposal, conquered neighbouring lands and carved out states for themselves, independent of the Horde. Thus Bulak Temir' (Bolaktemir') occupied the land of the Volga Bulgars; Tagai (Togai) established himself in Mordva territory on the banks of the Moksha, a

tributary of the Oka; and Sekiz-bii staked out a claim in the Zap'yanie,<sup>34</sup> the region beyond the river P'yana, south-east of Nizhny Novgorod.

The constant succession of khans initially made it necessary for the Rus'ian princes to travel again and again to do homage to their new master. Their journeys, and their residence at Sarai, became more and more dangerous with the increasing political and social chaos in the Horde. The chroniclers often expressed relief and joy that their princes had not been murdered at the Horde but had come back safe and sound, having managed to defend themselves on the way against the attacks of nomad Tatars; they also relate occasions when the returning princes were stripped of their clothes and property.<sup>35</sup> In view of these dangers the Rus'ian princes began increasingly to use envoys for their contacts with the khans. Even in such an important matter as the appointment to the Vladimir throne, the candidates no longer went to the Horde themselves but confined themselves to sending embassies. The khans replied in the same manner, using envoys to deliver the *yarlyk* (charter, patent) to the new grand duke. Just as Navrus and Khidyr', while in conflict with each other, both endeavoured to keep Rus' dependent on the Horde, so Murut and Avdula in their turn had no intention of abandoning sovereignty over Rus'. But they were too severely threatened on the home front and too uncertain of the future to be able to use force to compel the Rus'ian princes to resume the practice of doing homage in person.

Events in 1362-3 had an important effect on Tatar-Rus'ian relations in this period. The dispute between Donskoy and Grand Duke Dmitry for the Vladimir throne broke out in 1362. Both rivals sent envoys to Murut, who assigned the prize to Donskoy.<sup>36</sup> Avdula did the same in 1363, whereupon Murut in the same year ruled that the throne should again belong to Dmitry of Suzdal'. It is difficult in many ways to fathom these decisions by the khans, which the sources record in summary fashion. The chroniclers do not give the month and day on which events took place, so that the historian cannot determine their order and causal relationship.

In my opinion the statement that the dispute between the two Dmitrys broke out in 1362 must be understood in the sense that Donskoy at that time made a clear declaration of his claims and

intentions. There is no doubt that it was Moscow that threw down the gauntlet and that the rivalry between Moscow and Suzdal' that originated in 1360 had been growing more acute during 1361.

The chronicle gives the impression that the two Dmitrys sent their envoys to Murut at or about the same time. This cannot be verified, but it seems likely that they were separated by a very short interval. Nasonov thinks the envoys set out in summer or autumn 1362.<sup>37</sup> The fact that they were sent to Murut and not to one of the many other claimants for the khanate shows that at that time he held a dominant position at the Horde. We may wonder whether he upheld Donskoy's claim for reasons of state policy (e.g. to support Moscow against Lithuania) or merely because the Moscow envoy brought larger gifts. The latter is more probable, as Murut in 1362 abruptly switched to an anti-Moscow attitude, reacting in this way to Donskoy's contacts with Avdula.

Donskoy did not himself seek support from Avdula, or send envoys to him as he had to Murut. On the contrary, Avdula of his own accord sent him a *yarlyk*, his object being to intervene in Rus'ian affairs and show that he, Avdula, and not his rival, was the supreme overlord of Rus'. The chronicles give the impression that Donskoy was not especially pleased to receive Avdula's *yarlyk*: he treated the latter's envoy politely but coolly before sending him back to Mamai's horde.<sup>38</sup> In one sense it strengthened Donskoy's position as grand duke to have two *yarlyks*, but on the other hand it exposed him to Murut's anger and inevitable retaliation. He need not have feared this too much, however: Murut was uncertain of his own position in the Horde,<sup>39</sup> and geography also played a part. Murut was a long way off, while Mamai's horde commanded the shortest route across the steppes from Sarai to Moscow. One fact remained: the fierce rivalry of the two khans, and the consequent variability of their policy towards Rus', ensured Moscow's freedom of manoeuvre within the grand duchy.

It must be recognized that Moscow's policy in 1360-1, despite its failures, showed great consistency and strength of purpose, and that it took on ambitious dimensions from the winter of 1362/3. As we know little of the young Donskoy's advisers, it is worth noting the presence of a boyar named Amin' in the



embassy sent by him to the Horde in 1362. It was he who brought to his master Murut's *yarlyk* for the grand duchy.<sup>40</sup> Amin's task was not easy in view of the strong opposition of the envoys of Dmitry of Suzdal'. Donskoy showed gratitude to Amin<sup>41</sup> and presented him with estates near Moscow.<sup>42</sup>

The rapidly succeeding events show that the new political situation was to be governed not by the khans' decisions but by the military strength of the princes of Vladimir Rus'. The rivalry of the two Dmitrys, which had been conducted fiercely at the Horde but without bloodshed, now passed from the stage of negotiation and intrigue to that of open conflict. This phase began in the autumn of 1362,<sup>43</sup> and at the beginning of January 1363 Donskoy ceremonially entered Vladimir,<sup>44</sup> whence he had expelled Dmitry of Suzdal' by force of arms.

The chroniclers, describing these events, expatiate on the overwhelming military predominance of Moscow. Dmitry is terrified by the power of Donskoy and his brothers, does not dare to offer resistance, flees to his patrimony of Suzdal' and so on. We are conscious here that the older chronicles have been embroidered to conform to Moscow's subsequent desires and ambitions, though it does not follow that the basic course of events has been falsified. Dmitry of Suzdal' was in fact unable to hold Vladimir.

For lack of source material we can only frame hypotheses as to the reasons for Moscow's success at this time. Historians are right to some extent when they emphasize the increase of Moscow's economic and military strength during the reign of Kalita and his sons. In my opinion, however, it is not merely a question of the achievements of Donskoy's forebears; other causes were at work, which must not be overlooked.

For more than a century the Rus'ian princes had observed a tradition of implicit obedience and submission to the khans, which had become a dogma of their political thinking. Even when the internal dissolution of the Horde was most manifest, the princes constantly made their way to Sarai to pay eager homage to each new khan and outdo one another in servility. The incessant changes on the Tatar throne did not impair their loyalty to it. Paradoxical as it may seem, Rus' in those years was more pro-Tatar than the Tatars themselves.

Changes in the relationship between Rus' and the Horde begin to be observable from about the time of the conflict between the

two Dmitrys in 1362. Dmitry of Suzdal' thought on traditional lines, i.e. he regarded the khan as the final arbiter of Rus' 's destiny and especially of the appointment to the Vladimir throne. Relying on precedent—new khans had generally confirmed the grand dukes whom they found in office—he had reason to hope that things would be the same in his own case, and hence he was not prepared for an armed struggle with Moscow. Shortly afterwards, in 1363, the situation repeated itself: Murut unexpectedly changed his mind and conferred the grand-ducal dignity on Dmitry. The latter, armed with the khan's *yarlyk*, entered Vladimir but was driven out by Muscovite forces barely a week later.<sup>45</sup>

It is hard to be certain whether Moscow at this time had such a crushing military superiority over Suzdal', or whether Dmitry, who made a point of showing obedience to the khan, resolved to gain his full confidence and so bring about a conflict between Murut and Donskoy. If he made such a calculation, it was based on out-of-date presumptions and had little chance of success.

Donskoy's policy towards the Tatars rested on quite different premises. Having first made careful preparations for an armed attack, when his forces were ready he threw down the challenge to Dmitry and sent Amin' to the Horde with lavish gifts (1362). He had to reckon with two eventualities. Either Murut would uphold his claim (as he actually did), and the Moscow forces would then quickly eliminate the hated enemy, or else the khan would leave Dmitry on the Vladimir throne. In my opinion, by the autumn of 1362 Donskoy had already decided, if necessary, to ignore Murut's wishes, renounce his fealty to him—as he did demonstratively in 1363—and achieve his aims by armed conflict with Dmitry. In both cases Moscow's policy was based on military action.

Donskoy, pursuing a cautious and deliberate policy, was not in a hurry to break with the Tatars; initially, in 1360–1, he confined himself to seeking favourable decisions from them. Estimating the situation shrewdly, he became increasingly and rightly convinced that in the event of opposition on his part the *yarlyks* would not be backed by military intervention, so that they were of little practical importance. The right course therefore was swiftly to create a *fait accompli* in Rus', regardless of the khans' wishes or approval.<sup>46</sup> Moscow's policy showed a keen understanding of the internal Tatar crises. Donskoy did not have

much cause to fear Murut's reaction to the expulsion of Dmitry of Suzdal' from Vladimir, as the khan was murdered in the same year (1363). His successor on the Volga, Aziz—apparently a son of Temir' Khozha—was done to death not long after, in 1366 or 1367. His reign is of interest in that he once again appointed Dmitry of Suzdal' grand duke,<sup>47</sup> showing that Donskoy's policy of the *fait accompli* was not readily accepted at Sarai. However, Aziz's *yarlyk* was of no practical importance in view of the changes in the internal situation of Rus'. The course of events shows that by the 1360s the power of appointment to the Vladimir throne was beginning clearly to pass out of Tatar into Rus'ian hands, to the benefit of Moscow.

Donskoy's ambitions were favoured by two growing tendencies independent of his control. On the one hand the once formidable Tatar power was disintegrating year by year, and on the other the multiplication of the Rus'ian princely dynasty led to more and more friction and dispute among its members in the various lands. The great achievement of the young grand duke was to exploit both these circumstances.

In 1364 the territory directly under Donskoy's control was enlarged owing to the sudden death from plague<sup>48</sup> of his younger brother, Ivan of Zvenigorod. For the rest of Donskoy's life his only princely associate in Muscovite territory was Vladimir of Serpukhov, who was three years his junior. Moscow thus became a compact, self-contained entity, which enabled it to dominate the other principalities both militarily and politically.

The most important of the inter-princely feuds at that time was between two of the sons of Konstantin, the unifier of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal', who died in 1355. His patrimony was partitioned: Andrei received Nizhny Novgorod, Dmitry—Donskoy's rival for the Vladimir throne—received Suzdal', and Boris inherited Gorodets on the Volga.<sup>49</sup> In the 1360s Dmitry and Boris quarrelled about who should have Nizhny Novgorod after Andrei. The dispute was of wider scope than the feuds between brothers that were frequent in various territories, as it involved not only the interests of Konstantin's two sons but also, indirectly, those of Moscow, the Tatars and Lithuania. In spite of its scale, the conflict is difficult to reconstruct in detail. The chroniclers' accounts are fairly numerous but extremely laconic and full of gaps which open the way to various interpretations. There are also considerable

discrepancies in dates, which make it impossible to establish the order and interrelation of events. It is in respect of time that the differences between the chronicles are most apparent.

Andrei of Nizhny Novgorod died without issue on 2 June 1365 (this date is undisputed). Most chronicles state that the dispute between Dmitry and Boris over his patrimony broke out thereafter, and they accordingly date it to the summer or autumn of that year. However, a small number of early chronicles which contain a number of plausible details state that the quarrel broke out while Andrei was still alive.<sup>50</sup> As the details in question are highly probable and make it possible to give a clear and logical account of events, I will adopt the second hypothesis as far as the time is concerned.<sup>51</sup>

The fate of Nizhny Novgorod was affected not only by Andrei's death but, previously, by his abdication (although he spent the rest of his life in the city and was buried there). Andrei was extremely religious,<sup>52</sup> lacking in political ambition—in 1360 he renounced the Vladimir throne of his own accord in favour of his brother Dmitry—and comparatively little involved in inter-princely quarrels: he was drawn into political affairs rather than taking an active part. In 1364 he entered a monastery.<sup>53</sup> We do not know the exact date, but if it was at the beginning of the year he might, in 1363, have bequeathed Nizhny Novgorod to Boris and appointed him his successor, especially as Dmitry, the second brother, was then involved in his dispute with Donskoy for the office of grand duke.

We can establish approximately the date at which Boris took over the government of Nizhny Novgorod from Andrei. It must have been in the first half of 1363, as in autumn of that year Boris set about improving the city's fortifications.<sup>54</sup> This indicates that the prince of Gorodets was already reckoning with the possibility that attempts would be made to dislodge him from the newly acquired territory. In the nature of things, the enemies from whom he anticipated attack would have been Donskoy and his own brother Dmitry of Suzdal', independently of each other.

In the autumn of 1363 the metropolitan Aleksei sent two churchmen to Boris at Nizhny Novgorod requesting him to come to Moscow as soon as possible. When he refused, the envoys, on Aleksei's orders, imposed ecclesiastical sanctions and closed the churches. Faced with this severe pressure, Boris decided to

send an embassy. On their way to Moscow his envoys were suddenly attacked and captured by Vasily, the son of Dmitry of Suzdal', acting on his father's orders. One of the boyars, however, managed to escape and make his way to Aleksei, with whom he reached an agreement.<sup>55</sup>

These events provide valuable evidence as to the political situation in Vladimir Rus' in the second half of 1363, especially towards the end of the year. It is clear that at that time Boris of Gorodets was ruling Nizhny Novgorod, the metropolitan Aleksei was in *de facto* control in Moscow, and Dmitry of Suzdal' was in a state of enmity with his brother Boris as well as with Donskoy. The latter circumstance is confirmed by the fact that early in 1364—we do not know exactly when—Dmitry's son Vasily went on an important mission to the Horde on his father's behalf to obtain Tatar support and the *yarlyk* appointing him to the Vladimir throne. Vasily's journey shows that despite the reverses of 1363 Dmitry was still endeavouring to have himself made grand duke.

Two points are unexplained by the chronicler's account. We do not know why the metropolitan summoned Boris to Moscow, or what was the nature of the agreement reached with Aleksei by Boris's envoy after he had escaped from captivity. Clearly the two questions are connected. In default of source information we can only answer them hypothetically.

I assume that the matter was connected with Boris's acquisition of Nizhny Novgorod, which no doubt took place without Donskoy's knowledge or consent. This conjecture is not weakened by the fact that the metropolitan went so far as to order the closing of the churches. The synod of 1389 expressly censured Aleksei for having abused his ecclesiastical power for purely political ends.<sup>56</sup> The date of the churchmen's mission to Boris (autumn 1363) supports the idea that it reflected Moscow's strong reaction to everything that had happened at Nizhny Novgorod since Andrei's withdrawal from political life. If that withdrawal had taken place before spring or summer 1363, Aleksei's envoys would no doubt have been sent sooner. At this time Moscow was showing a tendency to interfere in the affairs of various principalities and decide who should rule them. This can be seen in Rostov,<sup>57</sup> Galich,<sup>58</sup> Starodub,<sup>59</sup> probably Yaroslavl',<sup>60</sup> and elsewhere. These activities, pursued with pertinacity and single-mindedness, were

designed to assert to the maximum Donskoy's influence over the minor princes. The metropolitan's mission to Nizhny Novgorod constituted a small part of this ambitious political programme.

If my supposition is correct, it would follow that the supremacy of Moscow over Nizhny Novgorod was the main issue in the debate with the metropolitan's envoys, and afterwards between Boris's emissary and Aleksei. We have no details of these exchanges. In my opinion Donskoy, or rather Aleksei, would have been prepared to leave Boris in Nizhny Novgorod on condition that he conformed to Moscow's policy; otherwise he would not have negotiated but would have expelled Boris from Andrei's inheritance by force. Boris at first refused to comply but afterwards adopted a more yielding attitude, the reason for which can be inferred from the chronicles.

Some time in 1363, after Andrei had withdrawn from public life, Dmitry of Suzdal' appeared at Nizhny Novgorod with a ceremonial escort, but without troops, in the hope of persuading Boris by peaceful means to make over Andrei's inheritance to him. Boris, however, refused to let him into the city. In the face of this resistance Dmitry withdrew to Suzdal',<sup>61</sup> but the brothers were henceforth at daggers drawn. I imagine that only a short time elapsed between the arrival of the mission from Aleksei and Dmitry's abortive visit. The fact that Boris's envoy came to terms with the metropolitan shows that for the time being he felt more threatened by Dmitry than by Donskoy. It is not impossible that, confronted by a twofold danger, Boris at this time appealed to the Tatars<sup>62</sup> for support and help. He probably also approached Lithuania,<sup>63</sup> but without any substantial result.

It can be seen that the political situation in the grand duchy in the second half of 1363 presented a paradoxical aspect, with Donskoy, Dmitry of Suzdal' and Boris contending simultaneously against one another. The three-cornered fight could not go on for long but ended, as it was bound to do, in two of the adversaries combining against the third. The sources make it clear that the two Dmitrys reached an understanding; they enable us to perceive its main points and to establish its approximate date.

In the early months of 1364, as already mentioned, Dmitry of Suzdal' 's son Vasily went to the Horde to obtain the khan's *yarlyk* appointing his father grand duke. Aziz granted his request, and he returned with the prize in the winter of that year. But,

unexpectedly, his father refused the appointment he had coveted and abandoned his claim to the grand-ducal dignity in favour of Donskoy.<sup>64</sup> It appears from this that the two Dmitrys came to terms some time after Vasily's departure (the exact date of which we do not know) and before his return at the end of 1364. Dmitry's abandonment of his claim to the Vladimir throne must have been the main point of his agreement with Donskoy; in return for it, he obtained Moscow's military help in evicting Boris from Nizhny Novgorod. In the same year 1364, probably in summer or autumn, Nizhny Novgorod was attacked by a joint force from Suzdal' and Moscow. Faced by clearly superior forces Boris offered no resistance, but relinquished the lands he had acquired from Andrei and returned to Gorodets.<sup>65</sup>

It seems clear that the most important event of 1364 was the agreement and co-operation of the two Dmitrys, which had a considerable effect on the general political situation in the grand duchy. It remains to inquire which side took the initiative and who benefited most from the agreement.

The chroniclers, although they differ as to dates, agree that the initiative came from Dmitry of Suzdal'<sup>66</sup> and was acceded to by Moscow. Historians generally agree that the agreement was a great success for Moscow. I think they are right to some extent but that they exaggerate the benefit from Moscow's point of view. If it were really so great, the initiative for the agreement would surely have come from Donskoy; otherwise Dmitry of Suzdal' would appear to have cared more for Moscow's interests than for his own.

Dmitry needed Donskoy's help. If he had not renounced the *yarlyk* he would have been simultaneously fighting Donskoy for the Vladimir throne and Boris for Nizhny Novgorod, without the slightest hope of winning both battles.<sup>67</sup> But it is also noteworthy that as between the two feuding brothers, Donskoy gave his support to Dmitry. This is surprising, since Boris, after brief resistance, had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Moscow, shown by the agreement between his envoy and Aleksei. Boris's modest ambitions were not dangerous to Moscow, being confined to the possession of Nizhny Novgorod and its surrounding territory. If Boris had been enabled to keep Nizhny Novgorod it would have broken the union between that principality and Suzdal', which would have been very much in Moscow's interest.<sup>68</sup>

It is generally but, I believe, wrongly supposed that when Dmitry renounced his claim to the Vladimir throne he subjected his own lands to the grand duke and acknowledged Donskoy's overlordship. This view is based on the fact that in later years the two are often found co-operating in various difficult situations. This is usually taken to mean that Dmitry was an obedient executant of Donskoy's orders; but the sources do not authorize so far-reaching an inference. The princes had conflicting interests, but they also had common ones, as we shall see later, and they may have freely agreed to joint action in defence of them.

The chroniclers, recording Dmitry's death in 1383, note that he ruled for two years as grand duke, occupying the Vladimir throne, and for 19 years in his own patrimony,<sup>69</sup> also as grand prince. The mention of '19 years' indicates that in 1364—the year in which he concluded his agreement with Donskoy—he retained the title of grand duke in respect of his own territory of Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal'. Historians mistakenly neglect this statement on the ground that the two grand dukes were unevenly matched in strength. No one disputes that Donskoy was the stronger, but the point here is a different one: individual lands might be subordinated to the grand duchy or even annexed to it, but grand-ducal lands remained separate and independent. Dmitry negotiated with Donskoy as an equal partner, being himself a grand duke; he renounced his claim to the Vladimir throne in return for Moscow's recognition of the independence of his own lands.

In my opinion the agreement of 1364 was a compromise: the parties met more or less half-way, though Dmitry, as the weaker, made more concessions. This did not mean, however, as is generally supposed, that he gave up his far-reaching ambitions or surrendered to a Moscow diktat. On the contrary, considering his difficult position, with Boris occupying Nizhny Novgorod, he obtained the maximum possible. Not only did he achieve the reuniting of Nizhny Novgorod with Suzdal' and the recognition of his territory's independence *vis-à-vis* the grand duchy of Vladimir, but, what was more, he acquired for the future a large measure of influence in Moscow itself. These remarkable successes entitle us to conclude that Dmitry not only made the approach to Moscow in 1364, but kept the initiative in the discussions with Donskoy, then aged 14, and his counsellors. The terms he



secured were based on well thought out, consistent and moderate proposals, bearing the mark of a mature and skilled politician. It is not accidental that in 1366 Donskoy married Dmitry's daughter Evdokiya.<sup>70</sup> The match may have been planned and discussed as early as 1364, but postponed for a time on account of the youth of both parties. The short delay did not diminish Dmitry's energy in pursuing his matrimonial projects. Here again we can see the skillful, conciliatory nature of his policy. Dmitry himself, as we know, had renounced the Vladimir throne, but he placed his daughter on that throne and made certain of the grand-ducal dignity for his grandson, the child of the arranged marriage.

There is no reason to think that Dmitry, then in the prime of life (he was just over 40),<sup>71</sup> opted out of political life and was content to entrust his aims and ambitions to posterity. On the contrary, Evdokiya's marriage, planned before 1366, was intended not only to redound to her benefit but at the same time to increase her father's influence to a large extent. Dmitry spared no effort to obtain Donskoy as a son-in-law and thus consolidate the position he had himself acquired. We also learn casually from a late 15th-century account that, at or about the time of Donskoy's marriage, Dmitry's elder daughter Mariya became the wife of Mikula (Nikolay), son of the *tysyatskii* Vasily Vel'yaminov, the highest Muscovite dignitary in charge of military and administrative affairs.<sup>72</sup>

Dmitry, well aware of Vasily's importance, was determined to work with him as closely as possible. Both parties were to gain substantially from their mutual understanding, taking advantage of Donskoy's youth. If the latter's marriage to Evdokiya was discussed as early as 1364, it was Vel'yaminov's part to ensure that the plan was put into effect as soon as possible. Having done this with great success, he was rewarded with the promise of his son's marriage to Dmitry's elder daughter.<sup>73</sup> There can be no doubt that the ambitious boyar received Dmitry's proposal with enthusiasm,<sup>74</sup> offering as it did the prospect of still further enhancing the family fortunes. Vasily's son would be married to a princess of the ruling dynasty and, moreover, would become a brother-in-law of Donskoy himself.

It would seem to follow from the logic of the facts, though not expressly confirmed by the sources, that an additional purpose of the understanding between Dmitry and Vasily Vel'yaminov

was to eliminate or greatly weaken the influence of the metropolitan Aleksei at the Muscovite court—an objective of the greatest importance to both men's ambitions.

Dmitry, as we can see from the sagacity of his decisions, did not oppose Moscow's political aims, but did not abandon his own designs either: he was careful to place both his daughters and his son-in-law Mikula (the latter was less important) in key positions in Moscow. Of paramount importance, naturally, were relations between Dmitry and Donskoy.

It would be wrong to suppose that in 1364–6 the young grand duke was no more than a tool in the hands of trusted counsellors—the metropolitan Aleksei, Vasily Vel'yaminov and probably other boyars unknown to us. Their influence at this time should not be ignored, but I believe that Donskoy's decisions were already his own in fact as well as in form. I am confirmed in this view by the advantages that Moscow secured from the agreement with Dmitry.

Moscow was still overshadowed by the Tatar danger. Although the khans, constantly succeeding one another, were too weak for any large-scale military action against Donskoy, the Horde was still capable of many surprises—a factor which could never be ruled out of account. Much depended on a particular khan's personality, and how long he was able to hold on to the throne.

Both Khidyr' and Aziz—the latter reigning from 1364 to 1366—were hostile to Donskoy's far-reaching ambitions, and saw in Dmitry—who, sincerely or otherwise, adopted a deferential attitude towards the Horde—the only hope of putting a stop to them. The two decisions by Aziz which we have recorded—the conferment of the *yarlyk* on Dmitry of Suzdal' for the grand duchy, and on Boris for Nizhny Novgorod—had failed to drive a wedge between the two Dmitrys. The latter's understanding was to some extent detrimental to the Horde, since it strengthened Vladimir Rus' at the expense of Boris, who was restricted to Gorodets,<sup>75</sup> and of the other Rus'ian princes.<sup>76</sup> The latter (Beloozero, Yaroslavl', Rostov, Starodub and others) had supported Dmitry in his contest with Donskoy for the Vladimir throne; they now feared aggressive action by Moscow, of which they had had ample experience in the past. When Dmitry established himself in Nizhny Novgorod they came to him with requests for support,<sup>77</sup> but the chroniclers do not say whether they were successful. It

must not be forgotten that princes of the same line were often at odds with one another, which made it easy for Moscow to exploit their internal conflicts.

The agreement between the two Dmitrys which we have analysed above enabled Moscow to consolidate its supremacy over the minor princes; this, in my opinion, was the great achievement of Donskoy's policy. No one disputes that both parties benefited much from the agreement, but in the long term, it seems to me, Moscow's gains greatly outweighed the concessions secured by Dmitry.

## Notes to Chapter 10

1. For a list of names and regnal dates see B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 453.

2. ' . . . a v Orde togda [1357] zamyatnya byst' velika, umre bo . . . tsar' Chzhanibek, i sede na tsar'stve syn ego Berdebak, ubiv bratov svoikh 12 okaannym predstatelem svoim Tovlub'em': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 180; X, p. 229, etc.

3. *PSRL*, XV, p. 68; XXV, p. 180, etc. According to *PSRL*, X, p. 231: 6 months and 5 days.

4. Ivan died on 13 November 1359; Berdibek most probably in the autumn, as the Rus'ian princes went to the Horde in the winter of 1359/60. Cf. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, pp. 121-2.

5. This Ivan must have been an infant at the time of his father's will (1358-9), as the chronicler, when recording his death in 1364, refers to him as a child (not even a youth) and gives his name in the diminutive form: ' . . . na Moskve knyaz' Ivashko detiya prestavisya': *PSRL*, XV, col. 78.

6. V. Kuchkin (*Iz istorii genealogicheskikh i politicheskikh svyazei*, pp. 365, 381) believes that Ivan's wife Aleksandra was the daughter of Vasily Vel'yaminov, *tysyatskii* of Moscow.

7. The synod of the Eastern Church presided over by Patriarch Anthony in 1389 stated that Grand Duke Ivan had before his death appointed Aleksei guardian of his son Dmitry: *RIB*, VI, N 33, col. 197. Ivan's testament refutes this, but the ambitious metropolitan did in fact take advantage of Dmitry's youth to exercise *de facto* power in Moscow for a certain time.

8. ' . . . i syade na velikom knyazhenii v Volodimeri knyaz' veliki Dmitrei Ivanovich' . . . , imeya let 11, razumom zhe i bodrostiyu vsekhn staree syi . . .': *PSRL*, XI, p. 1.

9. Aleksandra died in 1364 (*PSRL*, XV, col. 78), when Dmitry was 14. The death of both his parents while he was still a child (and his only brother, Ivan, also died in 1364) must have contributed to his early maturity.

10. 'Toe zhe zimy [1359] knyazi Rous'skyi poidosha v Ordou': *PSRL*, XV, col. 68. This was no doubt after the death of Grand Duke Ivan on 13 November 1359.

11. As Navrus became khan before March 1360 (cf. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, p. 121) and Kulpa ruled for 5 or 6 months, the latter must have begun his reign in about September 1359. I agree with Nasonov that Navrus must have come to the throne in January or February 1360.

12. '... i sede Navrus na tsarstvo, i poidosha k nemu v Ordu vsi knyazi Russkie, i byst' im v Orde rozdela knyazhen'em ikh i pridoshia vsi kazhdo ikh v svoyu otchinu': *PSRL*, XXV, pp. 180-1. Similarly *TL*, pp. 376-7, etc.

13. 'Toe zhe vesny [1360] pride na tsarstvo Volzh'skoe nekyi tsar' so v(o)stoka Zayad'sky [in *PSRL*, X, p. 232: Zayaitskii], imenem' Khidyr', prida vzyal Ordou . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 69. (The river Yaik flows into the Caspian.)

14. Konstantin of Suzdal' had died a few years earlier, in 1355. As we have seen, he did much to develop Nizhny Novgorod, which he made the capital of his principality.

15. '(N)avrous' . . . nasla na knyazya Andreyu Kost'yantinovicha, daya emou knyazhenie velikoe, 15 tem' on zhe ne yasya, no sostoupisya bratu svoemu men'shemu knyazyu Dmitreyu, a sam poide na Rous', a ostavi bratou svoemu na pomoch' boyar svoikh . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 68. '... tsar' Naurus . . . dade velikoe knyazhenie Volodimer'skoe knyazyu Dmitreyu Kostyantinovichyu Suzdal'skomu . . .': *PSRL*, X, p. 231.

16. '... tsar' . . . Khydyr' . . . dast knyazhen'e velikoe knyazyu Dmitreyu Kostyantinovichyu Suzdal'skomu': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 181. 'Dano knyazhenie velikoe knyaz' Dmitreyu Suzdalskomu, i koemu zhe knyazyu otchinu svoyu, ot tsarya Khydyrya': *PSRL*, XV, col. 428.

17. It is often supposed that these chronicles are mutually contradictory, on the ground that Navrus could not have appointed Dmitry to the Vladimir throne because Khidyr' certainly did so (as long as he was khan, he treated Dmitry as 'his' grand duke). But there is no basis for this reasoning.

18. 'Togo zhe leta [1360] byst' myatezh' silen v Orde: mnozi tsesari pobieni bysha i tsesaritsi i tsesarevitse, i ryadtsi sekoshasya mezhi soboyu': *NPL*, p. 366; *PSRL*, XXV, p. 181. '... tsar' . . . Khidyr' . . . tsarya Navrousa oubil i tsaritsyu Taidulu, a knyazi ordin'skykh Mualbouzinou chad' mnozh'stvo oubil, a sam sede na tsarstvo. I byst' v Orde zamyatnya velika': *PSRL*, XV, col. 69.

19. The chroniclers agree that Dmitry came to Vladimir and began his reign as grand duke on 22 June 1360: *PSRL*, XV, col. 69; XXV, p. 181; X, p. 232; *TL*, p. 377, etc. He must therefore have left the Horde in about May of that year; cf. 'Toe zhe vesny vyide iz Ordy na velikoe knyazhenie knyaz' Suzhdal'skiy Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' . . .': *TL*, p. 377. The date of 22 June is the only precise one we have within the relevant period, which is measured by months and weeks. Earlier events are simply recorded as 'during that spring', i.e. March-May. As far as dates are concerned, there is no reason to question the inference from the sources that Dmitry was appointed grand duke both by Navrus and by Khidyr'. The former event might have occurred in March; Dmitry's elder brother Andrei could have been appointed to the Vladimir throne earlier still. Khidyr' attacked the Volga Horde in about March or April; a short but violent struggle ended with the death of Navrus and his followers and Khidyr's accession to the khanate in April or May.

20. To avoid confusion between the two contenders for the Vladimir throne, Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal' will be referred to as Dmitry, and Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow by his later surname of Donskoy.

21. There is indirect evidence for this: Donskoy on his first military expeditions was accompanied only by his brother Ivan and his first cousin Vladimir (*PSRL*, XV, pp. 72, 73; XXV, pp. 181, 182, etc.), from which we may infer that at that time he was not supported by other princes. Later, when his rule was more secure, many princes are described as assisting him in political and military enterprises.

22. '[In 1360] pride iz Ordy knyaz' Dmitrei Borisovich' pozhalovan v Galich', knyaz(ya) Kostyantina ves' Rostov': *PSRL*, XV, col. 69. (More on the prince of Rostov: ' . . . priide izo Ordy ot tsarya knyaz' Konstyantin Rostovskii s chestiyu i s pozhalovaniem na vse knyazhenie Rostovskoe': *PSRL*, X, p. 232.) 'byst' s' 'ezd . . . knyazem rus'skym . . . na Kostrome: knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Kostyantynovich', brat ego stareishii knyaz' Andrei Nizhnego Novgoroda, knyaz' Kostyantyn Rostov'skiy, knyaz' Andrei Fedorovich [of Starodub]': *ibid.*, XV, col. 69. '[In 1361] priidosha v Ordu knyaz' veliky Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' i brat ego stareishii knyaz' Andrei i knyaz' Kostyantyn Rostovsky i knyaz' Mikhailo Yaroslavsky . . .': *ibid.*, XXV, p. 181. '[In 1363] knyaz' Dmitrei Kostyantynovich priekha v grad Volodimer' . . . a s nim knyaz' Ivan Belozerts . . .': *ibid.* XV, col. 74.

23. 'Togo zhe leta [1360] prisla knyaz' velikii Dmitrii (Kostyantynovich') svoi poslove names'tniki; i posadisha names'tniki knyazhii u sebe novgorodtsi, i sud im dasha, domolvyasya s knyazem': *NPL*, p. 367.

24. '[In 1360] vyide iz Ordy na velikoe knyazhenie . . . knyaz' Dmitrei Kostyantynovich', a ne po ochine, ni po dedine': *PSRL*, XV, col. 69; XXV, p. 181, etc.

25. '[In 1362] prinésosha (iz Ordy) yarlyk knyazhenie velikoe po otchine i po dedine knyazyu velikomu Dmitreyu Ivanovich(yu) Moskovskomu': *PSRL*, XV, col. 72; XXV, p. 181.

26. Confining our attention to the 14th century, it should be recalled that in 1328–31 Aleksandr of Suzdal' held the office of grand duke by Uzbek's appointment, jointly with Kalita; to him were then assigned Vladimir on the Klyaz'ma and Povolzh'e. On his death his territorial claims passed to his younger brother Konstantin, father of the Grand Duke Dmitry who is now in question. After Kalita's death Konstantin was able to gain possession of Povolzh'e, but he was unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain the Vladimir throne after the death of Semen.

In any case the house of Suzdal', represented by Dmitry in 1360, had high ambitions. Looking to the earlier past, Suzdal' and Rostov, the two oldest towns of Vladimir Rus', were incomparably more important than Moscow, which had come to the fore only in the 14th century.

27. This did not of course prevent each grand duke from trying to ensure that the Horde appointed his son to the Vladimir throne.

28. ' . . . priide knyazya velikogo syn Ivan(a) Ivanovich(a) Dmitrei i vsi knyazi Rus'stii i vide tsar' knyazya Dmitreya Ivanovicha ouna soushcha i mlada vozrastom i nasla na knyazya Andreyu Kost'nyantinovicha, daya emou knyazhenie velikoe, 15 tem' . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 68. The chronicler's bias is clearly shown here: Donskoy is referred to first, and by name, as the most important of the Rus'ian princes who attended the Horde, the rest being only mentioned generally.

29. The chroniclers agree that Donskoy was born on 12 October, but differ as to the year: some say 1350, others 1351. The former seems more likely and is usually accepted. When Khidyr' appointed the new grand duke of Rus' in about May 1360, Donskoy would have been aged nine and a half.

30. Cf. V. Kuchkin, *Iz istorii*, p. 372.

31. For instance, in the winter of 1360/1 the Rus'ian princes, headed by Dmitry, mounted an expedition on the khan's orders against brigands in the Volga basin. The chronicler give the names of the chief participants (*PSRL*, XV, col. 69; XXV, p. 181, etc.), but Donskoy is not among them.

32. Cf. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, p. 118; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 112.

33. 'Poide v Ordu [1361] knyaz' Dmitrei Ivanovich' Moskovskiy ko tsaryu Khydyryu i vyide izo Ordy do zamyatni, a togo zhe leta priidosha v Ordu knyaz' veliky Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' i brat ego stareishii knyaz' Andrei i knyaz' Kostyantyn Rostovsky i knyaz' Mikhailo Yaroslavsky, i byst' pri nikh zamyatnya velika v Orde. Ub'en bo byst' tsar' Khydyr' ot svoego syna Temir' Khozha . . .': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 181; XV, col. 70, etc.

34. The P'yana is a left-bank tributary of the Sura; the Sura, a right-bank tributary of the Volga.

35. '(V) to vremya [sc. the overthrow of Kulpa by Navrus] byst' v Orde knyaz' Andrei Kostentinovich, edva upase ego Bog ot gorkyya smerti ot ruk poganykh': PSRL, XXVII, p. 242. '... priide v Ordu knyaz' Dmitreii Moskov'skyi . . . k tsaryu Kydryyu: milostyu Bozhieyu vyide iz Ordy do zamyatni': PSRL, XV, col. 70. 'Togo zhe leta [1361] togdy pobezha iz Ordy na Rus' knyaz' Andrei Kostyantynovich' i naekha nan' Ordinskyi knyaz' Aratekhozya [PSRL, XXV, p. 181: 'Ryatyakoz']. I nachasha Tatarove ostupati ego s oba poly i so vse storony, knyaz' zhe Andrei, poostriv krepot' svoyu i ne uboyasya grozy ikh, no naprasno ustremivsyia i probivsyia skvoze polky Tatarskyya, biyuchisya s nimi, i tako Bozhieyu milostiyu priekha na Rus' dobr zdrav. A knyaz' Dmitrei brat ego osta v Sarae tsel skhranen byst'. A knyaz' Kostyantyn Rostov'skyi ostal knyazyia Andreyia v Orde i v zamyatnyu tu ograbisha ego Tatarove i telesa ikh obnazhisha i ne ostasya na nikh ni ispodnikh port, a sami nazi tokmo zhivi pridoshia peshi na Rus'': PSRL, XV, col. 71; and so on.

36. '[In 1362] . . . knyaz' Dmitrei Ivanovich' Moskov'skyi i knyaz' Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' Suzdal'skyi spersya o velikom knyazhenii i poslasha ktozh (kozhdo) svoikh kilicheev v Ordu k tsaryu Muratu i prinesosha yarlyk knyazhenie velikoe . . . knyazyu velikomu Dmitreyu Ivanovich(yu) Moskov'skomu': PSRL, XV, col. 72.

37. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, p. 120.

38. '[In 1363] . . . knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' priekha v Volodimer' . . . i priide k nemu posol iz Ordy ot tsarya Avdulya s yarlyky, knyaz' zhe velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' posla otpustil v Ordu, a sam poekha v Pereyaslavl': *ibid.*, col. 74. 'A ot Mamaeva tsarya knyazyu Dmitreyu Ivanovichyu yarlyk privezli na velikoe knyazhenii i sed na knyazhen'e': *ibid.*, col. 74. These accounts by the same source—an important one of the period, the *Rogozhskii letopisets*—do not entirely agree with each other. The first (like other chronicles, e.g. PSRL, XXV, p. 182; TL, p. 378, etc.) says nothing of Donskoy accepting the *yarlyk* from Avdula—possibly it takes this for granted—whereas the second expressly states that he did accept it. It was not in Moscow's interest to show ingratitude for Avdula's favour; Donskoy's desire, unrealistic though it might be, was to remain on correct terms with both khans.

39. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, p. 125; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 115.

40. 'Toe zhe zimy [1362] privezl Amin' ot Murata yarlyk na Moskvu na velikoe knyazhenie': PSRL, XV, col. 73.

41. Amin' must have been quite young in 1362, as the sources 100 years later mention his son Ivan (Ivan, Aminev syn): ASEI, II, N 93, p.

56; N 229, p. 150. See also *ASEI*, III, N 100, p. 137; N 246, pp. 265–6; and other sources.

42. The village of Aminevo is on the river Setonka, a small tributary of the Moskva. It was probably founded by the Amin' in question, as villages were usually named after their first owners. Cf. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii*, pp. 16–17.

43. Murat, by appointing Donskoy grand duke, automatically deposed Dmitry of Suzdal' from that position. The chroniclers say that Dmitry remained on the Vladimir throne for two years ('... knyazhiv dva leta': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 181) or 'more precisely, a little longer' ('... tochiyu malo bolshi dvoyu let': *PSRL*, X, p. 234). Since he ascended the throne on 22 June 1360, Murat's decision was most probably taken in the autumn of 1362.

44. 'Toe zhe zimy [1362] knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' s svoeyu bratieyu s knyazem s Ivanom Ivanovichem i s knyazem Volodimerom Andreevichem i so vseimi bolyary i sobrav voya mnogy svoeya otchiny i ide ratiyu k Pereyaslavlyu, knyaz' zhe Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' Suzdal'skyi ne sterpe prishestvia ego i uboyasya nakhozheniya ego, pache zhe ratnago dukha sdognusya i, urazumev svoe neizvolenie, sbezhe s Pereyaslavlya i paky bezhe iz Volodimerya v svoi grad Suzdal', v svoyu otchinu. Knyaz' zhe velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' prognav ego s Pereyaslavlya i sam sede v Pereyaslavli s svoeyu brat'eyu i z bolyary i s svoeyu družinoyu. Toe zhe zimy pered kreshcheniem' [1363] knyaz' Dmitrei Ivanovich' s svoeyu bratieyu s knyazem Ivanom i Volodimerom i s vseimi bolyary v sile velitse tyazhtse vekha v Volodimer' i sede na velikom knyazhenii . . . i stoya v Volodimeri 3 nedeli i poekha na Moskvu i voya raspusti kozhdo vsvoyasi': *PSRL*, XV, pp. 72–3.

45. 'Togo zhe leta [1363] knyaz' Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' priekha v grad Volodimer' i paky sede na velikom knyazhen'i v Drougye, a s nim knyaz' Ivan Belozerts', prishel bo be iz Murotovy Ordy s trit'satiyu Tatarinov, i tako prebyst' v Volodimeri nedelyu edinu . . . Se zhe slyshav knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' progna ego paky s velikago knyazhenia s Volodimerya . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 74; XXV, p. 182, etc. According to *PSRL*, XI, p. 2, Dmitry of Suzdal' was in Vladimir for 12 days.

46. The situation was simplified to the extent that Khan Avdula, Murat's rival, did not oppose Donskoy's ambition to be grand duke.

47. 'Toe zhe zimy [1364] priide iz Ordy knyaz' Vasilei Dmitreevich' Suzdal'skyi ot tsarya Aziza, a s nim tsarev posol, a imya emu Oursmangy, i vynese yarlyky na knyazhenie na velikoe knyazyu Dmitriyu Kostyantynovichyu Suzdal'skomu . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 77; XXV, p. 182; *TL*, p. 380, etc.

48. For details see M. Tikhomirov, *Srednevekovaya Moskva*, pp. 276–7.

49. Boris also possessed lands on the Sura, but the sources do not enable us to say whether he acquired them immediately after his father's



death, or later. Cf. V. Kuchkin, *Nizhny Novgorod i Nizhegorodskoe knyazhestvo v XIII-XIV vv.*, in: *Pol'sha i Rus'*, 1974, p. 248.

50. These accounts are collated and discussed in V. Kuchkin, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

51. This is also V. Kuchkin's view: *op. cit.*, p. 247.

52. 'Togo zhe leta [1365] miesyatsa iunya v 2 den' . . . prestavis(ya) blagovernyi khristolyubivyi smirenyi knyaz' Andrei Kostyantinovich' v chern'tsekh i v skime i polozhen byst' v tserkvi svyatago Spasa v Novegorode v Nizhnem . . .': *PSRL*, XV, cols. 78-9.

53. 'Togo zhe leta [1364] knyaz' . . . Andrei . . . postrizhesya vo inocheskkii chin; byst' zhe sei knyaz' dukhoven zelo i mnogodobrodetelen': *PSRL*, XI, p. 3.

54. 'Toe zhe oseni [1363] knyaz' Boris zalozhi gorod sypti': *PSRL*, XV, col. 74.

55. 'Toe zhe oseni [1363] priekhasha v Novgorod Nizhnii ot mitropolita Alekseya arkhimandrit Pavel da igumen Gerasim, zovuchi knyazya Borisa na Moskvu, on zhe ne poekha, oni zhe tserkvi zatvorisha, on zhe posla boyar svoikh na Moskvu. I naekha na nikh knyaz' Vasilei Dmitreevich' v noshch' i ovych iznima, a Vasilei Oleksich' outeche na Moskvu i tamouyadisya': *PSRL*, XV, col. 75.

56. *RIB*, VI, cols. 195, 197.

57. In 1360 the senior prince of Rostov, Konstantin Vasil'evich, who was closely associated with Grand Duke Dmitry of Suzdal', obtained from the Tatars the title to 'all Rostov'. This must have been at the expense of his nephew Andrei Fedorovich, as we hear of dissension between the two in the winter of 1362/3. 'Toe zhe zimy [1362] stvorilasya nelyubov' mezhi knyazi Rostovskymi Konstan(ti)nom i Andreem': *PSRL*, XV, col. 428. Andrei had to seek outside help, no doubt from Donskoy. He returned to Rostov in 1363. 'Togo zhe leta [1363] priekhav' knyaz' Andrei v Rostov . . .': *PSRL*, XV, col. 428. Andrei's rights and claims were vindicated, and Konstantin gave in completely to Donskoy. '[In 1363] . . . knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' . . . nad Rostov'skim knyazem Kon'styantinom vzya volyu svoyu': *PSRL*, XI, p. 2.

58. '[In 1363] A Galich'skago Dmitreya iz Galicha vygnali': *PSRL*, XV, col. 74. *PSRL*, XI, p. 2, expressly states that this was Donskoy's doing: 'Togo zhe leta [1363] knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich s gna s Galich'skago knyazhenia knyazya Dmitrea Galich'skago.'

59. 'Togo zhe leta [1363] knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' s gna s Starodub'skago knyazhenia knyazya Ivana Feodorovicha Starodub'skago': *PSRL*, XI, p. 2.

60. Mikhail of Yaroslavl' (as the sources call him; strictly speaking, of Mologa) disappears from the source accounts at this time.

61. 'Togo zhe leta [1363] priekha is Suzhdalya knyaz' Dmitrei Kostyantynovich v Novgorod Nizhni, a s nim mati ego knyagini Olena (Elena) da vladyka Aleksei. Brat zhe ego molodshii knyaz' Boris ne sstupisya emu knyazhenia, on zhe paky vozvratisya vsvoyasi i otekha v Suzhdal'': *PSRL*, XV, col. 74. The fact that Dmitry was accompanied by his and Boris's mother and the bishop of Suzdal', while there is no mention of troops, shows that Dmitry at first adopted a pacific attitude towards his younger brother.

62. Many chronicles record that envoys from the khan and his wife established Boris at Nizhny Novgorod in the winter of 1365; their names are given, which increases the probability of the story. 'Toe zhe zimy [1365] priide posol iz Ordy ot tsarya Bairam Khozi i ot tsaritsi Asan, i posadisha v Novegorode Nizhnem na knyazhen'i knyazya Borisa Kostyantynovicha': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 183. Similarly XXVII, pp. 243, 327; XXVIII, pp. 75, 236; XI, p. 5, etc. Only the date seems doubtful. This statement about the Tatar envoys appears in those chronicles which place the beginning of the dispute for Nizhny Novgorod in the period after Andrei's death, i.e. the second half of 1365. In my opinion the winter of 1363 is more probable in the light of the general political situation. The khan's embassy was of course ineffectual, owing to the weakening of Tatar rule in Rus' at the time.

63. Boris was the son-in-law of Grand Duke Algirdas of Lithuania.

64. 'Toe zhe zimy [1364] priide iz Ordy knyaz' Vasilei Dmitreevich' Suzhdal'skyi ot tsarya Aziza, a s nim tsarev posol, a imya emu Ourusmandy, i vynese yarlyky na knyazhenie na velikoe knyazyu Dmitriyu Kostyantynovichyu Suzhdal'skomu, on zhe stupisya knyazhenia velikago knyazyu velikomu Dmitriyu Ivanovich(yu) Moskov'skomu . . .': *PSRL*, XV, pp. 77-8.

65. '[In 1364] Knyaz' . . . velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich . . . vdst' silu stareishemu [sc. Dmitry] na menshago brata [sc. Boris], knyaz' zhe Dmitrei Kostyantynovich eshche k tomu v svoei otchine v Suzhdali sbrav voya mnogy, v sile tyazhtse poide ratiyu k Novogorodu k Nizhnemu i egda doide do Berezhitsa i tu srete ego brat ego molodshii knyaz' Boris s boyary svoimi, klyanyayasya i pokoryayasya i prosya mira, a knyazhenia sya sstupaya. Knyaz' zhe Dmitrei Kostyantynovich', ne ostavya slova brata svoego, vzyasha mir mezhu soboyu i podelishasya knyazheniem' Novogorodskym . . . , a sam sede na knyazhenii v Novegorode v Nizhnem, a knyazyu Borisu bratu svoemu vdst' Gorodets'': *PSRL*, XV, col. 78.

66. As soon as Dmitry returned from his repulse at Nizhny Novgorod he appealed to Donskoy for help. ' . . . isprosil i vzyal sobe u nego silu k Novogorodu k Nizhnemu na brata . . . Borisa': *PSRL*, XV, col. 78. ' . . . on zhe ide k Moskve k velikomu knyazyu Dmitreyu Ivanovichyu

prositi sobe na nego [sc. Boris] pomochi': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 183, etc. This initiative opened the way to collaboration, then and later, between the two Dmitrys, who had previously been enemies.

67. A situation of this kind was naturally bound to lead to closer collaboration between Boris and Donskoy.

68. It is hard to suppose that this fact was not appreciated in Moscow. Donskoy agreed to help Dmitry, but without enthusiasm: he first tried to reconcile the brothers, not wishing to be involved in their quarrel. 'Knyaz' zhe velikii Dmitrei Ivanovich' posla k nim posly svoa, chtoby sya pomirili i podelilisya votchinyu svoeyu': *PSRL*, XI, p. 5. Boris, however, took up an uncompromising attitude, refused to negotiate with Dmitry, and improved the defences of Nizhny Novgorod in preparation for war. He evidently calculated that any political or military co-operation between his brother and Donskoy was impossible owing to their conflict of interests and rivalry for the Vladimir throne, whereas his own claims were more modest. This was a reasonable estimate but, as events showed, a mistaken one. The Suzdal'-Moscow expedition against Nizhny Novgorod evidently took Boris by surprise, and he at once surrendered without a fight; he would no doubt have got better terms if he had taken Donskoy's advice and negotiated with Dmitry.

69. 'Togo zhe leta [1383] . . . prestavisya rab Bozhii knyaz' velikii Dmitrei Kostyantynovich' . . . I polozhen byst' v svoei otchine v Novegorode Nizhnem . . . , byv na velikom knyazhenii dva leta, a v svoei otchine tako zhe na knyazhenii na velikom 19 let . . .': *PSRL*, XV, cols. 148-9. Similarly *PSRL*, XXV, p. 211; XI, pp. 83-4, etc. Cf. *TL*, pp. 426-7.

70. 'Toe zhe zimy mesyatsa genvaryia v 18 den' . . . ozhenisya knyaz' velikiy Dmitrei Ivanovich' ou knyazya ou Dmitria ou Kostyantynovicha ou Suzhdal'skago, poya za sya dshcher' ego Ovdotiyu, i byst' knyazyu velikomu svad'ba na Kolomne': *PSRL*, XV, col. 83.

71. The chroniclers say that Dmitry was past 61 when he died in 1383: ' . . . a zhiv ot rozhd'stva svoego 61 (let)': *PSRL*, XV, col. 149. It thus appears that he was born in 1322 and was aged 42 in 1364, the time we are considering. He was Donskoy's senior by about 18 years, thus old enough to have been his father.

72. An apparently minor detail is of much political significance. The *tysyatskii* Vasily switched the wedding-presents intended by Dmitry for his two sons-in-law: he kept for his own son a large and costly belt that was meant for Donskoy, and gave the latter a smaller one. ' . . . poyas zolot na chepek s kamen'em, chto bylo pridano knyazya velikogo Dmitreyea Ivanovicha ot knyazya Dmitreya Kostyantynovicha Suzhdal'skogo. Se zhe pishem togo radi, pone zhe mnogo zla s togo sya pochalo, tot bo poyas o svad'be velikogo knyazya Dmitreya Ivanovicha podmenil Vasilei tysyatsky, knyazyu velikomu dal menshoi, a tot dal synu svoemu

Mikule, a za Mikuloyu togo zhe byla knyazya Dmitreya dochi Suzdal'skogo Mar'a bol'shaa': *PSRL*, XXV, p. 250 (s.a. 1433). This attests the fact that Maria was Mikula's wife, and it appears from the account that they were married at the same time as Donskoy. V. Kuchkin in *Nizhnii Novgorod*, p. 249, dates both marriages to 1366. The exchange of the belts shows that Vasily Vel'yaminov could do as he liked at the grand-ducal court.

73. The fact that Evdokiya, although younger than Maria, was chosen for the far more important match may either have been because Maria was somewhat older than Donskoy, or because he preferred Evdokiya.

74. If we suppose that the 'alliance' between Dmitry and Vel'yaminov was concluded in 1364, it would supply a further explanation for Moscow's support of Dmitry at that time in his contest with Boris for Nizhny Novgorod.

75. It may be that Dmitry would not have entered into so close an understanding with Donskoy if Aziz had assigned to him not only Vladimir (as the grand-ducal capital) and Suzdal', but also Nizhny Novgorod. But the khan could not do this for fear lest it should make the grand duke too strong and recalcitrant to the Horde.

76. Tver', which requires separate discussion, is left out of account here.

77. The chroniclers state (notes 58, 59) that Donskoy evicted Dmitry of Galich and Ivan of Starodub from their respective lands. These princes, and probably others similarly aggrieved, complained in person to Dmitry at Nizhny Novgorod. ' . . . i tii vsi knyazi ekhasha v Novgorod Nizhnii k knyazyu Dmitreyu Kostyantinovichyu': *PSRL*, XXVII, pp. 243, 327 (s.a. 1362). 'Togda vsi knyazi ekhasha v Novgorod Nizhnii k knyazyu Dmitreyu Konstyantinovichyu, skorbyashche o knyazhenyakh svoikh': *PSRL*, XI, p. 2 (s.a. 1363). These dates (1362, 1363) relate to action by Donskoy against the princes. The journeys referred to were later, as Dmitry did not rule in Nizhny Novgorod until 1364.

## Appendix 1

### The geographical zones of the East European plain

The enormous East European plain is divided into a number of geographical zones.<sup>1</sup> Excluding the far north (tundra) and the remote south-east (desert), it consists of two large parts, a northern one covered with forest and a southern one of open steppe country. These differ in climate, hydrography, soil, flora, fauna and so on.<sup>2</sup>

The East European zones dovetail and overlap with one another. Their boundaries are generally fluid and hard to define exactly.<sup>3</sup> Between them are transitional belts of tundra-forest, forest-steppe and steppe-desert. The individual zones are not uniform but vary within themselves, sometimes considerably. It is necessary to distinguish sub-zones, and perhaps even to subdivide these further.<sup>4</sup> All this illustrates the difficulty of defining natural regions in terms of clear-cut categories.

South of the Arctic region<sup>5</sup> extends the tundra, a flat, low-lying, marshy expanse, though with some drier and elevated areas. The climate is inhospitable: a long, severe winter, a short summer with low temperatures, much cloud, strong winds, and little precipitation. In consequence, vegetation is extremely scanty. The tundra is covered with moss and lichen, numerous shrubs and, here and there, stunted trees. Only in its southern parts, on the banks of rivers, do forests begin to appear.<sup>6</sup>

Between the tundra and the vast zone of continuous forest is a transitional belt called by Beketov<sup>7</sup> *predlesie* and by Berg<sup>8</sup> 'wooded tundra', where tundra and forest country are intermingled.<sup>9</sup> Here woods are not confined to river-banks but are found in groups or 'islands' in the extensive marshy areas between rivers, chiefly on the slopes of hills and other high ground. These forests, consisting of spruce, larch, birch etc., present a pitiful aspect: the trees are of low growth and often tens of metres apart. Denser forests are chiefly found on river-banks.

South of the forest tundra is a coniferous forest zone, the taiga, and further south a zone of mixed forest, deciduous (small-leaved) and conifer.<sup>10</sup>

The climate of the taiga varies along its wide area, but as a rule one may expect warm, damp summers and a very hard winter. The zone is chiefly characterized by abundant forests and by marshes which make access to them difficult. The soil is infertile and the vegetation poor. Meadows border on rivers and form glades in the forests.

As one goes from north to south the forests become taller, denser and more extensive. Spruce, pine, larch and other conifers are frequent; birch, aspen and alder occur in small numbers. There are scarcely any latifolious trees.

A line running approximately from Great Novgorod through Yaroslavl' to Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan' divides the taiga from the mixed-forest zone—a fairly lengthy one, narrower in its central and eastern part. This comprises both conifers and deciduous trees, including—besides those found in the taiga—oak, lime, maple etc. Conifers decidedly predominate in the north, but towards the south their numbers diminish. At a line running approximately from Zhitomir to Kazan' via Kiev, Karachev, Kaluga, Ryazan' and Nizhny Novgorod<sup>11</sup> the mixed forest zone is replaced by a transitional belt of forest-steppe, rich in vegetation and renowned for its fertility.

In the undulating forest-steppe territory, intersected by many ravines, gorges and river-valleys, forest areas and steppes are intermingled. These latifolious forests are predominantly of oak, though they also include ash, hornbeam, lime, birch, aspen, maple etc. Among conifers, pines are found in sandy soil. Many bushes and grasses grow in the forest and steppe areas of this zone. The steppes were formerly great meadows covered with various grasses, which grew to a great height especially in the northern part of the zone. Vegetation is rich in the western and central part of the forest-steppe zone, but considerably poorer in the eastern part.

Further south the forests gradually become thinner and less robust, till the woodless steppe is reached<sup>12</sup>—a vast plain extending to the shores of the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the semi-arid and finally desert region of the Caspian.<sup>13</sup> Although the forests are insignificant compared with the huge area of the

steppes,<sup>14</sup> narrow belts of trees extend for short distances along river valleys, ravines etc. and are very important climatically.<sup>15</sup> They protect the steppe, where the summer is usually long and very hot, from the frequent threat of drought<sup>16</sup> and from strong winds that destroy the vegetation.<sup>17</sup> Especially harmful are the hot, dry, violent winds, with swirling clouds of dust, known as 'black storms'.<sup>18</sup>

The steppes formed ideal pasture-land, being covered with grasses (*zlaki*) such as spear-grass, feather-grass (*kovyl'*), sheep's fescue (*tipchak*) etc. The vegetation in general is poorer than that of the forest-steppe,<sup>19</sup> as in the south there is more isolation, it is hotter and the air is less humid. In the northern part of the steppe zone and in part of the forest-steppe the soil consists generally of the fertile 'black earth' (*chernozem*),<sup>20</sup> while in the south (the 'dry steppe') the soil is dark brown.

The forest-steppe and steppe zones have undergone great changes in history, the forests being largely extirpated and the steppe, owing to its fertility, being turned to agricultural use. These southern lands are now the chief granary of Russia, providing the finest species of wheat, maize, millet, fruit etc. Thus the steppes today have completely lost their half-wild character, being wholly turned to economic use.

## Notes to Appendix 1

1. L. Berg, *Geograficheskie zony Sovetskogo Soyuza* 1, 1947; 2, 1952; id., *Priroda SSSR*, 1955 (in English: *Natural Regions of the USSR*, New York, 1950, transl. by O. Adler Titelbaum); F. Mil'kov, *Prirodnye zony SSSR*, 1964. Criteria for the definition of geographical zones are discussed by P. Polynov, *Uchenie o landshaftakh*, in his *Izbrannyye trudy*, 1956; A. Isachenko, *Uchenie o landshafte i fiziko-geograficheskoe raionirovanie*, 1962, and others.

2. G. Tanfil'ev, *Fiziko-geograficheskie oblasti Evropeiskoi Rossii*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, 1953, pp. 485-8.

3. At times, however, the boundaries between zones are clearer, e.g. in the valleys of large rivers. F. Mil'kov, *K analizu landshaftnykh (fiziko-geograficheskikh) rubezhei na Russkoi ravnine*, *IVGO*, LXXXIV (1) (1952), pp. 12, 22-3.

4. A. Isachenko, *O fiziko-geograficheskikh rubezhakh Russkoi ravniny*, *IVGO*, LXXXIV (1), 1952, p. 26.

5. G. Gorbatsky; *Severnaya polyarnaya oblast'. Obshchaya fiziko-geograficheskaya kharakteristika*, 1964.

6. V. Andreev, Podzony tundry Severnogo kraya, *Pri*, 1932 (10), pp. 890–906; Yu. Liverovsky, Pochvy tundr Severnogo kraya, *TPK*, XIX, 1934, pp. 1–112; B. Gorodkov, *Rastitel'nost' tundrovoi zony SSSR*, 1935; G. Tanfil'ev, Glavneishie cherty rastitel'nosti Rossii. Tundry, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, 1953, pp. 518–26; id., Predely lesov v polyarnoi Rossii po issledovaniyam v tundre Timanskikh samoedov, *ibid.*, pp. 123–226; A. Grigor'ev, *Subarktika. Opyt kharakteristiki osnovnykh tipov geograficheskoi sredy*, 1956; B. Tikhomirov, *Rastitel'nost' Krainego Severa SSSR i ego osvoenie*, 1956; A. Zavalishin and A. Khantulev, Pochvennoe raionirovanie Severa i Severo-Zapada Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR, in: *Pochvennoe raionirovanie SSSR*, 2, 1961, pp. 3–51; B. Tikhomirov, *Bezlesie tundry, ego prichiny i puti preodoleniya*, 1962; G. Rikhter and A. Chikishev, *Sever evropeiskoi chasti SSSR. Opyt prirody*, 1966; and others.

7. A. Beketov, *Geografiya rastenii*, 1896, p. 148.

8. L. Berg, *Priroda* (English edition), p. 15.

9. Some scholars (L. Berg, B. Gorodkov, V. Govorukhin) regard the tundra-forest as a sub-zone of the tundra; others (e.g. F. Mil'kov) as a separate zone.

10. Berg regards both these as subdivisions of a single huge forest zone; but he himself expresses doubt as to whether they should not rather be considered as two separate zones of the East European plain: L. Berg, *Geograficheskie zony* 1, p. 82. The latter view is held by V. Sochava, F. Mil'kov and others.

11. This view as to the southern limit of the mixed-forest zone, or the northern limit of forest-steppe, is accepted by G. Tanfil'ev, L. Berg, F. Mil'kov, S. Kirikov and others. Differing views on the subject are criticized by F. Mil'kov in: *Neskol'ko slov v zashchitu lesostepnoi geograficheskoi zony*, *IVGO*, LXXXIX (6) 1957, pp. 548–50; id., *Lesostepnoi landshaft i ego zonal'noe podrazdelenie*, *IANSG*, 1961 (5), pp. 3–14. See also P. Krylov, *K voprosu o kolebanii granitsy mezhdu lesnoi i stepnoi oblastyami*, *IBM*, XIV, 1915, pp. 82–130.

12. V. Ogonovs'ky, *Skhidno-evropeis'kii step*, *NTIS*, Pratsi geografičnoi komisii 1, 1935, pp. 129–88; F. Mil'kov, *Geograficheskoe polozhenie i obshchaya kharakteristika territorii*, in: *Lesostep' i step' russkoi ravniny*, 1956, pp. 3–27; V. Kotel'nikov, *Yuzhnaya polosna Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR. Ocherk prirody*, 1963.

13. P. Kuznetsov, *O pustynnoi oblasti v predelakh evropeiskoi territorii SSSR*, *IVGO*, LXXXI, (1) 1949, pp. 103–5.

14. L. Maikov, *Zametki po geografii drevnei Rusi*, *ZMNP*, CLXXIV, 1874, pp. 272–5; G. Tanfil'ev, *Predely lesov na yuge Rossii*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, pp. 227–348; V. Perevalov, *Nekotorye dannye ob ispol'zovanii lesa*, *TIL*, V, 1950, p. 163.



15. Ya. Fel'dman and L. Chubukov, *Klimat zasushliviyykh raionov SSSR i puti ego uluchsheniya*, 1955; iidem, *Osnovnye cherty klimata*, in: *Lesostep' i step'*, pp. 52-85.

16. I. Buchinsky, *O zasukhakh na Russkoi ravnine za poslednee tysyacheletie*, in: *Sukhovei, ikh proiskhozhdenie i bor'ba s nimi*, 1957, pp. 29-34; a collection of source information concerning drought in various parts of the East European plain.

17. The importance of forests to the steppe and its afforestation problems are discussed by G. Eitingen in: *Les' v stepi*, 1954. See also V. Sukachev, *Istoriya bor'by za oblesenie nashykh stepei*, in: *Voprosy istorii otechestvennoi nauki*, 1949, pp. 407-23; V. Dobrokhvalov, *Ocherk istorii stepnogo lesorazvedeniya*, 1950.

18. *Pyl'nye buri i ikh predotvrashchenie*, by several hands, 1963. See also *Sukhovei* (n. 16).

19. G. Tanfil'ev, *Glavneishie cherty rastitel'nosti Rossii. Step'i*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, pp. 552-89; id., *Botaniko-geograficheskie issledovaniya v stepnoi polose*, ibid., pp. 369-457; F. Mil'kov, *Rastitel'nost'*, in: *Lesostep' i step'*, pp. 122-65.

20. V. Dokuchaev, *Russkii chernozem*, (1883), 1952; N. Rozov and O. Vadkovskaya, *Pochvy*, in: *Lesostep' i step'*, pp. 107-21; P. Aderikhin, *Pochvenno-klimaticheskie raiony tsentral'noi chernozemnoi polosy*, in: *Pochvennoe raionirovanie SSSR* 1, 1960, pp. 6-48.

## *Appendix 2*

### Finno-Ugrian tribes

In the first millennium AD—to consider no earlier period—the vast northern area of Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Urals, was inhabited by Finno-Ugrian peoples.<sup>1</sup>

The interest aroused among scholars by the past and present of these peoples is shown by the number of publications, special periodicals and international congresses devoted to them.<sup>2</sup> The eastern Finno-Ugrians, who are chiefly of concern to us in the present work, settled in inaccessible forest areas and for long centuries led a primitive existence; they left no written evidence of their past, and did not attract the attention of other races sufficiently to produce any detailed or credible accounts of them from outside. To obtain an insight into their obscure history, modern scholars resort to archaeological remains and written sources that are mostly late and fragmentary; they examine the present-day lives of these peoples in search of ancient traditions, and pay special attention to the existing Finno-Ugrian languages. Not surprisingly, linguistic work comprises much the greater part of the abundant literature on the Finno-Ugrians. These peoples are not united politically or by cultural or historical traditions—for these, if they existed, were fragile and disappeared a long time ago<sup>3</sup>—but they belong to a single linguistic family, and ‘Finno-Ugrian’ is thus primarily a linguistic term. At the present day the Finno-Ugrian languages unmistakably present a number of common features in their grammar, phonetic system and vocabulary.<sup>4</sup> For this reason it has been suggested that there was once a common Finno-Ugrian language, although probably even then different tribes spoke dialects of their own, from which individual languages developed in time.

On the other hand, despite these common features the Finno-Ugrian languages show considerable differences, probably owing to the influence of other languages upon them. Anthropologically,

too, the present-day Finno-Ugrians do not belong to a uniform type.<sup>5</sup> The differences between them make it likely that in the course of long centuries they have interbred with other peoples.

These facts lead to the conclusion that the period of common Finno-Ugrian speech came to an end a long time ago. The break-up of linguistic unity probably began—it is hard to be more precise—some 4-5 millennia ago.<sup>6</sup> In the same way we can only make guesses as to the Finno-Ugrians' original home. Some scholars place it in the basin of the upper Volga and the Oka,<sup>7</sup> while a larger number think it was further east, in the area extending from the Kama river to the Urals.<sup>8</sup>

The number of existing Finno-Ugrian languages, their division into groups, the names of these groups etc. are not a matter of strict definition. Individual languages fall into dialects. As Collinder remarks, there is no clear-cut distinction between a 'language' and a 'dialect', so that some writers may treat a particular form of speech as a language in its own right while others consider it to be a dialect of another.<sup>9</sup>

The present-day eastern Finno-Ugrian languages are generally divided into three groups: (1) Ob-Ugrian (Vogul and Ostyak);<sup>10</sup> (2) the north-eastern or Permian group (Votyak and Zyryan); and (3) the south-eastern or Volga group (Cheremis and Mordvin).<sup>11</sup> This classification, however, is not free from objection.<sup>12</sup>

From our knowledge of Finno-Ugrian languages at the present day it is possible to draw general conclusions about the remote past of the peoples in question. It is generally supposed that the nearer their homes were and the more frequent their contacts, the more similar their languages would be; and conversely, if their languages were more different it would mean that they had separated longer ago and that their mutual relations were more distant.

On this basis we may suppose that the process whereby the Finno-Ugrians dispersed from their original home and developed a diversity of languages took place gradually and by stages. The first phase seems to have been the splitting-off of the Ugrians and their migration eastward. As the western Finno-Ugrian languages have many words which are also found in Mordvin but not, e.g., in the Permian group,<sup>13</sup> it is probable that the separation between these peoples was the latest phase in the break-up of Finno-Ugrian unity.<sup>14</sup>

Many authors hold, I think rightly, that the majority of the Finno-Ugrians originally lived in a different area from that in which they are found today. The Mordvins, Cheremis, Votyaks and others then lived further to the westward; the Voguls and Ostyaks were on the western, European side of the Urals.<sup>15</sup> In other words, over long centuries these peoples have moved steadily from west to east.<sup>16</sup>

Another trend of Finno-Ugrian migration was towards the north-west and north. The peoples concerned occupied parts of the Baltic area and that of the great lakes (Ladoga, Onega etc.), displacing the Lapps as far as the White Sea and assimilating them linguistically.<sup>17</sup>

The future of the Finno-Ugrian peoples was much affected by their dispersal. Considering how long ago the separation took place,<sup>18</sup> and the enormous extent of the new areas of settlement, it is not surprising that the history of the individual peoples developed on different lines. None of them, however, have played a part of much importance in world history except for the Finns and Estonians and especially the Hungarians on the banks of the Danube.<sup>19</sup> There are several reasons for this: probably their small numbers, in the past as at the present day,<sup>20</sup> and their low cultural level, though this may not have applied to all tribes equally. Apart from the three nations mentioned above,<sup>21</sup> the Finno-Ugrians did not develop the use of writing. Some of their languages, though not all, have been reduced to writing in the 20th century,<sup>22</sup> not without difficulty;<sup>23</sup> apart from this, some previous attempts were made and works published in their languages, chiefly for missionary purposes.

Living in the conditions they did, the eastern Finno-Ugrians remained in a primitive tribal state and did not develop any political organization or tradition.<sup>24</sup> This facilitated the task of foreign conquerors, though the Finno-Ugrians were aided by the inaccessibility of their settlements. Their resistance varied in degree according to the strength of particular tribes and the amount of pressure to which they were subjected. The course and outcome of these struggles, which are only sketchily reflected in the sources, varied likewise. Some tribes, despite considerable losses of territory and manpower, managed to preserve their individuality and sometimes their independence, while others succumbed more readily to foreign invasion.

## Notes to Appendix 2

1. The word *Finn* is Scandinavian and in all probability signified 'hunter' ('finder'). As a tribal name it first occurs in Tacitus's *Germania* (98 AD) in the form *Fenni*, then in Ptolemy's *Geography* (mid-2nd century) as *Phinnoi* (*finni*). The term 'Ugrian' derives from 'Ugra' (Yugra), the name of a tribe which inhabited the slopes of the Urals. 'Ugra' may be identical with the basic stem of 'Hungary', 'Hungarian': B. Collinder, *Comparative Grammar of the Uralic Languages*, 1960, pp. 12-13.

2. It is beyond the scope of the present work to list this abundant literature in detail. The following works provide an introduction and/or bibliography of the problems involved: TKIPS, XV, 1928 (studies by A. Andreev, D. Bubrikh, N. Poppe, A. Shmidt, D. Zolotarev); I. Manninen, *Die finnisch-ugrischen Völker*, 1932; D. Bubrikh, *Sovetskoe finno-ugorskoe yazykoznanie*, SFU, I, 1948, pp. 24-32; A. Sauvageot, *Langues ouraliennes*, in: A. Meillet and M. Cohen, *Les Langues du monde*, 1952, pp. 279-318; B. Collinder, *Survey of the Uralic Languages*, 1957; S. Tokarev, *Etnografiya narodov SSSR. Istoricheskie osnovy byta i kul'tury*, 1958; K. Maitinskaya, *Obshchie svedeniya o finno-ugorskikh yazykakh*, in: *Mladopis'mennye yazyki narodov SSSR*, 1959, pp. 400-10; P. Hajdú, *Finnugor népek és nyelvek*, 1962 (English translation and adaptation by G. F. Cushing, *Finno-Ugrian Languages and Peoples*, (1975); D. Sinor, *Introduction à l'étude de l'Eurasie centrale*, 1963; *Voprosy finno-ugorskogo yazykoznaniiya. Grammatika i leksikologiya*, 1964; G. Décsy, *Einführung in die finnisch-ugrische Sprachwissenschaft*, 1965; K. Vilkuina, *O polozhenii finno-ugorskoi etnografii (etnologii) v dannoe vremya*, SFU, I (2), 1965, pp. 129-38; K. Maitinskaya, *Finno-ugorskie yazyki. Vvedenie*, in: *Yazyki narodov SSSR*, III, 1966, pp. 9-25; eadem, *Razvitie finno-ugorskogo yazykoznaniiya za 50 let sovetskoi vlasti*, SFU, III, 1967, pp. 161-7; *Finno-ugorskie yazyki* (by several hands), in *Sovetskoe yazykoznanie za 50 let, 1917-1967*, 1967, pp. 213-43; K. Mark, *Zur Herkunft der finnisch-ugrischen Völker vom Standpunkt der Anthropologie*, 1970; A. Smirnov, V. Chernetsov, I. Erdeli (eds.), *Problemy arkheologii i drevnei istorii Ugrov. Sbornik statei*, 1979; *Commentationes fenno-ugricae* (by several hands), MSFOu, CL, 1973; etc.

3. K. Vilkuina, *O polozhenii*, p. 133.

4. The prevailing opinion is that the Finno-Ugrian languages form a branch of the Uralic group, the oldest languages hitherto attested in the area in question. Another branch is formed by the languages of the Samoeds (Samoyeds) in the far north. Cf. K. Maitinskaya in *Finno-ugorskie yazyki*, p. 9.

5. A. Sauvageot, op. cit., p. 280; *Narody mira. Narody evropeiskoi chasti SSSR* 1, 1964, pp. 67-9.

6. H. Sköld, Wann wurde die finnisch-ugrische Sprachgemeinschaft aufgelöst?, *FUF*, XVI, 1923-4, pp. 177-80; K. Maitinskaya, Obshchie svedeniya, pp. 400-1; eadem, Finno-ugorskije yazyki, p. 9.

7. T. Milewski, *Zarys językoznawstwa ogólnego* 1, 1947, p. 202; S. Tokarev, *Etnografiya*, p. 149.

8. I. Sebestyén, Zur Frage des alten Wohngebietes der uralischen Völker, *ALASH*, I, 1951-2, pp. 345-6; E. Goryunova, K voprosu o kul'turnykh i etnicheskikh svyazyakh naseleniya Verkhnego Povolzh'ya i zapadnogo Priural'ya v I tysyacheletii n.e., *UZMI*, VI, 1954, p. 113; B. Serebrennikov, Volgo-okskaya toponimika na territorii evropeiskoi chasti SSSR, *VY*, 1955 (6), pp. 28-31; K. Maitinskaya, Obshchie svedeniya, p. 400; P. Tret'yakov in: *SAr*, 1962, pp. 258-9; K. Maitinskaya in: Finno-ugorskije yazyki, pp. 10-11.

9. B. Collinder, *Comparative Grammar*, p. 11.

10. The Voguls and Ostyaks now inhabit the northern part of the Ob basin, beyond the Urals. They are designated by the river-name (Ob-Ugrians) not only to indicate their place of settlement but also to distinguish them linguistically from the Hungarians on the Danube. Hungarian forms a separate branch of the Ugrian languages. The Ob-Ugrians and Hungarians appear to have separated not later than the first millennium BC.

11. There is an equally sharp linguistic differentiation between the Finno-Ugrians in the west (the Baltic region) and the north-west, whose languages are Estonian, Finnish, Karelian, Lappish etc. Some scholars regard Lappish as a branch of Finno-Ugrian independent of the Baltic branch.

12. E.g. Cheremis and Mordvin are so different that it is hard to accept the view that they belong to a single group. Cf. A. Feoktistov, Volzhskie yazyki, in: *Sovetskoe yazykoznanie za 50 let*, 1967, p. 222. It is more justifiable to speak of a 'Volga group' from the point of view of geographical propinquity and archaeology (P. Tret'yakov, K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya v I tysyacheletii n.e., *SA*, 1957 (2), p. 65). Moreover, there is no such thing as a single Mordvin language: the Mordvin population consists of two parts, Moksha and Erzya, each with a language of its own. The two are related, but the differences in vocabulary, pronunciation and grammar are such that the Moksha and Erzya can scarcely understand each other. Cf. S. Tokarev, op. cit., p. 148; A. Feoktistov, op. cit., p. 223.

13. I. Smirnov (Finny, in: *Russkaya istoriya v ocherkakh i stat'yakh'*, ed. by M. Dovnar-Zapol'sky, 2nd edn. 1, 1912 p. 7) believes that the western Finno-Ugrians originally lived further south, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mordvins, and that this long coexistence affected the languages. Thus, for instance, the Estonians and Mordvins have similar

names for certain deciduous trees, words denoting a field, place of habitation, means of communication etc. R. Burnham takes a similar view (Who are the Finns?, 1946, p. 54). K. Maitinskaya (Finno-ugorskie yazyki, p. 10) likewise points out common features which belong only to the western Finno-Ugrian and Mordvin languages. N. Tukhtina, however, takes a different view: Ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya basseina reki Sheksny v X-XII vv., *TGIM*, XL, 1966, p. 136.

14. T. Milewski, op. cit., p. 203; *Narody* 1, p. 86, etc., etc.

15. I. Smirnov, op. cit., pp. 5-6; R. Burnham, op. cit., pp. 14, 55; S. Tokarev, op. cit., p. 149; B. Collinder, *Comparative Grammar*, pp. 26-7.

16. A similar phenomenon can be seen among the Samoeds. E.g. one people of this group, the Entsy (plural of Enets), who now live on the right bank of the lower Yenisei, in the 16th century inhabited the right bank of the Ob, as B. Prokov'ev has shown. According to Berg, in the 11th century the Entsy lived west of the Urals. Cf. D. Bubrikh, K voprosu ob otnosheniyakh mezhdru samoedskimi i finnougorskimi yazykami, *IANOLY*, VII, (6) 1948, p. 517.

17. K. Maitinskaya in: Finno-ugorskie yazyki, p. 10.

18. It is supposed that the formation of the Ugrian group, separate from the rest of the Finno-Ugrians, took place about 2500 BC; the Permian group about 1000 BC, and the other groups somewhat later, but in any case BC: R. Burnham, op. cit., p. 54; *Narody* 1, p. 86. These dates can only be hypothetical, and are the subject of much argument.

19. Cf. A. Shmidt, Arkheologicheskoe izuchenie drevnostei severa SSSR, *TKIPS*, XV, 1928, p. 135; A. Sauvageot, op. cit., p. 280.

20. According to the census of 1959 there were about 1,300,000 Mordvins, 600,000 Votyaks and 500,000 Cheremis, while the other Finno-Ugrians did not exceed half a million: cf. *Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1959 g.* (1962), p. 184. Some Finno-Ugrian languages are spoken by a very small number of people. Apart from the Ob-Ugrians we may mention here, from the western group, the Vepsians (16,000: cf. M. Khyamyalyainen, Vepsskii yazyk', in: *Yazyki narodov SSSR* III, 1966, p. 81); the Izhors (1,100: cf. A. Laanest, Izhorskii yazyk, *ibid.*, p. 102; the Livs (Livonians: 300-400, cf. E. Vyaari, Livskii yazyk, *ibid.*, p. 138); and the Vodian (100: cf. E. Adler, Vodskii yazyk, *ibid.*, p. 118).

21. The Lapps must also be included in this group. About 30,000 of them live in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, and 2,000 on the Kola peninsula in the USSR. The Lapps outside Russia had a written language as far back as the 17th century. Cf. G. Kert, Saamskii yazyk, in: *Yazyki narodov SSSR* III, 1966, p. 156.

22. Yu. Desheriev, *Razvitie mladopis'mennykh yazykov narodov SSSR*, 1958; *Mladopis'mennye yazyki narodov SSSR*, by several hands, 1959; V. Lytkin and others, O sovremennom sostoyanii mladopis'mennykh li-

teraturnykh yazykov finno-ugorskikh narodnostei, in: *Voprosy razvitiya literaturnykh yazykov narodov SSSR*, 1964, pp. 301–12; P. Skorik, O roli rodnogo i russkogo yazykov v kul'turnom razvitii malykh narodnostei Severa, *ibid.*, pp. 313–23; K. Musaev, *Alfavitnyy yazykov narodov SSSR*, 1965; F. Filin, Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya yazykov narodov SSSR, *VAN*, 1966 (11), pp. 27–33.

23. The Finno-Ugrian languages have many dialects, and together with the small number of speakers this acts as an obstacle to the development of writing. Among the Ob-Ugrians, for instance, there are something over 20,000 Ostyaks speaking 8 dialects, and barely 6,000 Voguls speaking 7 dialects.

24. Cf. J. Farkas, Die gesellschaftliche Organisation der finnisch-ugrischen Völker im Lichte der Wortkunde, *Saec*, V, 1954, pp. 329–35; K. Vilks, Studien über alte finnische Gemeinschaftsformen, *FUF*, XXXVI (1-2) 1966, pp. 1–180. See also A. Smirnov, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii stroi vostochnykh finnov IX-XIII vv. n.e., in: *Trudy seksii teorii i metodologii, RANION*, II, 192) (unavailable to me).



### Appendix 3

#### The Slavonic descent of the ancient Rus'

The view that the earliest Rus' were Slavs is frequently met with in historical literature. It is based on the accounts given by two sources, Ibn Khurdadhbih and the *Povest' vremennykh let*.

Ibn Khurdadhbih is the earliest Arabic writer who mentions the Rus'. In *The Routes and Kingdoms*, written in Baghdad towards the middle of the 9th century, this author, who is of Persian stock, relates that Rus'ian merchants used to come to Baghdad with their goods. The relevant passage reads: 'The route of the merchants of ar-Rūs: They are a tribe from among the Saqāliba.'<sup>1</sup> There is no certainty as to whether this means that the Rus' lived among the Saqāliba (Slavs), or were of the same stock as they. Authors generally adopt the second interpretation, but the former appears more likely, as there is not a single Arabic text which states that the Rus' were Slavs.

The studies of Zakhoder have thrown light on this subject. This scholar has pointed out the methodological shortcomings of previous literature on the subject,<sup>2</sup> and rightly observes that the above-quoted words are not those of Ibn Khurdadhbih himself but are quoted by him, in a garbled form, from an earlier source of which we have no other knowledge. This is supported by the fact that the same source was used by later Muslim authors such as al Mas'udi, al-Istakhri, Ibn Hauqal and others. All of them, however, oppose the Rus' to the Slavs; while Ibn al Faqih's text, the nearest to Ibn Khurdadhbih's, makes no mention of Rus'ian merchants in the corresponding passage.<sup>3</sup> Altogether, it is difficult to see an argument for the Slav origin of the Rus' in Ibn Khurdadhbih's text, which is suspect inasmuch as it is not original, and which lends itself to different interpretations.

There remains the other, principal source, the *Povest' vremennykh let*.

This chronicle states under the year 898 that 'the Slavonic *yazyk* and that of Rus' are one [and the same]': *A sloven'skyi yazyk i ruskyi odno est*'.<sup>4</sup> As the word *yazyk* generally means 'tongue' in the literal sense, and also 'speech, language', and by extension 'people' or 'nation',<sup>5</sup> it is commonly assumed that the Rus' were Slavs. This one sentence is taken as a basis for the whole history of Rus' in the 9th and succeeding centuries. But, as a long series of other contemporary sources testify that the Rus' were not of Slav origin,<sup>6</sup> the matter requires more careful investigation.

To interpret a source properly, the first thing to do is to establish the meaning of the words it uses. This important but constantly neglected principle was once expressed by Klyuchevsky in the words: 'The reasons for the difficulty we have in understanding the ancient monuments of our literature are not a matter of grammar or style, i.e. the authors' literary peculiarities, but have to do with the lexicon, i.e. our relation to the ancient Rus'ian vocabulary . . . taken over from the bookish ecclesiastical language in which the ancient Rus'ians wrote . . . Thus the philological criticism which we bring to the study of historical sources must be addressed to two main tasks: firstly the accurate reading of old manuscripts, and secondly the study of the language in which they are written. . .'<sup>7</sup>

In the passage quoted from the chronicle, the word *yazyk* requires special attention. Only if we understand its sense rightly can we interpret what the chronicler is saying. Contrary to the opinion prevailing in the literature on this subject, I maintain that besides the meanings 'language' and 'people', *yazyk* was used at that time in a religious and ecclesiastical sense.

Authors interpreting the Kiev chronicle use ethnic terms in their modern connotations, overlooking the fact that in those remote times they bore a somewhat different meaning. Ethnic notions in those days generally comprised two elements, those of origin and faith: i.e. the faithful of a given religion were referred to in ethnic terms. Thus 'Slavs' were identified with 'Greeks',<sup>8</sup> and 'Rus' also with 'Greeks'.<sup>9</sup> The term 'Varangian' also had a religious connotation.<sup>10</sup> Both then and later, a people's 'nationality' was defined by the faith it held. Vladimir the Great, though of Varangian origin, was a 'Greek by faith';<sup>11</sup> the Lithuanian

Svidrigaila, neither of whose parents were Polish, was a 'Pole by faith',<sup>12</sup> and so on.<sup>13</sup>

This was the contemporary custom not only in Rus' but in central Europe,<sup>14</sup> the Near East and Africa.<sup>15</sup> The attitude of the author of the *Povest'* towards ethnic problems is thus typical of the period.

Another fact should also be borne in mind. the establishment of Christianity in eastern Europe led to the lively development of literature in the Slav language: both original works and many translations from Greek into Slav. As various scholars have pointed out—V. Adrianova-Peretts, I. Eremin, D. Likhachev, N. Meshchersky, A. Orlov, M. Speransky and others—these translations afford first-class material for the study of the Slav vocabulary in the Kiev period.

It is common knowledge that the Slavonic word *yazyk* corresponded to the Greek *ethnos*. Therefore we must establish the exact meaning of *ethnos* in Greek sources, above all in the monuments of canon law of the Eastern Church. I have undertaken this elsewhere,<sup>16</sup> comparing the 34th Apostolic Canon with the 9th Canon of the Council of Antioch (341) and taking account of commentaries on these texts by eminent 12th-century Byzantine canonists: Aristenes, Zonaras and Balsamon.<sup>17</sup> Analysis of these sources shows beyond question that the term *ethnos*, which had various meanings, was also used in the sense of *eparchia*, i.e. a metropolitan province of the Church.

It is not surprising, therefore, that under Greek influence the term *yazyk* is used in the Slav literature of the period in a religious and ecclesiastical sense. In a previous work I have quoted numerous examples of this;<sup>18</sup> here it will suffice to repeat one by way of illustration.

The *Taktikon* was written in Greek by Nikon 'Chernogorets', a monk of the Black Mountain near Antioch, a short time after the final separation of the Churches in 1054. The passage of interest to us reads: 'The *yazyk* of the Vandals was [i.e. derived] from many heresies, such as Macedonians, Nestorians, Arians and the like'; in the Slavonic translation: *yazyk uandar'skyi be . . . ot rozlichnykh eresei: makidon'yane, nestoriyane, ariyane i podobni sim*.<sup>19</sup> The enumeration of heresies shows that *yazyk* in this text can only be understood as meaning 'faith' or 'religious belief'.

These remarks concerning the religious element in the ethnic terminology of the time, and Greek influence on the formation of the Slavonic vocabulary, enable us to approach in the right way the problem of the meaning of *yazyk* in the *Povest'*.

The chronicler's statement that the Slavonic *yazyk* is the same as that of Rus' is treated in the literature in isolation from its context, contrary to the most elementary rules of method. The passage as a whole reads: 'And the Slavonic *yazyk* and the Rus'ian are one [and the same]. [they, sc. the Polyanians] took the name of Rus' from the Varangians, but originally [they] were Slavs. Although [they] called themselves Polyanians, [their] speech was Slavonic.' (*A sloven'skyi yazyk i ruskyi odno est', ot varyag bo prozvashasya Rus'yu, a pervoe besha slovene; ashche i polyane zvakhushya, no sloven'skaa rech' be*).<sup>20</sup> Having stated that the two *yazyks* are the same, the chronicler at once says that the Polyanians later took the name of Rus' from the (Norse) Varangians, but previously they were (considered themselves) Slavs, and spoke a Slav tongue although they called themselves Polyanians. This twofold assertion of the Slav character of the Polyanians—by origin and by language—arises from the previous statement that the tribe was comprised under the name of Rus'. The chronicler thus stated as clearly as he could that the Varangian Rus' were not Slavs and did not speak a Slav language. Otherwise his whole comment would have been superfluous.<sup>21</sup>

The text in question is part of a long passage under the year 898, dealing not with political, social, military or similar matters but exclusively with religious ones: it is really a description of the beginnings of Christianity among the Slavs. This in itself throws light on the meaning of *yazyk*, used in connection with these facts.

As is known, the Slavonic rite was devised and propagated by the brothers Constantine (Cyril) (d. 869) and Methodius (d. 885). In the second half of the 9th century it spread from Moravia and Pannonia to other countries, and a metropolitanate was created with Methodius at its head; it did not last long, however, owing to the violent reaction of the Latin clergy, especially the Germans. We do not know the exact territorial extent of the Slavonic metropolitanate, which largely varied with the successes of the missionaries themselves. The Kiev chronicler attached great importance to the activity of these 'apostles of the Slavs' and

emphasized as strongly as he could that Christianity, which was finally established at Kiev under Vladimir, owed its origin to the rite of Cyril and Methodius.

In interpreting a source-text containing a word that can bear different meanings, one naturally chooses the one that makes sense and harmonizes with the text as a whole. If, in the controversial passage of the year 898, we apply the ecclesiastical equivalence *yazyk* = *ethnos* = *eparchia*, the passage ceases to be contradictory: it becomes self-consistent and crystal clear. 'A *sloven'skyi yazyk* [the metropolitan see of the Slavonic rite, of Methodius] i *ruskyi* [and the Rus'ian metropolitan see<sup>22</sup> established in Kiev after Vladimir's baptism] *odno est'* [are one and the same].'<sup>23</sup>

The correctness of this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that *yazyk* in the ecclesiastical sense occurs in the same source not once only but several times.

Let us compare two other passages of the *Povest'*. In the first, the chronicler enumerates a number of non-Slav peoples of eastern Europe and says that each of them has its own different *yazyk*.<sup>24</sup> In the second passage, however, we are told that the Danubian Slavs, the Moravians, Czechs, Lyakhs (Poles)<sup>25</sup> and the Polyanians on the Dnepr all had a common *yazyk*.<sup>26</sup> The translation of *yazyk* as 'language' here leads to a manifest absurdity: it would mean that there was a wide linguistic gulf between Slavs and non-Slavs, that the chronicler knew about twenty languages and that he could tell whether they were all related or not. On this argument one would have to suppose that there was a basic linguistic difference between the Polyanians and all the other eastern Slav tribes, as the latter are not described as sharing the common Slav language. Some explain this by maintaining that the 'Polyanians' here stand for all the eastern Slavs, but this will not do: for the chronicler never uses this term to include more than one tribe, but always refers to the Polyanians along with others such as the Severians, Dregovichians etc.

If the population of the land of Kiev spoke the same language as e.g. the Czechs or Poles, the Polyanians of Kiev would have to be reckoned as western and not eastern Slavs. This follows from the second passage referred to. In support of this inference it can be said that the author of the *Povest'* clearly contrasts the Polyanians with all the other east Slav peoples, saying that their

customs and character are different. The Polyanians, he tells us, were mild and gentle (*Polyane bo svoikh otets' obychai imut' krotok i tikh*), while the eastern Slavs were cruel and lived like wild beasts (*zverin'skim obrazom*).<sup>27</sup>

The chronicler himself, however, explains this apparent obscurity. Emphasizing the difference of character between the Polyanians and the others, he enumerates several eastern Slav tribes and then adds in a general way 'and other pagans' (*i prochii poganii*). He classifies them in religious terms, Christian versus heathen, and for this reason idealizes the Polyanians (who, as we know, were baptized much sooner than the rest) and presents all the other eastern Slavs in the worst possible light.

Returning to the text quoted above: 'There was one Slav *yazyk*: the Slavs settled along the Danube . . . the Moravians, the Czechs, the Poles and the Polyanians [on the Dnepr].' The ecclesiastical interpretation of *yazyk* as *ethnos* = *eparchia*, i.e. metropolitanate, elucidates this passage, which might otherwise mislead. 'There was one Slav metropolitanate' to which all these peoples belonged. There is no need of evidence to show that the Slavonic rite had spread among the Danube Slavs, the Moravians and Czechs. There are also strong traces of it having flourished in the Polish lands, especially in the south.<sup>28</sup> It made considerable progress among the Polyanians around Kiev, long before Vladimir was officially baptized.<sup>29</sup> Some authors say that we cannot precisely define the area of Methodius's metropolitanate, but the present passage of the Chronicle refutes this. The chronicler, be it noted, says exactly why he mentions these peoples, and not others, in the passage in question: 'It was for them that books were first translated [into Slavonic]'—*Sim bo pervoe prelozheny knigi*<sup>30</sup>—and the sacred books formed the very foundation of the faith. They were the link which bound together the peoples in question into one *yazyk*.

It is often said that the *Povest'* does not tell us anything about the origins of Christianity among the eastern Slavs. This is surprising on the face of it, since the chronicle was written in the Kievan Crypt Monastery. It is hard to imagine that such a powerful centre of missionary activity in eastern Europe should have been so ignorant or indifferent to Church affairs. But the supposed gap is filled by the present writer's interpretation, differing from the hitherto accepted, of the term *yazyk* in the

above-quoted passages. My interpretation also provides data for the study of the next phase of the development of Christianity, extending beyond the territory of the Polyanians on the Dnepr.

The following passage of the *Povest'* is of basic importance for this second phase:<sup>31</sup> 'This is the whole of the Slav *yazyk* in Rus': the Polyanians, Derevlians, Novgorodians, Polotsians, Dregovichians, Severians and Buzhians' (*Se bo tokmo slovenesk yazyk v Rusi: polyane, derevlyane, nougorod'tsi, polochane, dregovichii, sever, buzthane . . .*). Likhachev, in accordance with his argument that *yazyk* means 'language', translates: 'These are the only ones who speak Slav in Rus' ', followed by the names of the tribes.<sup>32</sup> But this cannot be accepted, since it would mean that e.g. the Krivichians, Radimichians, or Vyatichians did not speak Slav. To get around the difficulty, some writers suggest that the omitted tribes were meant to be included in the list. 'That he [the chronicler] omitted a couple of Slav-speaking tribes is surely pure oversight.'<sup>33</sup> But this reasoning is unacceptable, as the word 'only' (*tokmo*) shows that the chronicler deliberately mentioned some tribes and not others.

As long as *yazyk* in this passage is translated 'language', the text remains unintelligible; but it becomes clear and meaningful once the ecclesiastical meaning is introduced. The chronicler says that the Slavonic faith at that time extended to the tribes mentioned, i.e. from the organizational point of view the Slav (Kiev) metropolitanate embraced the territory of those tribes. By way of confirmation it may be noted that at the time the passage was written these particular tribal territories were the seat of separate bishoprics.<sup>34</sup>

The view is often encountered in the literature that the Rus' were one of the eastern Slav tribes. This would mean that the narrower concept of 'Rus'ians' would be part of the wider concept of 'Slavs'. But the statement from the *Povest'*, discussed above, indicates the opposite: the 'Slavs' are part of 'Rus' ' (*Se bo tokmo slovenesk yazyk v Rusi*).

Writers who regard the Rus' as an eastern Slav tribe raise a number of questions that they cannot answer. The first problem is: why does the Kiev chronicler not say where the original homeland of the Rus' was, as he gives this information for all the other eastern Slav tribes?

The scholars in question, obliged to designate that territory themselves, assume that the earliest home of the Rus' was on the river Ros', a right-bank tributary of the middle Dnepr. The only argument for this is the similarity of the names Rus' and Ros'. But if one wished to apply such a criterion it could equally well be maintained that the Rus' lived, for instance, in the north near Lake Ilmen' and that their chief settlement was Rusa (Staraya Rusa).<sup>35</sup> Or again their original home could be placed in the Baltic lands, among the Lithuanians and Prussians, as 'Rus'ian' names are to be found there also.<sup>36</sup> Toponyms derived from the root *rus/ros* are met with throughout Eastern Europe, and in the rest of Europe also.<sup>37</sup>

There is no dearth of hypotheses on this question. Talis, for instance, finds the lost land of the Rus' in the Crimea,<sup>38</sup> Novosel'tsov somewhere in the area formed by the triangle Novgorod-Rostov-Beloozero,<sup>39</sup> and Potin in the region between the Volga and the Oka.<sup>40</sup>

The most frequent theory is that which connects the Rus' with the Ros' basin; but archaeological research has shown no traces of permanent settlement in that desert, semi-steppe area.<sup>41</sup> It was inhabited only by warriors and their captives, brought by force by the Rus' from other lands,<sup>42</sup> to defend the borders of the Kiev state against raids by the steppe nomads.

It is hard to imagine that a territory of this sort could be inhabited by a strong, populous tribe which, according to the sources, performed outstanding military feats. It is the more extraordinary if one considers that although the *Povest'*, a Kiev chronicle, has so much to say about the Rus'ians, it knows nothing of any people of this name inhabiting the Ros' basin near Kiev.

The *Povest'*, in agreement with other sources,<sup>43</sup> says that the Rus'ians conquered and exacted tribute from all the eastern Slav tribes and many non-Slav peoples living in the far north and east.<sup>44</sup> No one could explain how Rus'ians from the river Ros', at the southern extremity of the area of eastern Slav settlement, could pursue their conquests as far as the Baltic, almost to the Arctic Ocean and the Urals.

As it proves a hopeless task to establish the Slav character of the Rus'ians from written sources, more and more attention is devoted to the results of archaeological studies. But the rich archaeological literature leads to nothing but hypotheses which



generally conflict with one another. The upshot was recently summed up by Tret'yakov: 'Whether the Rus' were an independent tribe, Slav or non-Slav [so this scholar does not exclude the possibility that the Rus' were non-Slav], or whether they lived between the Polyanians and the Ulichians [i.e. in the region of the river Ros']—to all these questions there is as yet no answer.'<sup>45</sup> Elsewhere the same archaeologist says: '[It would seem that in the lands of the Polyanians, Severians and Ulichians] there was also a local ethnic element—we do not know whether it was Slav or not—which gave the Rus'ian land its name. Attempts to solve its mystery from archaeological data have so far not led to any positive results.'<sup>46</sup>

Despite the vast number, archaeological studies have not yet succeeded in proving the Slav origin of the Rus', and there is no chance that they will, because all the contemporary sources exclude this possibility. It follows that the theory according to which the earliest Rus' were Slavs requires to be thoroughly re-examined, and appropriate conclusions drawn.

### Notes to Appendix 3

1. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 145–51. Saqālība is the plural of Saqlāb or Siqlāb, a Slav.

2. 'It might have been supported that this text, so important to our historiography, would have been examined fully and in detail. Unfortunately even the basic problems cannot be regarded as solved. Up to the present no exhaustive comparison of texts has been carried out': B. Zakhoder, *Iz istorii bytovaniya teksta s drevneishim upominaniem imeni "rus" v arabskoi pis'mennosti*, KSIV, XXII, 1956, p. 6.

3. B. Zakhoder, *Iz istorii volzhsko-kaspiiskikh svyazei drevnei Rusi*, SVo, 1955 (3), p. 112; id., *Iz istorii bytovaniya*, p. 6–12.

4. *Povesi' I*, p. 23.

5. Cf. N. Zverkovskaya, *Parallel'noe obrazovanie prilagatel'nykh s suffiksami -n i -sk v drevnerusskom yazyke*, in: *Issledovaniya po isto- richeskoi leksikologii drevnerusskogo yazyka*, 1964, p. 286.

6. See Chapter 2, *The Ancient Rus'*.

7. V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs lektii po istochnikovedeniyu*, in his *Sochineniya* VI, 1959, pp. 6–9. G. Vinokur (*Drevnerusskii yazyk*, 1961, p. 8) also rightly observes: '... it is a mistake to rely on what appears at first sight to be a close resemblance in meaning between . . . Old Rus'ian and modern Russian words, as this may lead to fundamental errors.

Words that exist in the modern language may have quite a different meaning in an Old Rus'ian text.

8. 'Monasteria . . . Graecorum sive Slavorum . . .': A. Budilovich, *Obshchieslavianskii yazyk* 2, 1892, p. 96.

9. ' . . . superavit Ruthenos seu Graecos': MPH, III, p. 62.

10. Simon 'was formerly a Varangian, but now by the grace of Christ [he is a] Christian' ('Simon . . . byv prezhde Varyag, nyne zhe blagodatiyu khristovoyu khristianin': PMPDU, IV, 1930, p. 5.

11. 'Elin . . . veroyu': PDRL, II, 1916, p. 4.

12. 'Lyakh be veroyu': PSRL, XI, p. 207. Expressions like 'the Greek faith', 'the German faith', 'the Polish faith', 'the Rus'ian faith' are frequent in the sources.

13. Only a few scholars, but those among the most eminent, have correctly interpreted the source material in the *Povest'*. V. Istrin, for instance, rightly observed that for the author of the Kiev chronicle the aspect and character of a people were determined not so much by ethnic connections as by community of faith, literature and culture. Cf. O. Kralik, *Povest'* vremennykh let i legenda Kristiana o svyatykh Vyacheslave i Lyudmile, TODRL, XIX, 1963, p. 180. It can hardly be overlooked that both literature and, to a large extent, culture were linked with the adoption of Christianity.

14. M. Hellmann ('Der Begriff "Populus" in der Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum', SF, VI, 1964, pp. 161-7) points out that the term *populus* denoted the Christian population as organized in the Church (*Kirchenvolk, christliche Gemeinde*).

15. B. Spuler (*Volkstum und Kirche in der orientalischen Welt*, KO, III, 1960, pp. 9-20) points out that 'as in Eastern Europe, so in the Near East, religion is the force that forms nations, uniting what was divided and dividing what was united.' He discusses the past state of Armenia, Syria, Egypt etc. and concludes that at that time 'membership of a religious community took the place of national consciousness.' Similarly S. Runciman in: *A History of the Crusades* I, 1965, p. 22: 'Nationalism in the East had for many centuries past been based not on race . . . , but on cultural tradition and geographical position and economic interest. Now loyalty to a religion became the substitute for national loyalties. An Egyptian, for instance, would not regard himself as a citizen of Egypt but as a Moslem, or as a Copt or as an Orthodox, as the case might be. It was his religion . . . that commanded his allegiance.'

16. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 21-8.

17. It should be noted that these canonists were contemporaries of the author of the *Povest'* or only slightly older. Aristenes wrote in the first half of the 12th century, Zonaras in the middle of that century and Balsamon in its second half.

18. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 28–51.

19. A. Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor drevnerusskikh polemicheskikh sochinenii protiv latinyan (XI–XV vv.)*, 1875, p. 289.

20. *Povest'* I, p. 23.

21. Present-day scholars who interpret the passage in question in an ethnic sense (the Slav and the Rus'ian *yazyk* are identical, i.e. the Rus'ians are Slavs) find an immediate contradiction in the next sentence of the *Povest'*. They consider that the chronicler compiled his account from various earlier texts containing contrary information (two versions of the origin of the Rus': Slav or Varangian), which he incorporated in his work uncritically and without reflection. But this hypothesis is refuted by the chronicler's method in general and by the attitude of later generations towards his work.

The author of the *Povest'* sometimes had contrary information to deal with, but in that case he gave the different accounts (e.g. as regards the origin of Kii, the legendary founder of Kiev, or the place where Vladimir was baptized), and also stated his own belief and the reasons for it. In the present case he would similarly have said that the Rus' were Varangians according to some accounts and Slavs according to others. But the origin of the Rus' was so universally known in the 11th century that no controversy was possible.

The *Povest'* deservedly enjoyed great authority over a long period: for centuries it was constantly being copied without change, amendment or addition. No one challenged it on the ground of obscurity or contradiction. The copyists of those times understood the text better than present-day scholars.

22. Cf. ' . . . mitropol'ya rus'skaya': *Povest'* I, p. 102.

23. The customary objection to the interpretation of *yazyk* in an ecclesiastical sense is based on a passage in the introductory part of the *Povest'* (I, p. 11) in which 'the Slavonic *yazyk*' appears as one of the 72 *yazyks* of divided mankind. Clearly in this passage *yazyk* is to be taken in an ethnic sense; but it is wrong to assume that because in one place the chronicler uses *yazyk* to mean 'speech' or 'people', he cannot use it elsewhere in the same work to mean something else. The *Povest'*, especially its introductory part, contained information from the chronicler himself as well as earlier texts which he included unchanged in his own work, though he might occasionally add comments. If he himself had been the author of the account of 898 he would no doubt have written it differently and more clearly. There would then have been no need for him to add a comment warning the reader that in the sentence about the two *yazyks* being the same, this word was not to be understood in the sense of 'language'.

24. 'A po Otse retse . . . muroma yazyk svoi, i cheremisi svoi yazyk, mordva svoi yazyk': *Povest'* I, p. 13. A little further on we read: ' . . .

chyud', merya, ves', muroma, cheremis', mordva, perm', pechera, yam', litva, zimigola, kors', noroma, lib': si sut' svoi yazyk imushche . . .': ibid., p. 13.

25. The Poles were known in Eastern Europe by their other name of Lyakhs (Lyakhove, Lyakhy). For details see H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 365-77.

26. 'Be edin yazyk slovenesk: sloveni, izhe sedyakhu po Dunaevi . . . morava, i chesi, i lyakhove, i polyane . . .': *Povest' I*, p. 21.

27. *Povest' I*, pp. 14-15.

28. K. Lanckorońska, *Studies on the Roman-Slavonic rite in Poland*, OCA, CLXI, 1961. M. Tikhomirov is mistaken in holding that Poland was completely pagan until 966 (*The Origins of Christianity in Russia*, H, XLIV (N 152), 1959, p. 201.)

29. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 89-95.

30. *Povest' I*, p. 21.

31. *Povest' I*, p. 13.

32. 'Vot kto tol'ko govorit po-slavyanski na Rusi . . .': *Povest' I*, p. 209.

33. A. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom*, 1970, pp. 400-1.

34. The only exception were the converted Derevlians, who had no bishopric of their own either before or after the 12th century. This, however, was due to the special political links between their land and Kiev.

35. This was the view of A. Shakhmatov, S. Platonov and others.

36. Cf. V. Sedov, *Baltskaya gidronimika Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya*, MIA, CLXXXIV, 1971, p. 106.

37. E.g. the town of Rossa in Dalmatia, the archbishopric of Rhusion or Rhosion in Thrace, Rusion (Rhusium) in the Rhodope mountains (on the route from Constantinople to Thessalonica), the bishopric of Rhusianum (Rossano) in Calabria, Ruscino in Gaul, Rusticona in the Iberian peninsula, etc. Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 131-2.

38. D. Talis, *Rosy v Krymu*, SAR, 1974 (3), pp. 87-99.

39. A. Novosel'tsev, *Vostochnye istochniki o vostochnykh slavyanakh i Rusi VI-IX vv.*, in: *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie*, 1965, pp. 403, 408.

40. V. Potin, *Monety v pogrebeniyakh drevnei Rusi i ikh znachenie dlya arkheologii i etnografii*, TGE, XII, 1971, p. 69.

41. V. Dovzhenok, *Storozhevye goroda na yuge Kievskoi Rusi*, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, pp. 38-9.

42. *Povest' I*, p. 101.

43. The account by Constantine Porphyrogenitus is especially noteworthy.

44. 'A se sut' inii yazytsi, izhe dan' dayut' Rusi: chud', merya, ves', muroma, chermis', mordva, perm', pechera, yam', litva, zimigola, kors', noroma, lib' ': *Povesť* I, p. 13.

45. P. Tret'yakov, O drevneishikh rusakh i ikh zemle, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, p. 187.

46. P. Tret'yakov, U istokov drevnerusskoi narodnosti, *MIA*, CLXXIX, 1970, p. 154.

## Appendix 4

### The land at the sources of the Dvina, Volga and Dnepr

The *Povest' vremennykh let* contains a piece of information on the development of Christianity and church organization in the eastern Slav lands between the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 12th, i.e. the date at which the chronicle was written. It states that 'The Slavonic metropolitanate (*slovensk yazyk*) [comprises] in Rus' only the Polyanians, Derevliaus, Novgorodians, Polotsians, Dregovichians, Severians [and] Buzhians.'<sup>1</sup>

It was a considerable success to win over so many tribes to the new faith in a relatively short time. However, the success should not be exaggerated: a large part of the population in question long adhered to its old pagan beliefs.<sup>2</sup> Without underrating the Church's role and the achievements of missionaries, there is no doubt that the state was the decisive factor in spreading the new faith. The secular power converted the population by coercive means. The metropolitan Hilarion, writing in the middle of the 11th century in praise of Vladimir's historic decision, rightly observed: ' . . . they accepted baptism, if not from love then from fear of punishment, for this piety was conjoined with power.'

The choice of tribes to be converted and organized as part of the Kiev metropolitanate was influenced not only by church considerations but also by ethnic and political ones. This is especially seen in the case of the Krivichians.

The question arises why, when bishoprics were created at Novgorod, Polotsk, Chernigov etc., the Krivichian centre of Smolensk was omitted. When the sees were established all these lands were still entirely or almost entirely pagan, so the Krivichians were no exception in this respect.

The *Povest'* twice refers to the extensive wooded lands at the sources of the Dvina, Volga and Dnepr. In one passage it states

that this was the home of the Krivichians,<sup>3</sup> and in the other it refers to the territory as Rus'.<sup>4</sup> Like all sources of the period, the chronicler uses 'Rus' ' to mean the Norse Varangians.

As we know, the Rus'ians conquered many Slav (and non-Slav) tribes. In the middle of the 10th century the emperor Constantine Prophyrogenitus records that they levied tribute on the Krivichians as well as other Slavs such as the Dregovichians, Severians etc.<sup>5</sup> But these other tribes, although they remained under Rus'ian rule, later had their own bishoprics under the metropolitan see of Kiev. Hence the fact that the Krivichians too were subject to the Rus'ians does not suffice to explain why no bishopric was created at Smolensk.

The *Povest'* states that the population of the Polotsk region was also Krivichian.<sup>6</sup> A separate bishopric was created at Polotsk in the 1050s or 1060s, and probably already during Vladimir's lifetime.<sup>7</sup> The chief bishoprics of the Kiev metropolitanate, based on tribal territories, did not originally have clearly defined boundaries. It might have been expected that as Christianity spread to the Smolensk area the new converts would either be given a bishop of their own or be placed under the see of Polotsk,<sup>8</sup> both for geographical and ethnic reasons (territorial propinquity and racial similarity); but this did not occur.

The reason for this unexpected fact is to be sought in the name 'Rus' ', denoting the land at the sources of the Dvina, Volga and Dnepr. In the passage of the *Povest'* cited above, this term is used in a geographical sense. Nasonov rightly describes the area in question as the 'geographical centre of Rus' ',<sup>9</sup> but by confining himself to the geographical aspect he implicitly neglects the ethnic and political. He thus fails to explain how the name of Rus' came to denote the land containing the headwaters of these three great rivers.

Since the *Povest'* refers to this territory as the land of the Krivichians and also as Rus', and as it distinguishes the Slav Krivichians from the Varangian Rus'ians, it follows that the territory must have been inhabited by two distinct peoples. The bishoprics forming part of the Kiev metropolitanate were intended to serve the Slav tribes. Some of the tribal centres, as the *Povest'* tells us, had Varangian garrisons, but they were not so large as to affect the ethnic character of the area.

Ethnic conditions in the land of the Krivichians must, however, have been different. The patriarch took advantage of this to separate the region from the whole territory of the Slav metropolitanate, from the earliest period of Church organization in Rus'.<sup>10</sup> The Greeks were remarkably well informed as to the ethnic situation in Eastern Europe and knew that in the Smolensk area the Varangian element was much stronger than in the other Slav lands; so much so that, to some extent at least, the Slav character of the territory could be called in question.

This strong concentration can be accounted for on geographical and other grounds. The Varangian seafarers penetrated Eastern Europe by way of the river routes, and therefore special importance attached to the area containing the sources of the Dvina (and the Lovat', which flows northward), the Volga and the Dnepr. As is well known, the Rus'ians kept in close touch with the Baltic area, while developing a lively trade with the Arabs and pressing southward towards Kiev and the Black Sea. They could not have done all this without gaining and keeping a firm hold on the key river junction of Eastern Europe, for which purpose they needed a large and permanent military garrison.

Sedov's analysis of the archaeological material and texts shows that the territory was very unevenly populated. The largest concentration of settlements is found in the central and northern part of the Smolensk area, while in the east they are considerably less frequent. In Sedov's opinion there were not many Krivichian settlements on the upper Dnepr and they were not concentrated on the famous route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks'.<sup>11</sup> The Krivichian population was so distributed as to make it easier for the Varangian Rus' to keep a strong hold on the great river routes.

About 10 kilometres from Smolensk, near the village of Gnezdovo, there is a huge crematory burial ground of the kurgan (barrow) type. It contains over 250 graves, and there is no doubt that originally there were many more. The large number of barrows provide valuable evidence as to the history of the burial ground.

Archaeologists believe<sup>12</sup> that Gnezdovo was an important military stronghold and to some extent a centre of trade and craftsmanship. The barrows contain a surprising quantity of weapons—swords, helmets, coats of mail, spears, arrows etc.—but few agricultural



implements have been discovered. The ethnic origin of the warriors is a key question as to which there is considerable difference of opinion in the relevant literature.

Shmidt argues that before trying to solve the problem it is necessary (1) to examine the whole of the Gnezdovo material (this is clearly of the greatest importance: so far only some of the barrows have been excavated), and (2) to establish undisputed criteria which would make possible a definitive judgment as to the ethnic origin of those buried at Gnezdovo.<sup>13</sup> Basically this is correct, but it is easier to postulate such criteria than to formulate them exactly. Despite its many achievements, archaeology has shown great weakness when it comes to solving ethnic problems—as is abundantly illustrated by the differences of view that are frequently met with in archaeological works.

Kirpichnikov has devoted several studies to the history of the ancient weapons, especially swords, that are most often found in barrows and in warriors' tombs.<sup>14</sup> Over a hundred of these swords have so far been discovered in various parts of Rus' including Gnezdovo; they date from the 9th-11th centuries, i.e. the period of the Northmen's expansion into Eastern Europe. They are inscribed with the name of the workshop or place where they were made, but not the name of the warrior who owned them and with whom they were buried.<sup>15</sup> All the inscriptions are in Latin characters.<sup>16</sup> Some have only recently been read after the swords were cleaned, e.g. in 1964 the word 'Ulfberht' on a sword from the oldest group of barrows at Gnezdovo.<sup>17</sup> There is no doubt that these swords come from Western Europe and especially the Rhineland.

As to how they reached Gnezdovo and elsewhere, there are two possibilities. Either particular East European tribes, including the Krivichians, brought them directly from the West, or else they were first used in Scandinavia and then brought to Eastern Europe by the Varangians. The latter hypothesis supports the view that there were several concentrations of Varangians in Eastern Europe. Many archaeologists firmly deny it, though without sufficient grounds, but some of them admit the possibility of Varangian influence on Slav weaponry.<sup>18</sup>

Kirpichnikov states: 'As far as weapon finds are concerned, an ethical diagnosis is extremely difficult to carry out.'<sup>19</sup> The problem is indeed very hard to solve on archaeological evidence alone.

In a case like this, where archaeology is baffled, source texts in the nature of things acquire decisive importance.

If the Gnezdovo burial ground is to be regarded as Krivichian, we would have to suppose that that tribe possessed great military strength, though they did not use it either to make conquests or to defend their own freedom. It is hard to believe that if they had at their disposal powerful military contingents on the scale of Gnezdovo they would have tamely paid tribute to the victorious Rus'ians, as Constantine Porphyrogenitus tells us they did in the mid-10th century. On the other hand, many sources of the period agree in expatiating on the military feats of the Varangian Rus'. Both Constantine and the Arab writers say that the Rus'ians did not practise agriculture or stockbreeding; the contents of the graves at Gnezdovo go far to confirm this statement.

Most archaeologists, though not all,<sup>20</sup> believe that the burial ground and the neighbouring settlement at Gnezdovo date from between the beginning of the 9th century and the beginning of the 11th.<sup>21</sup> Once again historical data throw light on the whole problem and confirm that this dating is correct. According to the *Povesť*, the Gnezdovo area was known as Rus'. By 'Rus'ians' the chronicler meant the Norse Varangians, and he described their exploits in Eastern Europe as taking place in the 9th and 10th centuries, which agrees generally with information from other sources.<sup>22</sup>

As archaeological studies proceed, more and more objects of Scandinavian origin are found in Rus'. Archaeologists suggest that these could have been made by local Slavs under Varangian cultural influence, or they could be the result of trade between Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.<sup>23</sup>

Avdusin is especially emphatic in denying that Varangians settled in the new territory in any numbers. 'We cannot conclude that the buried person was a foreigner to the region even in cases when some object found in the barrow is unquestionably foreign, and no other objects have been found there.'<sup>24</sup> If this point of view were accepted, it would have to be on condition that Avdusin's principle was applied consistently everywhere and at all times; but unfortunately this is not what happens in archaeological literature.

The same authors who maintain that there were few or no concentrations of Varangians in Eastern Europe, nevertheless

accept that the Slavs, chiefly Krivichians, colonized Merya territory on a large scale.<sup>25</sup> If objects are found in that territory which archaeologists believe to be of Krivichian type, they may have been made by Meryans under Krivichian cultural influence, or be the result of trading between Smolensk and Rostov. In other words, the same criteria are used to deny that there were Varangian concentrations at Gnezdovo<sup>26</sup> and elsewhere, and to assert that there was an influx of Slavs into the Merya country. In this as in the former case we are thrown back on the written sources, which know nothing of the supposed colonization.

It is still an open question whether, as V. Sisov and A. Spitsyn suggest, Gnezdovo was the original site of Smolensk before the town was moved to its present location, probably in the 10th century.<sup>27</sup> The oldest archaeological material from what is now Smolensk belongs to the mid-11th century, while there are faint traces pointing to the 10th. Yanin and Aleshkovsky believe that Gnezdovo preceded Smolensk as the large political and administrative centre of the extensive territory.<sup>28</sup> If this is so,<sup>29</sup> we can understand the Greeks' decision to treat the land of the Krivichians as non-Slav (or, strictly speaking, not wholly Slav) and therefore to exclude it from the jurisdiction of the metropolitan at Kiev.

## Notes to Appendix 4

1. See Appendix 3, The Slavonic Descent of the Ancient Rus'.

2. Cf. M. Azbukin, *Ocherk literaturnoi bor'by predstavitelei khristianstva s ostatkami yazychestva v russkom narode*, RFV, XXVIII, 1892; XXXV, 1896; XXXVII-IX, 1897-8; P. Vladimirov, *Poucheniya protiv drevnerusskogo yazychestva i sueverii*, in: A. Ponomarev, *Pamyatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury* 3, 1897, pp. 195-250; N. Gal'kovsky, *Bor'ba khristianstva s ostatkami yazychestva v drevnei Rusi* 1-2, 1913; E. Anichkov, *Yazychestvo i drevnyaya Rus'*, 1914; N. Andreyev, *Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia*, ASEER, XXI, 1962; and others.

3. '... Krivichi... sedyat' na verkh Volgi, i na verkh Dviny i na verkh Dnepra, ikh zhe grad est' Smolensk': *Poves'* I, p. 13.

4. 'Dnepr bo poteche iz Okov'skago lesa, i potechet' na poldne, a Dvina iz togo zhe lesa potechet, a idet' na polunosch'e... Is togo zhe lesa poteche Volga na vstok... Tem zhe i iz Rusi mozhet' iti po Volze v Bolgary i v Khvalisy..., a po Dvine v Varyagi... A Dnepr vtechet' v Ponet'skoe more zherelom...': *Poves'* I, pp. 11-12. The

following annotation should be made to this text: after saying that the Dnepr flows into the Pontic (i.e. Black) Sea, the chronicler adds: 'which is called the Rus'ian Sea' ('... ezhe more slovet' Ruskoe...'). Since the above passage of the *Povest'* is concerned with the great river routes of Eastern Europe, and since the Rus'ians lived on the shores of the Black Sea and ruled over it, as is supposed to be indicated by its name, it would apparently follow that the journey from the Black Sea to the Caspian was made by ascending the Dnepr to its source and sailing right down the Volga. As this is obviously geographical nonsense I have suggested elsewhere that the passage in the *Povest'* originally spoke of the 'Roman Sea' (*Rumskoe more*), i.e. the 'Sea of Byzantium', and that the confusion of *Rumskoe* with *Ruskoe* is due to a copyist (H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 419–35). This supposition was challenged by A. Soloviev in: *Mare Russiae*, *WS*, IV (1) 1959, pp. 1–12, to which I replied in: *Mare Russiae*, *Ant.* IX, 1965, pp. 133–62.

5. *Constantine Porphyrogenitus. De Administrando Imperio* I. G. Moravcsik (ed.)—R. Jenkins (transl.), 1949, pp. 62–3; II. Commentary, 1962, pp. 59–61.

6. '... v Polot'ski krivichi...': *Povest'* I, p. 18. Cf. A. Kuz'min, 'K voprosu o "polochanakh" Nachal'noi letopisi', *MIA*, CLXXVI, 1970, p. 125. The results of excavations in the Polotsk territory, and historical views on its earliest past, are reviewed in L. Alekseev, *Polotskaya zemlya* (*Ocherki istorii Severnoi Belorussii v IX–XIII vv.*), 1966, pp. 50–65. According to L. Klein, G. Lebedev and V. Nazarenko (*Normanskoe drevnost' Kievskoi Rusi na sovremennom etape arkheologicheskogo izucheniya*, in: *Istoricheskie svyazi Skandinavii i Rossii*, 1970, p. 230), archaeological studies in this area are still only in the initial stage.

7. A. Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkvi*, I, 1959, p. 183.

8. Polotsk was at that time an important centre for the dissemination of the new faith. This is shown by its buildings, especially the monumental cathedral, comparable only with those of Kiev and Novgorod. N. Voronin, *Drevnyaya Rus': istoriya—iskusstvo*, Vol. I, 1967 (2), p. 48.

9. A. Nasonov, *Nachal'nye etapy kievskogo letopisaniya v svyazi s razvitiem drevnerusskogo gosudarstva*, *PI*, VII, 1959, p. 456.

10. The ecclesiastical history of the Smolensk land indicates that in the time of Vladimir and Yaroslav there were already plans in Constantinople for the creation of a second metropolitan see in Rus' for the non-Slav lands, with Greek as its liturgical language.

11. V. Sedov, *Nekotorye voprosy geografii Smolenskoi zemli XII veka*, *KSIA*, XC, 1962, pp. 12–24. Cf. E. Schmidt, *K istoricheskoi geografii Smolenskoi zemli*, *UZSI*, XII, 1963 (unavailable to me); L. Alekseev, *Ustav Rostislava*, pp. 104–5 (maps).

12. A. Artsikhovskiy, *Vvedenie v arkheologiyu*, 1947, pp. 184–5; id., *Arkheologicheskie dannye po varyazhskomu voprosu*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei*

Rusi, 1966, p. 36; D. Avdusin, *Arkheologiya SSSR*, 1967, pp. 233–4; E. Shmidt, *Ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya Gnezdova, SA*, 1970 (3), pp. 102–3, and others.

13. E. Shmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

14. A. Kirpichnikov, *Mechi Kievskoi Rusi, SAR*, 1961 (4), pp. 179–97; *id.*, *Drevnerusskoe oruzhie*, vol. I: *Mechi i sabli IX–XIII vv.*, in: *Arkheologiya SSSR. Svod arkheologicheskikh pamyatnikov*, Vyp. E 1–36, 1966. Cf. O. Pritsak, An Arabic text on the trade route of the corporation of ar-Rus in the second half of the ninth century, *FO*, XII, (1970), 1971, pp. 250–6.

15. A. Kirpichnikov, *Ozbroennyya voyniv Kiivs'koi Rusi v svitli rus'ko-skandinavskikh kontaktiv IX–XI st.*, *UIZ*, 1972 (7), pp. 79–81.

16. The only exception up to the present is an inscription in Cyrillic on a sword found in the Poltava region. A. Kirpichnikov, *Drevneishii russkii podpisnoi mech, SAR*, 1965 (3), pp. 196–201; *id.*, *Nadpisi i znaki na klinkakh vostochnoevropeiskikh mechei IX–XIII vv.*, *SS*, XI, 1966, pp. 268–70.

17. D. Avdusin, *O datirovke gnezdovskogo kurgana s mechom iz raskopok M.F. Kustinskogo*, in: *Kul'tura i iskusstvo drevnei Rusi*, 1967, pp. 21–5.

18. A. Kirpichnikov, *Drevneishii*, p. 201; L. Klein, Y. Lebedev, V. Nazarenko, *Normanskii . . . izucheniya*, in: *Istoricheskie soyazi Skandinavii i Rossii*, 1970, p. 252.

19. A. Kirpichnikov, *Connections between Russia and Scandinavia in the 9th and 10th Centuries, as Illustrated by Weapon Finds*, in: *Varangian Problems, SSI*, XIV, 1968, p. 53. Cf. O. Kindt-Jensen, *The Evaluation of the Archaeological Evidence*, *ibid.*, p. 42.

20. Thus e.g. Avdusin dates the origin of Gnezdovo to the 10th century, especially its second half. D. Avdusin, *K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii Smolenska i ego nachal'noi topografii*, in: *Smolensk. K 1100-letiyu pervogo upominaniya goroda v letopisi*, 1967, p. 75; *id.*, *Skandinavskie pogrebeniya v Gnezdove, VMU, (Istoriya)*, 1974 (1), p. 86.

21. I. Lyapushkin, *Novoe v izuchenii Gnezdova*, in: *Arkheologicheskie otkrytiya 1967 g.*, 1968, p. 44; *id.*, *Gnezdovo i Smolensk*, in: *Problemy istorii feodal'noi Rossii*, 1971, pp. 33–7; V. Bulkin and V. Nazarenko, *O nizhnei date gnezdovskogo mogil'nika, KSIA, CXXV*, 1971, pp. 13–16. On the other hand T. Pushkina (*O gnezdovskom poselenii, VMU (Istoriya)*, 1974 (1), p. 89 places the origin of Gnezdovo around 900. The recent (1970) discovery of traces of the spread of Christianity in Gnezdovo—see N. Astashova, *Enkolpion iz Gnezdova, SAR*, 1974 (3), pp. 249–51—does not help much as regards the origin of the burial ground. Igor's treaty of 944/5 with the Greeks indicates that some of the Varangian Rus' were already Christians at that date.

22. The famous Rus'ian expedition against Constantinople took place as early as 860. Cf. A. Vasiliev, *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860*, MAA, 1946:

23. M. Fekhner, *O proiskhozhdenii i datirovke zheleznykh griven*, *TGIM*, XL, 1966, pp. 101–4; eadem, *Sheinye grivny*, *ibid.*, XLIII, 1967, pp. 55–87; eadem, *Nekotorye dannye arkheologii po torgovle Rusi so stranami Severnoi Evropy v X-XI vekakh*, in: *Novoe o proshlom nashei strany*, 1967, pp. 33–41; V. Dedyukhina, *Fibuly skandinavskogo tipa*, *TGIM*, XLIII, 1967, pp. 191–206; I. Dubov, 'O datirovke zheleznykh sheinykh griven s priveskami v vide "molotochkov Tora"', in: *Istoricheskie svyazi Skandinavii i Rossii*, 1970, pp. 262–8; V. Petrenko, 'O bronzovykh "figurkakh vikinga"', *ibid.*, pp. 253–61; V. Potin, *Russko-skandinavskie svyazi po numizmaticheskim dannym (IX-XIII vv.)*, *ibid.*, pp. 64–80; T. Pushkina, *O proniknovenii nekotorykh ukrashenii skandinavskogo proiskhozhdeniya na territorii drevnei Rusi*, *VMU*, 1972 (1), pp. 93–5, and others.

24. D. Avdusin, *Varyazhskii vopros po arkheologicheskim dannym*, *KSDPI*, XXX, 1949, p. 8.

25. See Appendix 5, Slav Colonization of the Merya Territory.

26. Here is an example: An amphora found at Gnezdovo in 1949 bears a one-word inscription in Slav, which has been variously read as 'goroushcha', 'goroukhshcha', 'gorushna', 'goryuchee', 'gorukh p'sal', etc. The literature is summarized in A. L'vov, *Eshche raz o drevneishei russkoi nadpisi iz Gnezdova*, *IANOLY*, XXX, 1971, pp. 47–52. Some archaeologists argue that this vessel is evidence for the Slav character not only of the grave in which it was found, but of the whole burial ground of Gnezdovo. Yet, in accordance with the reasoning of Avdusin and others, we might equally well say that non-Slav merchants had acquired the amphora, inscription and all, on the northward journey e.g. from Kiev (the famous route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks'). According to G. Korzukhina (in: *O gnezdovskoi amfore i ee nadpisi*, *Issledovaniya po arkheologii SSSR*, 1961, p. 229) the barrow in which this amphora was found belongs to the late group of Gnezdovo barrows (second half of the 10th century). It is not impossible that by then the Varangians in Eastern Europe were already using the Slav written language, as they did in the first half of the 11th century.

I leave out of account here a number of problems connected with the ethnic character of Gnezdovo, as they do not help to resolve the controversy. For example, as regards burial customs: cremation was frequent in Sweden, and at Gnezdovo it was decidedly more common than inhumation. But it is difficult to infer anything from this, because the Krivichians, like the other Slavs, also burnt their dead.

27. D. Avdusin opposes this conjecture in: *K voprosu o pervonachal'nom meste Smolenska*, *VMU*, VII A, 1953 (7), p. 137.

28. V. Yanin, and M. Aleshkovsky, *Proiskhozhdenie Novgoroda (k postanovke problemy)*, ISSSR, 1971 (2), p. 61. Cf. T. Pushkina, *O gnezdovskom poselenii*, pp. 92-3.

29. A contrary piece of evidence is the statement in the *Ustyuzhskii letopisnyi svod*, ed. by K. Serbina, 1950, p. 20, that in 863 Smolensk was 'a great city, full of people'. But this is a late source (first quarter of the 16th century), and improbable in many details.

## *Appendix 5*

### Slav colonization of the Merya territory<sup>1</sup>

Studies of the ethnic character of the population of the upper Volga basin from the 9th to the 11th century (and earlier) require co-operation by archaeologists, linguists, anthropologists, ethnographers, historians and others. As the literature on the subject shows, it is not easy to achieve harmonious co-operation among them all. The number of works devoted to the problem, and of mutually exclusive hypotheses, increases annually by leaps and bounds and is, unfortunately, out of all proportion to the positive results obtained.<sup>2</sup>

Certainly the disagreement is not complete. All scholars agree that the upper Volga was a Slav region by the 12th century at latest, and they firmly maintain that this was the result of colonization by Slavs. But when it comes to tracing this important process in more detail—its origin, how long it took, its course and character, the part played in it by individual Slav tribes, the mutual relations of Slavs and Merya, the fate of the Merya in later times, etc.—all this remains completely vague and is the subject of contrary opinions among adherents of the same general theory.

The present work is a historical study. The author does not conduct studies of his own in the fields of archaeology, toponymy, anthropology etc., but confines himself to enquiring what information these sciences have so far furnished to the historian as regards Slav colonization of the Merya territory.

Archaeologists maintain, while disagreeing over details,<sup>3</sup> that the area between the Volga and the Oka was colonized by three Slav tribes: the Krivichians from the Smolensk region, the Novgorodians and the Vyatichians from the Oka. Settlers from Novgorod, it is thought, moved southward chiefly along the Mologa river and advanced to the right bank of the Volga. The



Vyatichians settled on the middle and lower Moskva and the right bank of the Klyaz'ma. It appears from these hypotheses that the Slavization or the Merya was chiefly the work of the Krivichians, since they occupied the larger part of that tribe's territory.

Many authors believe that another ethnic element, distinct from the Slavs and Finns, must be taken into account: the Balts,<sup>4</sup> who are the subject of an abundant literature<sup>5</sup> and whose main territorial link was with the Krivichians.

The analysis of geographical names, especially hydronyms, leads to the conclusion that in former times, unlike the present day, the Balts occupied large areas in the east: both banks of the upper Dnepr (on its left bank, the basins of the Sozh, the upper Desna and the upper Oka), and the lands watered by the Western Dvina and the upper Volga.<sup>6</sup> Important to our present study is the fact that Balts were settled around the headwaters of the Volga, on the upper Moskva and the upper Ugra (left-bank tributaries of the Oka) and in all the surrounding area.<sup>7</sup> In other words, the Balts for many centuries were neighbours of the Merya and other Finno-Ugrians.<sup>8</sup> This naturally meant that the peoples concerned interacted and influenced each other in many fields of life.

The chronicles twice mention the existence in the 11th and 12th centuries of a people called 'Golyad', of whom nothing else is known. The first reference dates from 1058<sup>9</sup> and is extremely brief; the second, in 1147, adds that this people lived in the region of the upper Protva,<sup>10</sup> a left-bank tributary of the Oka.<sup>11</sup> Many authors believe that the name 'Golyad' is etymologically connected with the Prussian tribe of the Galindians,<sup>12</sup> and denotes the eastern Balts.

The *Povest' vremennykh let* states that 'the Krivichians . . . live at the headwaters of the Volga, the Dvina and the Dnepr, and [their] city is Smolensk'<sup>13</sup>—i.e. on the very territory of the eastern Balts. Many questions arise as to the occupation of this land by the Krivichians: when and why did they migrate there, what were the circumstances and character of the settlement, what were relations like between the original inhabitants and the newcomers, what afterwards became of the Balts, and so on. Naturally it is easier to ask all these obvious questions than to answer them. The literature on the subject is not wholly consistent.

On the one hand it is assumed that the Balts were quickly Slavized; on the other they are supposed to have influenced the Slavs to an unexpected degree, as seen in burial customs, ceramics, clothing, metal ornaments etc.<sup>14</sup> Their influence is also seen in the field of language. The Slavs adopted Baltic words denoting buildings, implements, kitchen utensils, prepared dishes etc., and terms connected with nature and the countryside. It should not be forgotten that almost all the Baltic place-names, especially hydronyms, of the upper Dnepr area have survived into later times.<sup>15</sup> From these facts one might gain the impression that there was more likelihood of the Slavs being Balticized.

Some archaeologists maintain that the general cultural differences between Balts and the Krivichians (and other Slavs) were so slight—all these peoples being more or less on the same economic and social level—that as far as the classification of finds is concerned, it is impossible to distinguish between Baltic and Slav artefacts.<sup>16</sup> If so, it may be that archaeological material from the headwaters of the Dnepr or the Volga which has been classified as Slav is in fact Baltic. It is not my intention here to advance new hypotheses concerning the remote past of the territory in question, but merely to observe that from the ethnic point of view there may be another interpretation of the archaeological finds than the one hitherto accepted.

The territory of the Krivichians indicated by the *Povest'*, i.e. the Smolensk region, can be extended to take in the region of Polotsk. The chronicler himself authorizes this,<sup>17</sup> and other sources expressly state that lands which belonged to Polotsk in the 12th century<sup>18</sup> were inhabited by Krivichians.<sup>19</sup> Sedov goes still further and believes that the Krivichians also occupied what was later the land of Pskov.<sup>20</sup> He maintains in fact that the Pskov region (the Velikaya basin, the shores of Lake Pskov and the headwaters of the Dvina) were the original home of the Krivichians, from about the middle of the first millennium AD. This would mean that the Krivichians did not come to their historical homeland from the middle Dnepr area, as has hitherto been generally thought, but, as Sedov believes, from the Upper Niemen<sup>21</sup> and an area further to the south-west, between the Vistula and the Bug.<sup>22</sup>

According to Sedov, the region south of Pskov was inhabited by eastern Balts when the Krivichians made their appearance

there. Their pressure on the Balts began around the 7th or 8th century, and by degrees they occupied an ever-increasing territory as far as the upper Dnepr. The expansion of the Krivichians gradually produced a mixed Krivichian-Baltic population in this large area, which was almost completely Slavized by the 11th or 12th century.<sup>23</sup>

Sedov's theory is based on two main premises: (1) that the Slav burial mounds in the Pskov region are older than those around Smolensk,<sup>24</sup> and (2) that the Eastern Balts lived on the upper Dnepr and further to the north and east, until the end of the first millennium AD.

In the most recent literature a view similar to Sedov's is found, viz. that the Slavs appeared on the upper Dnepr 'comparatively late',<sup>25</sup> in the 8th or 9th century.<sup>26</sup> The former opinion that they did so earlier, or very much earlier, is described as 'groundless' and 'over-hasty'.<sup>27</sup> But there are also other views. Solov'eva, for instance, questions the theory that the Slavs colonized the upper Dnepr region as late as the 9th century, and prefers the middle of the first millennium AD.<sup>28</sup> Tret'yakov goes still further and believes that the process began not later than the first few centuries AD.<sup>29</sup>

The question of the date of Krivichian settlement in the Smolensk area is of particular importance to our subject. The problem is not merely one of Balto-Krivichian relations, but is closely bound up with the wider question of the date of any Krivichian colonization of Merya territory.

Many archaeologists, on the other hand, continue to maintain that the Slavs migrated northward from the middle course of the Dnepr to its sources, in the direction of Smolensk. It would thus appear that the Novgorodian Slavs (*Sloveni*) inhabited the upper Dnepr area for a time, before the Krivichians appeared there, and were only later displaced towards the north, or else quitted their previous home of their own accord. It would seem, though there is no certainty,<sup>30</sup> that the Krivichians settled in the region of the headwaters of the Volga, Dvina and Dnepr after the territory around Lake Ilmen' was occupied by the Novgorodian Slavs. Recent archaeological works maintain that the Slav settlements near Novgorod date from the 10th century or late in the 9th;<sup>31</sup> they may have existed earlier still, but as yet there is no evidence to support this. It seems probable therefore, as

far as one can speak of probability in this whole question, that the Krivichians settled on the upper Dnepr in about the 9th century.

If so, we must discard hypotheses which suggest that the colonization of Merya territory by the Krivichians began in or before the 9th century. It must be borne in mind that the new arrivals in the region of the Dnepr, Volga and Dvina headwaters must have had to exert great efforts for a long time to make themselves masters of it, because of resistance by the Balts and difficulties of terrain in a thickly-wooded area<sup>32</sup> full of rivers and lakes, marshes and swamps.<sup>33</sup> For this reason it is hard to suppose that their occupation of the Merya territory could have begun before the 10th century, and even so early a date as this seems unlikely. Korzukhina,<sup>34</sup> Goryunova,<sup>35</sup> Fekhner,<sup>36</sup> Artamonov<sup>37</sup> and other scholars<sup>38</sup> opt for the 10th century and the first half of the 11th.

Goryunova says that 'the first traces of Slav colonization on the upper Volga . . . date from [the first half of] the 10th century'; she refers to these as 'a mere trickle of colonization, extremely small numerically'.<sup>39</sup> However, she believes that in the second half of that century there was 'a mighty wave of Slav colonization on the upper Volga', constituting 'the beginning of a very rapid assimilation of that area by the Slavs'.<sup>40</sup> In agreement with the great majority of archaeologists Goryunova maintains that the Krivichian infiltration, first into the territory of the Eastern Balts and afterwards into that of the Merya, was purely peaceful and that in both cases the autochthonous peoples opposed no serious resistance but were very soon Slavized.

Tret'yakov differs from this view on many points. He believes that the pressure of the Slavs on the Eastern Balts was in the nature of a conquest, causing some of the vanquished population to migrate towards the upper Volga, though most of the Balts would have remained in their old homes.<sup>41</sup> Tret'yakov believes that the Baltic territory was occupied by the Krivichians at a relatively early date and in a short time. 'The assimilation of the Balts on the Dnepr by the Slavs began in the first centuries of our era.'<sup>42</sup> Further on we read: 'The final stages of the assimilation of the Eastern Balts took place . . . in the first centuries of the second millennium of our era.'<sup>43</sup> Thus in his opinion the whole process took about a thousand years to accomplish.

On the assumption, which Tret'yakov shares with other scholars, that if autochthons rapidly lose their ethnic individuality it is a sign that they have opposed little or no resistance to the new arrivals, it would seem to follow from his own hypothesis that the Eastern Balts opposed the Krivichians tooth and nail, since it took a thousand years to assimilate them. But Tret'yakov gives quite different accounts of the process of assimilation in different territories: he believes, for instance, that the Merya were very soon Slavicized, but does not explain why the course of events should have been so different with the Baltic and Finnic peoples respectively.

Other archaeologists, taking a more consistent view, state firmly that both the Balts and the Finns were Slavicized at a very fast rate. But this is an illusory and quite unrealistic theory, since assimilation has always been a very difficult and above all a slow process, and was especially so in those times.

One might conclude from archaeological works that the Krivichians were extraordinarily successful in the matter of colonization and assimilating the original inhabitants. In addition to the region of Smolensk and Polotsk they were supposed to have occupied the land of Pskov and the shores of Lake Ladoga,<sup>44</sup> as well as the extensive Merya territory. Not content with that, they pushed further still to the south-east into the territory of the Finnic tribe of Muroma on the lower Oka.<sup>45</sup> If all these regions are added together, the size of the resulting territory is quite unrealistic. It would imply that the Krivichians were an extraordinarily strong and fertile race, with a population out of all proportion to the other peoples of eastern Europe. But ideas of this sort are exploded by Uspenskaya and Fekhnner's archaeological map not to speak of other data, which indicates that from the 10th to the 13th century the Krivichians were mainly concentrated close to Smolensk<sup>46</sup> (which agrees with what the *Povest'* tells us) and, in general, in the northern part of the country.<sup>47</sup> The Smolensk region was thinly populated, as was more or less true of any wooded and marshy area in those days.

Sedov, in the light of archaeological data, examines the question of the population of the central part of the Smolensk region between the 8th and the 15th century, covering the period of Krivichian colonization in the north and east. He concerns himself chiefly with rural settlements, which must naturally have played

an important part in the colonizing process. It is hard to suppose that colonization on such a large scale as is presumed by writers on the subject would not have caused upheavals in the life of the Smolensk region, profound changes in the pattern of settlement, the depopulation of many areas etc. Sedov, quite rightly, perceives no changes of this kind and treats the development of rural settlement in the area as though there had been no such thing as a Krivichian colonization of Merya and other territory.<sup>48</sup>

The Krivichians, of course, could have conquered and colonized one of the lands mentioned above if the whole tribe had left its former homeland and settled there. Migrations of this sort occurred in Eastern Europe in or about the 9th century; but in the present case nothing of the kind happened. The great majority of the Krivichians remained in the Smolensk region, and at most only tiny groups may have penetrated into neighbouring territories. It is inconceivable that they could have conquered and Slavicized the Merya country.

A great deal is written about the 'Slav colonization' of Merya territory; but the term is inaccurate and even to some extent false. Archaeologists say that the new settlers were chiefly Krivichians. But, on the other hand, it is maintained that when the Krivichians previously invaded the area around the headwaters of the Dnepr, Dvina and Volga, the Baltic inhabitants remained in their homes<sup>49</sup> and mingled with the Krivichians, thus becoming Slavicized. In that case, however, the term 'Krivichian' in the period from the 10th to the 13th century would denote a race who were not wholly but at most half-Slavs.

The assimilation of the Balts by the Krivichians was still going on 'in the first centuries of the second millennium',<sup>50</sup> i.e. in the 11th and 12th centuries and perhaps even the 13th.<sup>51</sup> The influx of colonists into Merya territory, and consequently the gradual assimilation of the Merians, is generally supposed to have begun some time in the 10th century. It would thus follow that the Balts, together with the Krivichians, Slavicized the Merya at a time when they were not wholly Slavicized themselves.

If the Krivichian-Baltic expansion eastward led in such record time to the Slavicization of the Finnic Merya, we must suppose that the population of the upper Volga region, who are generally referred to as 'Slavs' in the 11th-12th centuries (and later), were at that time really Krivichian-Baltic-Finnic, with a definite numerical

predominance of the last element. If we recall that, according to the *Povest'*, the strongholds of the territory were then occupied by the Norman Varangians (they too were apparently Slavized in short order!), the racially Slav element dwindles to insignificant proportions.

Moreover, none of the authors quoted above answers the obvious question: if there was no Slav conquest, how was it that the Balts, Merya and Varangians freely elected to give up their ethnic individuality and succumbed to the Slavs without resistance?<sup>52</sup>

The prevalent view, both in the older literature (Solov'ev, Klyuchevsky, Lyubavsky etc.) and in nearly all the most recent works, is that the Slav infiltration into Merya territory was a 'quiet' and entirely peaceful process, since the chroniclers say nothing of any conquest by the Slavs or attempt by them to exterminate the local population;<sup>53</sup> the Slavs, in short, behaved with extraordinary humanity and generosity. The Merya for their part did nothing to resist the influx of foreign settlers, and are therefore assumed to have been gentle, kindly, peaceful, conciliatory and so on. Unfortunately all this reasoning and the inferences drawn on the subject are basically erroneous. Indeed the chroniclers do not say that one side was violent or that the others offered resistance; but then they say nothing at all about any Slav colonization of Merya territory, so that the above conclusions are beside the point. The idea that the Merya were particularly docile rests on no foundation, and by analogy it is more likely to be false than true.<sup>54</sup>

Klyuchevsky, describing the region between the Volga and the Oka (and other neighbouring areas) in the 13th-14th century, says that 'with its forests, morasses and swamps it confronted the settler at every step with a host of minor dangers, unforeseen difficulties and unpleasant situations, with which he had to wage an unending struggle.'<sup>55</sup> What tempted the Slavs to penetrate into such an inhospitable area?

On the assumption that the Slav colonists were farmers concerned with the needs and requirements of agricultural life, many authors (A. Maksimov, A. Nasonov, M. Tikhomirov, P. Tret'yakov, N. Voronin and others) maintain that what attracted the Krivichians to the territory in question was the *pole* (field), *opol'e* or *opol'shchina*—i.e. lands with few trees and fertile soil,<sup>56</sup> but which

formed no more than oases or islands in the thick-forested wilderness.<sup>57</sup> A zone of this kind, interspersed with forests,<sup>58</sup> extended from the area of Lake Rostov and Lake Pereyaslavl' southward to the Klyaz'ma and eastward to its tributary the Nerl'.<sup>59</sup>

The main concentrations of Merian population, according to the *Povest'*, were in the vicinity of these two lakes, and it is generally said that they lived by agriculture.<sup>60</sup> It would thus appear that the Merya farmers looked on passively as foreign newcomers took away their most fertile lands.

Archaeologists believe that the *opol'e* was occupied by the Krivichians; the Novgorod Slavs and the Vyatichians did not reach it and there is no evidence that they tried to. Yet these tribes are supposed to have taken part in the colonization of the area between the Volga and the Oka; so it was not only the *opol'e* which attracted the Slavs to the territory in question.

If the Krivichians set out to occupy these fertile lands and succeeded in their object, it must be supposed that the new settlers concentrated in the *opol'e* areas in such strength as to change the whole ethnic character of the region. But archaeological maps of the period do not point to the existence of any overwhelming concentration of settlement in these open areas. The *opol'e*, of course, was quite densely populated (as appears from the account in the *Povest'*), chiefly on the shores of rivers and lakes: land of this kind, especially when treeless, was most attractive to settlers in those days.<sup>61</sup>

Owing to the difficulties of terrain, the Krivichians from Smolensk must have penetrated the Rostov-Suzdal' region by river routes. Their choice of these does not argue strongly for the existence of a strong colonizing movement.<sup>62</sup>

Our analysis of the literature so far raises a more general question: can archaeology, on which the colonizing hypothesis is chiefly based, provide a decisive answer to complicated ethnic problems?

One of the greatest weaknesses of archaeology is the arbitrary and highly uncertain dating of its finds, which makes it difficult if not impossible to classify them chronologically.<sup>63</sup> Latterly there has been a change for the better, as modern science and techniques have begun to assist archaeologists in their difficult task.<sup>64</sup>



However, the prospect of future successes as yet affords little help in solving our problem.<sup>65</sup> If we are able to establish the date at which a house or a bridge was built, or a log hewn out, or an implement fashioned at Novgorod, Polotsk, Smolensk or Beloozero,<sup>66</sup> this is certainly a useful addition to our knowledge, but it may be doubted whether it will throw any light on social<sup>67</sup> or, above all, ethnic conditions.

The various tribes of Balts, Finno-Ugrians and Slavs, and the troops of Norman Varangians—all these diverse ethnic elements intermingled and influenced one another. How strong the influences were, how they varied from one period to another; which archaeological finds are the result of trade within a single tribe or between tribes, which were war booty, and whether they were of local manufacture or not—all these are still matters of completely arbitrary speculation.<sup>68</sup>

Russian archaeology at the present day<sup>69</sup> can boast of important achievements especially in a quantitative sense, i.e. the wealth of material collected.<sup>70</sup> We must not, however, overlook its shortcomings: the unevenness of field investigation so far, as well as the unavoidably fragmentary and accidental character of the discoveries made. Referring to these shortcomings Lyapushkin says, rightly in my opinion, that 'the decisive factor in all . . . differences of opinion [among archaeologists] lies not so much in the objects found and the way in which they are studied, but in the way scholars use them to serve their conception of history. The objects are used not as a source from which the history of a given territory can be reconstructed, but as a means of illustrating an abstract conception.'<sup>71</sup> Shmidt remarks that 'there is a strong Slav bias' in the work of Russian archaeologists before 1917 (Kondakov, Spitsyn, Tolstoy): 'many groups of objects whose ethnic origin is in doubt . . . [are ascribed] to the Slavs.'<sup>72</sup> This is not only true of Tsarist archaeologists but, in no less degree, of Soviet ones.<sup>73</sup>

In the lands with which we are concerned, the chief objects of archaeological study are kurgans (barrows)—mounds erected over graves, sometimes with stones added—and *gorodishcha*, i.e. remains of fortified settlements of varying size, built on sites suited to the purpose and surrounded by ramparts and ditches.

Kurgan burial-grounds have a long history, terminating only in the 12th or 13th century. According to many archaeologists<sup>74</sup>

the ethnic character of a population can be deduced from them, so that they may serve as evidence of Slav colonization in Finnic lands. The main features which throw light on ethnic origin are funeral customs and the contents of tombs.

The dead are buried either by cremation (*truposozhzhenie*), the ashes being placed in a tomb, or by inhumation (*trupopolozhenie*). At the period in question the Slavs used the former methods, so that Spitsyn, Got'e, Tret'yakov and other scholars regard graves in Merya territory containing ashes as Slav. If a grave is found with traces of both methods, it is supposed that the population of the area was mixed Krivichian and Merian.<sup>75</sup> This might be legitimate if we were sure that the Merya did not burn their dead or use both methods of burial, either at the same time or at different periods. Unfortunately we do not know this, while we do know that cremation was a practice not only of the Slavs but also of the Northmen and the Finnic peoples. 'Hence,' as Goryunova rightly says, ' . . . we cannot regard [cremation] as an ethnic criterion.'<sup>76</sup>

Research has shown up to the present that barrows were constructed over some graves in the upper Volga region, but not over others. They were in use among the Slavs, but we do not know whether the Merya used them or not.<sup>77</sup> As Tsirkin rightly says, 'Cremation does not necessarily mean a Slav funeral rite, nor does the presence or absence of a kurgan.'<sup>78</sup>

Archaeologists put forward other arguments for the belief that Slavs penetrated the Merya territory. Goryunova maintains that it was a typical custom of the Slavs to collect the ashes of the dead in special urns, generally of earthenware, while the Finno-Ugrians scattered them directly into a grave.<sup>79</sup> This view, which is markedly conjectural, is disputed by other authorities. Mal'm, for instance, writes that 'analysis of the funerary objects found in kurgans containing urns allows us to conclude that there is no question of all the dead belonging to a single race. Some of the graves are Finnic, some Slav and some Scandinavian.'<sup>80</sup>

Ethnic conclusions are often drawn from the shape and size of kurgans. Two types are of special interest to archaeologists: 'long barrows'<sup>81</sup> and *sopki*.<sup>82</sup> As the *Povesi'* places the Krivichians in the Smolensk area, and long barrows are found there in large quantity,<sup>83</sup> they are supposed to be Krivichian.<sup>84</sup> The chronology of these barrows is not as yet firmly established.<sup>85</sup> Our knowledge

of them in general is rather fragmentary, chiefly because few objects have been found in the graves.<sup>86</sup>

Long barrows are also found in the region of the upper Volga and its tributaries.<sup>87</sup> Scholars see this as evidence of Krivichian settlement in Merya territory, but the matter is not so simple as it may appear at first sight. Chernyagin, whose work influenced other archaeologists, did classify the long barrows as Krivichian, but he also noted, in 1941, that a definitive solution of the problem required further study.<sup>88</sup> Archaeological finds of the last few years show that these barrows cover a much wider area than the territory of the Krivichians according to the Kiev chronicle,<sup>89</sup> so it is difficult to link them solely to that tribe.

It has for a long time been a moot point<sup>90</sup> whether long kurgans can be regarded as Slav and, more precisely, Krivichian. Lyapushkin says that their contents in the upper Dnepr area 'are typically Baltic: this is nowadays universally recognized.' He also says that 'the long kurgans of the 8th-9th century are not a sign of Slav penetration,' but 'testify that the long period of the existence of Baltic tribes in that area was coming to an end.'<sup>91</sup> Artamonov is of the same opinion.<sup>92</sup> Shmidt adopts a cautious and reticent stand as to the Slav character of 'long kurgans'. 'they have been studied for over a hundred years, but the level of research is so far not high, and the conclusions are very contradictory.' Recalling that on the strength of these kurgans different opinions have been formed as to the ethnic origin of the population in various territories (Finnic, Baltic, Slav), Shmidt observes that 'Long kurgans must apparently be regarded as a specific manner of burying the dead which came into use in the first millennium of our era among a large number of tribes . . . which may have differed ethnically.'<sup>93</sup> Hence 'long kurgans' do not justify any conclusion as to the Slav (Krivichian) origin of the remains in question.

The same can be said of *sopki*. These tall kurgans have been regarded as distinctive of the Novgorodian Slavs, since they are found in the region of Lake Ilmen', on the upper course of the Msta, which flows into that lake, and on left-bank tributaries of the Volga (the upper Tvertsa, the upper Mologa, and the Sheksna).<sup>94</sup> But *sopki* are also found on the Velikaya river, around Lake Pskov, on Lake Ladoga and on the Volkhov<sup>95</sup>—in short, along the great waterways leading from the Baltic to the interior of Eastern Europe.<sup>96</sup>

To quote Lyapushkin: 'The view commonly found among experts that *sopki* are relics of the Novgorodian Slavs of the 6th-9th centuries is not justified by the [archaeological] evidence . . . In the first place, *sopki* are in no way linked with Slav settlements. Those around Lake Ladoga belong to the 7th-9th centuries and perhaps earlier, whereas even in the 9th century there is doubt as to the presence of Slav strata in the Ladoga settlement. There are *sopki* near Novgorod, but their chronology is in no way linked with the material from old Novgorod, where no strata earlier than the 10th century are known.' The *sopki* vary so much in size, shape, construction and contents that they cannot be regarded as a separate, self-contained group with a common ethnic origin. According to Lyapushkin, '[such a] classification cannot be considered scientific [or used] as a basis for far-reaching historical conclusions.'<sup>97</sup>

Artamonov rejects the possibility that the upper Volga area was colonized by the Novgorodian Slavs, since in his opinion the latter appeared on the shores of Lakes Ilmen' and Ladoga very late (not before the 10th century).<sup>98</sup> Tukhtina believes that the *sopki* on the Volkhov, which flows between these two lakes, are a relic of the Scandinavians,<sup>99</sup> like those on Lake Ladoga.<sup>100</sup> Since *sopki* cannot be associated exclusively with the Novgorod Slavs, the main argument used to support the theory that the latter colonized the Merya territory automatically disappears.

Many archaeologists believe that graves containing remains of the dead provide valuable evidence as to their ethnic origin; but this is not free from doubt. The skeletons found in kurgans in the upper Volga region show that the dead were buried in various ways: above ground (in an earthen mound), on the ground, or beneath it in a dug grave. The skeleton is usually found lying on its back, the head facing upwards and the arms stretched out along the body. In other cases, however, the head is turned to the right or left, and the body lay on its side or was placed in a sitting posture.<sup>101</sup> It is hard to discern any definite, uniform burial ritual in the Merya territory or the surrounding lands. The difficulty is increased by the fact that the men and women were buried in different ways. Sometimes the women's heads were placed facing the same way as the men's, and sometimes not.<sup>102</sup>

Archaeologists, who attach much importance to this question of the placing of the head, assume that the burial ritual reflected

the religious beliefs of particular tribes or groups of tribes linked by kinship. This is inevitably no more than a hypothesis, which may be true in some areas and false in others. Important factors may have been local cults within a single tribe, the dead man's social position, or, for instance, a tradition which ordained that the members of an extensive family or clan should be buried in a particular way. Unfortunately we know nothing of such possibilities.

Archaeologists believe that the Slavs usually buried their dead with the head facing westward (sometimes north-west or south-west),<sup>103</sup> but at other times facing east.<sup>104</sup> Different writers state that the heads in Merian graves face north, north-east,<sup>105</sup> east,<sup>106</sup> south-east,<sup>107</sup> south, or south-west.<sup>108</sup> Comparing these various statements we are bound to conclude that no strict rule was observed as to the arrangement of the remains of those buried in Merya territory.<sup>109</sup>

Sedov believes that the position with the head facing east was distinctive of the Eastern Balts.<sup>110</sup> Solov'eva disputes this, as the practice occurs most frequently in the region of the Sozh, a tributary of the Dnepr, i.e. in the homeland of the Slav Radimichians.<sup>111</sup> She believes that the position in question was either a specific custom of that tribe or was due to the influence of Finnic peoples on the upper Volga, i.e. the Merya. In my opinion she is right to doubt the idea that the direction in which the remains face is sufficient to indicate the ethnic origin of the dead.<sup>112</sup> It is not surprising that archaeologists themselves do not attach special importance to this question.<sup>113</sup>

Archaeologists are not on stronger ground when they invoke a second argument, based on the contents of graves, to prove that the Merya territory was colonized by Slavs. The main feature here is the large quantity of earthenware vessels, especially pots, which have survived either intact or in fragments.

Two phases are traced in the development of pottery. In the first, pots were hand-modelled, i.e. the base and sides were moulded from a single piece of clay by repeated pressure with the fingers (more seldom the flat of the hand, when fashioning the bottom); while in the second phase, after implements came to be used, the most frequent device was the potter's wheel. The transition from one phase to the other was slow and gradual. For a time the two techniques coexisted, though naturally the

wheel was used more and more. Changes in the technique of pottery took place both in the Slav and in the Finnic lands.

According to Rabinovich, pottery makes it possible 'to draw extremely valuable conclusions as to the ethnic origin of the population'.<sup>114</sup> Similarly Goryunova states that 'pottery is one of the most permanent and reliable signs of tribal origin'.<sup>115</sup> Mal'm says that 'this evidence [of pottery] helps to solve a number of especially important problems such as the ethnic origin of a particular artefact'.<sup>116</sup> Artsikhovsky<sup>117</sup> and many others agree with this view.

The transition from modelled to wheel-made pottery can be traced in the upper Volga region as elsewhere. According to archaeologists it marks a turning-point in the history of the area, as it denotes a basic change in its ethnic complexion. The authors in question believe that modelled pottery was the work of the Merya, while the wheel-made variety was that of Slav settlers who brought the technique from their original homes to the upper Volga. As a result of their arrival, 'in the regions which were completely Slavized in the 11th-12th centuries, . . . the typical Merian moulded earthenware was everywhere replaced by wheel-made vessels of Slav manufacture'.<sup>118</sup>

The question arises whether the changes in ceramic technique on Merya territory were really due to the new Slav settlers, in other words whether they be regarded as a proof of Slav colonization on the upper Volga. The confidence of archaeologists is not sufficient to dispel doubts and far-reaching reservations.

The Slav neighbours of the Merya used the hand-modelling technique for a long time, from the 6th century (not to speak of any earlier date) to the 9th or 10th. Only then did the wheel come increasingly into use among them. In Great Novgorod, for instance, moulded pottery is rare in the first half of the 10th century and almost disappears in the second half.<sup>119</sup> The oldest pottery in the upper Volga area, as among the Slavs, was hand-modelled, but the wheel makes its appearance there some time in the 9th or early 10th century. By the 10th century, at all events, both ceramic techniques were practised on Merya soil.<sup>120</sup> Hence the difference in time as regards the acquisition of the new technique by the Slavs and Merya respectively was very slight if it existed at all—for the dating of ceramic finds in all the territories in question is, up to the present, highly conjectural.

Even if we accept, which is not certain, that the Slavs had a hand in the introduction of the new earthenware technique in the upper Volga region, it does not necessarily follow that they colonized the Merya territory. It is sufficient to recognize the existence of contacts and mutual influence between neighbouring peoples at that period.<sup>121</sup> It is a very long step indeed to advance from such contacts and influences to the assertion that the Finnic lands were colonized by the Slavs, that the Merya lost their ethnic identity, and that they were Slavicized in an extraordinarily short space of time.

It is hard to trace the origin of the changes in ceramic technique that took place among the various peoples of Eastern Europe. The potter's wheel was also in use during our period among tribes on the middle Volga, e.g. the Bulgars; but no one has suggested that the latter were colonized by any other people. Nor does anyone claim that the transition among the Slavs in the 9th-10th century from hand-modelled to wheel-made pottery was due to their lands being colonized by any foreign ethnic element. It remains true that the introduction of the wheel greatly increased production and so contributed to the development of a ceramic industry satisfying popular requirements.<sup>122</sup> The demand may itself have prompted one tribe or another to adopt the new technique. Processes may have developed independently in different areas at the same time, so that their ceramic products have a similar appearance. The appearance of the potter's wheel in a particular territory should not, as it is with the Merya, be ascribed first and foremost to some outside agency; account should be taken of internal conditions, and above all the territory's economic requirements.

The idea that the Slavs colonized the upper Volga area presupposes that their material culture was markedly superior to that of the Merya. But there is no evidence for this presumption, which is the subject of much disagreement even among archaeologists (as discussed more fully elsewhere in the present work).

Other details connected with the objects found in graves (the shape and size of pots, various other implements, knives, axes etc.) afford little support to the colonizing hypothesis. Ornaments, including a large amount of women's 'jewellery'—rings, bracelets, pendants, buckles etc.—whether locally made or imported, are

evidence of intertribal 'fashion' and nothing more. Archaeological 'facts', as they are commonly called, allegedly proving that there were Slav settlers in Merya territory in the 9th-11th centuries, not to speak of earlier, are only hypotheses of extremely doubtful value. The archaeological material permits of various inferences and does not necessarily point to Slav colonization.

Archaeologists claim that traces of the remote past of the territory inhabited in historical times by the Merya are to be sought in what is called the D'yakovo culture,<sup>123</sup> dating from approximately 500 BC to 500 AD. Some prolong its duration well into the second half of the first millennium (the 'late D'yakovo culture'). As to its ethnic character,<sup>124</sup> archaeologists differ widely.<sup>125</sup> Some consider its relics to be Finno-Ugrian,<sup>126</sup> others Slav or mixed Slav-Baltic-Finnic,<sup>127</sup> others again think they are mainly Eastern Baltic.<sup>128</sup> Despite a swelling literature,<sup>129</sup> the analysis of these objects has produced very uncertain inferences of an ethnic character,<sup>130</sup> as specific examples will show.

The well known fortress site of the D'yakovo type near the village of Berezhnyaki on the Volga<sup>131</sup> (*Berezhnyakovo gorodishche*), dating from the 4th or 5th century AD, has been variously classed as Merya,<sup>132</sup> Slav or Balto-Slav,<sup>133</sup> and Slav-Merian.<sup>134</sup> There is similar disagreement as to the fortress on the river Sara (*Sarskoe gorodishche*) near present-day Rostov,<sup>135</sup> which was constructed in the 6th or 7th century or perhaps later and existed until the 10th or 11th. Some believe that the relics found on the site are Slav,<sup>136</sup> others Slavo-Merian,<sup>137</sup> and still others Merian.<sup>138</sup>

Excavations near Yaroslavl' on the Volga have also produced results of interest to our subject. In particular three large burial-grounds, dating for the most part from the second half of the 10th century or the beginning of the 11th, have been regarded as Norman (Arne), Slav (Stankevich) and Merian (Goryunova). The most recent collective publication on this topic, in which the archaeological material is carefully classified, comes down in favour of Slavo-Merian origin (the latter element predominating),<sup>139</sup> but the basis for this conclusion is slender, as the authors themselves admit.<sup>140</sup> Thus the ethnic origin of these remains is still an open question.

Many other types of evidence could be cited which are more or less relevant to the alleged Slav colonization of Merya territory, but as to the significance of which archaeologists are in constant



disagreement.<sup>141</sup> Unfortunately they are unable to place these matters beyond the bounds of controversy.

Let us see what archaeologists themselves have to say about the exact state of our knowledge of the alleged colonization.

'While it seems beyond doubt that the Slavs colonized the north-east, particularly the . . . Merya territory, we are still completely ignorant as to the method and nature of this colonization and the time at which it took place.'<sup>142</sup> This judgment by Sukhov in 1941 remained valid despite the large number of studies published in the ensuing 20 years. 'Up to the present,' wrote Goryunova in 1961, 'it is hard to form a [more definite] opinion as to the character of the [colonizing] process, or the reasons which led the first [Krivichian] settlers to leave their old homes and advance into . . . Merya territory.'<sup>143</sup> Similarly Rabinovich: 'Unfortunately [the archaeological material] . . . from the area between the Oka and Volga has not yet been sufficiently analysed for us to have any clear idea whatever as to the nature of the population in the 8th-10th centuries, the Slav colonization and relations between the Slavs and the Ugro-Finnic population.'<sup>144</sup> This is still the case today. The archaeological arguments and hypotheses are so weak, although often asserted in categorical form, that some scholars from other disciplines doubt the possibility of ascertaining the ethnic character of the population of the Volga-Oka area at the period in question, purely on archaeological evidence.

As Tokarev wrote in 1949: 'Although some archaeologists at the present time talk with great confidence about "Slav", "East Finnic" etc. ceramics of the first millennium of our era, about "Slav temporal rings", Slav burial grounds and so forth, in reality these are only hypotheses which are plausible in so far as they are supported by other sources. The burial of the dead, or the way pots are made, can tell us nothing about the language spoken by their owners or producers. The same pottery may perfectly well have belonged both to Slav and to Finnic tribes.'<sup>145</sup> Elsewhere the same author says: 'Whether the relics that are found alternately in a given area belonged to one people or several—whether one or more tribes, related or alien, inhabited a large territory in which the remains of a single culture are found—archaeology by itself cannot answer these questions . . . Archaeological material only reflects [material] culture, but not a people [considered

ethnically].<sup>146</sup> Filin says: 'It is certain that many tribes of different origin can have the same material culture,' and remarks that 'archaeological cultures, considered in themselves [i.e. in isolation from other criteria] open the door wide to "ethnogenetic" subjectivism and arbitrary judgments.'<sup>147</sup> According to Toporov and Trubachev, 'archaeological data . . . compete with linguistic data but are less authoritative, firstly because they are more ambiguous from the point of view of ethnic interpretation, and secondly because archaeological facts can tell us nothing unless we know something of the linguistic situation in the territory concerned.'<sup>148</sup>

No one disputes the desirability of co-operation between archaeologists and philologists in order to throw light on ethnic changes in the Merya territory; but it is easier to state this highly important aim than to realize it. As Goryunova writes, 'Unfortunately the linguistic history of the territory has scarcely yet been studied at all, and we [archaeologists] have no linguistic conclusions to go on.'<sup>149</sup>

Merya was a spoken language only; no traces of writing have come down to us. The only basis for a study of this extinct language consists in place-names, but Finno-Ugrian (including Merian) toponymics have as yet received little attention, as philologists themselves admit.<sup>150</sup>

According to Popov, 'Merya was a Finno-Ugrian language, but with highly peculiar features, differing markedly from the norms of the languages of that group known to us at the present day. It contained numerous lexical elements quite different from those that have survived in the related [Finno-Ugrian] languages.'<sup>151</sup> Consequently, as Popov himself notes,<sup>152</sup> many place-names in the Merya territory are indecipherable. Serebrennikov deduces from this that the Finno-Ugrians of the upper Volga and Oka originally lived somewhere else, probably near the Urals,<sup>153</sup> and only afterwards occupied the territory on which we find them in historical times. This territory was previously inhabited by other peoples, and the numerous place-names that cannot now be explained must be due to them.<sup>154</sup> The point is much disputed, however:<sup>155</sup> many authors still regard the Finno-Ugrians of the upper Volga and Oka as autochthonous.

Controversy increases with the development of etymological studies of hydronyms and toponyms on Merya territory. Great

importance is usually attached to the names of big rivers and lakes, as most of these are very old.<sup>156</sup> We must not, however, lose sight of Vasmer's general observation that 'In studying the river names of various countries we find that the best authorities differ considerably about the origin of the names and that apparent explanations give rise to doubts and objections.'<sup>157</sup>

Names of localities in the upper Volga area arose in various ways. They are often derived from the rivers on which the places were situated;<sup>158</sup> sometimes from animals,<sup>159</sup> sometimes from the names or nicknames of their founders or first owners,<sup>160</sup> and so on.

The ethnic classification of geographical names is made more difficult by the fact that as time went on some Finnic names were Slavized in various ways.<sup>161</sup> In many cases—Serebrennikov reckons them at several thousand in the upper Volga and Oka area<sup>162</sup>—the origin of these names is quite unidentifiable.

There are a considerable number of works listing what the authors believe to be Finno-Ugrian geographical names in the area in question.<sup>163</sup> Often their opinion as to origin is shared by other authorities, but often too it is rejected or questioned. Arguments on the subject remain largely hypothetical. The amount of controversy increases rapidly, which does not signify a gain in knowledge.<sup>164</sup>

As Zhuchkevich writes: 'There are dozens of linguistically justified etymologies for such universally known names as Moscow (Moskva), Volga, Dnepr and so on, yet at best only one of them can be right in each case. Linguistic correctness is not always a protection against false etymologies. To be plausible, an etymology must not only be possible linguistically but admissible from the point of view of geography and history.'<sup>165</sup> In the same way Popov warns historians not to rely too much on etymological arguments but to use them in so far as they are supported by other facts, especially those of history.<sup>166</sup> Again, Vilinbakhov remarks that the historian may of course take etymological studies into account, but only as auxiliary to his argument. 'A theory based purely on etymology . . . forfeits the right to historical plausibility.'<sup>167</sup>

We come to the question whether anthropology can throw light on the problem of Slav settlement in Merya territory. Unfortunately

anthropologists themselves answer this question in the negative, although there is a rich literature on the subject and knowledge has considerably advanced.<sup>168</sup>

As is known, a single people or group of related peoples is generally composed of different anthropological types. The Finno-Ugrians are no exception: anthropological differences between individual Finno-Ugrian tribes are greater than between those tribes and neighbouring peoples who belong to a different linguistic group. Thus, for instance, the Finno-Ugrians of the central Volga are anthropologically more similar to the Turkic Chuvashians, who live near by, than to the Baltic Finno-Ugrians.<sup>169</sup>

The same anthropological types are found among the Finns and Slavs, which might suggest that they once sprang from a common origin. A comparison of Merian and Slav skulls shows considerable resemblance,<sup>170</sup> so that the two are easily confused. Mistakes of this sort are often encountered in the relevant literature.<sup>171</sup>

Anthropologically, the Eastern Slavs exhibit both resemblances and differences among themselves.<sup>172</sup> In any case there has so far been no anthropological confirmation of a tribal division of the Eastern Slavs such as archaeology claims to have discovered in some degree, though with important reservations.<sup>173</sup> As Tokarev rightly says, anthropological studies have shown that 'the same racial elements enter into the composition of the most different peoples, whose languages and cultures are far apart, and the same racial types may extend over a huge territory irrespective of the ethnic character of its population . . . Anthropology illuminates only one aspect of the problem, viz. the origin and physical structure of the population. But the idea of a people or nation involves both language and culture, on the origin and development of which anthropology can shed no light whatever.'<sup>174</sup> In another work the same author writes: 'The division into anthropological types does not coincide with ethnic boundaries. Nearly every people is composed of different racial types, and, conversely, the same racial type is often found not only in neighbouring peoples but in widely separated ones.'<sup>175</sup> Similarly Filin observes that anthropological material can be used as an auxiliary element, but anthropology itself cannot establish the ethnic character of a population.<sup>176</sup>

It will be seen from this that anthropology can provide little support for the theory that the Merya territory was colonized by Slavs and that its people were Slavicized. Although anthropologists do not contest that theory, they put forward important reservations as regards the lands between the Volga and the Oka. 'The [anthropological] basis of the Vyatichians and the Volga Krivichians consisted of Finno-Ugrian tribes. In the Middle Ages the Slav element, [as it presented itself] in the physical aspect of the population, was very slight.'<sup>177</sup>

Thus the hypothesis of Slav colonization continues to stand or fall with archaeological and etymological studies. Both these have led to useful results: the archaeologists have convincingly shown the weakness of etymological arguments, and the etymologists have returned the compliment no less successfully. All the evidence for the colonization has been called in question, although all authorities have defended the thesis itself. Such, paradoxical as it may seem, is the sole upshot of the relevant literature up to the present.

Of late the view is more and more frequently expressed (by Goryunova, Artamonov, Fekhner and others) that the Slav colonization of Merya territory did not begin earlier than the 10th century, i.e. in historical times. In that case, historians must naturally have a voice in the solution of the problem.

Numerous studies on the upper Volga region in the 9th-11th centuries and later have been devoted to the key problem of the mass influx of Slav settlers into Merya territory.<sup>178</sup> All other events of the period are treated in terms of that decisive event, which is supposed to have transformed the ethnic character of the region.

The *Povest'* knows nothing of any Slav colonization on the upper Volga, although in general the Kiev chronicler showed a lively interest in questions of colonization and settlement: he indicated where particular tribes lived and which peoples had changed their homelands (the Danubian Bulgarians, Hungarians, Radimichians, Vyatichians etc.), described the Kiev princes' policy of colonizing the steppe borderlands, and so on. The chronicler thought it worth while to mention these facts from the remote past, yet he said nothing about the Slav colonization of the Merya

territory, about which he could easily have obtained information from his contemporaries, or the generation of his father or grandfathers.

The *Povest'* was copied many times down to the 17th century. Some of the copyists lived on the upper Volga and knew its past history (especially those who were alive in the 13th or 14th century), so that could have supplemented their predecessor's narrative; but none of them did so.

In analysing a source text, account must be taken of the author's style of writing. When the Kiev chronicler describes past events he nearly always relates them to the present. He is careful to use the past tense when it is appropriate, and the present tense for events of his own time; in the latter case he sometimes adds 'now', 'to this day', and so forth.<sup>179</sup>

It is generally thought that, as a result of the Slav influx, the Merya disappeared from the historical scene very quickly, by the beginning of the 10th century. The last mention of them in the chronicle is supposed to be in 907.<sup>180</sup> This is a mistake, however: the Merya are referred to several times in the introduction to the *Povest'*, which dates from the beginning of the 12th century.<sup>181</sup> They are mentioned there not as a past phenomenon, in the way the chronicler from time to time speaks of other peoples such as the Avars, Ulichians, Tivertsians etc., but as existing in his own times, and NB he writes of them in the present tense: 'the Merya . . . dwell . . . on Lake Rostov . . .' (' . . . *sedyat'* . . . *na Rostov'skom ozere merya* . . .').<sup>182</sup> He does not write *sedosha* ('dwelt, lived') as he often did when describing past situations.<sup>183</sup> Similarly in other passages of the introductory part of the *Povest'* the Merya are referred to in the present tense.<sup>184</sup>

Other sources confirm that this is a true picture. Adam of Bremen, who saw the Finno-Ugrian tribes from the west as the Kiev chronicler did from the south, also knew of the existence of the Merya, whom he called *Mirri*.<sup>185</sup> The *Life* of St Leontius, bishop of Rostov, states that the bishop, who died in the eighth decade of the 11th century, 'knew the Meryan language well' (*mer'skii yazyk dobre umeyashe*).<sup>186</sup> The Hungarian missionary Julianus, who was in north-eastern Europe during the great invasion of Batu Khan (1237–8), lists the Merya (*Merovia*) among the peoples conquered by the Tatars.<sup>187</sup> All this shows that the Merya did not disappear from the sources at the beginning of

the 10th century, but existed for at least 300 years longer.

Klyuchevsky, disappointed by the chroniclers' silence as regards Slav colonization on the upper Volga, placed great hopes in the *Lives* of Rus'ian saints, which he expected to contain information on the subject. He made a study of these sources and produced a valuable work on them,<sup>188</sup> but did not find the data he was looking for; nor did his successors.<sup>189</sup>

It is often said that under pressure from the Slavs, the Merya left their original homes and migrated elsewhere: chiefly north-eastward to the abode of the Finnic Cheremisians between the left bank of the Volga and its tributary the Vyatka. To support this conjecture it is suggested that the Merya and the Cheremis were identical or very closely related, a view said to be confirmed by archaeological<sup>190</sup> and toponymic<sup>191</sup> data. Some authorities think the two tribes may have been identical,<sup>192</sup> others disbelieve this.<sup>193</sup> Importance is attached to the resemblance between the name 'Merya' and the present-day name of the Cheremis (Mari). But all such conjectures are ruled out by purely historical material: the Cheremisians are always referred to in the sources as *Cheremis*, never as Mari. The *Povest'*, at the beginning of the 12th century, treats the Merya and Cheremis as two separate ethnic groups, mentioning them at the same time and on the same footing.

Not all authors accept the 'Cheremisian hypothesis' in its full form. Some adopt a more cautious position, maintaining that only some of the Merians emigrated while others remained in their homes.<sup>194</sup> Many archaeologists think the Merya went on living in their original territory, but that as colonization intensified they lost their ethnic individuality and were Slavized to such an extent that the upper Volga area became a Slav territory by the 12th century or earlier.

Some scholars believe that there were Slavs living on the upper Volga from time immemorial, and that the Merya were Slavized in the prehistoric period.<sup>195</sup> Others try to date the process with some degree of accuracy and opt for different centuries, but always remote ones: the most cautious speak of the 9th or 10th century,<sup>196</sup> or the period from the 10th to the 12th.<sup>197</sup> Two quotations will show how widely opinions differ. Grekov writes: 'In any case the [Merya] territory became Slav around the 7th century [AD];'<sup>198</sup> while Bunsik declares: 'At the end of the first and beginning of the second millennium of our era the upper Volga area was

inhabited by Merya tribes. In some places Merian settlements survived till the 18th century . . . In the rest of the area the Merians disappeared at an earlier date, but in the 14th and 15th centuries they still comprised a large part of the population of the Rostov lands.<sup>199</sup>

The picture is similar as regards the course and outcome of the process of assimilation. Some authors believe that the whole of the Merya people was soon Slavicized,<sup>200</sup> others that only most of them were. Those who take this view consider that some of the Merya preserved their ethnic character and went on living in small groups or 'islands' scattered about the country.<sup>201</sup> Others again hold that the Merya continued to exist for a considerable time as a separate tribe, but only on the borderlands of their original territory.<sup>202</sup>

The view that all or most of the Merians were Slavicized presupposes that the Slavs were at a higher cultural level, but this has so far not been proved. It must not be forgotten that the Merya were a large tribe occupying an extensive territory; they were about as compact and self-contained as other peoples,<sup>203</sup> with long centuries of existence behind them and with traditions of their own.<sup>204</sup> Authorities again differ widely in their views on this aspect of the matter. Some regard the Merya as primitive forest-dwelling savages, while others think they had quite a high level of civilization for those days. In support of this, attention is drawn to the development of their domestic crafts, their knowledge of weaving, the fashioning of objects from wood and bone, the fur industry, the extraction of salt, the exploiting of their own mineral wealth and the processing of minerals imported from the Ural lands, and so on.<sup>205</sup> The more advanced the material culture of the Merya, the less likely are they to have been assimilated.

Voronin states that 'the culture of the Merian tribe, as archaeological evidence shows, [was] outwardly very close to that of the Slavs; this is evidently the reason why ethnic and cultural differences between the two [Slav and Finnic] tribes were so soon effaced.'<sup>206</sup> Similarly the archaeologist Lyapushkin says that 'the Baltic and Finnic tribes differed little from the Slavs in many aspects of their material culture, so that it is very difficult to distinguish their respective antiquities.'<sup>207</sup> Some, though not all, archaeologists<sup>208</sup> agree that these differences were slight (and that



this explains the rapid Slavization of the Merya); but, if so, I would draw the opposite conclusion that graves and their contents which have been classified as Slav were in reality Merian, there being no basic dissimilarity between the two.

An analysis of the literature on the subject of Slav colonization in the upper Volga area shows that scholars' views differ widely not only on points of detail but on matters of fundamental importance. These differences point to the extreme weakness of the foundations, chiefly of an archaeological character, on which the colonizing hypothesis has been erected.

Two further facts are adduced to prove that the population of the upper Volga area was Slav at the period we are concerned with: (1) the Merya homeland is referred to in later times (according to Shakhmatov, from about the mid-13th century)<sup>209</sup> as Rus'ian, not Merian, and the latter name then disappears from the sources; and (2) at the present day the population of the area speaks Russian, a Slav language.

To consider the first point: if the area between the Volga and the Oka had been colonized by Krivichians, Novgorodian Slavs and Vyaticians, the respective portions of the territory ought to be referred to as Krivichian,<sup>210</sup> (Novgorod) Slav and Vyatician; but this nomenclature is nowhere found in the sources, which refer to them as Rus'ian.

Advocates of the colonizing hypothesis maintain that the Rus' were one of the Eastern Slav tribes. As the Merya territory came to be called Rus'ian and, as we are constantly told, the population allowed themselves to be Slavized without resistance, the inference must be that the territory was colonized by none other than the Rus'ians, whose home was on the river Ros'.<sup>211</sup>

The *Povest'* has much to say about the fierce struggles that the Rus' had constantly to wage in order to keep particular Slav tribes in subjection.<sup>212</sup> Here the Kiev chronicle agrees with Constantine Porphyrogenitus, not to speak of other sources such as the Arabic ones. In the mid-10th century the Byzantine emperor says that the Rus' levied tribute on the Krivichians, Severians, Dregovichians and others. Thus, in spite of their common origin, there was a strong antagonism between the Rus' and the other Slav peoples.

All that we know of the Rus', the cruelty and ruthlessness of their conquests, excludes the idea that their settlers could have peacefully infiltrated the Merya territory without any violence or coercion. Whereas the Slav tribes fiercely opposed the Rus', who were themselves Slavs, the Finnic Merya did not; yet from the racial point of view it should have been just the opposite.

The *Povest'* refers several times to far-reaching migrations of peoples before the 10th century.<sup>213</sup> In this way the Rus' might have left their previous home *en masse* and settled on the upper Volga. It seems unlikely, however, in view of the distance and difficulties of terrain, that small groups of Rus'ian settlers from the Ros' should have slowly and gradually found their way to Merya territory—and still less likely that, being agriculturalists, they should have quitted their fertile lands for the north-east, which consisted mainly of forests, bogs and marshes.

There is no need to consider the further doubts to which the theory gives rise, but we must draw attention to a fact of basic relevance to the question of Slav colonization of the upper Volga area.

The Merya are not mentioned in the sources after the mid-13th century, and their 'disappearance' is taken as a proof that the Slav colonization took place and that the Merya were consequently Slavicized. But this reasoning is quite mistaken.

The disappearance of the name Merya is not an isolated phenomenon. All the Eastern Slav peoples lose their tribal names in the 12th century and are referred to as 'Rus'ian'.<sup>214</sup> According to the above argument they must therefore have all been colonized by Rus'ian settlers from the banks of the Ros'; but this is obviously absurd.

The explanation of the disappearance of tribal names is to be sought in political and ecclesiastical conditions as they developed in the vast territory of Eastern Europe. Changes in those conditions were inevitably reflected in changing connotations of the term 'Rus'', the meaning of which went through several phases.

As the ruling dynasty asserted its power, and with the spread of Christianity, the conquered territories by degrees became integrated and unified. In the 12th-13th centuries the sources cease to mention the time-honoured tribal names which expressed the ethnic individuality of particular Slav races and some Finnic ones (the Merya). Everywhere we see the past being obliterated

and replaced, at least outwardly, by the finally prevalent general term 'Rus' ' or 'the Rus'ian land', expressing both a political<sup>215</sup> and an ecclesiastical<sup>216</sup> reality.

The territorial extent of this 'land' was extremely wide.<sup>217</sup> The absence of natural frontiers made it easy for the Rurikides to keep adding to their conquests, and the zeal of the missionaries prompted them to spread the faith to one new territory after another. However, for practical reasons it was necessary to define more closely the names of the inhabitants of different parts of the Rus'ian lands. As the tribal names disappeared, the regions finally came to be known after their fortress towns, the names of which were used to designate their population and the surrounding areas. From this point on the chronicles refer constantly to 'Kievans', 'Chernigovians', 'Novgorodians' and so on. In the Merya territory as elsewhere, city names replaced tribal ones, and the chroniclers refer to the inhabitants only as 'Rostovians', 'Suzdaliens', 'Vladimirians' and so forth.

The upper Volga area was also designated in terms of physical geography. The Novgorodians called it 'the Low Country' (*Niz, Nizovskaya zemlya*), and the Kievans 'the Land beyond the Forests' (*Zalesskaya zemlya*) on account of the vast forest areas (inhabited chiefly by Vyatichians) which separated the basins of the upper Volga and Oka from the southern lands. All these names—whether politico-ecclesiastical or derived from fortresses or from geographical features—have one thing in common, viz. that they contain no ethnic reference.

The next question is whether the fact that the population of the upper Volga area now speaks a Slav language—Russian—is evidence of Slav colonization of the Merya territory in those distant times.

Although there is a fair amount of source material on the territory dating from the 12th-14th centuries, it does not throw much light on ethnic conditions there: the Merian masses are concealed by the use of political or ecclesiastical nomenclature, city-names, social terminology etc.

In my opinion the ethnic problem as it existed over several centuries in the upper Volga area must be considered on a wide comparative basis covering the whole of Eastern Europe. The correctness of this approach is clearly seen from an analysis of

such an important fact as the disappearance from history of the name 'Merya'.

We can only draw conclusions as to the fate of the Merya by analogy with many tribes of the north and east who for the most part were akin to them. The sources, chiefly of the 15th and 16th centuries, contain valuable indications of ethnic and especially linguistic conditions in those vast areas. They enable us to assert, firstly, that as a result of missionary successes and the conquests of the Rurikides, the Rus'ian church and state were the chief agency in spreading the use of the Slavonic language in non-Slav territory.<sup>218</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that when people spoke of 'the Rus'ian language' in the 15th and 16th centuries, and somewhat earlier, they meant Slavonic. The second fact attested by the sources is that as the Slavonic language became widespread the Finno-Ugrian peoples adopted the alien tongue without ceasing to use their own, so that after a longer or shorter time they became bilingual.

Herberstein, the Habsburg envoy in Moscow (1517, 1526), collected some extremely valuable material on this subject.<sup>219</sup> Describing the situation in his own day, he states that the inhabitants of the Ustyug area, north-east of Beloozero,<sup>220</sup> have their own language but more often use Rus'ian.<sup>221</sup> He also says that the Permians (a Finno-Ugrian tribe living on the upper Kama) have their own language, while Chalkondyles, a Greek writer, reports that the same people speak Slavonic ('Rus'ian').<sup>222</sup> These two statements are not necessarily contradictory, but rather confirm that the people in question was bilingual. Herberstein writes that the Samoyad' in the far north, on the White Sea littoral at the mouth of the Pechora, spoke their own language, while reports by English travellers (1556) state that some of the Samoyad' 'can speake the Russe tongue to be understood.'<sup>223</sup> There is no need to quote other accounts confirming that the inhabitants of the territories in question were bilingual: the fact is generally known and recognized. Differences of view only arise when it comes to determining who was chiefly responsible for these linguistic changes in the far north and east.

It is generally supposed that the main part was played by masses of Slavs from the upper Volga<sup>224</sup> who, after the Slavicization of the Merya, migrated on a large scale in a northward

and easterly direction; but for this colonization, the development of bilingualism could not be explained.

This hypothesis is, on the face of it, doubtful. Considering the immense size of the area supposed to have been colonized, one would have to assume that a tremendous number of Slav settlers poured into the territory if the effect was to threaten the existence of the local languages. The Slav settlers in Merya territory are usually thought to have been farmers. If so, it is surprising that they should have been attracted by new lands which notoriously consisted of bogs, marshes and boundless forest tracts. At all events the colonization cannot have been determined by economic motives.

Contemporary sources provide the explanation of this apparently obscure and controversial problem, by indicating that linguistic changes in the territories in question were primarily due to missionaries spreading Christianity among the local pagans in the Slavonic language. Reports to this effect are unexpectedly numerous and originate from witnesses of the process in question; they are independent, yet fully agree with and complement one another. The upshot is that, apart from the Rus'ian state, the Church was the chief agent of the linguistic changes that took place.

Matthew of Miechovia in his *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis* (1517) relates that in his time many northern peoples were still pagan and preserved their native languages.<sup>225</sup> He indirectly suggests that the retention by particular tribes of their native languages was linked with the persistence of their pagan beliefs.

Reviewing as a whole the linguistic process observable among the non-Slav peoples, Herberstein arrived at a definition of the term 'Rus'' as it was used in his day. He believed it to include 'all the peoples using the Slavonic language and following the rite and faith of Christ according to the Greek custom'.<sup>226</sup>

Matthew of Miechovia puts the matter in exactly the same way. Just as Herberstein judged that the same designation of 'Rus'' was common to all the converted tribes,<sup>227</sup> so Matthew states that in Muscovy, in all its provinces and principalities, there was one language and one speech, namely Rus'ian or Slavonic. 'Thus even the Vogulians and the inhabitants of the Vyatka [river region] are of the Rus' and speak Rus'ian, and profess one faith and religion according to the Greek model.'<sup>228</sup>

The mention of the Voguls and the people living on the Vyatka shows how far the missionaries extended their activity eastward,<sup>229</sup> and the same is true of the north. English travellers relate that the peoples in the far north affirmed 'that they believe in the Russes God'.<sup>230</sup> The efforts of the Russian church to convert the peoples of Eastern Europe arouse admiration by their vigor and extent.<sup>231</sup> The capital importance of the language used by the priests to spread Christianity can be seen at this period not only in Rus' but in other countries.<sup>232</sup> The rapid development of the Slavonic language, its flourishing literature, and above all the fact that it possessed an alphabet (whereas the primitive languages or dialects of pagan peoples remained unwritten), account for the extraordinary success of Slavonic in so many ethnically different areas.

The question of the abandonment of their native language by the Volga Merians can only be properly examined against the wide background of linguistic change in Eastern Europe in general. The disappearance of Merian was part of a great process developing over the centuries in the immense areas of the north and east.

Among peoples closely or distantly related to the Merya, special interest attaches to the Ves', a tribe in the vicinity of Beloozero. Their history is closely linked with that of the Merya,<sup>233</sup> which suggests that their fortunes were more or less similar. Archaeologists regard it as certain<sup>234</sup> that their territory was occupied by Slav settlers, the bulk of whom arrived, in their opinion, in the 10th and 11th centuries. The colonization, it appears, was highly successful, and the Ves' territory was Slavized by the 12th century if not earlier. Such assertions, however, are not confirmed by the sources and are indeed contradicted by them.<sup>235</sup> The hypothesis is based purely on archaeological research, which must be treated with great caution.<sup>236</sup>

Herberstein says that the native population of the Beloozero region 'has its own language, though now nearly all speak Rus'ian.'<sup>237</sup> It follows from this that the Ves' were still in existence in the 16th century, that they had maintained their own language up to that time, and that before the 16th century not all of them knew the Slavonic (Rus'ian) language.

If in Herberstein's time nearly the whole Ves' population used Slavonic, then certainly the 'Slavonicization' of the Merya must have taken place earlier: it is hard to say when, but some time

after the 13th century and before the 16th. For it was the upper Volga area that first saw the consolidation of the church organization which sent its mission to the north-east, and the political power which expanded with considerable vigour in the same area.<sup>238</sup> Before any activity, religious or military, could be undertaken on a scale involving several tribes, it was necessary first to establish and fortify a Rus'ian base of operations which, if only for geographical reasons, could only be on Merya territory. Herberstein, like other contemporary witnesses, omits the Merya from his list of bilingual peoples; the reason, in my view, must be that their language had by then almost completely died out.<sup>239</sup>

There are two independent 13th-century sources, the first of which is the account of the Hungarian Dominican Julianus. As already mentioned, he witnessed the tragic events of 1237-8 and knew that the home of the Merya (*Merovia*) was among the pagan lands conquered by the Tatars. Julianus uses three terms to denote the upper Volga region, which had at least formally been won over to the new faith: from the church point of view he calls it Rus', while politically it is Suzdal' and ethnically *Merovia*.<sup>240</sup> The second source is the *Slovo o pogibeli russkyya zemli* (Discourse on the Ruin of the Rus'ian Land), which indicates indirectly that the 'Rus'ian land' included the Merya territory.<sup>241</sup> There is no contradiction in these different statements. They only show that in the 13th century, with changing political and ecclesiastical conditions, the name of the Rostov-Suzdal' territory was not yet firmly fixed, and that the 'Rus'ianization' of the Merya was proceeding.

This last term requires comment. On the one hand it denotes the steady spread of Christianity, and on the other the increasing stability of Rurikid rule. These constituted the first phase of the 'Rus'ianization' of any people affected by the expansion of Rus'. Both church and state used all their efforts to promote the use of the Slavonic language among the peoples who had been conquered and at least partially converted. As a result of these efforts, the second phase was primarily one of linguistic evolution among the tribes in question. The information in the sources concerning the Ves' throws light on the fate of their Merya kinsfolk. While the 13th-century *Slovo o pogibeli* uses the broad term 'Rus'ian land' to include, *inter alia*, the territory of the Ves', Herberstein states that that people still spoke their native tongue

as late as the 16th century. Linguistic change in the north-east proceeded at a slow pace: the period of bilingualism lasted for centuries<sup>242</sup> before, in the third phase, the native languages of the conquered tribes died out entirely.

Herberstein in the 16th century expressed the position correctly when he referred to the Finno-Ugrian peoples, conquered by Moscow and exposed to the Church's missionary action, as 'using the Slavonic language' (*qui lingua Slavonica utuntur*), but not as being themselves Slavs. In my opinion, exactly the same might be said of the Merya in the 14th or 15th century.

Gradually, in the course of many centuries, Church and state pressure caused the Merya to give up their native language. But it does not follow from this that the upper Volga area should be regarded as ethnically Slav.<sup>243</sup> It has rightly been pointed out that 'the origin of a language does not in itself explain the origin of a people,'<sup>244</sup> and that 'linguistic kinship and national origin are far from being the same thing.'<sup>245</sup>

The adherents of the colonizing hypothesis assume that only a massive influx of Slav settlers could have brought about the linguistic changes in the upper Volga area and subsequently in other Finnic lands. According to this view, the disappearance of the native languages automatically meant that the peoples concerned lost their sense of communal and racial identity.

Our analysis of the alleged evidence for a mass influx of Slavs into Merya territory has shown that this 'undisputed fact', as it is usually called, rests on very shaky foundations, in the nature of things, the 'evidence' consists only of hypotheses which are often grossly improbable and often contradict one another. To ascertain the ethnic situation in the upper Volga area, account must be taken of all sources of whatever kind. Archaeological, linguistic, anthropological and other material must be used, but its purpose is in the main auxiliary. The Slav colonization of Merya territory is supposed to have taken place in historical times. But the theory that it took place has been put forward and considered without due regard to historical sources, and, what is more, in conflict with those sources; which is the reason for its extreme weakness.

Presnyakov, who was highly critical of the colonizing hypothesis, gave the truest picture of the early history of Rostov-Suzdal', based first and foremost on the evidence of contemporary texts.<sup>246</sup>



Although so much has since been written on the subject,<sup>247</sup> his work, dating from 1918, is still a definitive summary of our knowledge.

## Notes to Appendix 5

1. Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 247–302.
2. Tret'yakov rightly remarks on this subject: 'Linguistic, archaeological, ethnographic and anthropological material, and historical data if any, should supplement and correct one another. It is really only a matter of recognizing the necessity of contact between fields of research based on different types of sources. But whenever some specific problem arises we always find differences of opinion among the exponents of different sciences, and often they are profound and unreconcilable.' P. Tret'yakov, *Etnogenicheskii protsess i arkhologiiya*, *SAr*, 1962 (4), p. 3.
3. Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin of Russia*, 1954, pp. 261, 265–8 etc.
4. The artificial term 'Balts', derived from the name of the Baltic Sea, was introduced into the literature in the mid-19th century. The Balts, a numerous group, existed in historical times but have mostly died out: only the Lithuanians and Latvians survive.
5. E.g. M. Grinblat, K voprosu ob uchastii litovtsev v etnogeneze belorusov, in: *Trudy Pribaltiiskoi Ob' 'edinennoi Kompleksnoi Ekspeditsii* 1, 1959, pp. 523–43; V. Sedov, Sledy vostochnobaltiiskogo pogrebal'nogo obryada v kurganakh Drevnei Rusi, *SAr*, 1961 (2), pp. 103–21; P. Tret'yakov, Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane v oblasti verkhnego techeniya Dnepra i Volgi, in: *Istoriya, fol'klor, iskusstvo slavyanskikh narodov*, 1963, pp. 3–33; P. Tret'yakov and E. Shmidt, *Drevnie gorodishcha Smolenshchiny*, 1963, pp. 3–39; P. Tret'yakov, K voprosu o baltakh i slavyanakh v oblasti Verkhnego Podneprov'ya, *SA*, XI, 1964, pp. 31–4; I. Lyapushkin, Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki slavyan lesnoi zony Vostochnoi Evropy nakanune obrazovaniya drevnerusskogo gosudarstva, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 127–34; P. Tret'yakov, *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane na Dnepre i Volge*, 1966; V. Sedov, K proiskhozhdeniyu belorusov (Problema baltskogo substrata v etnogeneze belorusov), *SE*, 1967 (2), pp. 112–29; M. Grinblat, K proiskhozhdeniyu belorusskoi narodnosti (Po povodu teorii substrata), *SE*, 1968 (5), pp. 79–92; V. Zhuchkevich, K voprosu o baltiiskom substrate v etnogeneze belorusov, *SE*, 1968 (1), pp. 107–13; id., *Toponimika Belorussii*, 1968; V. Sedov, Kul'tura dnepro-dvinskogo mezhdurech'ya v kontse I tys. do n.e., *SAr*, 1969 (2), pp. 116–25; E. Shmidt, Baltiiskaya kul'tura v verkhov'yakh Dnepra vo vtoroi polovine I tysyacheletiya n.e., *ABS*, VI, 1969, pp. 129–44; P. Tret'yakov, O baltakh i slavyanakh v oblasti Verkhnego Podneprov'ya, *ABS*, VI, 1969, pp.

117–27; G. Solov'eva, O roli baltского substrata v istorii slavyanskikh plemen Verkhnego Podneprov'ya, *SAr*, 1971 (2), pp. 124–32; and others.

6. K. Buga, Die Vorgeschichte der aistischen (baltischen) Stämme im Lichte der Ortsnamenforschung, in: *Streitberg Festgabe*, 1924, pp. 22–35; M. Vasmer, Beiträge zur slavischen Altertumskunde XVI. Methodisches zum Merja-Problem, *ZSP*, XVI, 1939, p. 102; A. Moora, O drevnei territorii rasseleniya baltiiskikh plemen, *SAr*, 1958, pp. 9–11, 33; V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Linguisticheskii analiz gidronimov Verkhnego Podneprov'ya*, 1962, pp. 19, 20, 231–6, 244.

7. M. Vasmer, Beiträge zur historischen Völkerkunde Osteuropas I. Die Ostgrenze der baltischen Stämme, *SPAW*, 1932, p. 664; V. Toporov, Nekotorye zadachi izucheniya baltiiskoi toponimiki russkikh territorii, *VG*, LVIII, 1962, pp. 41–9; V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, op. cit., pp. 232–5; V. Zhuchkevich, *Toponimika. Kratkii geograficheskii ocherk*, 1965, p. 25; E. Pospelov, *Toponimika v trudakh V.P. Semenova—Tyan'-Shanskogo*, *VG*, LXX, 1966, pp. 99–100; P. Tretyakov, *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane na Dnepre i Volge*, p. 303; V. Sedov, *Baltskaya gidronimika Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya*, *MIA*, CLXXXIV, 1971, pp. 108–9, and others.

8. M. Vasmer, Beiträge zur historischen Völkerkunde Osteuropas 3. Merja und Tscheremissen, *SPAW*, XIX (2) 1935, pp. 580, 595; P. Tretyakov, *Volgo-Okskaya toponimika i nekotorye voprosy etnogeneza finno-ugorskikh narodov Povolzh'ya*, *SE*, 1958 (4), p. 9; id., *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane*, p. 301.

9. *Povest' I*, p. 109.

10. *PSRL*, II, p. 339. Cf. M. Vasmer in *SPAW*, 1932, p. 642. Archaeological finds do not tell us much about the population formerly settled on the upper Protva. Scarcely any kurgans (barrows) are found there. Cf. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 212–14; V. Sedov, *Sledy*, p. 121. Settlement on this thinly populated, wooded land only began to increase in the 14th or 15th century: M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii Velikorusskoi narodnosti*, 1929, pp. 57–8.

11. It might be supposed that the Golyad' also lived on the upper Moskva, since in that region there are rivers named Goledyanka, Golyad', Golyadinka etc. Cf. M. Vasmer in *SPAW*, 1932, p. 662. Archaeologists, however, deny this and say that the upper Moskva area was inhabited by Krivichians: see e.g. T. Ravdina, *Shishimrovskie kurgany*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 222–7.

12. The names 'Golyad'' and 'Galindia' are derived from Lithuanian *gālas*, Latvian *gals*, meaning 'end, border' (*etymology* of Buga, Vasmer etc.): thus they were peoples living at the furthest point of Eastern Baltic settlement. However, there is controversy on the subject, and other etymologies have been suggested.

13. *Povest'* I, p. 13.
14. P. Treť'jakov, K voprosu o baltakh i slavyanakh, pp. 6-7; id., *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane*, p. 303.
15. V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, op. cit., p. 241.
16. A. Moora, op. cit., p. 28; P. Treť'jakov, K voprosu o baltakh i slavyanakh, p. 28; I. Lyapushkin, Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki, p. 127; V. Sedov, Slavyane Verkhnego Podneprov'ya i Podvin'ya, *MIA*, CLXIII, 1970, p. 192.
17. '... v Polot'ski krivichi': *Povest'* I, p. 18; see also ibid., p. 20. Cf. L. Alekseev, *Polotskaya zemlya (Ocherki istorii Severnoi Belorussii v IX-XIII vv.)*, 1966, p. 60.
18. See map of the Polotsk land in the early 12th century in A. Nasonov, *Russkaya zemlya*, p. 152.
19. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, p. 267; id., *The Making*, p. 271.
20. V. Sedov, in 'Krivichi', *SA*, 1960 (1), p. 47, bases his argument on the late, not very reliable chronicle known as the *Arkhangelogorodskii letopisets*, which states that Izborsk, near Pskov, was in Krivichian territory: K. Serbina, *Ustyuzhskii letopisnyi svod*, 1950, p. 20. Sedov's view is shared by some writers, e.g. V. Yanin and M. Aleshkovsky, *Proiskhozhdenie Novgoroda (K postanovke problemy)*, *ISSSR*, 1971 (2), p. 49.
21. It is noteworthy that the region of the upper Neman (Niemen) was for many centuries regarded as Krivichian. In 1314, when the Teutonic Order undertook an expedition from Prussia against Novogrodok, '... frater Henricus ... venit ad terram Criwicie et civitatem illam, quae parva Nogardia dicitur, cepit': *SRP*, I, p. 180. 'Eodem anno [1314] fratres habebant expeditionem in fines Ruthenorum Criwicz': *MGH, Script*, XIX, p. 706.
22. Cf. V. Vilinbakhov, *Neskol'ko zamechanii o teorii A. Stender-Petersena*, *SS*, VI, 1963, p. 333.
23. V. Sedov, *Krivichi*, pp. 51, 54-62; id., *Sledy vostochnobaltiiskogo pogrebal'nogo obryada*, pp. 118-21; id., *Nekotorye voprosy geografii Smolenskoi zemli XII veka*, *KSDPI*, XC, 1962, pp. 22-3; id., *K proiskhozhdeniyu belorusov*, pp. 114-21, 125-9; id., *Slavyane Verkhnego Podneprov'ya*, *passim*.
24. This view is shared e.g. by D. Avdusin, *Arkheologiya SSSR*, 1967, p. 224.
25. V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Lingvisticheskii analiz*, p. 243.
26. I. Lyapushkin, *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki*, pp. 127, 134.
27. M. Artamonov, *Voprosy rasseleniya vostochnykh slavyan i so-vetskaya arkheologiya*, in: *Problemy vseobshchei istorii*, 1967, p. 69.
28. G. Solov'eva, K voprosu o vostochnoi orientirovke pogrebennykh v slavyanskikh kurganakh XI-XIII vv., *SAr*, 1963 (2), p. 106.
29. P. Treť'jakov, *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane*, p. 302; id., *U istokov drevnerusskoi narodnosti*, *MIA*, CLXXIX, 1970, p. 153.

30. According to a theory advocated by some earlier writers (M. Kachenovsky, M. Peremyshlevsky, N. Petrovsky) and also at the present day (V. Vilibakhov, *Baltiiskie slavyane i Rus'*, *SOc*, XXII, 1962, pp. 253-76; id., *Ob odnom aspekte istoriografii varyazhskoi problemy*, *SS*, VII, 1963, pp. 333-45; id., *Po povodu nekotorykh zamechanii P.N. Tret'yakova*, *SAr*, 1970 (1), pp. 294-8), the Novgorodian Slavs came to the region of Lakes Ladoga and Ilmen' by sea from the southern coast of the Baltic, which was inhabited by Western Slavs. In other words, according to this view the origin of the Novgorodians is not connected with Slavs inhabiting the middle course of the Dnepr.

31. I. Lyapushkin, op. cit., p. 128; M. Artamonov, op. cit., pp. 67-8, and others.

32. The *Povest'* calls this region the 'Okov'skii les' (forest): *Povest'* I, p. 11. L. Maikov observes in *Zametki po geografii drevnei Rusi*, *ZMNP*, CLXXIV, 1874, pp. 267-8, that the name of this forest is reflected in local geographical nomenclature. Cf. Ya. Stankevich, *K istorii naseleniya Verkhnego Podvin'ya v I i nachale II tysyacheletiya n.e.*, *MIA*, LXXVI, 1960, p. 8. V. Kharitonova, in: *Ob izmeneniyakh lesistosti basseinov verkhov'ev rek Evropeiskoi chasti Rossii*, *TIL*, V, 1950, pp. 209-12, emphasizes that the area continued to be densely wooded for a long time, as confirmed by 16th and 17th-century travellers.

33. D. Anuchin, *Iz poezdki k istokam Dnepra, Zapadnoi Dviny i Volgi*, in his *Geograficheskie raboty*, 1954, pp. 27-67; id., *Neskol'ko slov o Valdaiskom plato*, *ibid.*, pp. 67-76; id., *Ozera oblasti istokov Volgi i verkhov'ev Zapadnoi Dviny*, *ibid.*, pp. 77-123.

34. G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady IX-XIII vv.*, 1954, p. 40.

35. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 183, 190, 198, 199 etc.

36. M. Fekhnner, *Timerevskii mogil'nik*, in: *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e X-XI vv. po materialam Timerevskogo, Mikhailovskogo i Petrovskogo mogil'nikov*, 1963, p. 17.

37. M. Artamonov, *Voprosy rasseleniya*, p. 67.

38. Among earlier authors, Klyuchevsky already held a similar view. Cf. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 20, 26. On the other hand V. Sedov (*Iz istorii vostochnoslavianskogo rasseleniya*, *KSDPI*, CIV, 1965, p. 5) considers that the Slavization of the area between the Volga and the Oka 'undoubtedly' took place in the 9th-10th centuries.

39. E. Goryunova, op. cit., p. 183.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

41. P. Tret'yakov and E. Shmidt, *Drevnie gorodishcha*, pp. 36-41.

42. P. Tret'yakov, *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane*, p. 302.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 305. However, V. Zhuchkevich, in: *K voprosu o baltiiskom substrate*, p. 109, maintains that the Slavization of the Balts in present-day Belarus' (Belorussia), which began in the remote past, was not completed until the 19th century.

44. V. Ravdonikas, *Drevneishaya Ladoga v svete arkheologicheskikh issledovaniy 1938–1950 gg.*, KSDPI, XLI, 1951, p. 36; W. Hensel, *Słowiańszczyzna wczesno-średniowieczna*, 1956, p. 320.

45. A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', p. 197; T. Stroganova, *K izucheniyu govorov mezhdurech'ya Oki-Klyaz'my*, TIY, VII, 1957, pp. 89–90, and others.

46. A. Nasonov, op. cit., p. 160.

47. V. Sedov, *Nekotorye voprosy*, pp. 21–3.

48. Sedov considers that the settlement and general economic development of the Smolensk region reached its peak in the 11th–13th centuries; only in the mid-13th did a gradual decline set in, so that by the 14th or 15th there were considerably fewer rural settlements than previously. V. Sedov, *Sel'skie poseleniya tsentral'nykh raionov Smolenskoi zemli (VIII–XV vv.)*, MIA, XCII, 1960, pp. 24–5. These views are in contradiction with the thesis that the Krivichians colonized Merya territory in the 10th and 11th centuries. In the nature of things such colonization must have reduced the population of the Smolensk area and exhausted its economic resources.

49. A. Moora, *O drevnei territorii*, p. 29; V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Linguisticheskii analiz*, pp. 16, 236; V. Sedov, *K proiskhozhdeniyu belorusov*, pp. 116, 126; and others.

50. V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, op. cit., p. 236; P. Tret'yakov, *Finno-ugry*, p. 305.

51. V. Sedov, op. cit., p. 128.

52. It is usually thought that the Krivichians were more numerous than the Balts and Finnic peoples and that this was the reason for their success. But this is a gratuitous supposition for which there is no evidence.

53. 'Für die spätere Zeit [sc. from the 10th century onwards] ist keine einzige altrussische schriftliche Quellenangabe über Ausrottung und Vernichtung der Einheimischen durch die slawischen Kolonisten vorhanden': B. Widera, *Zur Kolonisation der Ostslawen in der Zeit bis zum Mongoleneinfall in die Rus'*, ZS, IX (1), 1964, p. 111.

54. The idea that the Merya were gentle and submissive is in sharp contrast with what we know of the Mordvians, a related people who were on about the same cultural level, and whose savagery and cruelty is described by the Hungarian missionary Julianus, who passed through their territory in the first half of the 13th century. ' . . . [Morduani] sunt pagani, et adeo homines crudeles quibus pro nichilo reputatur homo ille, qui multos homines non occidit, et cum aliquis in via procedit, omnium hominum capita, quos occidit, coram ipso portantur, et quanto plura coram unoquoque portantur capita, tanto melior reputatur; de capitibus vero hominum civos faciunt, et libentius inde bibunt. Uxorem ducere non permittitur, qui hominem non occidit.' L. Bendefy, *Fontes authentici*

itineraria (1235–1238) fr. Juliani illustrantes, *AECO*, III, 1937, p. 25. It is hard to believe that the Merya would have behaved any differently in defending their homes and livelihood against invading Krivichians.

55. V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii* in his *Sochineniia* 1, 1956, p. 310. Cf. S. Kirikov, *Izmeneniia zhivotnogo mira v prirodnnykh zonakh SSSR (XIII–XIV vv.)*. *Lesnaya zona i lesotundra*, 1960, pp. 10–11.

56. D. Petryaeva, *Vladimirskoe Opol'e*, VG, XLIX, 1960, pp. 148–57; A. Tyuryukanov and T. Bystritskaya, *Opol'ya tsentral'noi Rossii i ikh pochvy*, 1971 (unavailable to me).

57. Yu. Kizilov, *Geograficheskii faktor v istorii srednevekovoi Rusi*, Vol. 1, 1973 (3), p. 53.

58. A. Flerov, *Flora Vladimirskoi gubernii* 1, 1902, pp. 160, 161, 215.

59. N. Voronin, *Kul'tura Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi zemli XI–XIII vekov*, *Isz*, 1944 (4), p. 36; A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', p. 246; *Ocherki istorii SSSR, IX–XIII vv.*, 1953, p. 322; M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda*, 1956, pp. 60–1, 394; D. Petryaeva, op. cit., pp. 149–51, etc.

60. A. Smirnov, *Ugro-finskie plemena*, in: *Istoriya SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* I, 1966, p. 470; D. Avdusin, *Arkheologiya SSSR*, 1967, p. 226, and many others.

61. L. Berg (*Vopros ob izmemenii klimata v istoricheskuyu epokhu*, iz his *Klimat i zhizn'*, 1947, p. 39) considers that the capacity of rivers at that time—the upper Dnepr, upper Oka, upper Volga etc.—was not different from what it is today.

62. A. Nasonov ('*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 165) points out that the expansion of the Smolensk principality towards Merya territory in the 11th and 12th centuries did not follow the course of the Moskva, although its upper reaches were in Smolensk possession. Cf. M. Dovnar-Zapol'sky, *Ocherk istorii krivichskoi i dregovichskoi zemel' do nachala XIII v.*, *UIK*, XXX, 1890, p. 26; A. Nasonov, op. cit., map pp. 160–1. Nor did it follow the Vazuza, a tributary of the Volga, which flowed almost entirely through Krivichian territory; instead it took a long circuitous route from Toropets to the upper Volga. If the purpose of the expansion, like that of earlier colonization by the Krivichians, was to penetrate to the fertile *Opol'e*, the natural course from the politico-military point of view and from that of the settlers would have been to advance along the Moskva to the Klyaz'ma and along the Vazuza to the Volga. Nasonov (*ibid.*, p. 172) says that Krivichian colonization on Merya territory did not play any clearly defined role in the later eastward expansion of the Smolensk principality; but one would have expected that Smolensk would have taken the maximum political advantage of the fact that large numbers of Krivichians had settled in the fertile *Opol'e*. Indeed Nasonov himself states (p. 172) that the Krivichian colonization was bound to affect the later political expansion by Smolensk, but he does not explain in what way.

63. Cf. T. Nikol'skaya, *Khronologicheskaya klassifikatsiya verkhnevolzhskikh kurganov*, *KSDPI*, XXX, 1949, p. 31.

64. Cf. B. Kolchin and A. Mongait, *Arkheologiya i metody estestvennykh nauk*, *VAN*, 1959 (12), pp. 32–6; *idem*, *Primenenie estestvennonauchnykh metodov v arkheologii*, *VoI*, 1960 (3), pp. 75–87; N. Merpert and D. Shelov, *Arkheologiya i istoricheskaya nauka. Nekotorye itogi razvitiya sovetskoi arkheologii*, *VoI*, 1961 (12), pp. 63–85; S. Burlatskaya, *O datirovani arkheologicheskikh ob'ektov arkheomagnitnym metodom*, *SAr*, 1962 (3), pp. 99–104; 1963 (4), pp. 115–21; V. Vikhrov and B. Kolchin, *Osnovy i metod dendrokhnologii*, *SA*, 1962 (1), pp. 95–112; *Novye metody v arkheologicheskikh issledovaniyakh*, by several hands, 1963; B. Kolchin, *Novye metody v arkheologii*, *SA*, 1963 (4), pp. 256–70; *id.*, *Arkheologiya i estestvennye nauki*, *VAN*, 1963 (6), pp. 122–4; N. Rudakov, *K voprosu o metodakh dendrokhnologicheskogo analiza*, *SAr*, 1964 (2), pp. 79–86; *Arkheologiya i estestvennye nauki*, by several hands, *MIA*, CXXIX, 1965; S. Burlatskaya—T. Nechaeva—G. Petrova, *Arkheomagnitnoe datirovanie keramicheskikh izdelii*, *Doklady i soobshcheniya arkheologov SSSR. VII Mezhdunarodnyi kongress doistorikov i protoistorikov*, 1966, pp. 244–52, and others.

65. Cf. G. Fedorov-Davydov, *O datirovke tipov veshchei po pogrebal'nym kompleksam*, *SA*, 1965 (3), pp. 50–65.

66. B. Kolchin, *Dendrokhnologiya Novgoroda*, *SAr*, 1962 (1), pp. 113–39; *id.*, *Dendrokhnologiya drevnego Polotska*, *MIA*, CXXX, 1965, pp. 262–6; N. Chernykh, *Dendrokhnologiya postroek drevnego Smolenska*, *KSDPI*, CX, 1967, pp. 129–35; *id.*, *Absolyutnaya dendrokhnologicheskaya shkala drevnego Beloozera*, *MIA*, CXXIX, 1965, pp. 86–94; A. Miklaev and N. Gerasimova, *Opyt primeniya metoda fosfatnogo analiza pri razvedke drevnikh poselenii na territorii Pskovskoi oblasti*, *SAr*, 1968 (3), and others.

67. Different views are expressed in the literature as to the value of archaeology as a key to social conditions. E.g. G. Fedorov (*Ob obryade pogrebeniya kak istoricheskom istochnike*, in: *Istoriko-arkheologicheskii sbornik*, 1962, p. 154) states that the burial grounds excavated by archaeologists 'to some extent reflect . . . the social and economic conditions of the people who erected the graves'; while P. Rappoport (*O tipologii drevnerusskikh poselenii*, *KSDPI*, CX, 1967, p. 3) says that 'archaeological material scarcely ever gives a full answer to the question as to the social character of a settlement.' D. Wilson takes a similar view in: *East and West: a Comparison of Viking Settlement*, in: *Varangian Problems* 1970, pp. 107–8.

68. Cf. O. Klindt-Jensen, *The Evaluation of the Archaeological Evidence*, *ibid.*, pp. 39–44.

69. On the history of Russian archaeology see S. Zhebelev, *Vvedenie v arkheologiyu* I, 1923; A. Artsikhovskiy, *Arkheologiya*, in: *Ocherki po*

*istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR* I, 1955; II, 1960; A. Formozov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi arkheologii*, 1961.

70. A. Rogachev and others, *Dostizheniya arkheologicheskoi nauki v RSFSR*, *SAr*, 1967 (3), pp. 9-46.

71. I. Lyapushkin, *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki slavyan lesnoi zony Vostochnoi Evropy nakanune obrazovaniya drevnerusskogo gosudarstva* (VIII-IX vv.), in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 128-9.

72. A. Shmidt, *Arkheologicheskoe izuchenie drevnostei severa SSSR*, *TKIPS*, XV 1928, p. 187.

73. Cf. M. Miller, *Archaeology in the USSR*, 1957; H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 14.

74. P. Tret'yakov, *K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya v I tysyacheletii n.e.*, *SAr*, 1957 (2), pp. 73-5; M. Rabinovich, *Ob etnicheskom sostave*, p. 61; A. Uspenskaya, *Drevnerusskoe naselenie bliz g. Dubna*, *TGIM*, XL, 1966, p. 105; and others.

75. N. Nedovshina, *Mikhailovskii mogil'nik in: Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e X-XI vv.*, 1963, p. 31.

76. E. Goryunova, *Ob etnicheskoi prinadlezhnosti naseleniya Bereznyakovskogo gorodishcha*, *KSDPI*, LXV, 1956, p. 24. This view is shared e.g. by Mongait, *Ryazanskaya zemlya*, 1961, p. 79.

77. E. Goryunova, *Meryanskii mogil'nik na Rybinskom more*, *KSDPI*, LIV, 1954, p. 159.

78. A. Tsirkin, *K istorii voprosa zaseleniya mordovskikh zemel' slavyanami*, *TNII*, XXIV, 1963, p. 143.

79. E. Goryunova, *Ob etnicheskoi prinadlezhnosti*, p. 24.

80. V. Mal'm, *Kul'tovaya i bytovaya posuda iz yaroslavskikh mogil'nikov*, in: *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e*, p. 43. Similarly D. Avdusin, *Varyazhskii vopros po arkheologicheskim dannym*, *KSDPI*, XXX, 1949, p. 5.

81. 'Long barrows' (kurgans) are mounds covering several graves, and were lengthened as each new burial took place: beside each grave a second, third etc. were added in a row. The average length of the kurgans is about 30-40 metres, the height 1-1.5 metres.

82. *Sopki* also covered several graves, which were piled vertically on one another. The barrow was thus distinguished by its height, which might reach 8-10 metres. *Sopki* are chiefly found on river-banks.

83. The Smolensk region is one of the parts of Eastern Europe in which barrows are found in huge quantity. Besides the largest burial ground at Gnezdovo (see Appendix 4) there are more than 700 others comprising over 12,000 kurgans; over 2,000 of these had been excavated by 1960. There were once considerably more, but many have been ploughed over and destroyed in the last 100-150 years. V. Sedov, *K*



voprosu o klassifikatsii smolenskikh kurganov, *KSIA*, LXXXI, 1960, p. 3.

84. N. Chernyagin, *Dlinnye kurgany i sopki*, *MIA*, VI, 1941, pp. 93, 99; T. Nikol'skaya, *Kurgany Verkhnei Volgi X-XIII vv.*, *KSDPI*, XXIII, 1948, p. 102; A. Moora, *O drevnei territorii rasseleniya baltiiskikh plemen*, *SAr*, 1958 (2), p. 29; P. Tret'yakov, *K voprosu o baltakh i slavyanakh v oblasti Verkhnego Podneprov'ya*, *SAr*, XI, 1964, p. 34; id., *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane na Dnepre i Volge*, 1966, pp. 297-9; D. Avdusin, *Arkheologiya*, 1967, p. 223, and others.

85. S. Tarakanova, in *Dlinnye i udlinennye kurgany*, *SA*, XIX, 1954, pp. 100-7, suggests that the earliest were erected in the 2nd or 3rd century AD, but this is unacceptable, as V. Sedov points out (Krivichi, p. 49). Other writers, including N. Chernyagin, P. Tret'yakov and D. Avdusin, date these barrows to the 6th-9th centuries. The prevalent view at present is that the earliest were erected in about 900 and the latest date from after the 9th century, probably the 10th and beginning of the 11th. Cf. V. Sedov, op. cit., p. 49; E. Shmidt, *O smolenskikh dlinnykh kurganakh*, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, pp. 227-9.

86. E. Shmidt in P. Tret'yakov and E. Shmidt, *Drevnie gorodishcha Smolenshchiny*, 1963, pp. 177, 188.

87. T. Nikol'skaya, *Kurgany Verkhnei Volgi*, pp. 103-4; eadem, *Etnicheskie gruppy Verkhnego Povolzh'ya XI-XIII vv.*, *KSDPI*, XXIV, 1949, pp. 79, 80, 82; E. Goryunova, *Ob etnicheskoi prinadlezhnosti*, p. 22.

88. N. Chernyagin, op. cit., pp. 93, 95.

89. S. Tarakanova, op. cit., pp. 77-83; F. Gurevich, *O dlinnykh i udlinennykh kurganakh v Zapadnoi Belorussii*, *KSDPI*, LXXII, 1958, pp. 54-65; P. Tret'yakov in P. Tret'yakov and E. Shmidt, *Drevnie gorodishcha Smolenshchiny*, p. 35, and others.

90. Among earlier archaeologists, Spitsyn already expressed doubt as to whether long kurgans were relics of the Slavs. Cf. P. Tret'yakov in *SAr*, 1962, p. 267. Got'e was inclined to ascribe them to the Balts. Cf. V. Sedov, Krivichi, pp. 47-8.

91. I. Lyapushkin, *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki lesnoi Vostochnoi Evropy nakanune obrazovaniya drevnerusskogo gosudarstva (VIII-IX vv.)*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 129, 131, 134.

92. M. Artamonov, *Voprosy rasseleniya vostochnykh slavyan i sovetskaya arkheologiya*, in: *Problemy vseobshchei istorii*, 1967, pp. 66-7.

93. E. Shmidt, *O smolenskikh dlinnykh kurganakh*, pp. 224-5.

94. P. Sukhov, *Slavyanskoe gorodishche IX-X st. v yuzhnom Beloz'er'e*, *MIA*, VI, 1941, p. 90; T. Nikol'skaya, *Etnicheskie gruppy*, pp. 78, 83; P. Tret'yakov, *Finno-ugry*, pp. 299-300; and others.

95. Cf. V. Vilibakhov, *Po povodu nekotorykh zamechanii P. N. Tret'yakova*, *SAr*, 1970 (1), p. 295.

96. On the basis of these facts V. Vilibakhov (*Neskol'ko zamechanii o teorii A. Stender-Petersena*, *SS*, VI, 1963, p. 331) defends the hypothesis

that the Novgorodian Slavs originated from among the Western Slavs on the south coast of the Baltic.

97. I. Lyapushkin, op. cit., pp. 130–1.

98. M. Artamonov, op. cit., pp. 67–8.

99. Many other scholars have taken this view: H. Arbman, T. Arne, E. Kivikoski, B. Nerman etc.

100. N. Tukhtina, Ob etnicheskoi prinadlezhnosti pogrebnnykh v sopkakh volkhovskogo tipa, in: *Slavyane i Rus'*, 1968, pp. 188–93. Anthropological material confirms the existence of Varangian centres in the region of Lake Ladoga and the Volkhov river. M. Vitov, Antropologicheskie dannye kak istochnik po istorii kolonizatsii Russkogo Severa, *ISSSR*, 1964 (6), p. 97.

101. T. Nikol'skaya, Khronologicheskaya klassifikatsiya verkhnevolzhskikh kurganov, *KSDPI*, XXX, 1949, pp. 34–5.

102. T. Nikol'skaya, op. cit., p. 41; E. Goryunova, Etnicheskaya istoriya, p. 122; T. Ravdina, Shishimrovskie kurgany, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, p. 222.

103. E. Goryunova, Etnicheskaya istoriya, p. 234; M. Fekhner, Timerevskii mogil'nik, in: *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e*, p. 15; T. Ravdina, Shishimrovskie kurgany, p. 222; V. Sedov, Finno-ugorskie elementy v drevnerusskikh kurganakh, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, p. 246; id., K proiskhozhdeniyu belorusov, *SE*, 1967 (2), p. 120.

104. F. Gurevich, O vostochnoi orientirovke slavyanskikh pogrebenii, *KSIA*, CXXV, 1971, pp. 17–22.

105. E. Goryunova, Etnicheskaya istoriya, pp. 119, 122.

106. Ibid., p. 234.

107. Ibid., pp. 119, 122.

108. M. Fekhner, Timerevskii mogil'nik, p. 15; A. Kirpichnikov and I. Shaskol'sky in *SAr*, 1965 (1), p. 318.

109. Cf. T. Nikol'skaya, Etnicheskie gruppy, pp. 78–9; E. Goryunova, Meryanskii mogil'nik, p. 160; eadem, Etnicheskaya istoriya, p. 122.

110. V. Sedov, Sledy vostochnobaltiiskogo pogrebal'nogo obryada v kurganakh drevnei Rusi, *SAr*, 1961 (2), pp. 118–21.

111. G. Solov'eva, K voprosu o vostochnoi orientirovke pogrebnnykh v slavyanskikh kurganakh XI–XIII vv., *SAr*, 1963 (2), pp. 100, 106.

112. G. Solov'eva, op. cit., p. 106.

113. For instance T. Nikol'skaya in Etnicheskie gruppy, pp. 78–9, regards an 11th–12th century burial ground on the river Msta (which flows into Lake Ilmen') as Slav; 27 of the heads face north-east, 24 east, 9 west. L. Golubeva (Raskopki v Beloozere, *Arkheologicheskie otkrytiya* 1965 g., 1966, pp. 174–6) classifies the remains buried at Beloozero with heads facing west as Finnic (Ves'); and so on.

114. M. Rabinovich, Moskovskaya keramika, *MIA*, XII, 1949, p. 57.

115. E. Goryunova, *Meryanskii mogil'nik*, p. 159.
116. V. Mal'm, *Kul'tovaya i bytovaya posuda*, p. 43.
117. A. Artsikhovskiy, *Arkheologicheskie dannye po varyazhskomu voprosu*, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, p. 38.
118. E. Goryunova, *Meryanskii mogil'nik*, p. 160. A similar argument is used not only for the ethnic character of ceramics from the Merya territory but also in respect of the Beloozero region, the home of the related Ves' tribe. Cf. L. Golubeva, *O date poseleniya vesi na Belom Ozere*, *KSDPI*, CIV, 1965, p. 13.
119. G. Smirnova, *Opyt kalssifikatsii keramiki drevnego Novgoroda (po materialam raskopok 1951-1954 gg.)*, *MIA*, LV, 1956, pp. 234-7.
120. Cf. Mal'm, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
121. The colonizing hypothesis shows how little importance archaeologists attach to relations between neighbouring tribes based on shared needs of everyday life.
122. A. Bobrinsky, *Drevnerusskii goncharnyi krug*, *SAr*, 1962 (3), pp. 33-52; W. Hofubowicz, *Garncarstwo wczesnośredniowieczne Słowian*, *AIUW*, XXXI, 1965, pp. 18, 43, 51, 140-2 etc.
123. This culture is named after the village of D'yakovo on the Moskva near Moscow (now part of the city itself), where the first burial site of this type was excavated.
124. A. Smirnov, in: *K voprosu ob arkheologicheskoi kul'ture*, *SAr*, 1964 (4), pp. 3-10, discusses the problem of 'archaeological culture' and its relation to ethnic conditions.
125. Cf. A. Smirnov, *Nekotorye spornye voprosy finno-ugorskoj arkheologii*, *SAr*, 1957 (3), pp. 28-30.
126. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 44-8; T. Tsalkin, *Zhivotnovodstvo i okhota v lesnoi polose Vostochnoi Evropy*, *MIA*, CVII, 1962, p. 73; A. Smirnov, *Ugro-finskie plemena*, in: *Istoriya SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* 1, 1966, pp. 312-14.
127. P. Tret'yakov in *SAr*, 1962, pp. 263-5; *id.*, *K voprosu o baltakh i slavyanakh*, pp. 26-7.
128. V. Sedov, *Sledy vostochnobaltiiskogo pogrebal'nogo obryada*, p. 118.
129. Yu. Krasnov and N. Krasnov, *Obsledovanie pamyatnikov d'yakovskoi kul'tury v doline Moskvyy-reki*, *SAr*, 1963 (1), pp. 204-18; A. Dubynin, *Troitskoe gorodishche Podmoskov'ya*, *SAr*, 1964 (1), pp. 178-98; *id.*, *Gorodishche Kuznechiki v Podmoskov'e*, *SAr*, 1970 (1), pp. 152-64; M. Gorbanevsky, *Novye nakhodki na D'yakovskom gorodishche*, *SAr*, 1971 (1), pp. 235-6; N. Trubnikova and M. Fekhnner, *Pamyatnik d'yakovskogo vremeni v Verkhnem Povolzh'e*, *ibid.*, pp. 232-5; *Drevnee poselenie v Podmoskov'e. Troitskoe gorodishche*, *MIA*, CLXXXIV, 1971; *D'yakovskaya kul'tura. Sbornik statei*, 1974 (unavailable to me), and many others.

130. V. Kachanova (O zaselenii Moskovskogo kraia v epokhu d'yakovskoi kul'tury, *TMIRM*, V, 1954, p. 37); M. Rabinovich (Ob etnicheskom sostave pervonachal'nogo naseleniya Moskvyy, *SE*, 1962 (2), p. 60); G. Latysheva and M. Rabinovich, *Moskva v dalekom proshlom* (1966), pp. 15, 36–41), and others, consider that there is not sufficient evidence for the tribal classification of the relics of D'yakovo culture and that for the present—whatever may come to light in the future—the matter should be pronounced on with caution.

131. On the right bank, below the influx of the Sheksna.

132. E. Goryunova, Ob etnicheskoi prinadlezhnosti naseleniya Be-reznyakovskogo gorodishcha, *KSDPI*, LXV, 1956, pp. 3–30; eadem, Et-nicheskaya istoriya, pp. 62–82.

133. P. Tret'yakov, *Vostochnoslavjanskije plemena*, 1953, pp. 119–23, 126–7, 265, 284; id., K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave, pp. 69–77; id. in *SAr*, 1962, pp. 263–4.

134. A. Smirnov, Nekotorye spornye voprosy, pp. 29–30.

135. A. Uspenskaya and M. Fekhnner, Goroda i poseleniya gorodskogo tipa in Ocherki po istorii russkoi derevni X–XIII vv., *TGIM*, XXXII, 1956, p. 148.

136. A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', 1951, p. 175.

137. D. Eding, *Sarskoe gorodishche*, 1928 (unavailable to me).

138. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 65, 95–8, 119–20, 199–200.

139. *Yaroslavskoe Povolzh'e X–XI vv. po materialam Timerevskogo, Mi-khailovskogo i Petrovskogo mogil'nikov*, 1963.

140. M. Fekhnner in: *Timerevskii mogil'nik*, op. cit., p. 17, states that as regards 43% of the graves in that burial ground it is impossible to determine the ethnic origin of those buried there. As to the other 57% his criteria appear to us more than uncertain. N. Nedovshina in: *Mi-khailovskii mogil'nik*, *ibid.*, p. 30, gives a figure of 50% for the ethnically unidentified graves and says that a large number of graves are classified as Slav 'only by way of presumption'.

141. For instance, as regards the social classification of those buried in the Mikhailovskii burial ground at Yaroslavl', Ya. Stankevich (K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya Yaroslavskogo Povolzh'ya v IX–X st., *MIA*, VI, 1941, p. 80) expresses the view that they were ordinary tillers of the soil, whereas D. Avdusin (Varyazhskii vopros po arkheologicheskim dannym, *KSDPI*, XXX, 1949, p. 12) thinks they were picked warriors, members of the princely retinue (*druzhina*). Archaeological material shows that up to the 11th century a pagan bear-cult existed on the upper reaches of the Volga. According to N. Voronin (Medvezhii kul't v verkhnem Povolzh'e v XI st., *MIA*, VI, 1941, pp. 149–86) the adherents of this cult are to be considered as Slavs, but E. Goryunova (K voprosu o plemennoi prinadlezhnosti, pp. 24–5) says that the cult was typical of the Merya. Many other examples could be cited.

142. P. Sukhov, *Slavyanskoe gorodishche IX-X st. v yuzhnom Beloz'er'e*, MIA, VI, 1941, p. 89. A. Nasonov in 1951 stated in '*Russkaya zemlya*', p. 176: 'We have only scanty information about Rostov and its territory up to the mid-12th century (1157). Archaeological material, which might be a valuable complement to written sources, does not in fact add much.'
143. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 183.
144. M. Rabinovich, *Ob etnicheskom sostave pervonachal'nogo naseleniya Moskvy*, SE, 1962 (2), p. 60.
145. S. Tokarev, *K postanovke problem etnogeneza*, SE, 1949 (3), p. 20.
146. *Ibid.*, pp. 35–6.
147. F. Filin, *Obrazovanie yazyka vostochnykh slavyan*, 1962, pp. 66, 69.
148. V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Lingvisticheskii analiz*, p. 3.
149. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 6; eadem, *K voprosu o plemennoi prinalozhnosti letopisnoi merii*, KSIE, XVII, 1952, pp. 18–21.
150. K. Maitinskaya in: *Yazyki narodov SSSR III, Finno-ugorskie i samodiiskie yazyki*, 1966, p. 25.
151. A. Popov, *Osnovnye zadachi issledovaniya finno-ugorskoi i samodiiskoi toponimiki SSSR*, in: *Voprosy finno-ugorskogo yazykoznaniiya. Grammatika i leksikologiya*, 1964, p. 207.
152. A. Popov, *Finno-ugorskaya toponimika SSSR*, VAN, 1954 (7), p. 101; id., *Finno-ugorskie yazyki i leksika russkikh govorov*, SSASH, X, 1964, p. 446.
153. Cf. I. Sebestyén, *Zur Frage des alten Wohngebietes der uralischen Völker*, ALASH, I (1951–2), pp. 273–346.
154. B. Serebrennikov, *Volgo-Okskaya toponimika na territorii evropeiskoi chasti SSSR*, VY, 1955 (6), pp. 19–31 (= id., *Ortsnamen der Wolga-Oka-Gegend im europäischen Teil der Sowjetunion*, ALASH, VI, 1956, pp. 85–105). See also P. Tret'yakov, *Volgo-Okskaya toponimika i nekotorye voprosy etnogeneza finno-ugorskikh narodov Povolzh'ya*, SE, 1958 (4), pp. 9–11; A. Matveev, *K probleme proiskhozhdeniya severnorusskoi toponimiki*, in: *Voprosy finno-ugorskogo yazykoznaniiya*, 1964, pp. 185–92, and others.
155. G. Simina, *Doslavyanskaya toponimika Pinezh'ya*, VG, LVIII, 1962, pp. 87–8.
156. K. Buga, *Die Vorgeschichte der aistischen (baltischen) Stämme im Lichte der Ortsnamenforschung*, in: *Streitberg Festgabe*, 1924, p. 22; V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Lingvisticheskii analiz gidronimov*, p. 3.
157. M. Vasmer, *The Meaning of Russian River Names*, OSP, VI, 1955, p. 44.
158. Moscow (Russian *Moskva*) is on the Moskva river, Tver on the Tvertsa, Kostroma on the Kostroma, and so on.

159. Cf. P. Arumaa, *Des principes et des méthodes de l'hydronymie russe. Hydronymes empruntés aux noms d'animaux*, *SSI*, XI, 1965, pp. 155–85.

160. A. Superanskaya, *Protiv uproshchenchestva v toponimike*, *VG*, LVIII, 1962, pp. 151–4; A. Popov, *Osnovnye zadachi*, p. 211; id., *Geograficheskie nazvaniya (Vvedenie v toponimiku)*, 1965, pp. 30–1; K. Gorbachevich, *Russkie geograficheskie nazvaniya* (1965), pp. 40–2. Valuable material on this subject is contained in N. Tupikov, *Slovar' drevnerusskikh lichnykh sobstvennykh imen*, *ZORSA*, 1903.

161. N. Poppe, *O sobiranii geograficheskikh nazvanii*, *Kr*, II, 1925, pp. 286–7; M. Vasmer, *Beiträge zur historischen Völkerkunde Osteuropas. III Merja und Tscheremissen*, *SPAW*, XIX (2) 1935, pp. 524–7; P. Ravila, *Das Merja-Problem im Lichte der Ortsnamenforschung*, *FUF*, XXIV, 1937, p. 12; N. Podol'skaya, *Nekotorye formy slavyanizatsii inoyazychnykh toponimov*, *VG*, LVIII, 1962, pp. 34–40, and others.

162. B. Serebrennikov, *Volgo-Okskaya toponimika*, p. 28; id., *Pochemu trudno razreshit' problemu proiskhozhdeniya verkhnykh sloev severnorusskoi gidronimii?*, *VY*, 1970 (1), pp. 44–59.

163. Ya. Garelin, *Drevnyaya Suzdal'skaya oblast' i obitavshie v nei narody*, *TVGSK*, II, 1864, pp. 55–6; D. Korsakov, *Merya i Rostovskoe knyazhestvo*, *UZIKU*, VII, 1871 (1872), pp. 16–17; N. Ushakov, *Sputnik po drevnemu Vladimiru i gorodam Vladimirovskoi gubernii*, 1913, p. 5; N. Poppe, *O sobiranii*, pp. 286–7; M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii Velikorusskoi narodnosti*, 1929, pp. 11–12; M. Vasmer, *Die alten Bevölkerungsverhältnisse Russlands im Lichte der Sprachforschung*, *PAW*, (Vorträge und Schriften) V, 1941, pp. 28–30; G. Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia*, 1946, pp. 235–6; V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, in his *Sochineniya I* (1956), p. 294; A. Matveev, *K probleme proiskhozhdeniya*, pp. 189–92; A. Popov, *Osnovnye zadachi*, pp. 209–11; id., *Geograficheskie nazvaniya*, pp. 114–15, and others.

164. Ravila wrote, in protest against the multiplication of hypotheses: 'Vasmer reproaches me for not expressing a positive view of my own about the origin of the Merya. I do not see why I should put forward fresh unsustainable hypotheses when the necessary facts are lacking. My theory about the Merya language is: "We don't know."' P. Ravila, *Merja und Tscheremissen*, *FUF*, XXV, 1939–40, p. 24.

165. V. Zhuchkevich, *Toponimicheskii "landshaft"*, *IVGO*, C, (4) 1968, p. 345.

166. A. Popov, *Toponimika kak istoricheskaya nauka*, *M*, XIV, 1957, p. 8.

167. V. Vilibakhov, *Neskol'ko zamechanii o teorii A. Stender-Petersena*, *SS*, VI, 1963, p. 336.

168. M. Levin describes Russian anthropological studies in the 18th and 19th centuries in: *U istokov russkoi antropologii*, *TIE*, XXX, 1956,

pp. 275–98. The more recent literature is listed in O. Bunakova and R. Kamenetskaya, *Bibliografiya trudov Instituta etnografii i Muzeya antropologii i etnografii Akad. Nauk SSSR (1900–1962)*, 1966. See also M. Vitov, *Antropologicheskie dannye kak istochnik po istorii kolonizatsii Russkogo Severa, ISSSR*, 1964 (on pp. 106–7 there is a general discussion of the value of anthropological material for historical studies); V. Bunak and others, *Proiskhozhdenie i etnicheskaya istoriya russkogo naroda po antropologicheskim dannym, TIE, LXXXVIII*, 1965, pp. 273–82, etc.

169. V. Alekseev, *Proiskhozhdenie narodov Vostochnoi Evropy (Kra-niologicheskoe issledovanie)*, 1969, pp. 115–16.

170. T. Alekseeva, *Antropologicheskii sostav naseleniya Volgo-Oks-kogo basseina (K probleme slavyano-finskikh vzaimootnoshenii v Po-volzh'e, TIE, XXXIII*, 1956, pp. 44–7; V. Bunak and T. Alekseeva, *Antropologicheskoe issledovanie russkogo naseleniya Verkhnei Volgi, KSIE, XXIX*, 1958, pp. 124–30.

171. E.g. *Narody mira. Etnograficheskie ocherki. Narody Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR I*, 1964, p. 68.

172. T. Alekseeva, *Sravnitel'naya kraniologicheskaya kharakteristika slavyanskikh grupp srednevekov'ya na territorii naselennoi russkimi, TIE, LXXXVIII*, 1965, pp. 248–55.

173. Cf. V. Sedov in *SE*, 1967, p. 20.

174. S. Tokarev, *K postanovke problem etnogeneza*, p. 22.

175. S. Tokarev, *Etnografiya narodov SSSR. Istoricheskie osnovy byta i kul'tury*, 1958, p. 11.

176. F. Filin, *Obrazovanie yazyka*, pp. 74–5.

177. T. Alekseeva, *Etnogenez vostochnykh slavyan po dannym an-tropologii, SE*, 1971 (2), p. 57.

178. No one doubts that Slav individuals or groups lived in Merya territory at this period, chiefly as missionaries, traders etc. But the authors in question are concerned not with the presence of a Slav element as such but with mass colonization.

179. *Povest' I*, pp. 11–18, 20, 21, 23 etc.

180. *Povest' I*, p. 23.

181. Cf. V. Mordasov, 'K istorii teksta vvedeniya "Povesti vremennykh let"', in: *Problemy istorii feodal'noi Rossii*, 1971, p. 38.

182. *Povest' I*, p. 13.

183. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 13 etc.

184. 'V Afetove zhe chasti sedyat' . . . merya . . .': *ibid.*, p. 10; 'A se sut' inii yazytsi, izhe dan' dayut' Rusi: chud', merya, ves' . . .': p. 13.

185. B. Schmeidler and S. Steinberg: Adam von Bremen, *Hamburgische Kirchengeschichte*, in: *Die Geschichtsschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit* 44, 1926, p. 217; W. Trillmich and R. Buchner, *Fontes saeculorum noni et*

*undecimi historiam ecclesiae Hammaburgensis necnon Imperii illustrantes. Magister Adam Bremensis. Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum*, 1961, pp. 452–3.

186. A. Titov, *Zhitie sv. Leontiya, episkopa rostovskogo*, COID, 1893, p. 2; H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 265.

187. L. Bendefy, *Fontes authentici itinera (1235–1238) fratris Juliani illustrantes*, AEEO, III, 1937, p. 41; H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 265.

188. V. Klyuchevsky, *Drevnerusskie zhitiya svyatykh kak istoricheskie istochnik*, 1871.

189. The archetypal source for all hypotheses which assume that there was a mass colonization of the Merya territory by Slavs is the *Kniga stepennaya tsarskogo rodosloviya* ('Book of Degrees of the Imperial Genealogy'), compiled in the 1560s: PSRL, XXXI (1), 1908. Cf. P. Vasenko, '“*Kniga Stepennaya tsarskogo rodosloviya*” i ee znachenie v drevnerusskoi istoricheskoi pis'mennosti' 1, 1904. The author of the *Kniga* (Andrei-Afanasiï) lived at a time when the terms 'Slav' and 'Rus'ian' were synonymous as far as language was concerned, and accordingly he substituted 'Rus'ian' wherever the *Povest'* mentioned the 'Slav language' or 'Slav writing' (*gramota*) and so forth. In this way he was able to talk of Slav colonization in the north-east. Cf. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 16, 17, 269, 270, 280. The author of the *Kniga* no doubt looked for sources confirming the fact of Slav colonization, but evidently he found nothing except the *Povest'*. This rules out the possibility that there existed any source prior to the mid-16th century (which might since have disappeared) containing any mention of the alleged colonization. The highly tendentious nature of the *Kniga* and its author's deliberate distortion of facts deprives it of value as a historical source. Cf. M. Tikhomirov, *Istochnikovedenie istorii SSSR* I, 1962, pp. 266–8. Present-day advocates of the colonizing hypothesis disclaim the authority of the *Kniga* but are in fact influenced by it.

190. Cf. S. Tokarev, *Etnografiya narodov SSSR. Istoricheskie osnovy byta i kul'tury*, 1958, p. 150.

191. The utmost caution should be observed in treating geographical names as an argument for this or that 'colonial' hypothesis. On this basis it could equally well be maintained that the Cheremis were displaced into Merya territory and not the other way about, although there was at that time no Slav influx into the Cheremis area. Many 'Cheremis' names of places and rivers are found in Merya territory: Cheremisino, Cheremiska, Cheremisovka, Cheremisskaya, Cheremisskoe, Cheremisskovo etc. T. Semenov, *K voprosu o rodstve i svyazi meri s cheremisami*, in: *Trudy VII Arkheologicheskogo S'ezda v Yaroslavle 1887 g.* II, 1891, pp. 244–5.

192. M. Vasmer in SPAW, XIX (2), 1935, pp. 515–16; id. in ZSP, XIV, 1937, pp. 95–101; XVI, 1939, p. 106; id., *Die alten Bevölkerungsver-*



hältnisse Russlands im Lichte der Sprachforschung, PAW (Vorträge und Schriften), V, 1941, p. 28; S. Tokarev, *Etnografiya narodov*, pp. 149–50; V. Toporov and O. Trubachev, *Lingvisticheskii analiz*, p. 248, etc.

193. P. Ravila, Das Merja-Problem im Lichte der Ortsnamenforschung, *FUF*, XXIV, 1937, pp. 10–17; id., Merja und Tscheremissen, *ibid.* XXVI, 1939–40, pp. 19–26; E. Goryunova, K voprosu o plemennoi prinalozhnosti, pp. 18–21; eadem, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 39–41, and others.

194. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, pp. 5, 87; A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', p. 174.

195. A. Yanovsky, *Yury Dolgoruky*, pp. 94–5; A. Reformatsky in *DSIY*, IX, 1956, p. 114, and others.

196. V. Galkin, *Suzdal'skaya Rus'*, 1939, p. 31; A. Nasonov, 'Russkaya zemlya', p. 174; *Ocherki istorii SSSR IX–XIII vv.*, 1953, p. 321; A. Mongait, *Arkheologiya v SSSR*, 1955, p. 332, etc.

197. E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 152, 204, 248; D. Krainov, Nekotorye spornye voprosy drevneishei istorii Volgo-Okskogo mezhdurech'ya, *KSDPI*, XCVII, 1964, p. 9; D. Avdusin, *Arkheologiya SSSR*, 1967, p. 227.

198. B. Grekov, *Krest'yane na Rusi* 1, 1952, p. 501 (2nd edn.).

199. V. Bunak, Antropologicheskie tipy i nekotorye voprosy etnicheskoi istorii, *TIE*, LXXXVIII, 1965, p. 264.

200. G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, 1948, p. 159; A. Popov, *Iz istorii leksiki yazykov Vostochnoi Evropy*, 1957, p. 96; id., *Finnougorskii yazyki i leksika russkikh govorov*, *SSASH*, X (3–4), 1964, p. 446.

201. M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie*, p. 10.

202. E. Goryunova, Meryanskii mogil'nik na Rybinskom more, *KSDPI*, LIV, 1954, p. 160; eadem, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, p. 238; cf. V. Sedov, Finno-ugorskii elementy v drevnerusskikh kurganakh, in: *Kul'tura drevnei Rusi*, 1966, pp. 246–51.

203. As with the other tribes (Mordvins, Chuvash, Cheremis), so among the Merya there were, so to speak, sub-tribes (especially two: the central, and the north-eastern or Kostroma) which differed somewhat in their dialects and customs and were influenced by their nearest neighbours, who were different in the case of each group: E. Goryunova, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 38, 39, 57, 156, 157, 240–8. But scholars are agreed that these differences were not strong enough to impair the unity and coherence of the tribe as a whole.

204. Cf. P. Tret'yakov, *Finno-ugry, balty i slavyane*, pp. 293–4.

205. N. Ushakov, *Sputnik po drevnemu Vladimiru i gorodam Vladimirskoi gubernii*, 1913, p. 1; E. Goryunova, K istorii gorodov severo-vostochnoi Rusi, *KSDPI*, LIX, 1955, pp. 16–17; eadem, *Etnicheskaya istoriya*, pp. 107, 129, 161, 199–201, 235–44; N. Voronin, *Zodchestvo Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi (XII stoletie)*, 1961, p. 45; L. Efimova, *Tkani iz finno-ugorskikh*

mogil'nikov I tys. n.e., *KSDPI*, CVII, 1966, pp. 127–34, and others.

206. N. Voronin, Kul'tura Vladimiro-Suzdal'skoi zemli XI-XIII vv., *IsZ*, 1944 (41), p. 95.

207. I. Lyapushkin, *Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki*, 1966, p. 127. Tsirkin, discussing the question of Slav colonization among the Mordvins, a kindred race to the Merya, makes a number of more general remarks about relations between the Slav and Finnic peoples, which may be applied to the Merya also. He writes: 'The Slav newcomers apparently did not establish their own burial grounds but used those of the local population among whom they had settled; at first they observed their own funeral customs and traditions, subsequently they adopted the local ones.' A. Tsirkin, *K istorii voprosa zaseleniya mordovskikh zemel' slavyanami*, *TNII*, XXIV, 1963, p. 143. If this is so, and if the Slav kurgans came to be indistinguishable from those of the Mordvins, one would suppose that it was the Slavs who in course of time underwent Mordvin influence, not the other way round as is presumed in the literature.

208. P. Tret'yakov, *K voprosu ob etnicheskom sostave*, p. 65.

209. A. Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniya o sostave drevneishikh letopisnykh svodov*, 1908, pp. 328–9.

210. This term was used as late as the 14th century to denote the region of Novogrudok, north-west of Polotsk. Peter of Duisburg relates that in 1314 the army of the Teutonic Knights 'venit ad terram Criwicie et civitatem illam, que parva Nogardia dicitur, cepit': *SRP*, I, pp. 180–1.

211. The *Povest'* indicates the habitat of each of the Eastern Slav tribes except for the most important, the Rus'. Hence modern scholars have to identify the latter's homeland for themselves. The great majority place it on the river Ros' (a right-bank tributary of the Dnepr), south-west of Kiev.

212. *Povest'* I, pp. 20, 31, 47 etc.

213. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 14, 21 etc.

214. The following are the dates at which particular Eastern Slav tribes are first mentioned in Rus'ian chronicles: Polyanians, beginning of the 12th century; Dregovichians, 1149; Krivichians, 1162; Radimichians, 1169; Vyatichians, 1197; etc. For details see H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, p. 197.

215. As conditions in Eastern Europe became stabilized, the term 'Rus'' in course of time came to be used more and more in a supra-ethnic sense, comprising both the Varangian élite and the conquered Slav and Finnic peoples. In addition it was a military term for the fortress garrisons; a social and administrative term for the privileged groups or classes who governed the many subject territories; and finally a political term for the Rus'ian state. Cf. V. Klyuchevsky, *Sochineniya* 6, 1959, p. 133.

216. V. Samaryanov, in: *Sledy poselenii meri, chudi, cheremisy, emi i drugikh inorodtsev v predelakh Kostromskoi gubernii*, DTMAO, VI, 1876, p. 53, rightly expressed the view that at the period in question the term 'Merya' was used in the upper Volga region (and the position was analogous as regards other local peoples) to denote that part of the tribal population which held to its old pagan beliefs, whereas those who had accepted Christianity were, according to contemporary ideas, 'Rus'ian'. M. Lyubavsky notes in *Obrazovanie*, p. 10, that places named after the Merians (Merya, Staraya Merya, Merya Molodaya etc.) were often on land owned by monasteries; in other words, the monasteries were founded in places where there were strong concentrations of pagan Finnic population.

217. As the Rus'ian conquests in the 9th and 10th centuries were rapid and extensive, the term 'Rus'ian land' (or 'land of Rus' ') at once took on a very wide connotation, not confined to any specific territory such as the homelands of particular Eastern Slav tribes.

218. The liturgical language of the Rus'ian church was what is called Old Church Slavonic. For practical reasons, however, the language that came to prevail in the north-east was not this but Old Slavonic—the tongue in which missions were conducted and sermons preached, and which had the full support of the state authorities. The latter were concerned to introduce and maintain linguistic unity among all peoples who formed part of the Rurikide state.

219. S. Herberstein, *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*, 1556. Cf. E. Zamyslovsky, *Gerbershtein i ego istoriko-geograficheskie izvestiya o Rossii*, 1884.

220. Ustyug is situated at the influx (*ust'e*) of the Yug river into the Sukhona: the two rivers join to form the Northern Dvina.

221. 'Idioma quoque proprium, quamvis Ruthenico magis utuntur': Herberstein, op. cit., p. 80.

222. K. Dieterich, *Byzantinische Quellen zur Länder- und Völkerkunde* (5.-15. Jht.) 2, 1912, p. 106.

223. R. Haklyut, *The Principal Navigations, Voiages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation . . .* 2, 1903, p. 349; Yu. Got'e, *Angliiskie puteshestvenniki v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XVI v.*, 1937, p. 115.

224. The Novgorodians are also supposed to have played a part.

225. 'Aliae vero regiones praeexpressae in infidelitate et idolatria persistunt . . . , habent propria lingua et idiomata': S. Anninsky, *Matvei Mekhovskii. Traktat o dvukh Sarmatiyakh*, 1936, p. 193.

226. ' . . . populi omnes qui lingua Slavonica utuntur, ritum ac fidem Christi Graecorum more sequuntur': Herberstein, op. cit., p. 1.

227. ' . . . adeo ut omnes nunc uno et communi vocabulo Rhuteni dicantur'.

228. 'Accipiat . . . in Moscovia unam linguam et unum sermonem fore, scilicet Rutenicum seu Slavonicum in omnibus satrapiis et principatibus, sicque etiam Ohulci et qui in Viatka degunt Ruteni sunt et Rutenicum loquuntur, unamque sectam et religionem instar Graecorum tenent': S. Anninsky, op. cit., p. 192.

229. The region of the river Vyatka, a right-bank tributary of the Kama, was inhabited by Ugrian and Finnic peoples (the Votyaks, Permians and Cheremis). The Voguls (nowadays called Mansi), occupying the territory between the Ural and the river Ob', were a Ugrian tribe. They adopted the Slavonic language but did not forgo their vernacular, and were thus bilingual.

230. R. Hakluyt, op. cit., 2, p. 345.

231. These efforts can be observed not only in the north and east but also in the distant south. Herberstein reports that the Circassians (*Cherkesy*), a mountain people of the Caucasus, adopted Greek Christianity according to the Rus'ian model and consequently spoke Slavonic (' . . . Circassi, seu Ciki . . . montium asperitate freti, nec Turcis, nec Tartaris parent. Eos tamen Christianos esse, suis legibus vivere, in ritu et caeremonijs cum Graecis convenire, lingua Slavouonica (qua utuntur) sacra peragere, Rutheni testantur'): S. Herberstein, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. V. Klyuchevsky, *Skazaniya inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve*, 3rd edn, 1916, pp. 29-30.

232. Matthew of Miechovia relates that in his time 'in Samogitia . . . and Lithuania people in the villages speak Lithuanian but for the most part they use the Polish language, for the priests in the churches preach to them in Polish' ('In Samagithia autem . . . et in Lithuania . . . in villis Lithuanicum loquuntur et in magna parte Polonicum profitentur, nam et sermone Polonice sacerdotes eis praedicant in ecclesiis').

233. The similarity of the fortunes of the Merya and Ves' were noted by the chronicler as early as 862, describing the beginnings of the Rus'ian (Varangian) rule in Eastern Europe. Under that date the *Povest'* records a revolt which involved both the land of Rostov and that of Beloozero. The latter afterwards became part of the principality of Rostov, before becoming a separate appanage in the 13th century.

234. P. Sukhov, *Slavyanskoe gorodishche IX-X st. v yuzhnom Beloz'er'e*, *MIA*, VI, 1941, pp. 89-92; P. Tret'yakov, *Severnye vostochnoslavjanskije plemena*, *ibid.*, pp. 46-7; D. Bubrikh, *O dvukh etnicheskikh elementakh v sostave karel'skogo naroda*, *UZLGI*, *Oriental Studies*, series 2, 1948 (unavailable to me); M. Fekhnner, *Materialy k arkheologicheskoi karte Belozerskogo i Kirillovskogo raionov Vologodskoi oblasti*, *TGIM*, XXII, 1953, pp. 125-40, and others. There are many studies by L. Golubeva on the remote past of the Ves', and Slav colonization of their territory; Drevnee Beloozero, *KSDPI*, XLI, 1951, pp. 37-40; Nadpis' na korchage

iz Beloozera, *SAr*, 1960 (3), pp. 321–3; Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki vesi na Belom ozere (in: Z. Sokolova, Mezhdunarodnyi kongress finno-ugrovedov, *SE*, 1961 (3), p. 92); Mogil'nik X—serediny XI v. na Belom ozere, *SAr*, 1961 (1), pp. 201–5; Arkheologicheskie pamyatniki vesi na Belom ozere, *SAr*, 1962 (3), pp. 53–77; Belozerskaya ves' i ee zapadnye sosedi v X—nachale XI veka, *SS*, VIII, 1964, pp. 285–95; O date poseleniya vesi na Belom ozere, *KSDPI*, CIV, 1965, pp. 12–17; *Raskopki v Beloozere. Arkheologicheskie otkrytiya 1965 g.*, 1966, pp. 174–6, and others.

235. No one has yet explained why Slav farmers should have settled *en masse* in those densely wooded, marshy and for the most part infertile lands. The *Povest'* knows nothing of Slavs having colonized the territory of the Ves', any more than that of the Merya, yet the chronicler knew that the Ves' existed at the beginning of the 12th century, as he twice speaks of them in the present tense: *Povest'* I, pp. 10, 13. The Ves' are apparently mentioned in lives of 15th-century Rus'ian saints, but the matter requires further study.

236. According to Golubeva, Belozerskaya ves' i ee zapadnye sosedi, pp. 285–6: 'The Ves' are one of the least studied tribes of the Finno-Ugrian group . . . ; information [about them], their settlements, burial customs, economy and material culture . . . is still very incomplete. They appear only from the 10th to the 12th century and belong to a territory . . . around Beloozero and the Sheksna basin.' Similarly N. Tukhtina (Ob etnicheskom sostave naseleniya basseina reki Sheksny, *TGIM*, XXXX, 1966, p. 121) speaks of the 'poverty of archaeological studies of the whole Beloozero area'. Other authors agree. Yet, despite the backwardness of archaeological studies, sweeping conclusions are drawn concerning the whole Ves' territory and the fortunes of the tribe as a whole.

237. 'Huius loci indigenae proprium habent idioma: quamvis nunc ferme omnes Ruthenice loquuntur': S. Herberstein, *op. cit.*, p. 77. The present tense should be noted: the writer is speaking of his own time.

238. Missionary activity generally preceded conquest by the princes, though sometimes it was the reverse. The sources are too fragmentary to permit of a systematic view.

239. D. Avdusin, in: *Arkheologiya SSSR*, 1967, p. 227, states that the Meryan language is mentioned in written sources up to the 16th century, but he does not specify them.

240. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin*, pp. 442–7.

241. Yu. Begunov, *Pamyatnik russkoi literatury XIII veka 'Slovo o pogibeli russkoi zemli'*, 1965, pp. 154–7.

242. Herberstein's account of the linguistic situation in Ves' territory refutes the statement by F. Filin (*Istoriya obshchestva i razvitie dvyazychiya*, *IANOLY*, 1970 (3), p. 195) that the period of bilingualism among conquered peoples was very short, no more than a generation.

243. H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making*, pp. 283–6.

244. S. Tokarev, K postanovke problem etnogeneza, *SE*, 1949 (3), pp. 22, 36. See also D. Bubrikh, K voprosu ob otnosheniyakh mezhdu samoedskimi i finno-ugorskimi yazykami, *IANOLY*, VII (6) (1948), p. 517.

245. V. Alekseev and Yu. Bromlei, K izucheniyu roli pereselenii narodov v formirovanii novykh etnicheskikh obshchin, *SE*, 1968 (2), p. 45.

246. A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva. Ocherki po istorii XIII-XV stoletii*, 1918, pp. 1–47; English translation by A. Moorhouse, *The Formation of the Great Russian State. A Study of Russian History in the 13th to 15th Centuries*, 1970.

247. Tikhomirov, not to speak of lesser historians, states confidently that the upper Volga area was colonized by Slavs. He bases his view on archaeological finds in that area, which are thought to indicate some similarity of material culture as compared with the relics of Slav lands bordering on the Merya territory. This, in Tikhomirov's opinion, is evidence of a Slav presence in that territory. But he weakens his own position when, in another context, he rightly says that 'similarity of culture and material conditions . . . [between peoples] does not mean that those peoples are identical' (M. Tikhomirov, *Besermeniy v russkikh istochnikakh*, in: *Issledovaniya po otechestvennomu istochnikovedeniyu*, 1964, p. 51). It follows that Merian archaeological remains may have been wrongly classed as Slav. In the ordinary course of relations between neighbouring peoples the material culture of the Merya may have borne some resemblance to that of the nearest Slav lands, but this does not mean that there was a mass influx of Slavs into Merya territory.

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## Abbreviations

ABS	<i>Acta Baltico-Slavica. Białystok.</i>
AE	<i>Arkheograficheskii Ezhegodnik. Moskva.</i>
AECO	<i>Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis. Budapest. Leipzig.</i>
ALASH	<i>Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. Budapest.</i>
Ant	<i>Antemurale. Roma.</i>
AO	<i>Arkheologicheskie Otkrytiya . . . goda. AN SSSR. Moskva.</i>
Arch	<i>Archeologia. Warszawa-Wrocław.</i>
ASEER	<i>The American Slavic and East European Review. New York.</i>
ASEI	<i>Akty Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoi Istorii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi kotsa XIV—nachala XVI v. Moskva.</i>
ASSSR	<i>Arkhitectura SSSR. Moskva.</i>
AUW	<i>Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Wrocław.</i>
B	<i>Byzantion. Bruxelles.</i>
BS	<i>Byzantinoslavica. Praha.</i>
COID	<i>Chteniya v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete. Moskva.</i>
DDG	<i>Dukhovnye i Dogovornye Gramoty Velikikh i Udel'nykh Knyazei XIV-XVI vv. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
DSIY	<i>Doklady i Soobshcheniya Instituta Yazykoznaniya. Moskva.</i>
DTMAO	<i>Drevnosti. Trudy Moskovskogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva. Moskva.</i>
E	<i>Etnografiya. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
EAIVE	<i>Ezhegodnik po Agrarnoi Istorii Vostochnoi Evropy. Kishinev.</i>
EV	<i>Evraziiskii Vremennik. Berlin.</i>
FO	<i>Folia Orientalia. Kraków.</i>
FOG	<i>Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte. Berlin.</i>
FUF	<i>Finnisch-Ugrische Forschungen. Helsinki.</i>
GH	<i>Geographica Helvetica. Zürich.</i>
H	<i>History. London.</i>
HS	<i>Historische Studien (Ebering). Berlin.</i>
I	<i>Der Islam. Berlin.</i>
IAN	<i>Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR, VII Seriya. Otdel Gumanitarnykh Nauk. Moskva.</i>

IANOLY	<i>Izvestiya Akademii. Nauk SSSR. Otdelenie Literatury i Yazyka. Moskva.</i>
IANOON	<i>Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR. Otdelenie Obshchestvennykh Nauk. Leningrad.</i>
IANSG	<i>Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriya Geograficheskaya. Moskva.</i>
IGAIMK	<i>Izvestiya Gosudarstvennoi Akademii Istorii Material'noi Kul'tury. Leningrad-Moskva.</i>
IJSLP	<i>International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics. The Hague.</i>
IM	<i>Istoriik Marksist. Moskva.</i>
IOLDP	<i>Izдание Obshchestva Lyubitelei Drevnei Pis'mennosti. Leningrad.</i>
IS	<i>Istoricheskii Sbornik. Leningrad.</i>
ISSSR	<i>Istoriya SSSR. Moskva.</i>
IsZ	<i>Istoricheskii Zhurnal. Moskva.</i>
IUP	<i>Indiana University Publications. Uralic and Altaic Series. The Hague.</i>
IVGO	<i>Izvestiya Vsesoyuznogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
IZ	<i>Istoricheskie Zapiski. Moskva.</i>
JGO	<i>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, München.</i>
JSB	<i>Jazykovedný Sbornik. Bratislava.</i>
JS	<i>Journal des Savants. Paris.</i>
KO	<i>Kirche im Osten. Stuttgart.</i>
Kr	<i>Krivich. Mesyachnik Litaratury, Kul'tury i Gramadzkaga Zhyts'tsya. Menesinis Literaturos, Kulturos ir Visuomenes Gyvenimo Laikrastis. Kaunas.</i>
KSDPI	<i>Kratkie Soobshcheniya o Dokladakh i Polevykh Issledovaniyakh Instituta Istorii Material'noi Kul'tury. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
KSIA	<i>Kratkie Soobshcheniya o Dokladakh i Polevykh Issledovaniyakh Instituta Arkheologii. Moskva.</i>
KSIE	<i>Kratkie Soobshcheniya Instituta Etnografii. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
KSII	<i>Kratkie Soobshcheniya Instituta Istorii. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
KSIV	<i>Kratkie Soobshcheniya Instituta Vostokovedeniya. Moskva.</i>
KSIIMK	<i>Kratkie Soobshcheniya Instituta Istorii Material'noi Kul'tury. Moskva.</i>
LECU	<i>Liv-Est- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch. Reval.</i>
LP	<i>Lietuvos Praeitis. Kaunas-Vilnius.</i>
LUA	<i>Lunds Universitets Arsskrift. Lund.</i>
M	<i>Movoznavstvo. Kiiv.</i>
MAA	<i>The Mediaeval Academy of America. Cambridge, Mass.</i>
MAGKO	<i>Marburger Abhandlungen zur Geschichte und Kultur Osteuropas. Wiesbaden.</i>
MGH	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Hannover.</i>

MIA	<i>Materialy i Issledovaniya po Arkheologii SSSR. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
MSFOU	<i>Mémoires de la Société Finno-Ougrienne. Helsinki.</i>
MPHNS	<i>Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Nova Series. Kraków.</i>
NDVS	<i>Nauchnye Doklady Vysshei Shkoly, Istoricheskie Nauki. Moskva.</i>
NE	<i>Numizmatika i Epigrafika. Moskva.</i>
NPL	<i>Novgorodskaya Pervaya Letopis'. Moskva—Leningrad.</i>
NTEGU	<i>Nauchnye Trudy Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Erevan.</i>
NTIS	<i>Naukove Tovaristvo imeni Shevchenka u L'vovi. Pratsi geografichnoi komisii. L'viv.</i>
OC	<i>Orientalia Christiana. Roma.</i>
OCA	<i>Orientalia Christiana Analecta. Roma.</i>
OPZD	<i>Okhrana Prirody i Zapovednoe Delo SSSR. Moskva.</i>
OSP	<i>Oxford Slavonic Papers. Oxford.</i>
PAW	<i>Vorträge und Schriften der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin.</i>
PDRL	<i>Pamyatniki Drevnerusskoi Literatury. Akademiya Nauk SSSR. Leningrad.</i>
PG	<i>Patrologia Graeca (Migne). Paris.</i>
PI	<i>Problemy Istocznikovedeniya. Moskva.</i>
PIDO	<i>Problemy Istorii Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
PMPDU	<i>Pam'yatki Movi ta Pis'menstva Davn'oi Ukrainy. Kiiv.</i>
POr	<i>Przegląd Orientalistyczny. Wrocław-Warszawa.</i>
Pri	<i>Priroda. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
PSo	<i>Pravoslavnyi Sobesednik. Kazan'.</i>
PSRL	<i>Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei. Peterburg. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
PUP	<i>Princeton University Press.</i>
RANION	<i>Trudy Sektsii Teorii i Metodologii Instituta Arkheologii i Iskusstvoznaniya Rossiiskoi Assotsiatsii Nauchno-issledovatel'skikh Institutov Obshchestvennykh Nauk. Moskva.</i>
RES	<i>Revue des Etudes Slaves. Paris.</i>
RFV	<i>Russkii Filologicheskii Vestnik. Warszawa.</i>
RIB	<i>Russkaya Istoricheskaya Biblioteka. Peterburg.</i>
S	<i>Slavia. Praha.</i>
SA	<i>Slavia Antiqua. Poznań.</i>
Saec.	<i>Saeculum. Freiburg-München.</i>
SAn	<i>Sovetskaya Antropologiya. Moskva.</i>
SAr	<i>Sovetskaya Arkheologiya. Moskva-Leningrad. Moskva.</i>
SE	<i>Sovetskaya Etnografiya. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>


SEER	<i>The Slavonic and East European Review</i> . London.
SF	<i>Südost-Forschungen</i> . München.
SFu	<i>Sovetskoe Finnougrovedenie</i> . Saransk.
SGAIMK	<i>Soobshcheniya Gosudarstvennoi Akademii Istorii Material'noi Kul'tury</i> . Moskva.
SGGD	<i>Sobranie Gosudarstvennykh Gramot i Dogovorov</i> . Moskva.
SIII	<i>Soobshcheniya Instituta Istorii Iskusstv</i> . Moskva.
SK	<i>Seminarium Kondakovianum</i> . Praha.
SLA	<i>Slavyanskii Arkhiv</i> . Moskva.
SO	<i>Slavia Orientalis</i> . Warszawa.
SOc	<i>Slavia Occidentalis</i> . Poznań.
SPANK	<i>Sprawozdania z Posiedzeń Komisji PAN</i> . Oddział w Krakowie. Kraków.
SPAW	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Phil.-Historische Klasse)</i> . Berlin.
SR	<i>Slavistična Revija</i> . Ljubljana.
SRP	<i>Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum</i> . Leipzig.
SS	<i>Slavyanskii Sbornik</i> .
SSASH	<i>Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i> . Budapest.
SSb	<i>Slawistische Studienbücherei</i> . Leipzig.
SSI	<i>Scando-Slavica</i> . Copenhagen.
SVo	<i>Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie</i> . Moskva-Leningrad. Moskva.
TBM	<i>Trudy Botanicheskogo Muzeya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk</i> . St. Petersburg.
TGE	<i>Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha</i> . Leningrad.
TGGI	<i>Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Gidrologicheskogo Instituta</i> . Moskva.
TGIM	<i>Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeya</i> . Moskva.
TIE	<i>Trudy Instituta Etnografii</i> . Moskva.
TIIL	<i>Trudy Leningradskogo Otdeleniya Instituta Istorii Akademii Nauk</i> . Leningrad.
TIL	<i>Trudy Instituta Lesa Akademii Nauk SSSR</i> . Moskva-Leningrad.
TIY	<i>Trudy Instituta Yazykoznaniya</i> . Moskva.
TKIPS	<i>Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiyu Plemennoogo Sostava Naseleniya SSSR i Sopredel'nykh Stran</i> . AN SSSR. Leningrad.
TL	<i>Troitskaya Letopis'</i> . Moskva-Leningrad.
TMIRM	<i>Trudy Muzeya Istorii i Rekonstruktsii Moskvy</i> . Moskva.
TMNO	<i>Trudy Moskovskogo Numizmaticheskogo Obshchestva</i> . Moskva.
TNII	<i>Trudy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skogo Instituta Yazyka, Literatury, Istorii i Ekonomiki pri Sovete Ministrov Mordovskoi ASSR</i> . Saransk.
TODRL	<i>Trudy Otdela Drevnerusskoi Literatury Akademii Nauk SSSR</i> . Moskva-Leningrad.

TPK	<i>Trudy Polyarnoi Komissii Akademii Nauk SSSR. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
TVGSK	<i>Trudy Vladimirskego Gubernskogo Statisticheskogo Komiteta. Vladimir.</i>
UIGZ	<i>Ukrains'kii Istorichno-Geografichnyi Zbirnik. Kiiv.</i>
UIK	<i>Universitetskie Izvestiya. Kiev.</i>
UIZ	<i>Ukrains'kii Istorichnyi Zhurnal. Kiiv.</i>
ULS	<i>Ustyuzhskii Letopisnyi Svod. AN SSSR, Institut Istorii. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
UZSGU	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Saratovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Saratov.</i>
UZIUK	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Imperatorskogo Kazanskogo Universiteta. Kazan'.</i>
UZIV	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya. Moskva-Leningrad.</i>
UZK	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Finantsovo-Ekonomicheskogo Instituta. Kazan'.</i>
UZLGU	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Leningrad.</i>
UZMGU	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Moskva.</i>
UZMI	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Mariiskogo Instituta Yazyka, Literatury i Istorii. Ioshkar-Ola.</i>
UZRGPI	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Ryazanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Instituta. Ryazan'.</i>
UZSI	<i>Uchenye Zapiski Smolenskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Instituta. Smolensk.</i>
VAN	<i>Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR. Moskva.</i>
VDI	<i>Vestnik Drevnei Istorii. Moskva.</i>
VE	<i>Voprosy Ekonomiki i Klassovykh Otnoshenii v Russkom Gosudarstve XII-XVII vv. Moskva.</i>
VG	<i>Voprosy Geografii. Moskva.</i>
VID	<i>Vspomogatel'nye Istoricheskie Distsipliny. AN SSSR Leningrad.</i>
VIMK	<i>Vestnik Istorii Mirovoi Kul'tury. Moskva.</i>
VLU	<i>Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta. Leningrad.</i>
VMU	<i>Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Moskva.</i>
VoI	<i>Voprosy Istorii. Moskva.</i>
VV	<i>Vizantiiskii Vremennik. Moskva.</i>
VY	<i>Voprosy Yazykoznaniiya. Moskva.</i>
WN	<i>Wiadomości Numizmatyczne. Warszawa.</i>
WS	<i>Die Welt der Slaven. Wiesbaden.</i>
ZMNP	<i>Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya. Peterburg.</i>
ZNUJ	<i>Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Kraków.</i>


ZOG	<i>Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte. Berlin.</i>
ZORSA	<i>Zapiski Otdeleniya Russkoi i Slavyanskoi Arkheologii Imperatorskogo Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva. Peterburg.</i>
ZRIOP	<i>Zapiski Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva v Prage. Praha.</i>
ZS	<i>Zeitschrift für Slawistik. Berlin.</i>
ZSP	<i>Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie. Heidelberg.</i>
ZVO	<i>Zapiski Vostochnogo Otdeleniya Imperatorskogo Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva. St. Peterburg.</i>

The purpose of the following tables is not to give the full genealogy of each ruling house but to help the reader to identify most of the rulers mentioned in the present work. The dates of their deaths are given in parentheses.


# GENEALOGICAL TABLES 1. THE RURIKIDES OF THE KIEVAN PERIOD



## 2 THE RURIKIDES OF THE VOLGA REGION







32° East of Greenwich

34°

36°

40°

42°


44°

46°

# THE MERYA REGION

SCALE

0 50 100 150 200 km



34°

36°

38°

40°

42°

44°

Designed by S. Gross

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